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Series Editors’ Foreword
In a moment in which the EU is facing an important number of social,
economic, political, and cultural challenges, and its legitimacy and democratic
capacities are increasingly questioned, it seemsparticularly important to address
the issue of if and how EU citizenship is taking shape. This series intends to
address this complex issue. It reports the main results of a quadrennial Europe-
wide research project, financed under the Sixth Framework Programme of the
EU. That programme has studied the changes in the scope, nature, and char-
acteristics of citizenship presently underway as a result of the process of deepen-
ing and enlargement of the European Union.
The IntUne Project––Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an
Ever Closer Europe––is one of themost recent and ambitious research attempts
to empirically study how citizenship is changing in Europe. The Project lasted
four years (2005–2009) and it involved thirty of the most distinguished Euro-
pean universities and research centres, with more than 100 senior and junior
scholars as well as several dozen graduate students working on it. It had as its
main focus an examination of how integration and decentralization processes,
at both the national and European level, are affecting three major dimensions
of citizenship: identity, representation, and scope of governance. It looked, in
particular, at the relationships between political, social, and economic elites,
the general public, policy experts and the media, whose interactions nurture
the dynamics of collective political identity, political legitimacy, representa-
tion, and standards of performance.
In order to address empirically these issues, the IntUne Project carried
out two waves of mass and political, social, and economic elite surveys in 18
countries, in 2007 and 2009; in-depth interviews with experts in five policy
areas; extensive media analysis in four countries; and a documentary analysis
of attitudes towards European integration, identity, and citizenship. The book
series presents and discusses in a coherent way the results coming out of this
extensive set of new data.
The series is organized around the two main axes of the IntUne Project,
to report how the issues of identity, representation, and standards of good
governance are constructed and reconstructed at the elite and citizen levels,
and how mass–elite interactions affect the ability of elites to shape identity,
representation, and the scope of governance. A first set of four books will
v
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examine how identity, scope of governance, and representation have been
changing over time at elites, media, and public level, respectively. The next
two books will present cross-level analysis of European and national identity
on the one hand and problems of national and European representation and
scope of governance on the other, in doing so comparing data at both the
mass and elite level. A concluding volume will summarize the main results,
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1
Introduction: European integration
as an elite project
Heinrich Best, György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli
1.1 Eurelitism: A Top-Down View on the Project
of European Unification
It is a widely shared view and oft-quoted criticism that the contemporary
process of European unification has been and still is steered and driven by
the initiative of elites. A more positive perspective is that, after centuries of
bloody conflicts born out of dynastic rivalries, religious tensions, clashes of
economic interests, nationalistic ideologies, and racist hubris, and following
two cataclysmic world wars, during the second half of the twentieth century
European elites gradually reoriented themselves to policies of peaceful coop-
eration and economic and political integration. In an era of ever more effec-
tive weapons of mass destruction, a continuation of European auto-aggression
would have eliminated completely the already gravely weakened status and
influence of European elites in world politics and economics. In Western
Europe, the process of integration was furthered by the threat that state
socialism posed to representative democracy and private property––the two
main institutional pillars of Western elite regimes. In the 1950s, ‘s’unir ou
périr’ (unite or perish) was a widespread catchphrase, highlighting the imper-
ative of a pan-European elite consensus under the pressure of a common
threat (Haas 1958, 1964). The end of European state socialism in the 1990s
removed this threat and opened the way to include Eastern Europe in the
process of European integration. The newly emerging ‘Russian threat’, because
it has no basis in a universalistic ideology and does not question the institu-
tional foundations of private property and representative democracy, seems to
be less salient and more of a divisive than a unifying factor for the rest of
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Europe. It marks the return to old policies of regionalized power rivalries,
particularly concerning the territory of the former Soviet Empire.
The incongruous consequences of the fall of European state socialism and
the collapse of the Soviet Empire––i.e. the removal of strong external pressures
towards (Western) European political and economic integration, and the
simultaneous expansion of the area of European integration into territories
under former Soviet control––have dramatically changed the rationale of
European unification as an elite process: there were suddenly many more
options and fewer pressures in the agenda of European integration. The fact
that, notwithstanding some setbacks such as the rejection of the European
constitution in several national referenda, European integration is still widen-
ing and deepening indicates that it is driven by forces largely independent of
immediate external threats and pressures, and that this impetus is being
maintained by an endogenous logic.
This observation seems to give support to functional integration theory,
developed in the late 1950s and for decades the cornerstone of European
integration theory (Schmitter 2004). It holds,
that integration between hitherto separate units emerges because this leads to
gains in productivity and welfare. Once integration has been initiated in one
sector, it spills over to other sectors and from the economic to the political sphere.
Thus, integration processes acquire a logic of their own and reinforce themselves
with increasing international exchange and divisions of labour. The final stage will
be a highly integrated economic and political community. (Haller 2008: 56; see
also Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1958, 1964; Jensen 2003)
It is nevertheless paradoxical that, although functional integration theory
describes European integration as beneficial to elites, it does so without having
to take the contribution of the main decision makers, who are guiding and
driving this process, into consideration. The functional imagery is based on
‘teleological thinking, which assumes an inherent logic of development and a
well-defined final stage’ (Haller 2008: 56), thereby attributing to elites, per-
haps with the exception of initiating the process, the subsidiary role of merely
following a predetermined course of history.
The book introduced here pursues a different approach. It perceives the
ongoing process of European integration primarily as the result of conscious
and often controversial decisions made by its domestic (or national) elites.
These decisions are constrained by the pressures that national populations
exert on elites’ decision making, often with unintended consequences, but
they are neither predetermined in their course nor necessarily leading to a
fixed destination. Different decisions by elites have been possible in the past
and may have led (under the same or divergent circumstances) to different
developments and outcomes of the integration process. The actor- (and
The Europe of Elites
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action-) centred approach pursued in this book is reflected in its title, The
Europe of Elites, which refers to the unplanned and imperfect Babylonian tower
resulting from the accumulated construction work of several generations of
European elites under changing conditions, following different standards and
building plans.
We pursue an elite-centred approach because the contractual nature of
European unification as a sequel and system of treaties puts elites in a pivotal
role. They are the consignors, architects, and contractors involved in the
metaphorical building of the European ‘Tower of Babylon’. This approach
does not negate the highly relevant and independent role of non-elites in
the process of European integration, which is addressed in the final chapters of
this book, as well as in greater detail in other volumes resulting from the
IntUne project. The present book covers the impact that the general popula-
tion, or ‘masses’, have on elites, and elites’ responses to pressures originating
in the general population, but it does not consider the influences exerted by
elites on mass opinion. The fact that the voice of the general population can
sometimes redirect the course of history and that they have powerful means to
sanction their leaders is, however, reflected in the theoretical and empirical
findings of this book.
It starts with the assumption that there is a formal and factual asymmetry
between elites and non-elites, in that the former are formally entitled (by laws
and constitutions) or factually empowered (by property rights) to make and
influence decisions on behalf of the latter. The focus of our conceptual and
empirical work is, therefore, the visions, attitudes, and opinions of elites
concerning European integration. We address national elites specifically,
because we maintain that the multilevel construction of the European edifice
still attributes a pivotal role to national political and social institutions, and to
the elites who are running them. The institutional grid of European integra-
tion is based on the principle of the equality of the states involved and on their
agreement over the distribution of competences between the levels of the
European system of governance (Scharpf 2009b; Cotta and Isernia 2009).
The introduction of some majoritarian principles and the extension of the
rights of the EU Parliament in the EU decision-making processes and the
election of EU officials has not annulled the fact that the process of European
integration is continuously dependent on and driven by an accord of its
national elites. Another reason for our focus on political and economic elites
is that they are the main builders and operators of supranational European
institutions.
As a result of our research approach, we conceptualize the process of Euro-
pean integration as one of elite integration leading to a consensus between
national elites over their enduring cooperation and competition in a multi-
level system of governance. Here we are adapting and transferring core
European integration as an elite project
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elements of the new elite paradigm to the theory of European integration. This
argues that the key role in the interchange between actors and institutions
belongs to elites in that they are the dominant actors. It also holds that the
structure of elites has a major impact on the formation and reproduction of
political and social institutions: a fragmented elite structure is most likely
connected to serious disruptions in the reproduction of social and political
order, whereas a unified elite structure is associated with a more stable social
structure and the smoother operation of institutions. Unification of the elite
can be reached either by the imposition of a dominant ideology, or by con-
sensus. The theory of Higley, Burton, and others concerning the foundation of
stable representative institutions presumes that democratic institutions can
thrive on the basis of an elite settlement that secures a consensus over the
functioning of institutions and over elites’ working within the framework of
representative democracy (Higley and Burton 2006; Higley and Lengyel 2000;
Field, Higley, and Burton 1990; Burton and Higley 1987). This consensus can,
but need not necessarily, take the form of a formal agreement. It is, however,
always the result of, and dependent on, an encompassing process of elite
integration that provides the normative foundation and secures the structural
basis of elite cooperation and peaceful competition within the framework of
representative institutions.
We suggest that a similar process underlies the establishment and operation
of the European system ofmultilevel governance, i.e. that it is based on a set of
attitudes shared between European elites and favourable to the integration of
Europe in the form of a system of multilevel governance. We examine the
status of these attitudes within the wider concept of Europeanness, which will
be outlined in the following pages. This theoretical approach leads to one of
the central questions addressed in this book: to what extent, more than sixty
years after the end of the Second World War, and twenty years after the
breakdown of state socialism, are European elites integrated and united by a
coherent concept of European integration and a common attachment to
Europe? Our theoretical approach also raises the question of the determinants
of European elites’ Europeanness. In other words: what drives the drivers of
European unification and integration and what makes the brakemen apply
the brakes? The prime focus of this book is, therefore, the question: to what
extent and why do European national elites share a common set of cognitive
concepts, norms, and interests that orient their actions towards European
integration?
A self-interest in European integration seems to be more evident in the
‘Eurocracy’, i.e. among position holders in the central institutions of the
European Union and in ‘substitute bureaucracies’working towards EU institu-
tions in the member states, than among European national elites who are not
part of the Eurocracy or of their national dependencies (Hooghe 2001; Haller
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2008: 44). One approach that helps to explain national elites favouring pol-
icies of European unification and their support for a transfer of elements of
sovereignty to higher levels of the system of European multilevel governance
is the intergovernmental theory of integration. This theory suggests that
integration is a strategy pursued by national governments in order to gain
security in risky international environments and to cope by concerted action
with the challenges of globalization. Integration thereby ‘strengthens the
position of national governments both within their own state and at the
international level’ (Haller 2008: 56; Milward 1992/2000; Moravcsik 1998).
The strong ‘Eurelitist’ bias in this approach has been systematized in the
theory of permissive consensus, whichmaintains that the process of European
unification is mainly driven by the self-interest of elites who enjoy a fairly
wide margin of autonomy, as opposed to the general population, in pursuing
policies of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). According
to this approach, European integration is seen by elites as ‘a means to
advance political goals which they would not be able to enforce alone’ (Haller
2008: 42).
The perception of European integration and unification as an elite project,
designed to put an end to debilitating conflicts and rivalries by consolidating a
common power base and by pooling Europe’s economic resources, does not
imply that these policies contradict the interests and wishes of the vast
majority of the population. On the contrary: peace, prosperity, and mobility
are highly desirable achievements of European unification and integration,
and they were and still are strong attractors for populations in many non-
member states to join the EU (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). This even
includes countries like Serbia, where political interventions from the EU
have violated the deeply felt national sentiments of large parts of the popula-
tion (Best 2009). In this sense, the theory of permissive consensus perceives
public and elite interest in European integration as being mutually reinfor-
cing. Among the many factors advancing the integration of national elites
into a Eurelite, the following are of particular significance for this work:
 National elites are interested in empowerment and public support
through being part of a supranational political and economic
organization that offers them a stronger impact on world political and
economic affairs. This also means they can give greater protection to their
national realms from adverse developments from outside the EU than
they could provide on their own.
 They develop a feeling of belongingness to a common European space
and of sameness with elites in other European countries based on shared
cultural traditions, belief systems––be they religious or secular––and the
multigenerational experience of a common history.
European integration as an elite project
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 The close interaction of national elites results in the emergence of social
and institutional elite networks at the European level, thereby enhancing
the elites’ social integration into a ‘Eurelite’.
1.1.1 Sources of Elites’ Euroscepticism
As well as factors supporting favourable attitudes among European national
elites towards European integration, there are also countervailing tendencies
(Haller 2008: 41–7). Of foremost importance is the interest of national politi-
cal elites to safeguard a national arena of decision making and to prevent
multilevel governance from being imposed over the national realm (Milward
1992/2000). National political elites are answerable to national electorates and
do not want to be punished by their voters for unpopular policies imposed on
them by European institutions. National economic elites compete on national
markets and often do not want full competition from abroad. The question
here is: what does prevail, Eurelitismwith its positive attitude of national elites
towards European integration, or national elitism with its protectionist atti-
tudes towards national political arenas and economic markets?
Elements of Euroscepticism have been manifest in several segments of
European political elites since the start of the European integration process.
Recently, however, they have been enhanced by a growing antipathy within
national populations towards deepening integration. The creation of a laby-
rinth-like superstructure of European institutions, which intervene from afar
in the affairs of European populations, and the cession of national sovereignty
rights to political bodies that are inaccessible for any direct interventions by
European electorates, have contributed to an estrangement between the Eur-
ope of citizens and the Europe of elites (Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and
Dalton 2007). Indicative of this gap is the fact that a deepening of European
integration through the introduction of a European constitution or through
the signing of a new fundamental treaty has been rejected by referenda in
some traditionally EU-friendly countries, such as Ireland. There are many
signs indicating that the ‘happy days’ of Eurelitism being able to count on a
quiescent public opinion are over and that elites are now confronted with an
increase in the salience of Europe-related issues among the general population
and its growing Euroscepticism. As a result, Hooghe and Marks (2008) have
suggested replacing the concept of permissive consensus with the notion of
‘constraining dissensus’. Their argument focuses on the relation between
elites and the wider public, and attributes a greater role to non-elites as a
consequence of the conflictual politicization of European issues. The decisive
arguments here are that Europe has become an important issue in national
political agendas and that the public discourse on Europe is essentially about
The Europe of Elites
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identity rather than material advantages; hence the labelling of these theories
as post-functionalist.
It is obvious, therefore, that theoretical and empirical approaches designed
to describe and explain European national elites’ attitudes towards European
integration also have to encompass Euroscepticism (Fuchs, Roger, and Magni-
Berton 2009). Consequently, we see Europeanness as a bipolar concept whose
main components should ideally converge: at one extreme there is ‘Europhi-
lia’ (or the full set of pro-European orientations) and at the other, outright
‘Europhobia’. We also maintain that Europeanness is essentially a multidi-
mensional concept and that its elements may be loosely coupled; sometimes
they may even appear in contradictory configurations among national elites.
In sum, it cannot be assumed that all European elites are riding on a one-way
ticket towards a federal European state, as a somewhat simplified version of
functionalist theories would suggest.
With regard to the interests of political and economic elites, we see an
inclination to keep their national power bases and markets intact and, in the
case of political elites, to respond to the preferences of their national electo-
rates, all of whichmay play out against pro-integrationist orientations. We see
also that most elites are educated and socialized in national institutions,
which has the effect of bonding them more closely to their national cultures
and institutions. For national political elites, we have also to consider that
they are formally bound to national loyalty and thereby have to put the
interests of their countries first. We finally have to emphasize the role of
‘selectorates’ in limiting the Europeanness of Europe’s national political elites
(Putnam 1976; Aberbach et al. 1981; Kenig 2009). The European elites’ selec-
torates, supporting networks, and information flows are still mainly based on
and limited by their national realms, which may orient them towards their
home countries.
That elites’ interests, feelings, and networks can either enhance and
strengthen or restrain and reduce their Europeanness gives rise to the question
most contributions in this book address, namely under what circumstances
does the pendulum swing to one side or the other of a given indicator of
Europeanness? We assume, however, and take it as the starting point of our
study, that European elites are generally more devoted to the project of
European unification than the general population; in this way we can think
of them as the native citizens of the Europe of Elites. This assumption has been
empirically confirmed by analyses based on the data of the IntUne project.
These show that––after controlling for several social and demographic vari-
ables related to elite status, such as education, gender, and age––there is still a
strong and highly significant positive net effect of elite status of members in
national political and economic elites on indicators of Europeanness regard-
ing their attachment to Europe, their positive evaluation of the European
European integration as an elite project
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integration process, and their attitudes towards a future transfer of compe-
tences concerning foreign policy to the European level (Best 2009). In this
respect, Eurelitism is a well established and empirically sound concept. It is,
however, no rocher de bronze of attitudinal consistency and stability. The
countervailing interests, emotions, and associations mentioned in this chap-
ter are present simultaneously and make their impact on Europeanness in
each national elite, on public and private organizations, such as parties and
business companies, and, not least, on each individual member of the elite.
How these countervailing forces play out, what impact individual predisposi-
tions, contextual conditions, and situational influences have on elites’ atti-
tudes and orientations towards Europe and their integration will be shown in
the pages of this book. It is obvious that such an approach requires a research
design which uses the individual as the primordial object of observation,
proceeding from there to higher-level aggregates, such as organizations and
whole societies or polities, and ultimately to the pan-European level.
1.1.2 Foundations and Emanations of Europeanness
If elites are the drivers of European integration, the question of what is driving
them is the next question to be addressed. We assume that attitudes towards
European integration are mainly oriented by a composite set of perceptions
and sentiments which we refer to as ‘Europeanness’ (Bruter 2005; McLaren
2006; Fligstein 2008; Checkel and Katzenstein 2008). In various forms, this
concept is the main explanandum examined in this book. We suggest looking
at Europeanness as a multidimensional concept with an emotive, a cognitive-
evaluative, and a projective-conative dimension. We are referring here to an
established theoretical tool of the behavioural sciences that can be traced back
to the Weberian theory of social action (Weber 1922/1980). Other authors
have used it to conceptualize European identity by distinguishing between
feeling, thinking, and doing (Immerfall et al. 2010). The emotive (feeling)
dimension refers to positive or negative feelings of attachment towards Euro-
pean unification and integration. The cognitive-evaluative (thinking) dimen-
sion refers to the assessment and degree of approval of the present state of
European integration and unification. Although it seems plausible to say that
Europeanization is more a project than a process (Checkel and Katzenstein
2009), the actions of national elites are not studied here directly. Instead of
using direct measures of elite behaviour, the projective-conative (doing)
dimension is referred to by the approval or disapproval of prospects of higher
levels of European unification and integration in the institutional setting
of the EU (see Chapter 4). It is assumed that the emotive, the cognitive-
evaluative, and the conative-projective dimensions are distinguishable aspects
of the common underlying construct of Europeanness. This assumption
The Europe of Elites
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implies that indicators referring to these three dimensions show a positive,
albeit weak to moderate, correlation (see Chapters 2 and 10). We also assume
that the three dimensions of Europeanness are rooted in deeper mental layers
of attitude formations so that, for example, evaluations of and approaches
towards European integration are derived from ideas of sameness between
European populations that result from cognitive representations of history.
Accordingly, attachment to Europe is an identification based on feelings of
belongingness. The willingness to transfer control over important policy
areas to a supranational European level rests in a ‘progressive’ perception of
Europe’s destiny and future purpose (see Table 1.1).
We expect to find that processes of European integration have been, and
still are, based on and driven by high levels of Europeanness among European
elites; we also expect to find somewhat lower but nevertheless high degrees of
Europeanness among ordinary citizens. This assumption is founded on the
fact that European unification and integration is basically a consensual pro-
cess, highly dependent on the agreement of the vast majorities of actors
involved and ultimately submitted to democratic scrutiny. Agreement and
consent are expected to be based on shared affection for and approval of
Europe’s unity and its further integration.
The tripolar concept of Europeanness has obvious links to the categories of
identity, representation, and scope of governance, which form the topical grid of
the IntUne project (Cotta and Isernia 2009). Collective political identities are
based on ‘sentiments of solidarity’ (Weber 1922/1980: 244; Best 2011) and can
therefore be placed close to the emotive pole of the concept of Europeanness.
Representation is about designing appropriate institutional mechanisms of
transferring and transforming popular preferences, including grievances, to
the upper levels of the political system, and can therefore be located close to
the cognitive pole of the concept of Europeanness. Finally, scope of gover-
nance is evidently linked to implementing policies and to the allocation of
agency in the political system, and can therefore be positioned close to the
conative pole of the concept of Europeanness. Consequently, our book will
enquire into the Europeanness of political and economic elites’ attitudes
towards identity, representation, and scope of governance, assuming that there
are special relationships between sentiments and identity, cognitions and
representation, actions and governance. The reader has to be aware that this
Table 1.1. Foundations, dimensions, and emanations of Europeanness
Foundation Concept Dimension Time horizon Emanation
idea sameness cognitive past integration
identification belongingness emotive present attachment
agency destiny and purpose conative future transfer
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enquiry focuses on elites, i.e. on those who construct collective identities, who
represent and govern the general population. Therefore, a concept like citi-
zenship has a completely different significance when applied to elites com-
pared to the general population. It refers not to civic empowerment and
efficacy, but rather to a constraint, limiting the agency of those who are
exerting economic or political power.
Previous studies have already shed some light on the processes of conver-
gence, agreement, and consent among national European elites, although
they were mainly restricted to examining structural integration. Diachronic
analyses of legislative recruitment and career patterns of parliamentary repre-
sentatives in Europe show converging processes of professionalization and
modernization in Western Europe after World War II (Best and Cotta 2000;
Cotta and Best 2007; Best 2007). Other studies have focused on the role of
elites in the process of establishing and running the institutional framework
of European multilevel governance. From these we can see that the phenome-
non of Europeanization, traditionally associated with public policies, is today
much more related to the dimension of politics. The processes of integration
between and interdependence among different European realities therefore
relate increasingly to the transformation of national politics––for instance to
the typical ‘domestic’ world of parties and party systems (Mair 2007). Com-
parative analyses of the ‘politics of Euroscepticism’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart
2008) provide an insight into the complex set of countervailing factors that
are increasingly working in European party systems against a deepening of
European integration. Although the evolution of the European Union’s insti-
tutional setting has evidently worked as a catalyst for elite convergence in
Europe (Best, Cotta, and Verzichelli 2006), it is also true that the same process
generates a countervailing momentum which feeds the forces of Euroscepti-
cism. A comprehensive analytical framework, which would require compre-
hensive empirical analyses of these contradictory and highly complex
processes, has not been undertaken so far because of a lack of sufficient
data (Hartmann 2010; Haller 2008; Hooghe 2003; Gabel and Scheve 2007;
Lane et al. 2007). The data from the IntUne project provide an opportunity
to redress this deficiency and to make an in-depth investigation of these
issues (see Chapter 9).
The book presented here is based on the results of surveys conducted in
2007 that targeted political and economic elites in eighteen European
countries (see Appendix); Chapters 8 and 10 also utilized sample surveys of
the general population in seventeen European countries. The survey of politi-
cal elites consisted of eighteen sub-samples drawn from members of national
parliaments including top-raking politicians (N = 1411). Data on economic
elites were captured by contacting Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and top
managers in equivalent positions of the 500 biggest companies at national
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level, as well as leaders of banks and employers’ organizations, in each of the
eighteen European countries involved in the IntUne elite surveys (N = 730).
Both IntUne elite surveys were directed by the principal investigators in the
participating countries and conducted by their research teams (with the
exception of Denmark, where a commercial polling institute was involved).
Data were gathered by personal interviews, either face to face or by telephone.
With the exception of Serbia, all countries involved in the IntUne surveys
were EU member states when the fieldwork was carried out. Poland, Estonia,
Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia (only general population), the Czech
Republic, and Lithuania (only elites) represent new member countries from
post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in our survey; Belgium,
France, (West) Germany, and Italy represent founding countries; while the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Austria represent the
pre-CEE accession countries in Western and Southern Europe. The inclusion
of political and economic elites in the IntUne surveys enabled us to compare
the attitudes and orientations of national elites with those of the general
population towards a wide area of European issues in both, formerly separated
parts of Europe.
The questionnaires of the two elites surveys and the public opinion
survey had a wide overlap of comparable questions as well as sizeable elite-
specific and citizen-specific sections. In all questionnaires, large sections were
devoted to the investigation of the fundamental concepts used in the theoret-
ical framework of the IntUne project, such as, for example, the notion of
European citizenship (Cotta and Isernia 2009). Information concerning the
concepts of identity and attachment (local/regional, national, and European),
representation (mainly referring to concepts of representation and the cession
of sovereignty rights to European institutions), and scope of governance
(mainly referring to the allocation of policy competences) in the context of
European institutions, was particularly sought. Besides a standard demogra-
phy, the elite questionnaires contain items referring to transnational social
networks, institutional networks (specifically relating to European institu-
tions), and the cultural competences of elites (mainly language skills). These
are used as independent variables to explain the variation in European elites’
Europeanness.
1.2 Structure of the Volume
The multidimensional nature of elites’ Europeanness, and a number of related
issues, will be explored in the following chapters, which form the substantive
contributions of the present volume. As suggested earlier, the common thread
running through these chapters is the general effort to explore a number of
European integration as an elite project
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questions that can be somehow associated with the compound phenomenon
we call the Europeanness of political and economic elites. More specifically,
this book is about the visions and attitudes developed by European national
elites and their different perceptions of the European reality. After specifying a
cognitive and interpretative framework, each chapter attempts to reduce the
complexity of such visions emerging from the wealth of data to hand, and to
offer its own answers based on a selection of variables and the use of a standard
set of descriptive and confirmatory statistical tools. For the first time, a com-
prehensive view on the ‘Europe of the elites’, including the democracies of
Central and Central Eastern Europe and both political and economic elites
will be possible. The IntUne project united social scientists, mainly political
scientists and sociologists, in discussing and exploring the foundations of
European integration. The researchers who took part in the design of the
surveys are now sharing a unique wealth of data from which it is possible to
understand the elites’ views of Europe.
In Chapter 2, Cotta and Russo provide a systematic analysis of European
elites’ normative integration by exploring the multifaceted combination of
attitudes concerning the three components analysed in the IntUne project:
identity, scope of governance, and representation. After discussing a compre-
hensive analysis of the variation within the attitudes of European national
elites, the authors introduce a typology of elite outlooks vis-à-vis the idea of
EU citizenship. Hubé and Verzichelli (Chapter 3) approach the problem of
European national elites’ structural integration by investigating their involve-
ment in European career patterns and policy networks. This is an independent
but crucial aspect of Europeanness which is linked to the career prospects of
elites in a supranational European arena. Structural integration of European
national elites will be explored both in terms of country-specific factors and
individual characteristics.
The central section of the volume explores a number of aspects of elites’
Europeanness that are covered by specific sections of the IntUne elite survey.
In Chapter 4, Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel provide a systematic investiga-
tion of the views of political and economic elites with regards to EU respon-
sibilities in specific policy fields. Their findings confirm the more complex
and controversial attitudinal structure of national political elites in compari-
son to economic elites. From a different angle, Matonyt _e and Morkevicius
(Chapter 5) analyse the data by focussing on elites’ perception of potential
external and internal threats to a cohesive Europe. The data show that internal
rather than external threats prevail and that there is a correlation between the
threats identified by national elites and the degree of trust in the current EU
institutional scenario. In Chapter 6, Gaxie and Hubé explore variations in the
views of national elites with regard to the powers to be assigned to different
European institutions and to the role of national governments in the process
The Europe of Elites
12
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
of decisionmaking. The array of different explananda is completed inChapter 7
(Lazic, Jerez-Mir, Vuletic, and Vázquez-García), where regional variation in the
elites’ vision of European integration is under scrutiny.
In the final section, the volume deals with three broad issues which can be
adequately analysed in the light of the IntUne data. In Chapter 8, Müller,
Jenny, and Ecker touch upon a question which goes beyond the mere ‘elite
attitudinal profile’, bymeasuring the scale of the elites–masses gap with regard
to a variety of attitudes towards European unification and integration. The
implications of these differences on the attitudes of European elites, in terms of
national policies towards European unification, are discussed, identifying the
factors that can play a role in such dynamics. In Chapter 9, Conti provides an
analysis of the positions of parties and party families, relying on a comprehen-
sive description of the political discourse presented by the ‘Euromanifestos’,
and interpreting the variance showed by these data across countries and across
the different components of European citizenship. In Chapters 10 and 11, Best
returns to themultidimensional character of elites’ Europeanness, developed in
this Introduction. These concluding chapters aim at identifying the individual
and contextual factors which determine elites’ attitudes towards European
unification and integration. In Chapter 11, he gives a synopsis of the main
results of this book and links them to the theoretical propositions and research
concepts outlined in the present Introduction. The Appendix by Lengyel and
Jahr provides a description of the sampling methods, the questionnaire, and
techniques concerning data collection.
Taken as a whole, this book sets out to answer the central question of
whether and to what extent, more than sixty years after the Second World
War and two decades after the breakdown of state socialism, are European
elites integrated and united by a common and binding set of ideas and
attitudes that we can call Europeanness. Although the editors and authors of
this volume are not claiming to have the final word on European integration
as an elite process––if for no other reason, because the process is still ongo-
ing––we nevertheless maintain that the IntUne project is a large step forward
in the effort of a sizeable community of scholars to collect and analyse
comparative elite and mass opinion data on the process of European integra-
tion. For these reasons, we are confident that the research and findings dis-
cussed in the chapters to follow offer a valuable aid, both in theoretical and
empirical terms, for those who want to understand and evaluate this process.
European integration as an elite project
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2
Europe à la carte? European citizenship
and its dimensions from the perspective
of national elites
Maurizio Cotta and Federico Russo1
2.1 Introduction
Over the years, new elements of a European citizenship have been progres-
sively included in the proto-constitution (the treaties), the laws and the judicial
rulings of the European Union, and now form a highly significant, albeit
complex, legal, institutional, and policy reality (O’ Leary 1996; Closa 1998;
Eder and Giesen 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2005). This testifies to
an increasingly explicit self-understanding of the European Union as a polis:
even more as a polity with democratic (although imperfect) foundations. Yet
citizenship as a political phenomenon does not entail only a system of legal
regulations; a fundamental aspect is the penetration of this idea (and the
different elements of which it is composed) in the minds and the behaviour
of the crucial components of the European political system. The experience of
national states indicates that citizenship exists and develops as a real life
phenomenon only as long as citizens, political actors, and authorities under-
stand themselves and their roles as part of a ‘citizenship game’ and translate
this mindset into appropriate behaviour. This test should also be applied
to the European polity. When thinking about Europe, do European people
1 This chapter was discussed and written jointly, but Russo was particularly responsible for
subsections on ‘The Nature of the EU Citizenship’ and ‘Threats to European Cohesion’, and for
themain section on ‘AMore Synthetic Presentation of Elite Positions’. The research for this chapter
was funded by a grant from the IntUne project (Integrated and United: A quest for Citizenship in
an ever closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union,
Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421).
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consider themselves as European citizens and not just as citizens of one of the
twenty-seven member states, and are they prepared to behave accordingly?
The same questions can be raised for members of European elites. Do they see
Europe and thus also the relationship between European authorities and Euro-
pean people as inspired by the ideals of citizenship? As these questions do not
seem to have been sufficiently explored yet and have become increasingly
relevant after the great transformations of the 1990s, the IntUne project has
attempted to find answers through a survey of the general public (the masses)
and national (economic and political) elites in seventeen member countries.
Before embarking on this quest, however, some reflections are required
about the relevance of national elites—of their beliefs, attitudes, and value
judgements concerning Europe—for the system of European citizenship
(Cotta 2008). In particular we need to decide whether their point of view
should be considered as that of ‘external observers’ or of more ‘internal
participants’.
It is quite obvious that the modern system of political citizenship, as it has
developed in the framework of national states, is closely anchored to a strong
and dynamic relationship between citizens and their political representatives
(Marshall 1950; Manin 1997). Representative mechanisms have been the
central instrument through which citizens have affirmed their citizenship
rights and fought for their defence and expansion. At the same time, in their
quest for popular support and legitimation, representative political elites have
made a fundamental contribution to defining and shaping the ideas and the
instruments of citizenship, and tomaking them part and parcel of the ‘supply’
offered to the voters. In the end, it can be rightly said that both the political
self-understanding of the population as a community of citizens and the
implementation of this idea in the national democratic systems are the result
of interactions between the public at large and their political representatives.
An obvious example is the expansion of the right to vote (a central element of
political citizenship) for which pressures from below and support from above
have typically fed one another (Sartori 1976).
When we shift from the national to the European landscape, the citizenship
system and its dynamics are necessarily more complex. European citizenship
is an element of what has been called a ‘compound democracy’ (Fabbrini
2007) and as such combines elements of an indirect citizenship (European
citizenship as a consequence of the national citizenship ofmember states) and
of a direct citizenship (European citizenship deriving directly from the insti-
tutional mechanisms and policy processes of the EU) (Cotta 2008; Cotta and
Isernia 2009). Due to the persistent and dominant role of mechanisms of
national representation for the functioning of the EU, its institutions, and
its policy-making processes, and thus for the implementation of European
citizenship, we can assume that national elites and their views about the
Europe à la carte?
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European Union also play a crucial role in themaking of European citizenship.
National governments, which are constitutive elements of the central organs
of the European decision-making process, are legitimated by and accountable
to national elites. The analysis of their views in these matters is therefore well
warranted.
In the following pages we will conduct a systematic exploration of the
positions of national elites of a sample of member states of the EU with regard
to the crucial themes—identity, representation, scope of governance—which
contribute to defining the nature and content of a European citizenship
(Benhabib 2002; Cotta and Isernia 2009). Our research effort, however, not
only covers political elites (defined here as members of national parliaments),
but has been extended to include economic elites.2 Even if they are not
directly part of the institutional system of representation, there is no doubt
that economic elites exert a strong influence within national systems and,
given the strong economic dimension of the European polity, have important
interests at stake at the European level (Haller 2008). It seems reasonable,
therefore, to consider the views of economic elites and to compare them
with those of their political counterparts.
Before discussing our expectations with regard to the views of national
politicians and top economic leaders concerning Europe as a citizenship-
based polity, however, there are two basic aspects we need to consider. The
first is that citizenship (at the national and presumably also at the suprana-
tional level) is a multifaceted phenomenon. Put simply, it can be interpreted
as being defined by a horizontal and a vertical dimension: the horizontal
dimension has to do with the definition of the identity of a political commu-
nity and with the conditions of membership; the vertical dimension concerns
the set of rights and duties of political action and the portfolio of entitlements
pertaining to the citizens (Marshall 1950; Cotta and Isernia 2009). Conse-
quently, the positions of national elites have to be analysed according to these
dimensions; we may also expect that views concerning the different faces of
citizenship could be relatively independent of each other.
The second consideration has to do with the ‘compound’ nature of Euro-
pean citizenship, which is closely connected to the way the European polity
has been shaped by the process of integration. We must not forget that the
European Union is not the product of a unified and coherent conception
implemented by a centralized and dominant actor, but rather the result of a
process of voluntary association and of the consensual delegation and pooling
of sovereignty (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1998) by the governments of the
member states that have tried to keep a close control over the process. This
2 Economic elites are defined here as the top managers of the top economic and financial firms
of a country. To these are added representatives of the major business associations.
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does not mean that the solutions adopted have always been the most highly
preferred by eachmember state: although they have been seen as preferable to
non-agreement. At the same time, it is probable that the different member
states and their diverse elite groups must prefer certain aspects to others.
From these considerations we can draw the following points:
1. European citizenship has been constructed as a supplement to national
citizenship rather than as an alternative to it.
2. It has been shaped more in a ‘patchy’ than in a systematically coherent
way.
3. It is the result of compromises between the preferences of different
member states.
The views of national elites should presumably reflect this state of affairs and
thus show a composite picture across countries, political positions, and also
across dimensions and aspects of citizenship. In general, we can expect the
position of national elites (except for relatively marginal groups) to be char-
acterized by an instrumental and pragmatic orientation more than by a prin-
cipled and dogmatic one. Evaluations of benefits and costs should prevail over
expressions of affection. Views about supranational identity and affiliation
should not be framed as antagonistic to national identity and affiliation
but predominantly as extensions of the latter. Similarly, the role and powers
of European and national institutions should be seen as complementary to
one another. With regard to policy competencies, a sharing of responsibilities
between national and supranational authorities should be seen as better than
a drastic devolution from one level to the other (unless national elites have
become convinced that national authorities are unable to face the challenges
of new problems). We can also expect that the views of economic and political
elites towards Europe will differ on some aspects. Economic elites do not have
to represent a broad spectrum of opinions and can express their own specific
interests more directly so that we could, therefore, expect more homogeneity
and cohesion from their responses. Finally, economic elites should obviously
be more concerned with the potential economic consequences of certain
aspects of citizenship and less with the political ones.
2.2 The Main Dimensions of Analysis
2.2.1 Views About the EU as a Political Community Beyond the States
The first dimension of citizenship we will consider is the horizontal one. As a
result of the historical process of integration, the EU today defines itself as a
new political community composed of both (member) states and individual
citizens, which we can describe as a combination of ‘collective’ and ‘individual’
Europe à la carte?
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citizens.When exploring the positions of national elites on this dimension we
must distinguish between two main aspects: the evaluation of the process of
integration and the interpretation of its meaning.
EVALUATING EU INTEGRATION
Here we consider three questions: What is the degree of support for the
supranational polity, what are its bases, and to what extent are rational
calculations and affective mechanisms of identification at work? If we start
from an instrumental perspective, i.e. from an evaluation of the benefits of
European membership, attitudes of national elites towards Europe appear
widely positive. There are almost no doubts that the European Union has
had beneficial effects for the countries represented by the politicians surveyed
(Table 2.1). Only a very small minority has different views. Economic elites are
even slightly more positive, and the difference is statistically significant.3
It is well known that, at the national level, established political communities
are not valued only from an instrumental point of view. This element is in fact
normally overshadowed by the strong feelings of identification and affection
towards the polity that are shared by its members. It is therefore relevant to ask
whether the positive instrumental evaluation of the EU is matched by feelings
of attachment to this community; and if so, how this compares to the levels of
attachment to other political communities, such as those at the national or
regional level. Our data confirm indeed that the supranational community has
also generated some feelings of affection: a very largemajority within national
elites declare being attached to Europe. However, when we consider the
strength of these feelings, the EU is at a disadvantage compared to other
communities. The attachment of elites to their country or regions is clearly
stronger. Only a minority (albeit a significant one) declares a strong feeling of
belonging to the EU. At the same time, however, the percentage expressing a
strong rejection of the EU is very low, and outright opposition to the EU is only
a marginal position among national elites.
Table 2.1. Europe as beneficial for the country of the respondents (%)









Chi-square sig. (2-sided) 0.000
3 Data presented in this chapter are from the IntUne survey unless otherwise stated and refer to
all the countries surveyed in this project with the exception of Serbia.
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As might be expected given the strong international orientation of the
largest firms, economic elites are somewhat less strongly attached to their
country and region than political elites. On the other hand, their degree of
attachment to Europe is more or less the same. As a result, the attachment
differential between country and EU is substantially lower for economic elites
(27.3 per cent of strongly attached to the EU as against 39.5 per cent for
politicians; see Table 2.2).
Wemay then ask whether feelings of belonging to one’s own country and to
Europe are compatible or conflictual. The answer to this question, which is
important for understanding the meaning of the two levels of citizenship, is
rather straightforward: the two feelings appear quite compatible though the
correlation is less than impressive (Spearman’s rho = 0.290, correlation signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level). The proportion of those displaying a strong attachment
to Europe is, in fact, higher among those with strong feelings of affection for
their country than among any other category. Negative feelings towards
Europe increase with negative feelings for one’s country. This direct relation
between attachment towards one’s country and towards Europe is stronger for
economic elites (rho = 0.329) than for politicians (rho = 0.267).4 On average
then, Europe is not seen as a challenge to national bonds but probably as an
acceptable complement. A complement perhaps that does not warm the heart
as much as attachment to one’s country, but which does not create strong
feelings of rejection either.
At least in Europe, national polities are by now ‘mature products’ and for
them not much is to be expected in terms of future political growth (in fact for
some of them the future seems even to harbour some degree of deconstruc-
tion). Future developments are, however, much more relevant for the Euro-
pean polity, which in many ways has the features of a ‘work in progress’. It is
Table 2.2. Attachment to region, country, and Europe (%)
Attachment level Region Country Europe
Pol Eco Pol Eco Pol Eco
Strongly attached 54.0 29.0 76.5 63.9 37.0 36.6
Somewhat attached 35.3 40.7 19.0 29.8 49.5 47.1
Not very attached 9.1 22.1 2.7 5.4 11.2 14.1
Not at all 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.9 2.3 1.9
N 1313 673 1326 681 1312 675
Chi-square sig. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000 0.218
4 A slight positive relation also exists between attachment to Europe and attachment to one’s
region.
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therefore relevant to take into consideration the views of elites about the EU’s
future: should unification stop here or go further? Our survey indicates that
the positive view with regard to the past and the present of the EU is also
matched by a favourable view for the future: among national elites, a majority
wants to move further. Here, however, the proportion of those clearly sharing
the idea that unification should be strengthened (on a scale of 0–10, those
scoring 7 points or more) is still a majority but less strong (59 per cent) than
the number of those who have a positive evaluation of the benefits of the EU
and of those who feel attached to it. In addition, the share of those with
serious doubts about the project (i.e. scoring 0–4 points, or 15.5 per cent) is
twice as big as that of those who give a negative evaluation of the benefits of
integration. A sizeable share is in the middle in a somewhat more uncertain
position (Figure 2.1).
The distribution of responses to the proposal that ‘unification has already
gone too far or should be strengthened’ is similar for economic and political
elites, having a three-modal shape: the first peak comprises 15 per cent of
respondents who are satisfied with the level of integration already achieved
and think that process has neither gone too far nor should be strengthened.
The second peak, which is also the tallest, consists of respondents taking a
moderate but positive stance towards further integration. Finally, the distri-
bution has a third peak at the extreme right, which represents those who stress
that the process of integration should definitely go further. In general, eco-
nomic elites are slightly more in favour of moving further with unification
(and are even more positive about benefits), but overall the difference is







Political elite Economic elite
Figure 2.1. Frequency distribution of the variable ‘unification has already gone too far
(0) or should be strengthened (10)?’ for political and economic elites
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modest and statistically insignificant (Chi-squared sig. = 0.218). Finally, while
a positive attachment to Europe is correlated with a positive attitude towards
further integration, the coefficient of correlation is less than impressive for
both economic and political elites (Spearman’s rho = 0.297, significant at
the 0.01 level and Spearman’s rho = 0.228, significant at the 0.01 level,
respectively).
From these results, we can easily see that orientations in the two dimen-
sions are distributed in a somewhat unexpected way. Those expressing a
stronger attachment for the EU should also be in favour of strengthening
the integration. However, about a quarter of those strongly attached to
Europe display only medium or weak support for further unification; and
among those who are not attached to Europe, only a third opposes unifica-
tion (see Table 2.3). From these results, it appears that a significant amount
of support for further unification of Europe also comes from politicians
who do not share strong feelings of attachment (and in some cases have
even negative feelings). This suggests the importance of a more instrumental
attitude which can to some extent counterbalance the lack of a positive
affection for Europe. A rational evaluation of the benefits of integration
is probably at work here. Not surprisingly, this position is even more
significant among economic elites: among those indicating a negative attach-
ment to Europe, almost 50 per cent show a strong support for further
unification. It would seem that for top managers sentiments concerning
attachment are not an obstacle to an instrumental assessment of the advan-
tages of unification.
These results are evidence that views about the future of the EU are not
simply based on affective feelings, but are shaped independently in ways that
deserve further analysis in the final part of this chapter.
Table 2.3. Attachment to Europe and support for unification (%)



















33.9 52.8 74.3 47.6 57.7 72.4
Moderate support for
unification (4–6)
33.3 37.1 19.7 34.0 36.2 23.5
Negative support for
unification (0–3)
32.7 10.1 6.0 18.4 6.2 4.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 171 623 452 103 307 243
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THE NATURE OF EU CITIZENSHIP
The second aspect related to the position of national elites on the horizontal
dimension of citizenship concerns the meanings that national elites assign to
European citizenship as a ‘community bond’. We know from the experience
of nation states that a variety of elements—family lineage, cultural affiliations,
language, place of birth, and choice and acceptance of standards of civicness—
can be used to define the ideological foundations as well as the legal require-
ments of communitymembership. Some of these elements aremore open and
inclusive, others more closed and exclusive. The question to be explored here
is whether the European community bond is perceived as significantly differ-
ent from the national one or not.
On the basis of the different elements of identity proposed to the intervie-
wees, national elites define one scale of importance for the national level and
another one for the European level rather clearly (Table 2.4). It is interesting to
note that the two scales mirror each other almost perfectly, and that the order
and the importance of the factors are extremely similar. The support for all the
elements is however less strong when European identity is to be defined: as
could be expected, the relatively new and incrementally constructed suprana-
tional identity elicits weaker views.
For both national and European identity, ‘naturalistic traits’ (being born
in the country/Europe and having national/European parents) and religiosity
play on average only a limited role. The ‘civic’ traits (feeling national/Euro-
pean and respecting the laws) are the strongest elements, but two cultural
elements (sharing the cultural traditions of the country/Europe andmastering
the language of the country/a European country) follow quite closely.
From the point of view of elements defining the identity of the political
community and its members, the EU is thus not very different from national
states in the eyes of national political and economic elites.We suggest that this
result again confirms the derivative nature of the supranational construction,
Table 2.4. Elements defining national and European identity (%)









Being a Christian 14.3 (36.4) 9.6 (31.8) 9.3 (30.5) 5.1 (24.7)
To be born in the country/Europe 24.3 (56.4) 15.5 (49.2) 16.9 (53.0) 15.4 (49.3)
To have national/European parents 28.0 (62.2) 14.9 (49.3) 25.0 (62.8) 15.5 (51.0)
Share cultural traditions of country/Europe 49.7 (88.7) 38.7 (84.3) 45.1 (88.3) 44.7 (86.8)
To master the language/s of country/Europe 66.6 (94.2) 63.4 (92.5) 66.6 (96.4) 71.7 (95.1)
To feel national/European 68.4 (91.2) 64.5 (93.8) 60.9 (90.1) 65.3 (93.2)
Respect the laws of the country/Europe 72.6 (96.0) 65.0 (93.2) 64.1 (91.7) 67.4 (93.7)
Percentages answering ‘Very important’. Within brackets is the sum of ‘Very important’ and ’Somewhat important’.
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which is built on the basis of the same values that define its constituent units,
the national states. The EU is not an alien product but rather a territorial
extension of already existent models.
Within this general picture of similarity between the two levels, however,
we can see that the naturalistic, religious, and cultural aspects are even less
important at the European level, which is probably explained by the more
artificial, composite, and less homogeneous nature of the EU. Economic elites
do not differ very much in this field from political elites, except for the fact
that they assign a stronger importance to a number of aspects (language,
feeling of identity, respect for the law) when related to European as compared
to national identity. Moreover, compared to politicians, they seem to attribute
a greater weight to the role of language and cultural traditions in defining
European identity. At first this might seem strange, but is perhaps due to an
instrumental evaluation (which is probably more natural for economic elites)
of what can positively affect the functioning of the European Union.
THREATS TO EUROPEAN COHESION
A somewhat more indirect way to assess how national elites view the suprana-
tional polity is to examine their perceptions of the potential impact upon the
cohesion of Europe of a number of challenges that the Union is facing from
different directions (Table 2.5). Our survey asked them to evaluate the gravity
of each threat. Of the possible threats submitted to the attention of national
politicians, only two—the ‘growth of nationalist attitudes in member states’
and ‘economic and social differences amongmember states’—were considered
important by a clear majority, and the first was definitely the most relevant.
In addition, both threats originate internally. The other threats mentioned,
which are linked to external factors, were important for a more limited num-
ber of politicians. Among them, ‘entry of Turkey’, ‘interference from Russia’,
‘immigration’, and ‘effects of globalization on welfare systems’ were impor-
tant for a significant number of politicians.
With regard to economic elites and their perception of the importance of
threats, results indicate that their profile is not so different from that of the
political elite. In general, economic elites are slightly more anxious than
politicians about threats to the cohesion of the EU, with the only clear
exception being globalization, which they see as a minor problem.
The nature of the threats perceived by national elites as more significant
suggests a greater preoccupation with the internal problems of the European
polity and for its lack of homogeneity than for its external role and its
relationship with other international actors. Could we suggest that an
inward-looking perspective predominates among national elites when think-
ing about Europe? This finding can hardly be considered a surprise: though
European leaders occasionally talk of expanding the international role of the
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Union, the process of integration has been mainly concerned with internal
problems, and internal challenges (such as common economic and agricul-
tural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational gov-
ernance, and the consequences of enlargement) have always been the most
salient (Kagan 2002).
If we enquire about the extent to which threat perceptions are linked to one
another, a principal component analysis (Table 2.6) shows that respondents
feel EU cohesion is challenged by at least two broad phenomena: on one side,
by the emergence of cultural differences (immigration and enlargement), and
on the other, by a series of apparently different aspects (economic and social
differences among members, the effects of globalization, and the special
relation of some members with the ‘capitalist’ USA) that are probably related
in a latent way to the defence of a ‘European special model’ of a welfare state. It
is worth noting that the two dimensions reflect a right- and left-wing orienta-
tion, respectively: while conservatives fear enlargement and immigration,
those who lean to the left are more concerned by challenges to the European
social model.5 The threat posed by Russia forms a third dimension on its own,
while rising nationalism, the threat felt more than any other, has no signifi-
cant importance for any of these dimensions.






Do you think that the growth of nationalist
attitudes in European member states is a threat?
33.4 (74.4) 1313 37.4 (78.2) 679
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include
Turkey is a threat?
13.6 (42.4) 1307 13.8 (50.6) 673
Do you think that economic and social differences
among member states are a threat?
11.3 (54.0) 1324 9.9 (49.2) 687
Do you think that the interference of Russia in
European affairs is a threat?
10.6 (41) 1284 14.5 (44.5) 671
Do you think that immigration from non-EU
countries is a threat for the cohesion of the EU?
10.2 (39.4) 1314 8.5 (42.2) 671
Do you think that the effects of globalization on
welfare countries are a threat?
8.8 (40.6) 1289 4.8 (26.7) 663
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include
countries other than Turkey is a threat?
4.9 (26.4) 1211 6.1 (32.3) 653
Do you think that the close relationships between
some European countries and the United States
are a threat?
4.7 (20.7) 1318 2.2 (18.9) 683
Percentages of ‘Big threat’. Within brackets is the sum of ‘Big threat’ and ‘Quite a big threat’.
5 Right-wingers rank high on the first factor, while left-wingers rank high on the second: both
correlations are statistically significant.
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2.2.2 United for What? Views about the Scope of EU Governance
In the previous section, we have shown that national elites are almost unani-
mously convinced of the benefits of European integration for their countries,
that they show a broad (but not always very warm) attachment to the supra-
national polity, and that they predominantly express support for continuing
the process of integration. These elements indicate that the new polity is
largely accepted as a significant feature of the political landscape and as one
that can positively coexist with the traditional experience of national polities.
We must now explore what is the (accepted/preferred) scope of activity of this
supranational level of ‘membership’ which parallels and complements the
national one. More specifically, we need to consider what policy responsibil-
ities national elites would prefer to see assigned to the European Union and
which they feel should still be kept in the exclusive sphere of member states.
These questions are obviously relevant: first, because any polity is to a
significant extent defined by the policy responsibilities that are (legitimately)
attributed to it. From the start of the EEC, the then EC, and now EU, the policy
dimension has been a particularly crucial founding element. Indeed, it can be
said that the European supranational community was a ‘policy driven polity’
from its initial conception. It should also be noted that, since contemporary
national states have acquired a very broad panoply of policy competences
during their historical development, ones which have helped define their
identity and consolidate a strong relationship of trust and loyalty between
them and their citizens, the new supranational polity has to face comparison
Table 2.6. Oblique factorial analysis of threat perceptions (pattern matrix)
Factor
1 2 3
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a
threat?
0.799 0.018 0.024
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include countries
other than Turkey is a threat?
0.586 0.100 0.014
Do you think that immigration from non-EU countries is a
threat for the cohesion of the EU?
0.512 0.088 0.269
Do you think that economic and social differences among
member states are a threat?
0.077 0.593 0.289
Do you think that the effects of globalization on welfare
countries are a threat?
0.160 0.544 0.001
Do you think that the close relationships between some
European countries and the United States are a threat?
0.133 0.525 0.139
Do you think that the growth of nationalist attitudes in
European member states is a threat?
0.117 0.264 0.004
Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs
is a threat?
0.066 0.014 0.345
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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and competition with its powerful national counterparts. The views of
national elites on this point are especially interesting as their members are
strongly involved, either directly as decision makers (the politicians) or indi-
rectly as advocates and customers (the economic elites), in the policy respon-
sibilities of the national state. This leads to the question of how ready they are
to accept a redistribution of policy roles between the two levels.
The IntUne survey enables us to explore the attitudes of national elites with
regard to the more general purpose of the EU, as well as to some specific policy
competencies. Concerning the former, one question asked respondents to
choose between ‘a more competitive economy’ and ‘better social protection’.
Here responses may indicate the broad ideological orientations of the respon-
dents (pro-market or socially oriented), but they may also evoke support
(when the first option is chosen) for the original and pre-eminent purpose of
European integration (the creation of a broader market) versus a preference
(with the second option) for extending to the EUwhat has been the dominant
focus of national welfare states (i.e. providing for a social citizenship).
The viewsofnational politicians are evenly split among those assigning to the
EU the role of promoting a more competitive economy and those who expect
better social protection (Table 2.7). To these should be added a large group that
would prefer a combination of the two goals. These answers show that, for a
large section of national elites, the scope of the European polity is probably
conceived in terms that are not too different from those of the national states.
The EU is seen as more than a purely economic organization (if there was still
any doubt about this). However, the well-balanced distribution between the
two opposite models and the large weight of the median position may raise
some doubts about the future advances of the EU. This leads us to ask, which of
two possibilities will prevail—a stalemate between the two different views or a
compromise perhaps leading to a slow but two-pronged development?
It is worth noting that the question of a more competitive economy or
better social protection produces the strongest difference between political
and economic elites. Economic elites—not surprisingly—are particularly keen
on the role of Europe in ensuring a more competitive economy and much less
interested in its promotion of social protection. However, as we said before, it
Table 2.7. The broad goals of the EU (%)
Aim of the EU Political elites Economic elites
A more competitive economy 38 72.6
Better social protection 36.3 9.5
Both 23.9 16.4
N 1309 679
Chi-square sig. (2-sided) 0.000
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is a debatable point whether answers to this question really express a carefully
assessed view about Europe and what it should be, or whether they simply
reflect the basic values of the respondents. In order to move to firmer ground,
we can explore the views about the aims and competences of the EU further by
analysing the answers given by the members of national elites to questions
about the specific directions along which Europe should develop in the near
future (ten years was the time frame proposed in the survey). With regard to
four possible directions of evolution of the EU (‘greater aid to regions in
difficulty’, ‘a single foreign policy’, ‘a common system of social security’, and
a ‘unified tax system’) answers are positive for the majority of both political
and economic elites (Table 2.8), but breadth and intensity of support vary
significantly. The directions receiving the greatest support are those suggest-
ing a greater solidarity across the unequal territories of the European polity
and proposing a common foreign policy, while support for the other two
directions is at best lukewarm.
These findings do not really come as a surprise in view of what we know
about the developmental trends of the nation states in Europe in the period of
European integration (Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1992). The answers of politi-
cal elites indicate, first, that there is a large acceptance of the idea of the EU as a
necessary instrument for economic re-equilibration among European
countries (aid to regions). The national definition of the public interest is
thus balanced, to some extent at least, by a European definition of solidarity.
Second, there is a largely shared feeling of the inadequacy of national foreign
policies in the current world and of the need for pooling resources in order to
act effectively in the international arena. However, when it comes to what has
been the main playing ground for internal politics of the past decade, i.e. the
welfare state (social security), and the crucial instrument for ensuring its
resources (the tax system), national political elites are more prudent (Ferrera
2005; Cotta 2007). Here we should remember that, for most of the countries in
our sample, internal political alignments have been defined more on social
than on foreign policies (Rokkan 1970). To abandon control of the former
policy field would lead domestic elites into an uncharted political terrain.
Table 2.8. Views about Europe in the future (10 years) (%)






More aid to regions in
difficulty
57.7 (90.0) 1322 38.4 (82.5) 687 0.000
A single foreign policy 53.0 (85.7) 1318 57.5 (90.4) 680 0.033
Common social security 31.3 (66.3) 1312 27.2 (63.5) 683 0.135
A unified tax system 25.4 (57.1) 1309 29.9 (61.1) 683 0.052
Percentages of ‘Strong support’. Within brackets is the sum of ‘Strong support’ and ‘Medium support’.
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Although both economic and political elites are in favour of extending the
role of Europe in (socially and territorially) redistributive matters, economic
leaders take a more cautious stance: they are less supportive than politicians of
a European social security and even less about aid to regions. Nevertheless,
they are slightly more in favour of a unified tax system (probably perceived as
an instrument of economic simplification) and of a common foreign policy
(with obvious spillover into trade matters).
With questions and answers about the goals and scope of the European
Union, we have started to deal with the vertical dimension of citizenship,
which defines what citizens are entitled to expect from public authorities. We
must now try to reach a greater level of precision.What are the specific policies
that European citizens should expect the European Union and its authorities
to deal with? To help us with this matter, there are a number of questions in
the IntUne survey that can provide detailed information about how national
elites would prefer to allocate some of the crucial policy fields between the
different levels of authority existing in Europe. Indeed, it is immediately clear
from our results that national political elites have a rather clear ranking of
policies in mind. As suggested by the data displayed in Figure 2.2, there are
‘domestic policies’—health care, taxation, and unemployment—for which
the member states (or sub-national authorities or a mix of the two) are still
seen as the preferred level, and ‘European policies’, for which the European








































Figure 2.2. Preferences about levels of responsibility for different policies (only politi-
cians) (%)
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level as such (to which we might also add the choice of mixed solutions
combining the European and other levels) is clearly preferred to a purely
national (and sub-national) level, as in the case of immigration and environ-
ment. Other policies (such as fighting crime) are somewhat in between.
These policy preferences confirm what we have seen so far: for policies
related to the welfare state, such as health care and unemployment, the
national level is clearly preferred. Here, Europe and its institutions are probably
seen by amajority of national political elites as a competitor in their traditional
domaine reservé.Certainly, it is well known that national resistance to Europea-
nization of social policies has been stubborn (Ferrera 2005: chapter 4). For
other policies (either relatively new or receiving renewed attention because
of recent developments) Europe can be perceived as an instrument for solving
problems that national politicians may feel to be less easy to deal with effec-
tively at home. In these cases, European institutions, either alone or in con-
junction with national ones, can be seen by a large majority as a solution; we
should not forget, however, the existence of a not irrelevant minority, which
also defends the role of the state or of regional authorities in these areas.
When we consider the preferences of economic elites, we find a very similar
ordering. Economic elites seem, more or less, to share the same opinions as
political elites when it comes to allocating policies to different authorities, but
generally show a somewhat greater propensity to subtract competencies to
both state and sub-state levels. This becomes particularly clear for health care,
taxation, fighting crime, and the environment.
To these areas we can add the question of policy related to defence forces
(which could be taken as an indicator of preferences for the allocation of
international security policy to the different levels of authority). In the survey
instrument, this question was worded somewhat differently from the others
and the choice offered to respondents was only between a purely national, a
purely European, and a mixed solution. Politicians express a slight preference
for a purely national solution as compared to a fully European one, but the
largest preference is for a mixed solution. Economic elites are, however, much
more in favour of the supranational solution, which reaches a level not far
behind that of the preference for a mixed solution. The national solution is
shared only by a rather small minority of economic leaders.
If these are the views about what Europe should do in different policy fields,
what is then the amount of resources national politicians would be ready to
allocate to the European level in proportion to the global amount of taxes
raised? As one would expect, the range of variation in the answers is very large,
but the mean (at 16.3 per cent for politicians and 18.3 per cent for economic
leaders) is in any case quite high if compared with the current distribution of
resources (Table 2.9). If these views were translated into practice, they would
make for a dramatic increase of Union resources and raise the level of the
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European budget many times over!6 Wemay ask whether national politicians,
when answering to this question, considered the consequences their words
would have upon national policies, and thus also upon some of the interests
they are so keen to defend!
2.2.3 Representation in the European Union
The elites we have surveyed are national elites and they are significantly
involved in the national processes of representation, although in different
ways. The politicians we have sampled, who are members of national parlia-
ments, are by definition national representatives: their duty and their daily
job, which derive from the national process of electoral representation and its
mechanisms of accountability, are to represent the interests (however defined)
of their country. Economic elites are not institutionally linked to the national
arena: the firms they rule may have interests that go beyond the national
scene. However, given the strong links existing between the economic arena
and national politics, they too are typically and significantly involved in the
national representation process as advocates—individually or collectively—of
the interests of their firms and more broadly of the economy.
As the European process of representation is strictly connected to the
national processes of representation, in that two of the main EU institu-
tions—the European Council and the Council of Ministers—are the expres-
sion of national executives, and that elections for the European Parliament are
fundamentally run by national parties and national politicians, it is particu-
larly relevant to explore how national elites view the European polity from the
point of view of its representation dimension. Our survey enables us to
explore two aspects of the problem: from a substantive point of view, we can
establish how national political elites assess the quality of the representation
Table 2.9. Share of taxes to be allocated to the European level (%)
Amount of taxes allocated to Europe Politicians Economic elites
Up to 5% 17.7 10.9
6%–10% 29.6 31.0
11%–20% 31.3 34.3
21% and more 21.5 23.8
Mean 16.4 18.3
St. Deviation 11.12 11.67
N 1183 606
6 In 2007 the EU budget was equal to 1.10 per cent of the Gross National Income (GNI) of its
member states. Assuming that national taxation represents on average approximately 40 per cent of
GNI, a share of such taxes transferred to the EU as that suggested by politicians (16.3 per cent) would
mean an EU budget equal to 6.5 per cent of the European GNI. An increase of almost six times!
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of national interests in the European framework; and from a procedural and
institutional one, to what extent they support and trust the existing mechan-
isms of representation of Europe.
We have already seen that an extremely large majority of national politi-
cians and evenmore of economic leaders believe that their country has drawn
benefits from European integration (see Table 2.1). This suggests that they rate
the European mechanisms of representation as not completely flawed. How-
ever, whenmore detailed questions are asked, this broad positive evaluation is
corrected by some significant feelings of dissatisfaction with regard to the
representation of the country’s interests in the process of EU decision making,
and even more concerning the balance of power between countries (Table
2.10). Both politicians and economic leaders are almost evenly split between
those who believe that the interests of their country are not taken sufficiently
into account and those who disagree with this judgement. It must be added,
however, that those who express strong feelings of dissatisfaction are only a
small minority. When it comes to evaluating the degree to which the interests
of the different countries are taken into account, however, an overwhelming
majority believes that some countries are ‘more equal than the others’. The
glass of European representation is thus half full—the benefits are undeni-
able—but at the same time half empty; its ability to take care of ‘local’ (i.e.
national) interests is far from satisfactory and, perhaps more importantly, the
effectiveness in creating a situation of equal treatment among the internal
components of the polity is rather deficient.7
Is this somewhat sceptical (but fundamentally realistic) reading of the
effects of the European representative process matched by a position of
distrust vis-à-vis European institutions? Our results indicate that this is not
the case. The levels of trust in the three main institutions of the EU (the
Table 2.10. Views about European representation (%)
Statements Politicians Economic elites
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Those who make decisions at the
European Union level do not take
enough account of the interests
[of country] at stake
10.6 (48.0) 10.1 (52.0) 8.8 (50.2) 9.7 (49.6)
The interests of some member states
carry too much weight at the EU level
32.5 (84.0) 2.7 (16.0) 34.9 (83.8) 3.7 (16.2)
Percentages of ‘Agree or disagree strongly’. Within brackets is the sum of ‘Agree or disagree strongly’ and ‘Agree or disagree
somewhat’.
7 As the factor analysis reported in Table 2.15 shows, feeling scarcely represented forms a single
dimension with wishing more help for less developed areas.
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Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament) are significantly
positive (Table 2.11) and differences in level of trust among these institutions
are not dramatic. However, when we analyse responses from the politicians,
they reveal an (apparent) paradox: the two institutions that have a more
pronounced supranational character—the Commission and the Parlia-
ment—are the least and the most trusted, respectively, while the Council of
Minister is in between. A possible interpretation is that the least trusted
institution, (i.e. the Commission) is also the least directly connected to the
national processes of representation, and one that often appears as a severe
judge of their decisions. Albeit in rather different ways, the two other institu-
tions aremore closely linked to national politics since the Council of Ministers
consists of national representatives and the European Parliament is the result
of elections, which national elites still heavily control.
The position of economic elites is different. Their preferences show a differ-
ent order: the European Commission is rated as the most trusted, followed
by the Council, and then by the European Parliament. Here we are probably
seeing the typical preference of economic managers for governing bodies that
have a greater decision-making power, and lesser trust in a debating body.
Unfortunately, the comparison with national institutions is possible only
for economic elites as asking national MPs about their trust in the national
parliament or in the national government had been ruled out for obvious
reasons when the survey was designed. With regard to economic elites, when
considering the average levels of trust, results show almost no difference in the
level of trust between the national and the European Parliament, and only a
very small advantage for the Council of Ministers or the Commission over the
national government. Behind the averages, however, one can detect a some-
what more polarized distribution in their views about national institutions:
the levels of distrust for national parliament and national government are
considerably higher than those for the corresponding European institutions.
Quite obviously, the central aspect in a citizenship-based polity, and with
regard to its vertical dimension, concerns the allocation of authority and the
powers attributed to the institutions. The problem of who should represent
Table 2.11. Trust in European institutions (within brackets economic elite)









European Parliament 48.9 (30.4) 39.9 (52.0) 11.2 (17.6) 6.13 (5.36) 1295 (674)
Council of Ministers 40.8 (32.8) 47.2 (54.4) 12.0 (12.8) 5.82 (5.58) 1289 (663)
European Commission 36.5 (34.5) 49.0 (52.8) 14.5 (12.8) 5.6 (5.62) 1290 (675)
National Parliament  (35.2)  (42.2)  (22.6)  (5.34) (685)
National Government  (39.2)  (40.3)  (20.5)  (5.48) (659)
The last two questions have been asked only to economic elites.
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the citizens and be accountable to them is particularly complex in a polity
such as the European Union, whose institutions have not superseded national
ones, but rather complemented them. The institutions we consider here are
the European Commission and the European Parliament, but we will also
enquire about the role of member states, which play a crucial part in the
decision-making process of the Union through the participation of national
governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers.
Taking the views of national politicians first, these again reveal what could
be considered a not very consistent position. On the one hand, they make a
strong defence for the role of member states in the decision-making process,
probably because they think they are the most effective instrument of repre-
sentation of country interests. On the other hand, they are quite ready to
increase the powers of the European Parliament, with only a small minority
being strongly against this. In addition, they have a balanced position with
regard to the role of the European Commission, with only a minority strongly
against and only a minority strongly in favour (Table 2.12).
These results are somewhat puzzling: they seem to show support both for
an intergovernmental view, stressing the role of member states, and for a
more supranational one, emphasizing the importance of institutions that
are peculiarly European. Particularly surprising is that the defence of the role
of member states is matched by strong support for expanding the powers of
the European Parliament, which from this point of view fares better than
the Commission. In an attempt to explain these results, we suggest that the
European Parliament may be seen by many respondents not only as a supra-
national institution but also primarily as an instrument of representation for
national interests (much as national parliaments are perceived as the locus of
representation of local interests). As for results concerning the comparison
between the European Parliament and the European Commission, we cannot
deduce with certainty that national elites are more in favour of the former
than the latter. The two questions posed in relation to this question were
formulated somewhat differently: the question about the Commission had a
stronger wording, and by asking about the role of this institution as the ‘true
government of the EU’ set a higher threshold for positive answers; the ques-
tion relating to the Parliament simply asked about it having greater powers
and thereby was less demanding for those willing to give a positive answer.
Moreover, the question about the role of the Commission probably induced
the respondents to evaluate an alternative, suggested by the question about
the role of member states.
With regard to the position of economic elites, results suggest that in
general, they share a rather similar position to that of their political counter-
parts, except for being slightly more lukewarm concerning increasing the
powers of the European Parliament. The size of the majority in favour of
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extending its powers is significantly less and their answers less intense than
those found among politicians, but with 68 per cent of favourable answers it is
nevertheless quite large.
Using these data, we can move a step further and explore how different
attitudes concerning the institutional shape of the EU relate to one another.
For the sake of simplicity, we will now concentrate on attitudes towards the
role of the European Commission and themember states in the governance of
the EU, these being currently the two crucial poles in the institutional setting
of Europe. The answers we received to the related questions allow us to define
four different conceptual models of the institutional system of the EU: (1) a
federalist position (the positive answer to the question ‘The European Commis-
sion should become the true government of the EU’ is combined with the
negative answer to the question ‘Member states ought to remain the central
actors’); (2) an intergovernmentalist position (a negative answer to the first
question is combined with a positive one to the second); (3) a position of
support for a ‘compound institutional model’ (when the answer is positive to both
questions); and (4) a double negative position,which combines the two negative
answers and probably reflects a full rejection of the EU.
Our data show that national elites are predominantly distributed among the
first three models (see Table 2.13). The truly federal model is supported only
by a significant minority, but the purely intergovernmental model, although
prevailing, is more or less balanced by a position that combines national and
supranational options. The differences between the two national elite groups











The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the European Union
5.1 17.8 33.9 43.1 1306
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
European Union
20.4 28.8 36.9 13.9 1292
The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened
10.3 17.3 35.9 36.6 1297
Economic elites
The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the European Union
3.7 20.4 39.2 36.7 676
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
European Union
15.5 31.8 38.8 13.8 672
The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened
9.4 22.6 42.3 25.7 673
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are not very significant here (but among economic elites, federalists are some-
what stronger). The national elites are thus rather reluctant to embrace a more
radically innovative model of European governance (the federal one), but at
the same time their defence of the traditional role ofmember states is balanced
by a wide acceptance of a mixed system, which would strengthen the arrange-
ment that currently governs the Union. To this should be added that the
diffuse readiness to see a continuing expansion of the role of the European
Parliament provides a further element of support for further institutional
integration.
The last aspect of the representation dimension that we cover with our
survey concerns the instruments of political action that members of national
elites think most effective for influencing EU decisions. Here we ask whether
national channels of ‘representation’ are seen as more, or less, effective than
those of the European Union. The answers from the political elite offer a
double-sided view (Table 2.14). Among the instruments proposed in our
survey, action through the national parliament is seen as the least effective.
On the other hand, as expected, the national government is considered by a
large majority to be a very important instrument. At the same time (somewhat
unexpectedly) action through European parties also receives a fairly good
rating, but direct contact with European institutions is considered even
more important. National politicians confirm the view that, in the process
of European integration, national parliaments have been to a significant
extent sidestepped; at the same time they are aware that Europe works on
the basis of more than one channel (direct and indirect) of representation.
Economic elites are even more sceptical than their political counterparts
concerning the role of national parliaments. They see action through business
organizations and direct contacts with European institutions as the two
most important instruments of action, and rate them as more effective than
national governments.
Table 2.13. Views about European governance
The European Commission should become
the true government of the EU
Yes No










Yes includes answers ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree somewhat’; No answers includes ‘Disagree somewhat’ and ‘Strongly
disagree’. Percentages within brackets refer to economic elites.
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2.2.4 A More Systematic Presentation of Elite Positions
After a rather analytical presentation of the positions of national elites with
regard to the different aspects of European integration, it is time to attempt a
more systematic interpretation. Our analyses have already shown that, with
regard to some variables, attitudes towards Europe cannot be easily com-
pressed into a single pro-European/anti-European continuum and that we
must reckon with the existence of a variety of (relatively independent) dimen-
sions. However, even if a high degree of reductionism seems impossible, there
is still the need to assess the existence of a limited number of dimensions
along which the attitudes of national elites are structured. In particular, we are
interested in comparing the latent structure of our respondents’ attitudes with
the main components of citizenship implied by Benhabib’s conceptual analy-
sis, namely identity, representation, and scope (Benhabib 2002), which was
also used to structure the IntUne project.
We will start by focusing on political elites, whose opinions can have more
direct consequences on the process of integration. Among the several possible
statistical techniques that can be used to explore attitude structures, we under-
took an exploratory factor analysis with non-orthogonal rotation. There were
two main reasons for our choice: first, when compared to orthogonal factor
analysis, this method allows correlated factors to be identified without
imposing unnecessary restrictions on the data; second, by using the same
methodology and similar questionnaire items, the structure of elites’ attitudes
could be compared with that of the masses (Sanders et al. 2011). For our
analysis, we selected variables that would define attitudes towards European
integration and conceptions of a supranational citizenship (Table 2.15). We
did not include variables that might be used as explanatory variables, such as
the variable concerning preference for a social Europe or a more competitive
economy, as our main aim was not to explain positions but rather to elucidate
the variety of attitudes towards Europe and to explore their connections.
Table 2.14. Instruments of influence on EU decisions (%)









National Parliament Political 13.3 44.2 35.7 6.8 1304
Economic 22.6 47.3 24.8 5.3 669
National Government Political 8.3 28.2 49.7 13.8 1307
Economic 9.7 32.1 48.4 9.7 669
European party or
business organizations
Political 11.4 33.6 45.7 9.3 1270
Economic 2.9 28.6 55.4 13.1 664
Direct contact with EU Political 8.4 30.3 50.4 10.9 1207
institutions Economic 5.5 22.2 49.0 23.3 635
The Europe of Elites
36
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Table 2.15 suggests the existence of five main dimensions that can be fairly
easily interpreted:
1. Support for supranational political integration.
2. Trust in European institution.
3. Support for delegation of ‘new policies’ to the European level.
4. Support for delegation of ‘traditional state policies’ to the European level.
5. Representation of national interests.
The first dimension is mainly defined by seven questions addressing three
different issues: (a) strengthening the process of integration, (b) giving more
power to those European institutions that embody the supranational princi-
ple, and (c) reinforcing the external and military role of the Union. In addi-
tion, the variable comparing the level of European and National Attachment8
Table 2.15. Oblique factorial analysis of political elites’ attitudes towards the European
Union (pattern matrix)
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Unification should be strengthend 0.548 0.178 0.055 0.038 0.013
Favours EU . . . for foreign policy 0.533 0.071 0.052 0.006 0.153
European Commission should become EU
government
0.520 0.095 0.080 0.096 0.151
European army 0.481 0.043 0.116 0.079 0.002
Member states ought to remain central actors 0.440 0.161 0.019 0.114 0.145
Attachment to EU vs. country 0.428 0.011 0.020 0.087 0.197
European Parliament should be strengthened 0.402 0.048 0.065 0.078 0.005
Trust in the European Commission 0.091 0.837 0.016 0.009 0.013
Trust in the European Council of Ministers 0.147 0.817 0.059 0.050 0.008
Trust in the European Parliament 0.118 0.617 0.019 0.102 0.115
EU should make policy––environment 0.057 0.010 0.694 0.126 0.012
EU should make policy––crime 0.012 0.016 0.557 0.061 0.049
EU should make policy––immigration 0.084 0.018 0.515 0.008 0.007
Favours EU . . . for tax system 0.161 0.042 0.139 0.761 0.046
EU should make policy––taxation 0.002 0.002 0.217 0.535 0.158
Favours EU . . . for social security 0.225 0.039 0.100 0.513 0.355
Some countries have too much weight in the EU 0.009 0.048 0.048 0.025 0.460
My country is adequately represented at the EU
level
0.295 0.140 0.036 0.040 0.433
Favours EU for regional aid 0.169 0.097 0.061 0.179 0.287
EU should make policy––health 0.032 0.016 0.210 0.241 0.039
EU should make policy––unemployment 0.009 0.030 0.261 0.250 0.017
Rotation sum of squared loadings 2.944 2.272 1.65 2.34 0.92
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
8 This variable is computed by calculating the difference between a measure of European
Attachment (1–4 scale) and a measure of National Attachment (1–4 scale): the resulting scale
spans between 3 and 3.
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loads mainly on this dimension (0.428). In a way, this dimension appears
to resemble the classic polarization between Euroscepticism and Euro-
enthusiasm: those who rank high on this dimension actually want the
construction of a more integrated Union dominated by the supranational
principle and capable of acting in a unified way beyond its borders. Neverthe-
less, this dimension excludes some of the common attributes of Euro-enthusi-
asm, such as feeling of trust towards its institutions, readiness to delegate
national sovereignty in further policy areas, or satisfaction with how the
Union works. In fact, trust towards all European institutions, be they suprana-
tional or intergovernmental, forms a second dimension by itself. Support for
delegating new policy areas, such as immigration, crime, and environment, to
the European level emerges as a third dimension, while support for delegating
some traditional policy areas, such as taxation and social security, is a fourth
dimension. Finally, the perception that one’s own country is adequately
represented in the European policy-making process and that inequalities
among member states are too significant constitutes a fifth dimension.
These results can be related to Benhabib’s (2002) three components of
citizenship, but our analysis of how national parliamentarians’ attitudes are
structured brings some additional insights. First, national politicians’ attitudes
are clearly distributed on a continuum that lies between a supranational and
an intergovernmental pole. This dimension might have some similarity with
Benhabib’s concept of identity, if we assume that in the minds of political
elites support for a European identity directly translates into a coherent posi-
tion about institutional integration. Representation is divided into two sub-
dimensions, one referring to trust in European institutions and the other to
the feeling that one’s own country is adequately represented. Here it is inter-
esting to note that the perception of belonging to a country which is ade-
quately represented is positively related to the idea that some countries carry
too much weight in the Union: this constitutes a counter-intuitive finding
that deserves further investigation. Finally, attitudes about the desired scope
of governance of the EU split into two sub-dimensions, one referring to
taxation and social policies and the other to new emerging policy areas,
such as environment, crime, and immigration. Policies such as health and
unemployment are divided between these two sub-dimensions, moderately
loading on both.
Non-orthogonal factor analysis also allows correlated dimensions to be
identified, and thus for relations among distinct latent attitudes to be assessed.
Table 2.16 reports the intercorrelations among the five dimensions described
above. It should be noted that to construct this analysis we have not used the
scores directly derived from the factor solution: despite their advantages (they
all have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one), factor scores have
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undefined ranges and this complicates their interpretation and prevents
meaningful comparisons among factor scores. To overcome this limitation
we resorted to constant range scales constructed by combining the variables
that load highly on each factor in scales ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is the
most Europhobe and 10 the most Europhile position.9 These scales are con-
structed giving the same weight to each variable, regardless of their loadings:
however, all the constant range scales are highly correlated (r i 0.85) with the
original factor scores, with the partial exception of the scale of Representation
of National Interest (r = 0.753).
Table 2.16 shows that different dimensions are somewhat interrelated, but
correlations are generally weak. As a matter of fact, there are only two cases of
correlation coefficients higher than 0.3 and both include the first dimension.
Supranational Political Integration is correlated with Trust in EU institutions
(r = 0.35) and with Traditional Policies Delegation (r = 0.454). This provides
further support for the idea that attitudes of domestic elites towards Europe
reflect a complex structure of feelings and interests. Particularly interesting is
to find that support for the process of supranational integration and for its
institutional aspects is only mildly related with the readiness to expand the
policy competencies of the Union. Moreover, with regard to policies, attitudes
change depending on the policies at stake. National elites have thus different
agendas for Europe; some of them may be dictated more by views about the
shape of the polity, others by more instrumental views about how to conduct
more effectively different types of policies.


















Trust in EU institutions 0.35 1
New policies delegation 0.246 0.087 1
Traditional policied
delegation
0.454 0.125 0.272 1
Country representation 0.196 0.195 0.153 0.064 1
Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients reported; all significant at 0.001.
9 As stated in the text, the fifth dimension has an ambivalent character and it was not possible to
orientate it a priori.
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2.3 Europe à la Carte? Tentative Conclusions
From the results of our analyses we can see that a positive instrumental
evaluation of the EU is shared by an extremely large proportion of both
political and economic national elites, and that they see European integration
overall as beneficial for national interests. A very large majority of both groups
also reports an affective connection with the EU, although its intensity is
significantly lower than that felt for the national community. We also found
that support for taking the process of integration further is rather broad, but
when it comes to defining European identity, a predominant majority opts for
a ‘civic’ identity, while ‘naturalistic’ elements count generally less than for the
national identity.
With regard to possible threats to the cohesion of the EU, both political and
economic national elites seem particularly concerned by nationalist move-
ments emerging from within and by inequalities among member states (i.e.
by internal threats). However, when confronted with the dilemma between
a European Union focused on creating a more competitive economy or
providing better social protection, we find significant differences between
political and economic elites. While the latter are heavily in favour of creating
a more competitive economy, the former are more diverse in their responses
and show greater spread between the two competing options.
Taking the future of the EU into consideration, the broad majority of
national elites are ready to envisage a common foreign policy, to consider
some degree of solidarity with the less prosperous regions of Europe, and even
to contemplate common social security and taxation systems. But we find
some group differences if we consider only strong expressions of support;
political elites are only ready to express them for the first two possible future
developments, while economic elites seem prepared only to give a strong
sanction to a common foreign policy.
When it comes to a more precise and comparative choice between the
national (or sub-national) and the supranational level for the conduct of
specific policies, national elites only express a clear preference for a European
solution against a national one with regard to immigration and environment;
for health care, unemployment, and taxation, the preference is for policy
control at the national level. In all these areas, economic and political elites
show rather similar preferences, but with one exception. With regard to an
army, economic elites are more ready than political elites to adopt the supra-
national solution.
With regard to the European process of representation, a very large majority
of both elite groups share the view that member states do not carry the same
weight within the EU, but when asked whether they feel individual country
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interests are sufficiently taken into account, views are evenly split. Overall,
their evaluation of European representation is not too critical.
In line with the results discussed so far, national elites’ trust in European
institutions is more positive than negative. Where it is possible to compare
levels of trust in European institutions with similar national institutions,
differences are not significant, but they do tend towards favouring the EU.
On the other hand, when faced with more concrete choices about the (rela-
tive) role and weight of different European institutions, national elites are
generally conservative: a largemajority continue to defend the role of national
states, with only a minority ready to accept a transformation of the Commis-
sion into a true government of the Union. However, national elites appear
open to accept increased powers for the European Parliament.
These results indicate that, as a whole, the national elites of the member
countries surveyed by the IntUne project continue to provide a rather solid
backing to the process of European integration. If European integration has
been seen as an ‘Elite process’ in the past (Haller 2008), we see no strong signs
that this is likely to diminish. Indeed, there seems to be quite substantial
support for a continuation of European integration by the national elites.
Things become somewhat more complicated when it comes to the different
possible directions of the integration process. Our analyses have revealed the
variety of views about Europe held by national elites (political and economic).
It has also shown rather clearly that members of national elites, when asked to
express their attitudes and positions towards Europe and supranational inte-
gration, do not define themselves along a simple one-dimensional continuum
(pro-Europe $ anti-Europe) but display rather variable combinations of posi-
tions depending on whether they are asked to express their views on aspects
that concern the nature of the European polity, its institutional configuration,
or different sets of policy goals. It seems that, when confronted with an ‘à la
carte’ menu of various components of European citizenship, national elites
order a rather diversified combination of courses. We should not be too
surprised by this finding, however, if we consider how the process of European
integration has developed so far. It has not been the result of the victory of one
ideologically cohesive front against an opposing force originating from a neat
cleavage between pro- and anti-Europeans, but rather the product of a long
series of compromises negotiated among a plurality of national positions,
carefully aware of their specific interests, and trying to exploit the advantages
offered by integration (and to contain associated disadvantages) as best as
possible. The positions of national elites fundamentally reflect this back-
ground, and this makes for multifaceted and not necessarily geometrically
consistent views of the European polity and citizenship. In particular, views
about the institutional shape of the European Union and about its policy
competencies are variable and liable to be combined in multiple ways. Those
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who prefer a more supranational institutional system do not necessarily also
want to expand the policy competencies of the Union, and vice versa. More-
over, with regard to policy competencies, preferences for a stronger European
role vary according to the type of policy. This means that in the wide pool of
national elites there is simply no group that wants ‘more Europe’, but rather
different groups that want more of different aspects of Europe. Similarly, there
is not so much a compact group that is against ‘more Europe’, but rather
different groups that oppose different aspects of European expansion. This
leads us to conclude that changing the shape and scope of European gover-
nance and the contents of European citizenship requires broad coalitions and
compromises among these different views, and that, in order to understand
the future of European integration, a careful assessment of how different
attitudes are distributed across countries and what bases they can provide to
the formation of positive (or negative) coalitions is absolutely crucial.
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3
Ready to run Europe? Perspectives
of a supranational career among EU
national elites
Nicolas Hubé and Luca Verzichelli
3.1 Domestic Elites and the Ambition to ‘Run Europe’
The key question in this chapter is to what extent European political and
national elites consider professional advancement in the wider context of the
EU. Answering this question will help us broaden our knowledge about the
attitudes of national elites to being directly involved in EU issues and to
considering the European polity as a structure of opportunity for their careers.
The emergence of a supranational dimension of the elite career perspective
is certainly not a peculiarity of the European Union. The globalization of trade
and the increasing number of influent supranational organizations have
resulted in the emergence of a number of elite groups that are disconnected
from the traditional power structure existing at the national level. This is
particularly evident in the field of economic elites, due to the presumed
emergence of a ‘super-class’ of global capitalists (Sklair 2001). However, the
rise of a purely ‘supranational’ elite in the EU context appears to be a more
complex problem. On the one hand, the scope of economic integration and
the evolution of EU institutions have determined a unique case of suprana-
tional order, ruled by an increasing number of Eurocrats and open to the
influence of business networks. On the other hand, the relationships between
national and supranational elites (and especially between national and supra-
national political representatives (MEPs)) seem to be particularly close,
because EU politics and policies have become fundamental factors in the
career strategies of many aspirant leaders at the national level. Nonetheless,
it is not easy to understand the effective strategic importance of holding a
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supranational office rather than a national one, as suggested by the lack of
significant differences in the career orientations of supranational MPs com-
pared to their national colleagues (Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Scully 2005).
The rationale of this chapter is therefore rather simple: we want to measure
and then to explain the extent to which national elites are oriented towards a
supranational career (e.g. an office open to current national politicians in an
EU institution, or a job for national business elites in the EU economic
context). These orientations may be explained by the respective elites’ percep-
tion of the supranational environment’s relevance for their career and from
the elites’ sense of attachment/detachment towards the supranational order.
In other words, national elites will vary in the level of motivation to improve
their skills and increase their competitiveness by investing their time and
efforts in supranational activities. In this sense, a national politician or top
manager can be inclined to act at the supranational level because it offers the
potential of being a good environment for further advancement. On the other
hand, it could be that an orientation towards a European career is based on
feelings and ‘desires’ linked to support of the EU, so that we could expect to
find this particularly among pro-European elites, rather than among those
who are indifferent or oppositional. Thus defined, the multifaceted system of
interests and orientations pushing a member of the national elite to follow a
career at the European level can be conceived as part of the composite notion
of Europeanness that is at the core of this book.
Looking at the historical evolution of the process of European integration,
we see that the inclination of national elites to ‘run Europe’ has been weak for
a long time, and is still not very strong today. Indeed, when it is argued that
Europe is an elite project (see Chapter 1), this refers to national elites. In his
recent study, Haller (2008) underscores this point by arguing that room for the
creation of a genuine supranational European elite has always been limited, and
that this is particularly true for politicians.
As a matter of fact, the very expression ‘to run Europe’ was formulated with
regard to the European bureaucratic elite (Page 1997) who are those who
further the integration process and try to enhance their own career ‘in the
name of Europe’ (Hooghe 2001). National politicians, however, seem to be less
interested in becoming fully Europeanized: they do not tend to ‘go native’ as
Europeans (Scully 2005). In light of this we assume that their disposition to
invest time and effort in supranational institutions will depend on partisan
and country-specific factors.
Having a truly comparative and cross-national data set at our disposal, one
which includes information about the motivations of national political and
economic elites for an EU-based career, we can explore the different prefer-
ences in terms of elites’ future ambitions and their perceptions of the structure
of opportunity provided by the European Union.
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‘Career’, ‘ambition’, and ‘structure of opportunity’ are widely used concepts
in the study of political elites, both in Northern America (Shlesinger 1966) and
in Europe. However, the consolidation of a European multilevel system of
governance has provided a new framework for the consideration of these
phenomena. Indeed, European politicians have a priori an extended structure
of opportunity today––given the existence of EU institutions and EU-related
positions within national institutions––but their aspirations and vocation can
be seriously constrained at the individual level by a number of variables,
including their degree of familiarity with EU policy making and their sociali-
zation and competence to act within a multinational and multi-lingual
environment.
Changes in elite profiles and orientations can be connected to the process of
Europeanization, which has been defined as an ‘incremental process reorient-
ing the direction and shape of politics to the degree that [European] political
and economic dynamics become parts of the organizational logic of national
politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994: 69). Therefore, we have to test how
ambitions, structures of opportunity, and the career paths of national politi-
cians vary depending on their different perceptions of the relevance of EU
supranational governance and on the role played by the EU in national
politics.
In the case of economic elites, there has been a longer tradition of socializa-
tion into supranational organizations. However, if transnational business
organizations have a clear role in European corporate governance, indications
of economic leaders’ deeper personal involvement in the European scenario
are not necessarily evident. A trend of an ‘inward-looking orientation’ among
enterprises (and politicians) within the EU has been diagnosed (Haller 2008:
151), but we still have to discover the magnitude of such a phenomenon.
According to the literature, the process of Europeanizationwill have impacted
onmany elements and functions of political and institutional structures at the
national level (see Graziano and Vink 2007 for an overview). However, little
empirical research has been produced so far with which to analyse the con-
sequences of these processes on the profiles and behaviours of national elites
(Eymeri-Douzans andGeorgakakis 2008). Some research in this area has shown
that the Europeanization of careers seems to follow two structural patterns: the
first is the process of career-building in European institutions; the second is the
Europeanization of networks and the mobilization of the political resources
utilized during the ‘traditional’ processes of selection and career-building
within the national environment (Georgakakis and De Lassalle 2007a). It has
therefore been suggested that the Europeanization of political elites is a process
of selecting political actors who are Europeanized through their socialization
(Georgakakis and De Lassalle 2007b: 65, 2007a; Poehls 2009) or internationali-
zation (Wagner 1998).
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Following these arguments we suggest that the expectations of EU member
countries’ national political elites are increasingly orienting themselves
towards the European environment. This phenomenon can be measured in
several ways and explained by a broad set of hypotheses. In this chapter we
develop hypotheses concerning the impact of different indicators related to
political and institutional attitudes towards the EU, as well as to the socio-
structural characteristics of the elite on their inclination to seek an EU-related
career. Since the IntUne elite questionnaire (see Chapter 11) provides an
explicit question about the EU-related career perspective (‘Are you considering
pursuing a political/professional career at the European level?’), we will use
this question as the dependent variable in our study. Data from the first survey
wave are used to measure the relevance of this dependent variable and to
investigate possible explanations of supranational career orientations.
Concerning the independent variables, we will refer mainly to the following
three explanatory factors: (1) indicators about the different meanings of Euro-
pean identity; (2) indicators of elite orientations towards a broader future
scope of governance; and (3) indicators of elite attitudes about an extended
role for EU representative institutions. These indicators are analysed in the
light of a wide range of political, social, and cultural structural variables.
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses
There is more than one reason to presume that the EU institutional setting
and EU policy making are playing an increasing role in shaping the ambitions
and structures of opportunity of European national elites. This is supported by
recent literature that stresses the link between the transformation of European
elites and the rise of some EU-related issues.
The first hints come from the analysis of representative roles in Europe.
During the recent decades, the European political representatives have showed
a significant transformation from the standardized profiles shaped by themass
(and then catch-all) parties of the twentieth century. New challenges have
emerged, producing evident signs of unification and/or convergence among
political elites in Europe (Best, Cotta, and Verzichelli 2006). More recently,
the increased relevance of European-related issues in the patterns of national
political careers has determined new opportunities of growth for aspirant
‘decision makers’. It would seem that the course of a political career has not
greatly changed, with national offices still being clearly more important
than positions at EU level. However, this does not exclude specific skills in
EU-related issues being a crucial element for national political careers. Thus,
the political investment in supranational issues and the growing familiarity
with the multilevel governance can be an attractive perspective for a growing
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number of national politicians. Indeed, studies on the careerpatterns of national
politicians have stressed that someEUoffices represent a stepping stone towards
more attractive national positions (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005; Costa and
Rozenberg 2008).Moreover, an alternation betweennational and supranational
positions can be seen by career politicians as an opportunity to enlarge their
individual competences and strengthen their political influence. This scenario is
particularly compelling since it opens a new pattern of bi-directional career in
the EU landscape, thus replicating a structure of opportunity that can be seen in
some federal systems, such as Canada (Docherty 1996).
Studies on the transformation of EU politics lead to similar suggestions.
As Simon Hix (2008a) argues, national political parties remain uncontested
actors in the selection of the political elite, in an ‘upside-down polity’ where
national offices are still preferable to their equivalent EU offices. However, the
growing EU impact on a large set of policies, and the necessity of the major
national parties to build coalitions at the supranational level, determine in-
centives for the (national) party elites to deal with EU policies and to shape
their own preferences on these matters. This might determine a more intense
socialization of party politicians to the supranational sphere. Those politicians
who are able to increase their expertise in these fields can find very good pay-
off at the national as well as at the supranational level––as showed for instance
by the research on the crucial position of rapporteur within the European
Parliament (Kaeding 2004).
Other pieces of research have shown that the process of Europeanization
affects the sphere of (national) party organizations. In particular, as shown by
Poguntke et al. (2005), the role of EU ‘specialists’ in party life has apparently
been enhanced by the enlargement of the scope of EU governance. These
authors suggest that the increase of informal influence of EU specialists within
their own parties results in a change in their career patterns. However, inves-
tigations into this specific aspect are just beginning, and we do not havemuch
evidence with which to confirm such an assertion. Nevertheless, we know that
even the Eurosceptic parties can be affected by the Europeanization of politi-
cal life (Gautier 2007).
A different sector of the literature on European integration reveals that
policy makers––primarily political and economic elites––are increasingly ori-
ented towards playing a part in Europe. According to many scholars, relevant
fields of EU policy making converge in their dynamics, due to the predomi-
nance of new and flexible policy subsystems based on common attitudes and
shared values (see Richardson 2006 for a review). In these processes, new ideas
and new personalities emerge, through the encounter of very different experi-
ences and prerogatives, which determine peculiar policy environments called
by some authors epistemic communities (Verdun 1999) or advocacy coalitions
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(Sabatier 1998). In such a permeable system of policy subsystems, national
politicians need to add new knowledge and new linkages to their traditional
roles of constituency and party servants. This is particularly applicable to the
realm of national MPs, whose role is at the core of a totally renovated and
rather innovative model of representative democracy (Crum and Fossum
2009).
In light of our findings from the literature, we can now set out our working
hypotheses concerning the growing importance of the EU dimension in elite
career trajectories in Europe, and the increased interest in EU-related issues by
national elites. The aim of the empirical part of this chapter is (1) to determine
the proportion of national elites who have the ambition to ‘run Europe’; and
(2) to understand what factors are influencing the supranational career orien-
tations of European national elites.
As a first working hypothesis, we assume that the original gap between
economic elites already having a more supranational orientation and political
elites predominantly oriented towards national constituencies and policy
issues has been recently reduced. Although economic elites are involved in
processes of supranational bargaining from early in their career, and national
political elites remain typically anchored in the national political arena, we
see a number of indicators showing an increased interest of political elites in
the supranational dimension and in gaining cognitive control over EU issues.
In this line of reasoning, we would expect some empirical evidence showing
that European governance represents a complementary, rather than an alter-
native goal for career politicians. In other words, the national politicians who
deal with European affairs would still be a ‘minority of specialists’ in their
respective party organizations. However, given the factors outlined earlier, we
argue that the propensity of national representatives from EU member states
to see themselves in a broader and supranational political context should
somehow be significant today. In this way, the minority of EU specialists
should have became more numerous and, above all, more politically relevant.
Different structural factors can be identified as influencing variation in the
different degrees of elite socialization to Europe and their willingness to run
Europe. The first one we turn to is differences in party attitudes towards the
EU. However, since one reason for the growing attention to EU-related issues
by national politicians can be linked to the different degrees of involvement
of their own national parliament in European affairs, we can assume that
purely country-related factors may also play a decisive role in this aspect of
Europeanness.
In addition to our hypothesis on the increasing relevance of supranational
political careers, we suggest that the increase is related to a generational divide:
the new generation of politicians, which is less connected to old attitudes, is
more cosmopolitan in their outlook andapproach to extra-national experiences,
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such as learning new languages, while seasoned politicians of the older genera-
tion may be less inclined to change their inward-looking attitudes.
The hypotheses discussed so far, which are based on structural explanations
of variation in elites’ propensity to run Europe, could be refuted if our analyses
showed that variation is due more to elites’ attitudes than to political or socio-
demographic factors. We therefore formulate a further hypothesis stating that
variance in elites’ propensity to run in Europe is a function of differences in
their attitudes towards Europe. Here again, findings could point to totally
different factors. For example, we could find that a propensity to ‘run Europe’
is correlated with a strong attachment to Europe and a desire for deeper EU
integration. In this case we could argue that active participation in a European
party federation or the strong feeling of supranational identity are the best
predictors of national politicians’ future European career developments. On
the other hand, we could find that a higher trust in EU institutions is asso-
ciated with a desire to ‘run Europe’. This would suggest we consider an
explanation linked to the personal characteristics of national MPs, who
want to move where the institutions are more influential and where the
structure of opportunity seems more suitable for their ambitions. We could
also argue––adapting MaxWeber––that the Europeanization of a career might
be the result of a general process of professionalization of politics, whereby
political actors live off and for European politics.
Finally, if we find that a propensity to run Europe is linked to a preference
for deeper EU integration, it could be that elites’ existing levels of skills related
to EU issues are the decisive variable. In other words, those who feel them-
selves to be ‘specialized’ in EU issues will work towards increasing the scope of
EU governance in order to find a niche for their competences and reap the
concomitant rewards.
With regard to the hypotheses we have outlined, we now take a first look at
the IntUne dataset (see the Appendix for details) in order to refine and retest
them before drawing our conclusions.
3.3 Measures of National Elites’ Europeanness
In this sectionwe discuss the descriptive findings fromour analysis concerning
orientation towards a European career for both national political and eco-
nomic elites. As can be seen in Table 3.1, economic elites are more inclined
than their political counterparts to consider a career in Europe. This trend is
reversed in only three national groups (Greece, Lithuania, and Slovakia) where
politicians are more inclined than managers to consider a job at the European
level. Overall, however, the number of politicians aiming at furthering their
career in Europe remains lower, which is not unexpected given the propensity
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for economic elites to act in a multinational environment and the more
parochial, national orientation ofmost of politicians, especially parliamentary
backbenchers.
There is also no significant relationship between orientation towards a
European career and the geographical origins of the elites in our sample. In
Table 3.2, we have four groups of countries: the old core of EU founder
members; those joining the EU in the enlargement of the 1970s; those
included from the enlargement of the 1980s and 1990s; and the most recent
new members following the 2004 enlargement. This allows us to control the
distribution of our dependent variable by the ‘duration of the membership’
but also by a geographical divide: the West/East cleavage.
Table 3.1. Difference in the % of domestic elites who declare a
wish for a European career
Political elite Economic elite Difference
Austria 6.6 61.8 55.2
Czech Republic 6.5 41.5 35.0
France 27.1 58.5 31.4
Hungary 12.2 42.9 30.7
Estonia 34.4 61.1 26.7
Spain 20.2 43.4 23.2
Germany 1.3 21.2 19.9
Great Britain 26.0 45.0 19.0
Denmark 10.0 28.2 18.2
Belgium 20.5 34.1 13.6
Serbia 60.0 72.7 12.7
Bulgaria 30.1 37.5 7.4
Portugal 45.5 52.5 7.0
Italy 33.8 40.5 6.7
Poland 39.4 43.6 4.2
Greece 23.2 20.0 3.2
Lithuania 22.7 17.5 5.2
Slovakia 22.4 5.1 17.2
Total 22.1 38.6 16.5
Table 3.2. Orientation to pursue a career at the European level. Cross-tabulation by groups









Yes 123 39 143 217 519 160
% 27.2 23.1 30.4 27.6 27.8 33.4
No 329 130 327 562 1348 319
% 72.8 76.9 69.6 72.4 72.2 66.9
N 452 169 470 776 1867 479
Note: these data report the distribution of the answers to the question: ‘Are you considering pursuing a political/
professional career at the European level?’
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Table 3.2 shows the ‘duration of membership’ effect to be very limited. In
particular, the expected higher enthusiasm of national politicians from the
newmember states for a career at the European level is not evident––except for
Serbia that is, whose elites are extremely oriented towards a European career.
However, Serbia is a deviant case in our data set, being the only non-EU
member state included in the survey. This means that, since we cannot
control the trend in other significant non-EU and/or applicant countries, we
cannot use the Serbian interviews.
A correlation analysis reveals a limited number of variables to be signifi-
cantly correlated to elites’ (both political and economic) aims for a future
career in Europe (see Table 3.3). Although there is no clear polarization of
coefficients around a specific set of variables, there seems to be a stronger
correlation for some socio-structural and cultural indicators than for political
and attitudinal ones. In particular, elites who speak a number of European
languages have previous experience of living or studying abroad, want to be
informed by international media, are younger, and are more likely to run for a
European position. This confirms the plausibility of the cognitive dimension
of Europeanness. Conversely, having a degree, being attached to the EU, and
being oriented politically on a left–right scale are not very much correlated
with an ambition to work at the EU level.
When we restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of political elites, there is
little change. Most of the coefficients are slightly lower, but they show the
same level of significance and they rank in the same order of relevance,
Table 3.3. Orientation to pursue a European career: correlation analysis






Number of European languages spoken 0.169** 0.000 1867 0.176** 0.000 1285
Have you ever lived in another EU country? 0.200** 0.000 1865 0.171** 0.000 1224
Which has been the highest education
degree received?
0.112** 0.000 1852 0.114** 0.000 1214
Have you had any study experience
abroad?
0.156** 0.000 1815 0.140** 0.000 1181
Do you have close relatives or friends living
in or coming from another EU country?
0.166** 0.000 1853 0.162** 0.000 1261
Attachment to the European Union 0.095** 0.000 1834 0.087** 0.000 1206
How often do you use media from other
than your nation to inform yourself?
0.174** 0.000 1792 0.140** 0.000 1158
Left–right scale (0: right, 10: left) 0.063** 0.000 1773 0.063** 0.000 1283
Age 0.178** 0.000 1818 0.149** 0.000 1204
Notes: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The coefficients refer to the correlation between the variables listed in the table and the distribution of the answer to the
question ‘Are you considering pursuing a (political/professional) career at the European level?’ (1: yes; 0: No).
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whereby the above indicated socio-structural variables are more relevant than
EU attachment or political affiliation. This is also confirmed by other descrip-
tive cross-tabulations concerning only political elites, which we do not pres-
ent here for reasons of space.
Another interesting aspect to be explored here is the relation between a
supposed degree of ‘EU specialization’ and the propensity to follow a political
career in Europe. Two variables from our data set can be used here: Table 3.4
presents a cross-tabulation between our dependent variable and an index of
EU specialization, which was achieved by summing the results of two survey
questions: (1) ‘Have you, or have you had, a position in a European Party
federation?’; (2) ‘Have you sat, or are you currently sitting, on a parliamentary
committee on EU affairs?’. As can be seen in Table 3.4, a relation is suggested
between experience in EU affairs at the national level and interest in pursuing
a career at EU level. However, the relation seems rather weak in the small
group of national MPs (twenty-seven cases overall) whose EU experience is
already ‘complete’ (having both partisan and parliamentary experiences in the
field). Of these, only sixteen declare to be interested in a future commitment
in Europe.
A second variable we correlated with the propensity to follow an EU career is
that of an MP’s1 self-perceived ‘role’. In line with our expectations, those
national politicians who reported being open to a European career are more
likely to see themselves as ‘party representatives’ or ‘national representatives’,
while those identifying with the role of ‘constituency servant’ or ‘advocate of
specific interests’ are less inclined to a career at the EU level. However, differ-
ences between these categories are not great. The first two categories of MPs
include 26.5 and 23.0 per cent of the political elite sample, respectively, while
the other two categories have only 20.3 and 10.6 per cent, respectively.
Table 3.4. Propensity to an EU political career and experiences in EU-related issues
Experiences in EU- related offices Propensity to EU-related career
Yes No N
Complete 8.4 1.5 27
Medium 28.9 16.9 170
No experience 62.6 82.5 714
N 190 721 911
Note: a medium experience occurs when an MP has experienced one of the two positions: a position in a
European party federation, or a seat on a parliamentary committee on EU affairs. A complete experience is when
the MP has both experiences.
1 The question at stake here is ‘Do you think of yourself primarily as . . . ?’. Possible answers were:
‘Representative of your constituency’, ‘Representative of your party’, ‘Representative of a particular
social group’, and ‘Representative of the citizens of your country as a whole’.
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The descriptive analyses showed that identifying the variables influencing
availability for a career at the EU level is rather difficult. The fact that an
aspiration for a career at the EU level is only reported by a limited number of
respondents raises the interesting question why, if the interest of national
politicians for EU affairs is today relevant, so few politicians ready to specialize
in this arena can be found in the current European parliamentary elite. We
have also seen that an inclination to follow a career at the European level
seems to be weakly correlated with social and political background variables
and attitudinal orientations of the elite.
However, we can argue that the propensity to invest time in EU-related
issues seems to grow, since the quota of respondents considering a career as
MEP is about 20 per cent higher within the group of beginner MPs. In order to
explore the possible explanations of such a (new?) attitude of national politi-
cians, and to distinguish the factors that determine these specific aspects of
elite Europeanness, we need to refine the frame of working hypotheses listed
above, and explore the data in more depth.
3.4 Two Dimensions of Europeanness
On the basis of the descriptive analysis, we can confirm that the economic
elites are still more oriented to ‘run Europe’ than the national political elites.
However, it is interesting to note that the latter seem to be significantly
interested in pursuing a supranational career. Therefore, the following part
of the chapter will focus on an analysis of the politicians included in our data
set (and using only those from EU countries, thereby excluding the Serbian
political elites) utilizing multivariate and reduction data techniques (Biland,
Eideliman, and Gojard 2008). In order to identify the main dimensions of
political elites’ career patterns, we first undertook a Multiple Correspondence
Analysis (MCA). By means of a quantitative and qualitative approach, corre-
spondence analysis provides a simplified representation of the space defined
by these answers, which explores the contexts and conditions of MPs’ careers.
For the analysis, we used answers to ten questions from the IntUne ques-
tionnaire. These included three questions related to elites’ contacts with the
EU and/or international institutions; four questions related to their socializa-
tion and social origins; and three about their former and current parliamen-
tary positions. With regard to contacts, the participants were asked about the
frequency (weekly, monthly, every three months, yearly, etc.) of their contact
with EU institutions; the frequency of their contact with international institu-
tions; and about their contact with European interest groups, NGOs, and
parties. In relation to socialization and social origins, respondents were
asked about the extent of their international experience (friends, studies,
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stays abroad, and command of foreign languages); the frequency of their use
of international media; their level of education; and their country of origin.
Finally, they were asked about the number of parliamentary mandates they
had received; whether they had held positions as back- or frontbenchers; and
whether they had served on their national committee on EU affairs.
Using these ten independent variables, the first axis summarizes 7.05 per
cent of the variance in the answers, the second 4.7 per cent, and the third 4.34
per cent. The variances of these axes built on the ‘career question’ are signifi-
cant with regard to the forty-five answer categories. Correspondence analysis
allows for a substantive interpretation of these axes, as can be seen in the
graphical solution (Figure 3.1, infra). The analysis helps us to understand the
salience of the variables included here to represent contexts and conditions
forMPs’ European career ambitions. In our interpretation, wewill focus on the
first and the third axes extracted in the correspondence analysis (Table 3.5)
which depicts the Europeanization of social and institutional networks and
media use, rather than on the second axis, which is mainly directed by
country of origin and level of education.
A first relevant dimension emerging from the analysis is the distance
between two poles made up of ‘cosmopolitan MPs’ and ‘parochial MPs’.
Cosmopolitan MPs are in contact with non-EU and EU institutions every
week,2 or at least, once a month, and have a score of 5–6 on the index of
international socialization.3 They are more likely to be members of their
parliamentary EU affairs committee, they tend to have contacts with Euro-
pean interest groups, European social movements, and parties from other EU
countries, and they tend to use international media daily. They are tenured
members of their Parliament (typically having held more than four man-
dates), and they are frontbenchers with a high level of education (PhD).
They may, therefore, be defined as ‘cosmopolitan frontbenchers’, forming
part of a national Europeanized political elite (Haller 2008: 79). Country of
origin has less weight in defining this axis, although we see a correspondence
with MPs coming from Austria, Denmark, and Great Britain, and (to a lesser
extent) from Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece). The strong
Europeanness of these MPs is defined by their involvement in transnational
networks and by their having an internationalized lifestyle (Wagner 1998).
At the opposite pole we find parochial MPs. These do not show signs of
international socialization (including mastering foreign languages), and have
2 Answers defining this first pole of the first axis are mentioned hereafter in decreasing order of
their positive contribution to the first factorial axis. It means that the answers ‘contacts with non-
EU actors: every week’ display the highest weight to the first axis on the ‘cosmopolitans’ side.
3 This index, which goes from 0 to 6, was built by adding the values of four questions about
international experiences: ‘Do you have friends living in other countries’ (if yes, 1), ‘Did you study
or live abroad’ (for each question, if yes 1), and ‘Do you speak foreign languages’ (from 0 to 3).
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Table 3.5. Weights of each variable’s modality in the definition of the first and third factorial
axes
Dimension 1 Dimension 3
Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
every week
1.39544656 Frequencies of EU contacts: no
contact last year
1.280777897
International media uses: never 1.38855687 Accession date: second wave
(1973)
1.021836024
Frequencies of their EU contacts:
every week
1.25926847 Accession date: 1995 0.907856384
Number of international
socialization: 6
1.21615670 International media uses: never 0.859441615
Number of international
socialization: 0
1.10416017 Number of international
socialization: 6
0.750532837
Frequencies of EU contacts: no
contact last year
1.04789307 Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
every week
0.733339617
Frequencies of their non-EU
contacts: no contact last year





0.90127004 Level of education: lower than
secondary school
0.694601958
European contacts: no contact
at all
0.89500975 European contacts: no contact
at all
0.611074901
Member of the EU affair
committee: yes
0.82341592 European contacts: 2 contacts 0.606315524
Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
once per month
0.81952077 Frequencies of EU contacts: once
every three months
0.604094592
Frequencies of EU contacts:
once a year
0.79913834 Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
once every three months
0.585153411
European contacts: 3 0.77650483 Tenure: fourth tenure 0.563138424
International media uses:
every day
0.75732119 Accession date: first Eastern
enlargement (2004)
0.531365909
Tenure: fifth tenure 0.73219738 Tenure: third tenure 0.504909758
Number of international
socialization: 1
0.65863497 Frontbencher: yes 0.477664287
Level of education: PhD 0.64629900 Elements of international
socialization: 0
0.471212322
International media uses: from
time to time
0.53077970 Frequencies of their EU contacts:
every week
0.458962554
Frequencies of their non-EU
contacts: once a year
0.51210174 Tenure: fifth tenure 0.436281955
Frontbencher: yes 0.50875453 Level of education: university
degree
0.435965232
European contacts: 1 contact 0.48086657 Tenure: first tenure 0.411663095
Accession date: 1995 0.46917045 Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
no contact last year
0.379954986
Frequencies of EU contacts: once
per month
0.41086824 Elements of international
socialization: 5
0.349227530





0.38908083 European contacts: 3 contacts 0.318242612
Frontbencher: no 0.34609467 Frequencies of EU contacts: once
a year
0.305453387
Accession date: second wave
(1973)
0.34449422 Elements of international
socialization: 1
0.298015270
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no contacts with European and international institutions, interest groups,
social movements, or parties. They typically have only occasional contacts
with the EU and non-EU institutions, and they are in touch with only one of
the three European actors (interest groups, social movements, parties of other
EU countries). Their level of international socialization is usually limited, as
well as their use of international media. They are typically new to politics
(often in their first term in parliament), are backbenchers, and are not usually
members of the EU affairs committee. They have a lower level of education
(only primary or secondary) and often come from the Central-Eastern Euro-
pean countries, although national origins contribute less to the definition of
the parochial pole than to the cosmopolitan one of the first factorial axis. It is
noticeable here that the old core of the member states (Belgium, France,
Germany, and Italy) doesn’t contribute to this first axis. To understand the
Table 3.5. Continued
Dimension 1 Dimension 3
Number of international
socialization: 4
0.29093300 Elements of international
socialization: 3
0.270055986
Member of the EU affair
committee: no
0.26049219 European contacts: 1 contact 0.264672150
Frequencies of EU contacts: once
every three months
0.24176325 International media uses: from
time to time
0.244813153
Level of education: lower than
secondary school
0.23865229 Member of the EU affair
committee: yes
0.235507840
Level of education: secondary
completed
0.23416106 International media uses: every
day
0.219026505
International media uses: once
every week
0.17923617 Member of the EU affair
committee: no
0.193811179
Tenure: third tenure 0.16974565 Level of education: PhD 0.192157915
Level of education: master
degree





0.15421265 Tenure: second tenure 0.182233559
Accession date: first Eastern
enlargement (2004)
0.15395049 Frequencies of their non-EU
contacts: once per month
0.137002587
Accession date: last Eastern
enlargment (2007)
0.13927822 Frontbencher: no 0.132794847
Accession date: first generation
(1957)
0.09964488 Frequencies of their EU contacts:
once per month
0.127210158
Tenure: second tenure 0.08821328 Accession date: last Eastern
enlargement (2007)
0.123305291





0.04654582 Accession date: first generation
(1957)
0.040766339
Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
once every three months
0.02733633 Frequencies of non-EU contacts:
once a year
0.028647817
Level of education: university
degree
0.01831205 International media uses: once in
the week
0.009532188
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Europeanization of experiences and careers of MPs from these countries, we
have to look to other dimensions.
The third axis divides the sample between those who do not show particular
familiarity with the European multilevel governance and those with a strong
or weak Europeanization. On the one pole, we find MPs with some but little
European network and career experience. They have contacts with at least two
of the three European actors (interest groups, social movements, parties from
other EU countries), have low levels of contact to EU and international
institutions, and tend to use foreign media occasionally. They are typically
frontbenchers, experienced members of their Parliament (three or more man-
dates). With regard to their country of origin, they tend to come from Austria
or from the countries of the first wave of Eastern EU enlargement. We can say,
therefore, that these MPs show a low level of Europeanization. On the oppo-
site pole, we find MPs whose supranational experience and socialization are
either strong or non-existent. For instance, a typical profile of these MPs is to
have no contact with supranational institutions, no contact with European
actors, andmake no use of international media. At the same time, we find near
the same pole a cluster of MPs that is defined by weekly contact with EU
institutions, connections to all three European actors, and, to a lesser extent,
daily use of international media. They are either close to the ‘cosmopolitan’
profile (scoring five or six elements of international socialization) or to the
parochial profile (scoring zero or just one element). They are typically new-
comers in parliament and come from different Western countries that joined
the EEC in the first waves of enlargement (Denmark, Great Britain, Portugal,
Spain, and Greece).
The space created by these two axes reveals a map of MPs’ career Europea-
nization (Figure 3.1). In this map, we can see a clear differentiation in Euro-
pean career orientations (vertical axis) crossing the parochial vs. cosmopolitan
dimension (horizontal axis).4 Underlying this configuration is also an East/
West differentiation.
We may observe that the countries of the old core of European integration
are scattered in all partitions of this map, while the subgroups of representa-
tives of the different generations of latecomers can be distinguished. Themulti-
linear regressions of the countries on the axes (see Table 3.6) show that
Belgian, French, and German MPs are close to the centre of the first axis
with a large standard deviation. Other Western countries (with the exception
4 Old-core countries are distributed across all four segments. Those from the first Western and
the South-Western enlargements (1973 to 1986) are found distributed almost exclusively across the
upper two quadrants of the map, above the first solid line. Austria is primarily found within the
broken circle in the bottom right quadrant. The 2004-enlargement’s Eastern countries are found
clustered in the lower left quadrant towards the centre, but below the middle solid line. Romania
and Bulgaria are thinly but evenly distributed across all four segments.
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of Austria) are clearly divided into two groups: those with strong cosmopolitan
practices and socialization (top-right quadrant of Figure 3.1) are opposed to
those with strong parochial patterns of career (top-left part of Figure 3.1). The
Portuguese are at the Eurocentric side of the first axis and at the top of the
third axis, whereas SpanishMPs are strongly parochial. CEE countries typically
represent moderate Eurocentric positions: if MPs are mostly on the negative
side of the axis (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland),
they are close to the centre of thefirst axiswith a large standard deviation. They
have a realistic understanding of Europeanism, based on effective but weak
practices: the position of Hungary, for example, is far from the centre of the
second axis (0.248) with a 0.025 standard deviation. Austria is a particularly
interesting case, occupying the bottom-right quadrant of the map: MPs are
divided into groups of strong and weak levels of Europeanization and cosmo-








Last Eastern enlargment (2007)





Figure 3.1. Countries’ projection on the factorial plan (axes 1 and 3)
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Table 3.6. Multiple linear regressions of the countries on the first and third factorial axesa
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(|t|) Sig. level
Austria 0.235161 0.052472 4.482 8.05e06 ***
Belgium 0.005884 0.052799 0.111 0.911290
Bulgaria 0.069810 0.051836 1.347 0.178291
Czech Republic 0.152255 0.052799 2.884 0.003994 **
Denmark 0.226146 0.060967 3.709 0.000216 ***
Estonia 0.142095 0.055655 2.553 0.010787 *
France 0.111403 0.052472 2.123 0.033931 *
Germany 0.035549 0.052799 0.673 0.500879
Great Britain 0.108498 0.066786 1.625 0.104494
Greece 0.040312 0.049779 0.810 0.418191
Hungary 0.148139 0.052799 2.806 0.005094 **
Italy 0.114067 0.051526 2.214 0.027016 *
Lithuania 0.252909 0.052799 4.790 1.86e06 ***
Poland 0.344496 0.052799 6.525 9.69e11 ***
Portugal 0.342111 0.052799 6.480 1.30e10 ***
Slovakia 0.064597 0.052799 1.223 0.221377
Spain 0.112669 0.048708 2.313 0.020868 *
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4722 on 1318 degrees of freedom; Multiple
R-squared: 0.1236, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1123; F-statistic: 10.93 on 17 and 1318 DF, p-value: < 2.2e16
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.10718 0.33026 0.04094 0.30639 1.63415
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
0.86883 0.20427 0.02179 0.20609 1.17299
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(|t|) Sig. level
Austria 0.356841 0.024892 36.813 < 2e16 ***
Belgium 0.155613 0.025047 0.305 0.76048
Bulgaria 0.048466 0.024590 26.377 < 2e16 ***
Czech Republic 0.227008 0.025047 6.243 5.78e10 ***
Denmark 0.426795 0.028922 20.455 < 2e16 ***
Estonia 0.003501 0.026402 6.450 1.57e10 ***
France 0.056723 0.024892 0.972 0.33130
Germany 0.168568 0.025047 1.666 0.09590
Great Britain 0.371458 0.031683 16.087 < 2e16 ***
Greece 0.226909 0.023615 2.657 0.00797 **
Hungary 0.248613 0.025047 8.027 2.19e15 ***
Italy 0.019637 0.024444 4.875 1.22e06 ***
Lithuania 0.353325 0.025047 4.755 2.21e06 ***
Poland 0.240762 0.025047 8.373 < 2e16 ***
Portugal 0.335816 0.025047 1.323 0.18596
Slovakia 0.165707 0.025047 11.338 < 2e16 ***
Spain 0.284970 0.023107 2.547 0.01098 *
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.3095 on 1318 degrees of freedom; Multiple
R-squared: 0.388, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3801; F-statistic: 49.15 on 17 and 1318 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16l
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
0.86883 0.20427 0.02179 0.20609 1.17299
Note: a The estimate is the weight of each modality of the nationality variable on the axis. Pr(|t|) t measures the statistical
significance of the correlation between each modality (nationality) and the factorial axis. It is all the more significant that
it is close to zero.
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political elites has less to do with the structural consequences of the elite-
driven process of European integration than with the domestic structure of
opportunity of each national polity.
3.4.1 The Non-Relationship between Elites’ Europeanness and their
Europeanization
In a next step, we have tested regressions of the distribution of the indepen-
dent variables. This analysis confirmed that political and economic elites’
orientation to a European career does not necessarily overlap with Europhilia
in general (Gaxie and Hubé, Chapter 6 in this volume), or with other aspects
of Europeanness (Best, Chapter 10 in this volume).
With regard to political elites, in our findings, orientation towards a Euro-
pean career is weakly correlated with their sense of cosmopolitanism, but it is
also located close to a critical mass of parochial MPs who concentrate on their
national career. In general, however, we find that the correlation between
European career orientations and the third axis is very weak: both answers (yes
and no) are close to the centre (0.059 and 0.024) with a large standard
deviation (0.024 and 0.013)—see Table 3.7. To shed more light on the rela-
tions between Europeanness and Europeanization in terms of experiences and
socialization it is useful to look at the correlation of the career question with
the second axis of the correspondence analysis solution. This allows us to
understand the structure of opportunity implied by a national political career:
whereas for the oldest MPs in Western countries, whose careers are almost
entirely pursued at a national level, a European career option makes relatively
little sense, for young and Eastern frontbenchers a European career is an
attractive option.
We also tested the correlation between the career orientations of political
elites and their Europeanness. For this analysis we used the same two dimen-
sions identified by Gaxie and Hubé (Chapter 6, this volume) as scales of
Europhilia (the first dimension) and as strength of Europhile attitudes (the
second dimension). Again, we observe that there is no strong correlation
between Europhilia and Europeanness.5 Europeanized MPs are in fact sharing
Europhile opinions, but the correlation is weak. The only strong association is
one between MPs with lukewarm Europeanness and those with mid-level
European career orientations. On the other hand, those with strong Europea-
nized experiences and those with no European career orientation show the
highest levels of Europeanness (Table 3.8).
5 The Gaxie and Hubé scales are here reversed: the first axis is going from the Euro-critics to Euro-
supporters and from lukewarm to strong opinions. We do not present here all the tables for reasons
of space.
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As for party affiliations, MPs are also well scattered across this factorial plan.
Only few parties, the Greens, the New Left (although less strongly), and the
European Peoples’ Party strongly contribute to the cosmopolitan group,
whereas the Conservatives and extreme right parties contribute to define the
parochial pole. Other Christian Democrats, Right Liberals (although with less
weight), Agrarians, and Ethnic Minority Parties form the core of the opposite
pole. From these findings, we can assume that party ideologies do not provide
any strong cognitive pattern of Europeanness pushing national political elites
to ‘run Europe’.
We also observe that no other social background variables are correlated
with the Europeanization of career orientation. Young and female MPs are
mostly situated in the top-left quadrant of the factorial map (the strong
parochial and non-Europeanized area) but the correlation is not significant.
Their location on the map has probably more to do with their position as
structural outsiders in the national political field, than with their Europeani-
zation. Finally, it is not surprising to find a strong correlation between MPs
speaking English and their positions in the top-right quadrant of the map.
3.4.2 Strongly Europeanized Elites are in the Minority
In order to complete the analysis of our map of MPs’ Europeanness, we
conducted an ascendant hierarchical classification. The objective was to find
Table 3.7. Multiple linear regressions of the wish to pursue a European career on the first
and third axes
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Yes 0.18811 0.02978 6.316 3.75e10 ***
No 0.05119 0.01587 3.225 0.00129 **
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01* p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4903 on 1223 degrees of freedom; (110 observations
deleteddue tomissingness);Multiple R-squared: 0.0395, AdjustedR-squared: 0.03793; F-statistic: 25.15on2 and1223DF,
p-value: 1.986e11
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.29855 0.36621 0.02967 0.33230 1.37083
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Yes 0.05978 0.02407 2.484 0.0131 *
No 0.02425 0.01283 1.890 0.0590
Note : *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 1; Residual standard error: 0.3962 on 1223 degrees of freedom; (110
observations deleted due to missingness); Multiple R-squared: 0.007901, Adjusted R-squared: 0.006279;
F-statistic: 4.87 on 2 and 1223 DF, p-value: 0.007823
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
0.960449 0.281800 0.009638 0.264782 1.170424
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distinct clusters of European political representatives by applying an algo-
rithm that minimizes intra-group and maximizes inter-group distances. The
best optimization revealed eight clusters scattered across the factorial map,
which could be further aggregated into three national elite groups. The first
group comprised ‘Europeanized and cosmopolitan’ MPs, representing 25 per
cent of all national MPs in our sample, with a core of only about 10 per cent
being fully Europeanized. The second group represents one third of the sam-
ple (31 per cent) and is the ‘parochial family’. This group does not really show
a significant degree of Europeanness and may therefore still be considered as
that of nationally oriented politicians. Nevertheless, their attitudes towards
Europe can differ. About 44 per cent of MPs fall in the third group, which
consists of MPs who appear to be detached from European supranational
networks and socialization agencies. Here we can distinguish two subgroups:
Eastern Eurosceptics (25 per cent), and Western Europhiles (19 per cent).
3.4.3 The Europeanized and Cosmopolitan Family
The group of ‘Europeanized and cosmopolitan’ MPs can also be further
divided into two subgroups. The first is the fully Europeanized minority (N =
95, 10 per cent) of MPs who are continuously in contact with EU and non-EU
institutions, with social and political groups, andwho use international media
every day. They also have a high score of international socialization (between
5 and 6), are often tenuredMPs (four or five terms), frontbenchers, members of
the EU affair committee, and are highly educated (to PhD level). They tend to
be Europhiles who are in favour of a broader delegation of power to EU
institutions. These champions of Europeanness are a minority in our sample
and are not characterized by social or national specificities, thus becoming
more and more similar to the superelite of Eurocrats leading EU institutions
(Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007a and b; Poehls 2009) or to the international
representatives of other supranational organizations (Wagner 1998).
Table 3.8. Multiple linear regressions of the scale of attitudes towards the European
construction on the first factorial axis
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Attitude scale (axis1) 0.04225 0.02478 1.705 0.0885
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.5009 on 1334 degrees of freedom; Multiple
R-squared: 0.002174, Adjusted R-squared: 0.001426; F-statistic: 2.906 on 1 and 1334 DF, p-value: 0.08848
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.33291 0.36633 0.03819 0.31861 1.49187
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The second subgroup, representing about one in six MPs (N = 154, 16 per
cent), has rather similar properties in comparison to the fully Europeanized
subgroup, the main difference being the frequency of their contacts with EU
and non-EU institutions. They also represent a lower level of tenure in parlia-
ment (three terms) and a lower score of international socialization (scores
from 4 to 6). This subgroup comprises mainly Eastern Europeans (59.9 per
cent of this class) and is not characterized by specific attitudes towards Euro-
pean integration, meaning that their Europeanization is only weakly linked to
pro-European attitudes. These two subgroups are the only ones structured by
the firm wish to pursue a career at the European level (37 per cent of MPs in
the first group and 27 per cent in the second). As a result, we may say that
Europeanness is only specific to a minority of national European politicians
who have ambitions to ‘run Europe’.
3.4.4 The Parochial Family
About one third of the sample is located in the parochial quadrant and can be
further divided into three subgroups. The first (N = 119, 12 per cent) represents
the strictly parochial group, whose MPs have little or no contact with EU and
non-EU institutions alike, or with European social or political actors. They are
primarily first-term backbenchers, are not members of the EU affairs commit-
tee, use no international media, and cannot be characterized by any particular
national origin. We can further distinguish two subgroups of Western MPs,
representing 16 per cent (N = 155) and 3 per cent (N = 33) of the sample,
respectively. Both groups are very similar, but with the first group showing
more contacts with both European and non-European institutions, and some
use (once a week) of international media. They are typically backbenchers,
coming mainly from Greece, Spain, and Portugal, with limited parliamentary
experience (two terms), with a moderate level of higher education (80 per cent
have a university degree) and a mid-range level of international socialization
(two elements). They come predominantly from mainstream parties, 36 per
cent being Conservatives and 48 per cent Social-Democrats. In this subgroup
we also see a disconnection between attitudinal Europeanness and structural
Europeanization, in that the MPs in this group tend to express positive views
towards European integration. They strongly agree that the powers of the
European Parliament should be strengthened, approve of a common system
of social security, and have a high level of trust in the European Commission
(scores of 7 to 10 on the trust scale). In other words, in this group of Western
backbenchers and members of governmental parties, the European level does
not play any role in their career ambitions, even if they are in favour of a
growing role of EU institutions. At the same time, we find a Eurosceptic
subgroup (3 per cent) of MPs coming from countries at the old core of the
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EU (mainly France; 48 per cent of the subgroup) and sharing negative views
towards the European Commission (scores 0 to 4 on the trust scale). The most
recurrent party families in this subgroup are Communists and Conservatives.
3.4.5 The Detached, Partially Europeanized Family
According to our map, the largest group is that comprising detached and
partially Europeanized MPs, who represent about 44 per cent of the sample.
Two main subgroups can be distinguished. The first (N = 246, 25 per cent)
comprises MPs who tend to be moderately Europeanized and Eurosceptic
Eastern frontbenchers with little contact with European actors and institu-
tions (one contact every three months or once a year). They have no regular
use of international media, show two elements of international socialization,
and typically have a high level of education (i.e. a Masters degree). They are
mainly under fifty years of age, newcomers to parliament, frontbenchers, and
are not members of the EU affairs committees. The most represented party
families are liberals and right-liberals, while themost represented countries are
those of the first Eastern enlargement (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Lithuania), representing 95 per cent of the group. They also
tend to express strong negative views towards European integration, favour a
national army, are very attached to their country (85 per cent), and much less
attached to the EU (16 per cent). We can say, therefore, that while these
Eurosceptics agree to and actually act at the European level, the European
political sphere does not feature in their future career plans. In this way, we
can say that they are detached from the European level.
There is also a subgroup of Western Europhiles (N = 134, 13 per cent) who
share the same indifference towards a European career. However, when we
look at their other attitudes and at their respective parliamentary positions,
they present the opposite image to that of the Eurosceptic group. Indeed,
these MPs often have a low level of European experience (no more than one
contact between one and three months), have occasional contacts with Euro-
pean social and political actors, and use international media from time to
time. Overall, the low level of Europeanization of these MPs puts them at the
bottom of the map. In terms of background, they are well educated, senior
MPs, over fifty, backbenchers, and non-members of the EU affairs committee.
They come mainly from the old-core countries (mostly from Germany, Italy,
and France; 90 per cent of this subgroup). Contrary to the Eastern Euroscep-
tics, this subgroup shows support towards further European integration, is in
favour of a unified tax system for Europe, and supports a common system of
social security. They also report a high level of trust in the European Parlia-
ment (scores 7 to 10 on the trust scale). They form the core of those MPs for
whom the European political sphere is not part of their immediate career
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trajectory, and probably will not be in the future. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that these MPs are not pro-European.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have measured the extent of national elites’ orientation
towards a European career and explored the possible factors explaining this
orientation. The basic finding was that there are few politicians with such an
orientation and they are less numerous than those who explicitly exclude the
prospect of a European career. Although economic elites appear more familiar
with working in a supranational environment, even in this case, most of them
do not anticipate a European career trajectory. In the case of political elites,
attention to EU issues in general does not mean they consider the European
level as a structure of opportunity for their future careers.
These findings seem somewhat at odds with utilitarian theories of attitudes
towards European integration (Binnema and Crum 2007; Dell’Olio 2005).
Whereas mass surveys show that positive views of European integration are
more likely the higher the levels of education, income, and social status, here
we see that the Europeanization of careers has little to do with general atti-
tudes towards European integration.
There is no straightforward explanation for differences in elites’ attitudes
towards office seeking at the EU level, and as our analyses have shown, there
are no clear direct relations between a given social or political background and
an inclination for a European career. The situation seems to be in the making,
and the few politicians who are interested to run Europe are probably moved
by different motivations. At the same time, there are revealing findings
showing that the process of Europeanization of political careers in Europe has
to do with different dimensions, somehow comparable to the dimensions of
Europeanness analysed by Best (Chapter 10, this volume): the cognitive dimen-
sion of Europeanness is present among those MPs who are typically more
informed and capable to deal with European issues, although they remain
representatives of a ‘national polity’. The emotive dimension seems to be more
present in a very select cluster of MPs who aspire to play a role in Europe,
simply because they feel and demonstrate their attachment to the EU. Finally,
a greater political investment in EU-related issues, as well as the desire for an
EU-related office in the future, can be interpreted for some groups of politi-
cians as evidence of the perception of a wider structure of opportunity, where EU
issues and offices can be considered in the future.
Country- and most likely party-specific factors are at work in determining
this compound framework of skills, ambitions, and opportunities. These fac-
tors can enhance the Europeanization of political careers, but theymay also be
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(and more frequently) intervening factors showing the resistances and the
distances between the EU polity and traditional national institutions. Of
course, this crucial aspect deserves more specific attention, but in order to
give fully fledged comparative explanations of the reason for the differentiated
patterns of Europeanization of political careers, a coherent and consistent
diachronic set of data is needed with which to control the trend country by
country and party by party. This will form the next step in our research
agenda.
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4
National elites’ preferences on the
Europeanization of policy making
José Real-Dato, Borbála Göncz, and György Lengyel
4.1 Introduction
European integration can be described as a process of reallocation of policy-
making competencies between member states and supranational institutions.
Since the Treaty of Rome, and following subsequent treaties and reforms,
decision-making processes in many policy areas have moved from the
traditional state sovereignty to intergovernmental and supranational arenas
(Börzel 2005; Wessels and Kielhorn 1999; Schmitter 1996). Nevertheless,
research on citizens’ attitudes towards the Europeanization of specific policy
areas has been less frequent than that concerning general support for
European integration. Only recently has research on this topic been under-
taken, mostly interested in explaining the factors determining public opinion
towards the Europeanization of specific policy domains (i.e. Dalton and
Eichenberg 1998; Vössing 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the structure
of the European political space according to specific policy preferences (Gabel
and Anderson 2002), and on the role of the outputs of Europeanized policies
in fostering a European identity (Kritzinger 2005).
There are fewer studies on elites’ preferences concerning the Europeaniza-
tion of specific policy domains, mainly as a consequence of the scarcity of
data.1 Some exceptions are Wessels and Kielhorn (1999), who analysed the
1 The survey amongmembers of national parliaments conducted in 1996 in eleven EU countries
within the umbrella of the Political Representation in Europe research project included a question
of whether a number of policy areas (seventeen) should be decided at the national or at the
European level (‘European Study of Members of Parliament 1996’ Core questionnaire <http://
www.wzb.eu/~wessels/Downloads/Quest&Codebooks/CORE-MNP1.pdf> (accessed 18 December
2011)). Similarly, the survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe also in 1996 on behalf of the
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driving forces behind the Europeanization of national policy competencies,
and the differences in preferences among policy areas and countries, and types
of elites; and Hooghe (2003), who compared public and political elites’ pre-
ferences on policy Europeanization, and attempted to explain the variation
and underpinning logic.
In this chapter, we follow the line of these previous works, believing that
the study of specific policy preferences has the virtue of providing ‘a more
fine-grained measure’ (Hooghe 2003: 283) of national elites’ views of the
European integration process. The reasons behind national elites’ support
of the transfer of former national (sub-national) powers to supranational
institutions where their influence on decision making is lower or uncertain
constitute a major puzzle when studying European integration. Besides this,
it is useful to explore whether patterns of support differ according to policy
area. These differences can be seen as an expression of the multidimen-
sional nature of the forces and conflicts behind the process of European
integration. In this respect, this chapter aims to contribute to the debate on
the configuration of the European political space of contestation (Gabel and
Anderson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Hix 1999).
The elite survey of the IntUne project provides the necessary data with
which to explore these questions. In addition, compared to previous studies,
it adds new value in three aspects. First, it allows us to compare the views
of political elites (national MPs) with those of economic elites, an aspect
not dealt with by previous works, and where difference in preferences over
Europeanization between the two types of elites would suggest the impact of
political authority. Second, we are able to contrast attitudes in the short term
with those in the long term in order to look for different time frames
concerning the support of policy-making Europeanization. Finally, it enables
us to explain patterns of support using not only individual but also country-
level variables.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First we offer a description
of national elites’ preferences concerning the Europeanization of a number of
policy areas covered by the IntUne elite survey. Then, in order to account
for such preferences, we review the main theories explaining support of
policy-making Europeanization and set a number of propositions, which are
subsequently tested and discussed in the corresponding sections. The chapter
ends with a brief summary of the main findings in our analysis.
European Commission among several groups of national elites (‘top decision makers’) in the fifteen
member states (Spence 1997) included a question on fourteen policy areas, where respondents had to
choose on a ten-point scale whether each policy area should be dealt with ‘exclusively at the national
or regional level’ or ‘exclusively at the European level’.
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4.2 Descriptive Analysis of Policy-Making Preferences
In this section we briefly examine our dependent variables. Two types of
questions in the IntUne elite survey refer to preferences concerning the Eur-
opeanization of policy making; one relates to the preferred level of policy
making, ranging from the sub-national level to the full allocation of decision-
making authority to European Union institutions, with regard to a number of
policy areas: namely, unemployment, immigration, environment, fighting
crime, health care, and taxation. The second type of question examined relates
to the agreement with the full long term (within ten years) Europeanization of
taxation, social security, and foreign policy. Despite some limitations, the
catalogue of variables covers the spectrum of activities performed by contem-
porary states—basic sovereignty and security functions (foreign policy, fight-
ing crime, and immigration), economic regulation and distribution (taxation),
welfare (health care, social security, and unemployment), and activities con-
cerning post-materialist values (environment). Thus, the preferences of
national elites in each of these policy areas may be used as a proxy for the


























Immigration Environment Fight against
crime
Health care Taxation
National or sub-national Shared Europeanized
Figure 4.1. Preferred level of government in policy areas (political and economic elites)
(valid percentages)
Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: Environment = 1988; Immigration = 1992; Fight against crime
= 1990; Taxation = 1988; Fighting unemployment = 1987; Health care = 1989.
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In order to have amore parsimonious view of the preferred level of authority
over policy making, we have recoded the variables and regrouped the original
categories, which comprised different combinations of national, regional, and
European levels of government, into three categories: (1) authority only at
national or sub-national level, (2) shared authority between national/sub-
national and EU levels, and (3) full authority at the supranational/EU level
(Figure 4.1).2
Looking at the distribution of preferences along these categories, there seems
to be an underlying pattern regarding levels of government preferences depend-
ingonpolicy area: national and sub-national levels are clearly preferred inhealth
care, unemployment, and taxation. In contrast, participants clearly show a
preference for the Europeanization of environment and immigration policies.
Finally, despite the fact that 40.6 per cent prefers the fight against crime to
remain under national and/or sub-national authority, the proportion of those
preferring shared or full Europeanized control shows that there is a general
feeling about the importance of the EU level of government in dealing with
this policy area. These results are verymuch in line withWessels and Kielhorn’s
(1999: 177)hypothesis that the level of Europeanizationof a policy areadepends
on the cross-border character of the problem it addresses—more globalized
problems, such as environmental issues and immigration, are more acceptable
as areas to be dealt with at the EU level. We examine this in greater detail in the
following paragraphs.
Factor analysis (Table 4.1.) confirms this underlying pattern regarding levels
of government preferences depending on policy area both on the whole
sample and by type of elite. Although the factor solutions are not quite robust,
Table 4.1. Factor analysis of level of policy-making variables
All Political elites Economic elites
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
Fighting unemployment 0.030 0.448 0.170 0.431 0.126 0.487
Immigration policy 0.440 0.141 0.454 0.256 0.468 0.282
Environment policy 0.845 0.129 0.782 0.112 0.782 0.097
Fight against crime 0.396 0.178 0.416 0.325 0.445 0.222
Health care policy 0.057 0.572 0.087 0.482 0.150 0.566
Taxation 0.105 0.515 0.244 0.484 0.255 0.557
Explained variance 33.415 32.055 35.624
KMO (sig.) 0.734 0.734 0.718
Note: method of extraction: principal axis factoring; method of rotation: oblimin for the whole sample (factors are
correlated); varimax for subsamples (factors are uncorrelated).
2 We have also considered as missing values the ‘none of them’ responses.
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factor loadings reveal the same underlying structure. In the first factor, envi-
ronment policy has the highest loadings, followed by immigration policy, and
finally fighting crime. Policies with high loadings on the second factor are
health care, taxation, and unemployment.
These patterns of policy-making preferences fit into Wessels and Kielhorn’s
(1999) ‘globalization of problems’ hypothesis, and more specifically into the
sub-hypothesis about the ‘cross-border’ (transnational) character of problems.
Respondents favour Europeanization where a policy is related to a problem
requiring cooperation between countries. This is clearly the case with envi-
ronment and immigration, to which Wessels and Kielhorn also attribute
a high cross-border nature (1999: 178). Regarding the fight against crime,
recent developments in economic globalization, technologies, and the grow-
ing phenomenon of organized crime crossing the borders of member states
(profiting from freedom of circulation within the EU) have clearly raised
awareness of the need for a more coordinated, even common, approach.
Wessels and Kielhorn also expected that a convergence of problems
between countries (what they term problem ‘load’) (1999: 177–8) would lead
to a stronger desire for higher Europeanization, although to a lesser extent
than in the case of cross-border problems. Our cross-sectional elite data only
allows us to state that significant differences in terms of readiness for the
Europeanization of problem solving still exist across countries. Furthermore,
preferences for the Europeanization of tackling unemployment––one of the
policy areas to which Wessels and Kielhorn attributed a high degree of con-
vergence across countries (1999: 178)––are lower than those concerning taxa-
tion, a policy area which allegedly has a low ‘load’.
This general pattern of differential preferences between policies concerning
transnational problems and the other policy areas is generally reproduced
within the countries, although there are variations concerning the intensity
of preferences according to policy area (Table 4.2). However, in all countries, the
percentages of those who favour some kind of Europeanization (full or shared)
in policy areas of ‘transnational’ nature are always higher than those in any of
the other policy fields. The only exception is the strong support in France for
the Europeanization of taxation, which is even higher than for fighting crime.
Along with these general patterns, there are differences among countries, as
can be seen in Table 4.2. For instance, elites in two Baltic countries, Estonia
and Lithuania, seem to bemore zealous concerning national sovereignty in all
policy areas, while French national elites tend to have amore pro-EU standing.
Nevertheless, apart from these outstanding cases, there is much variation
between countries according to policy area, which suggests that a more
sophisticated analysis is needed to shed light on underlying patterns.
Concerning the type of elite, Figure 4.2 shows how economic elites are on
the whole slightly more pro-European than political ones in all policy areas
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Table 4.2. Preferred level of government in policy areas (valid percentages by country)
Immigration Environment Fight crime Unemployment Health care Taxation
N/S S EU N/S S EU N/S S EU N/S S EU N/S S EU N/S S EU
Austria 28.1 16.7 55.3 16.7 20.2 63.2 35.7 19.1 45.2 50.9 14 35.1 85.2 8.7 6.1 56.1 14.9 28.9
Belgium 17.7 19.4 62.9 14.5 26.6 58.9 26.6 40.3 33.1 63.7 25 11.3 70.2 22.6 7.3 44.7 30.9 24.4
Bulgaria 28.2 56.5 15.3 22.8 66.7 10.6 35.4 57.5 7.1 62.9 33.1 4 54.4 40.8 4.8 60 37.6 2.4
Czech republic 27.9 13.9 58.2 31.1 16.4 52.5 54.5 19 26.4 72.7 10.7 16.5 85.2 6.6 8.2 73 9.8 17.2
Denmark 40 13 47 15 13 72 34 29 37 76.3 14 9.7 85 5 10 75.8 7.1 17.2
Estonia 47.3 15.2 37.5 60.4 17.1 22.5 75.9 13.4 10.7 83 8 8.9 93.8 4.5 1.8 86.6 9.8 3.6
France 5.9 47.1 47.1 7 45.2 47.8 23.3 52.6 24.1 35.3 52.1 12.6 53.9 34.8 11.3 19.3 48.7 31.9
Germany 26.3 13.6 60.2 15.3 14.4 70.3 42.4 19.5 38.1 78 11 11 83.1 7.6 9.3 60.2 12.7 27.1
Greece 17.5 60 22.5 14.2 63.3 22.5 36.1 54.6 9.2 39.3 52.5 8.2 50.4 43.7 5.9 44.9 43.2 11.9
Hungary 38 12.4 49.6 15.6 26.2 58.2 32.8 33.6 33.6 65.3 16.5 18.2 76.9 14 9.1 43 26.4 30.6
Italy 15.9 19.8 64.3 19 23.8 57.1 43.7 27.8 28.6 52.4 17.5 30.2 72.2 15.9 11.9 55.6 22.2 22.2
Lithunia 55.1 2.5 42.4 42.4 8.5 49.2 72 3.4 24.6 82.2 0 17.8 86.4 2.5 11 64.4 6.8 28.8
Poland 31.4 55.1 13.6 20 67.5 12.5 23.3 68.3 8.3 52.1 42 5.9 74.2 23.3 2.5 64.2 35 0.8
Portugal 13.3 16.7 70 10 18.3 71.7 32.5 26.7 40.8 47.5 15.8 36.7 74.2 10.8 15 43.3 15.8 40.8
Spain 25 24.3 50.7 26.4 31.1 42.6 36.6 37.9 25.5 65.5 23.6 10.8 76.2 19 4.8 52.7 24.3 23
Slovakia 35.6 11.9 52.5 24.8 24.8 50.4 45.3 22.2 32.5 87.3 5.9 6.8 88.9 5.1 6 88.1 5.9 5.9
United Kingdom 32.9 55.7 11.4 14.3 51.4 34.3 44.3 50 5.7 65.7 28.6 5.7 85.7 11.4 2.9 83.6 13.4 3
Total 28.2 26.2 45.7 21.9 31.2 46.9 40.6 33.7 25.7 63.2 21.9 14.9 75.8 16.6 7.6 58.7 22 19.3
Note: N/S = ‘Subnational and national level’; S = ‘Shared powers between subnational/European or national/European levels or the three of them’; EU = ‘European level’.
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Somewhat in favourNeither against nor in favour
Somewhat againstStrongly against
Figure 4.3. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years (valid
percentages)
Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: unified tax system = 1992; Common Social Security = 1995;
single foreign policy = 1998.
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Table 4.3. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by country (valid percentages)
Unified tax system for Europe Common system of social security Single foreign policy
Somewhat in favour Strongly in favour Somewhat in favour Strongly in favour Somewhat in favour Strongly in favour
Austria 36 28.9 31.6 18.4 39.5 44.7
Belgium 38.5 27 39.7 19.8 37.9 57.3
Bulgaria 34.9 36.5 36.5 44.4 28 64.8
Czech Republic 28.1 9.9 29.5 10.7 43.4 31.1
Denmark 22.2 7.1 33 9 40 43
Estonia 30.9 2.7 50 14.5 41.5 50.9
France 23.8 53.3 41.2 37.8 17.4 74.4
Germany 30.2 32.8 29.1 15.4 36.8 50.4
Greece 27.9 50.8 32 57.4 16.1 80.6
Hungary 44.3 27 36.4 44.6 38.5 55.7
Italy 67.5 87.9 90.4
Lithuania 32.8 26.9 39.2 30 40.8 51.7
Poland 41.3 16.5 32.8 30.3 35.5 42.1
Portugal 50.8 17.8 57.1 26.1 40.8 49.2
Spain 49.3 25.7 61.5 23.6 36.5 56.1
Slovakia 26.1 8.4 31.7 18.3 33.6 50.4
United Kingdom 1.4 4.3 1.4 37.1 8.6
Total 31.5 26.9 35.4 29.9 32.8 54.5
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except for tackling unemployment. However, differences between the two
elite groups are only statistically significant in the case of taxation, health
care, and environmental policy making.
With regard to the second type of question (those referring to the preferences
of elites concerning the Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign
policy within the next ten years), the majority of respondents favour Europea-
nization in all three policy areas (Figure 4.3). The Europeanization of foreign
policy obtains the greatest support among European elites, while the level of
consensus on the policy areas of taxation and social security are somewhat
lower.
In all, the general pattern seen for short-term preferences in relation to the
Europeanization of policy areas is repeated on the long term within countries,
and variation between countries is also found (Table 4.3). Here, the case of the
United Kingdom is particularly interesting, in that both types of national elites
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Figure 4.4. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by type
of elite (valid percentages)
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(political and economic) are overwhelmingly against the full Europeanization
of social security and taxation, and although somewhat less vehement in their
rejection, they are still the elites most against a single foreign policy.
Concerning the type of elite––as with short-term preferences––economic
elites are more in favour of the Europeanization within a ten-year term of
foreign policy and taxation (Figure 4.4). In contrast, they show a less favour-
able attitude towards social security, where political elites have amore positive
stance. Again, there are differences across countries and between elite groups
across the three policy areas, but less so than for short-term preferences.
4.3 Theories Explaining National Elites’ Policy-Making
Preferences
The literature on European integration has identified a number of drivers
accounting for the process. First, there is the hypothesis that the Europeaniza-
tion of policy making can be explained as a result of functional needs: policy
making should be transferred to the European Union in the hope that it
contributes to better problem solving or that the subsequent economies
of scale produce more efficient results (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht
2001). This is the rationale behind the functionalist theory of European
integration, and it is consistent with the globalization of problems perspec-
tive. Similarly, there is the argument that economic internationalization is a
driver for European integration. International economic interdependence
undermines national governments’ ability to control economic actors and
transactions in their own territory (Schmidt 2002: 18), so that it is logical for
national elites (mostly economic elites) to favour Europeanization ‘in order to
have the same conditions of market participation with respect to the structure
of regulation, incentives, and the like’ (Wessels and Kielhorn 1999: 184), and
that this should be mainly in policies directly affecting a country’s economic
performance.
An alternative driver to explain policy-making preferences––and one that
may be considered to be closely related to the functional explanation––is the
instrumental-evaluative argument taken from public opinion research (Gabel
1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), which is based
on the reasoning that people support Europeanization if they can derive
direct benefits from the EU. Concerning elites, it is plausible to think that
they are more homogeneous as a group than the general public, and
that their usually more affluent position makes direct material benefits less
important. However, it is possible to apply a ‘sociotropic’ extension of this
utilitarian argument in their case (Hooghe and Marks 2005)––elites may
The Europe of Elites
76
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
evaluate Europeanization of policy making based on the effect they perceive
it may have on their countries’ welfare, rather than on their own per se. This
evaluative judgement may also be extended to the perception of the func-
tioning of European institutions compared to national ones (Rohrschneider
2002; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).
Political attitudes play an important role in shaping the degree of support
for the European Union, and perhaps one of the most important attitudes
with regard to EU integration is that of ideology. Certainly, the relationship
between ideology and positions taken on EU integration has been widely
discussed and is part of the debate about the configuration of the European
political space (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Gabel and Anderson 2002).
According to Marks and Steenbergen, four basic standpoints have been
distinguished regarding ideology—interpreted in the sense of left–right posi-
tioning, ideology is irrelevant to understand anti- or pro-integration positions
(a position shared by realist, intergovernmentalist, and neo-functionalist the-
ories on EU integration). In this way, elites’ preferences on Europeanization
should not be influenced by their ideological positions. A second stance is that
ideology and integration collapse in one dimension (Tsebelis and Garrett
2000), that is, the politization of the European integration debate implies
that actors take the dimensions of national debate to the European level. In
this case, variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy areas
would be explained by ideological positions. According to the third approach,
the European space is formed by two basic unrelated dimensions (Hix and
Lord 1997). Thus, domestic conflict over socio-economic issues cannot be
extrapolated to the European level, where the dominant dimension is that
of national sovereignty, ranging from independence to integration. The ide-
ology dimension would express a cleavage between functional groups, while
the national sovereignty dimension involves a cleavage between territorial
groups (Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 884). Thus, ideology would not explain
variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Finally,
Hooghe and Marks (1999) propose a fourth vision of the European political
space. They identify two dimensions: the first runs along the ideological
spectrum (left–right), ranging from social democracy to market liberalism;
and the second refers to European integration, ranging from nationalism to
supranationalism. According to the authors, these dimensions are related,
collapsing into a diagonal dimension with its extremes lying between regu-
lated capitalism (encompassing centre-leftist and pro-supranational positions)
and neo-liberalism (combining rightist views and an acceptance of European
integration limited to minimal regulation––economic and monetary––that
allows markets to work more efficiently).
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When dealing with political ideology it is also important to take into
account the extremeness of ideological positions’ (Aspinwall 2002). Thus,
centrist voters would tend to be more open to international interdependence
and support European integration on an instrumentalist basis while extreme
voters are more likely to reject the idea of the EU, but for different reasons:
extreme left-wing voters see the EU as too much in favour of a liberal free
market, while extreme right-wing voters reject the supranational character of
the EU.
Along with ideology, identity also arises as a factor to be taken into
account in explaining attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe and
Marks 2005, 2008; Risse 2006; Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004; Carey
2002; Diez-Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Identity issues have gained
strength as a defining axis of political conflict, forming a ‘new politics’
dimension along with other issues (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards
2006). To be more precise, the post-functionalist view claims that identifica-
tion with territorial communities (national or sub-national) plays a decisive
role in issues where economic implications are unclear and where there are
strong communal implications (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). However, it is
not the degree of territorial attachment that is important, but the exclusive-
ness of the attachment, i.e. the extent to which national or sub-national
identities are viewed to be incompatible with European identity (Hooghe
and Marks 2005). In this respect, exclusive attachment to national or
sub-national territorial levels would be a factor fostering positions against
Europeanization. Nevertheless, the proponents of this idea argue that
elites’ preferences are not greatly influenced by identification (Hooghe and
Marks 2008).
Finally, in explaining elites’ preferences on Europeanization it is also
necessary to consider the effect of country-specific institutional and socio-
economic configurations, and their mediating influence on other explanatory
variables (Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). For example,
Vössing (2005) shows how public opinion on EU policy making depends
significantly on nationality, behind which are a number of institutional ele-
ments that may influence policy positions. For example,Wessels and Kielhorn
(1999) have argued that political elites in corporatist countries are not likely to
favour Europeanization in policies directly affecting organized interests,
because such a process would undermine their position in internal policy
making. Besides, and related to the above-mentioned globalization hypothe-
sis, these authors test the influence of a country’s degree of economic inter-
nationalization on the level of national elites’ support for policy-making
Europeanization.
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From the different theoretical arguments set out in this section, we have
determined a number of propositions displayed in Table 4.4, where variables
used in the analysis are shown. Also, a number of control variables have been
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Notes: a This variable has been centred to the sample mean in order to offer a clearer interpretation.
b We prefer to measure ideology in three categories ‘left’, ‘centre’, and ‘right’ (the latter as a category of reference) rather
than using the 0–10 scale measurement, as we do not assume that ideology exerts a linear influence on the explained
variables (that is, an individual is not more or less pro-EU whether his/her ideological self-positioning is 1 or 3.5). Besides,
it allows us to better assess the specific behaviour within these ideological groups. However, due to the asymmetric
distribution of cases (most of them concentrated on the centre-left of the ideological spectrum) we also included the
pure ideological scale as a contrast. Results did not show any difference.
c These variables have been calculated as follows: [Attachment to territorial level (0–3)––Attachment to Europe
(0–3)]. After obtaining results, a dummy variable was constructed at any territorial level, with 1 = results > 0 and
0 = rest of results.
d Operative Budgetary Balance (OBB) is defined as the difference between allocated operating expenditure––i.e.
excluding administration––to EU member states and their own resources payments, excluding traditional own resources
(European Commission 2008: 80), see <http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_report_07_en.
pdf> (accessed 22 April 2010).
e Average of imports and exports of the items, goods, and services of the balance of payments divided by GDP. If the
index increases over time it means that the country/zone is becoming more integrated within the international
economy. Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab = table&init = 1&plugin = 1&language
= en&pcode = tsier120> (accessed 9 November 2009).
f Source: AIAS (2009). For details on the elaboration of the index, see Visser (2009).
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4.4 Models and Results
In this section we test the previous propositions. We have run separate models
for political and economic elites in order to see whether the factors explaining
preferences on Europeanization of policy making differ along type of elites.
Besides, differences between countries found in descriptive analysis suggest
that variations at this higher level of aggregation may influence lower level
(individual) positions. Statistically, an adequate treatment of such kind of data
requires a multilevel approach (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Previous studies
applying this modelling technique (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Brinegar and
Jolly 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) have shown that the multilevel
character of attitudes towards the EU should not be ignored––higher levels
of analysis, typically country-level and party-level data accounted for 14–20
per cent of the variance in EU support in those models.
4.4.1 Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Transnational Policy Areas
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the multilevel multinomial logistic
models for short-term policy-making preferences by type of elite. Here, we
will address how they confirm the different theoretical arguments and propo-
sitions considered above. Concerning what have been called ‘transnational’
policy issues (environment, immigration, and fighting crime), different pat-
terns explaining the focus of attitudes emerge.
With respect to political elites’ individual characteristics, instrumental-
evaluative arguments (trust in EU institutions) are relevant for explaining
preferences for full Europeanization against keeping control over these policy
areas at the national/sub-national level. However, the significance of these
arguments disappears when considering members of political elites with
more moderate preferences (sharing powers between EU and national/regional
authorities), where ideology factors are more important. Nevertheless,
patterns differ according to policy area. Left–right positions are significant in
the case of environmental and fighting crime policies, with leftist positions
more prone to support an intermediate Europeanization of these areas.
The neoliberal/regulatory dimension, on the other hand, is significant for
explaining preferences for control over policies related to immigration and
fighting crime. Members of national political elites who think the EU’s
main goal should be exclusively to promote economic competitiveness
are less likely to delegate authority to the EU level in these areas. Finally,
political elites’ preferences concerning environment policy are also signifi-
cantly influenced by their exclusive identification with their regions––
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Table 4.5. Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: ‘transnational’ issues
Environment Immigration Fighting crime
Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites
Level 1 units 1124 534 1126 533 1127 532
Level 2 units 17 17 17 17 17 17
Condition number 2458.873 2179.483 2165.223 1881.994 2542.094 1904.377
Log likelihood 1042.320 481.976 1062.450 501.058 1106.416 540.180
Cat: Shared Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Age 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.019* 0.010
Male 0.098 0.947*** 0.326 0.456 0.101 0.053
Benefited EU 0.720 0.971 0.550 0.034 0.412 0.118
Trust EU institutions 0.125 0.041 0.118 0.010 0.057 0.063
Left 0.553* 0.398 0.164 0.021 0.711* 0.332
Right 0.580* 0.300 0.335 0.031 0.186 0.499
Extremism 0.054 0.259 0.015 0.172 0.122 0.256
EU more competitive 0.292 0.289 0.415* 0.369 0.351* 0.424
Exclusive national 0.138 0.181 0.125 0.070 0.059 0.274
Exclusive regional 0.584* 0.239 0.432 0.085 0.337 0.146
Trust national
institutions
1.044*** 0.688 0.884*** 0.484* 0.676* 0.179
OBB 2007 per 0.304 0.211 0.322 0.385 0.307 0.235
Trade integration 0.014 0.003* 0.042 0.004 0.005 0.002
Bargaining centralized 0.081 4.100 0.855 6.462*** 0.783 1.694
EU member 73–81 0.760 0.928 0.097 0.658 0.634 0.095
EU member 86–95 0.425 0.729 0.038 0.369 0.565 0.042
EU member 04–07 0.581 1.098 0.291 1.095 0.237 0.202
Constant 5.575*** 6.900 5.361*** 6.534*** 3.540 2.686
Cat: EU level Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Age 0.012 0.009* 0.001 0.019 0.034*** 0.002
Male 0.462* 0.665 0.045 0.275 0.070 1.411***
Benefited EU 0.255 1.813 0.058 0.933 0.115 0.010
Trust EU institutions 0.133* 0.056 0.160*** 0.095 0.123* 0.009
Left 0.370 1.282*** 0.047 0.110 0.628 0.819
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Right 0.485 0.823 0.297 0.653 0.390 0.159
Extremism 0.071 0.303 0.085 0.178 0.070 0.054
EU more competitive 0.150 0.256 0.075 0.112 0.140 0.171
Exclusive national 0.011 0.072 0.208 0.313 0.168 0.046
Exclusive regional 0.653* 0.145 0.344 0.161 0.342 0.787**
Trust national
institutions
0.159 0.733*** 0.074 0.485** 0.210 0.162
OBB 2007 per 0.097 0.049 0.143 0.335 0.105 0.232
Trade integration 0.012 0.037* 0.017* 0.033* 0.007 0.004
Bargaining centralized 0.169 2.600 0.900 5.100*** 0.761 4.465
EU member 73–81 0.064 1.405* 1.235** 0.023 0.936 0.028
EU member 86–95 0.071 0.254 0.285 1.449*** 0.035 0.203
EU member 04–07 1.598* 2.623*** 1.935*** 2.277*** 0.832 0.209




0.109 (0.078) 0.000 (0.000) 0.129 (0.074) 0.000 (0.000) 0.235 (0.116) 0.112 (0.077)
Note: multilevel multinomial logistic regression. Category of reference: ‘National/subnational level’. Robust standard errors.
* p  0.05; ** p  0.01; *** p  0.005.
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Table 4.6. Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: ‘non-transnational’ issues
Fighting unemployment Taxation Health care
Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites Political elites
Level 1 units 1125 532 1117 534 1126
Level 2 units 17 17 17 17 17
Condition number 1872.626 1129.145 2295.274 1353.347 1591.295
Log likelihood 907.232 447.690 902.204 511.828 639.035
Cat: Shared Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Age 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.007
Male 0.105 0.134 0.103 0.235 0.409*
Benefited EU 0.268 0.538 0.792 0.179 0.305
Trust EU institutions 0.014 0.058 0.090 0.128 0.084
Left 0.850*** 1.420*** 0.641* 0.473 0.373
Right 0.228 0.548 0.132 0.721 0.029
Extremism 0.134 0.322 0.092 0.379 0.036
EU more competitive 0.829*** 0.409 0.632* 0.427 0.673***
Exclusive national 0.190 0.340 0.051 0.241 0.236
Exclusive regional 0.025 0.070 0.445 0.605 0.486
Trust national institutions 0.427 0.083 0.903* 0.056 1.000***
OBB 2007 per 0.035 0.225 0.254 0.257 0.111
Trade integration 0.027 0.005 0.023 0.020 0.005
Bargaining centralized 0.449 3.405 4.629 1.761 2.208
EU member 73–81 0.026 0.319 1.558 0.452 0.707
EU member_86–95 0.131 0.513 0.358 0.756 0.115
EU member 04–07 0.066 1.009 3.140*** 0.330 1.909*
Constant 2.272 0.897 4.667* 0.675 5.225***
Cat: EU level Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Age 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.005 0.008
Male 0.059 0.134 0.544*** 0.687 0.022
Benefited EU 0.621 0.479 0.206 0.806 1.073*
Trust EU institutions 0.045 0.113 0.078 0.201* 0.123
Left 0.537 1.014 0.681* 0.111 0.955
Right 0.518 0.444 0.223 0.086 0.880
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Extremism 0.041 0.048 0.009 0.097 0.050
EU more competitive 0.229 0.322 0.407* 0.065 0.249
Exclusive national 0.251 0.155 0.146 0.048 0.250
Exclusive regional 0.170 0.233 0.250 0.178 0.790*
Trust national institutions 0.045 0.308 0.144 0.070 0.058
OBB 2007 per 0.324 0.258 0.576*** 0.516 0.698***
Trade integration 0.004 0.001 0.023 0.010 0.020
Bargaining centralized 0.264 1.540 2.188 3.508 0.303
EU member 73–81 1.804** 0.250 2.091*** 0.938 1.514*
EU member 86–95 0.012 0.005 0.072 0.133 0.779
EU member 04–07 1.284* 0.774 2.824*** 2.281* 2.148***
Constant 0.297 0.981 2.278 1.122 1.011
Level 2 variance
(standardized estimate)
0.210 (0.077) 0.000 (0.000) 0.304 (0.094) 0.030 (0.072) 0.227 (0.128)
Note: multilevel multinomial logistic regression. Category of reference: ‘National/subnational level’. Robust standard errors.
* p  0.05; ** p  0.01; *** p  0.005.
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exclusive identities would reinforce attitudes towards keeping environmental
issues in national hands.
Concerning the influence of contextual (country) variables on political
elites’ attitudes, there is a significant negative effect in the case of interviewees
from former state socialist countries concerning the full Europeanization of
environment and immigration policies, and for the United Kingdom, Den-
mark, andGreece in the case of immigration policy. Thesemodels also provide
further evidence for the globalization hypothesis, as political elites in
countries with a greater level of international embeddedness are more favour-
able to the full Europeanization of national immigration policy. Another
contextual variable––a country’s average level of trust in national political
institutions––is significant, but only for intermediate Europeanization prefer-
ences. Here, results confirm the instrumentalist proposition, in that political
elites in countries with a lower average level of trust in national political
institutions are more favourable towards some kind of Europeanization in
these transnational policy areas.
For economic elites, preferring shared authority over national/regional con-
trol in transnational policy issues has more to do with national contexts than
with individual level variables. The only individual level variable having a
significant effect is that of gender on environmental policy, where women are
more favourable towards Europeanization. Individual level characteristics,
however, are important in explaining strong preferences for full Europeaniza-
tion (transferring all powers to the EU) in transnational policy issues. More
specifically, ideology has a significant effect in the case of environmental
policy––members of the economic elite who position themselves on the
political left are less likely to favour full Europeanization; while exclusive
regional identity seems to foster a preference to keep the fight against crime
at national or sub-national level.
Some contextual variables also have significant effects. Regarding prefer-
ences on shared powers over policy making, there is evidence to support
functionalist-pragmatic arguments. Thus, for environmental policy, eco-
nomic elites in countries with higher trade integration are more likely to
favour shared competencies between national/regional levels and the EU. In
the case of immigration policy, in countries with higher trust in national
political institutions, economic elites are less prone to support intermediate
Europeanization. However, in this policy area, the higher the degree of corpo-
ratism (centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining) the higher
the preference for keeping control over it in national or sub-national hands.
For those members of the national economic elite preferring a full transfer of
powers to the EU, country-level variables are significant for environment and
immigration policy. In both cases, a country’s average level of trust in national
institutions has a negative, significant effect, while the degree of trade
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integration of the country increases the likelihood for preferring full Europea-
nization against exclusive national/regional authority. Top business leaders in
countries joining the European Economic Community or the EU in 1986–
1995 (Spain, Portugal, and Austria), however, are more likely to prefer com-
plete Europeanization of immigration policy compared to those in founding
member states. In contrast, economic elites in former state socialist countries
are significantly less likely to delegate environmental and immigration policy
to the EU level.
4.4.2 Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Non-Transnational
Policy Areas
In the case of policy areas dealing with problems without a direct cross-border
nature (fighting unemployment, taxation, and health care; see Table 4.6)
again, patterns between political and economic elites differ. For political elites,
in the case of preferences for shared powers, apart from the significant negative
effect of being male on health care policy, ideology is the only significant
explanatory factor at the individual level. For the three policy areas, prefer-
ences for an intermediate Europeanization are significantly related to the
dimension of ‘neo-liberalism–regulation’. Being a member of political elites
and believing that the EU should promote economic competitiveness means
that supporting the Europeanization of the two policies usually classified as
‘social’ (fighting unemployment and health care), and the intervention of EU
decisionmaking into national/regional taxation policy, is less likely. However,
this ideological axis does not overrule the traditional ‘left–right’ dimension in
the case of unemployment and taxation policies, where MPs with leftist self-
positioning are more likely to support shared powers. Both ‘competitive/regu-
lative’ and ‘left–right’ variables are also significant in the part of the model
related to full Europeanization preferences in case of taxation policy. For the
other policy areas, only in the case of health care we find two individual
variables with a significant effect––exclusive regional identity and evaluation
of the benefits of the EU for the respondent’s country. In the latter case, the
direction of the effect is not as expected theoretically in that the likelihood of
preferring full Europeanization of health care policy is lower for thosemembers
of the political elite who evaluate the EUpositively. It is also interesting that no
individual level variable accounts for this group’s preferences to transfer all the
powers to the EU level in the case of policies to fight unemployment.
With respect to country level variables, a country’s average level of trust in
national institutions again has a negative, significant effect on preferences in
taxation and health care issues, where the preference is for intermediate
Europeanization. Furthermore, political elites in former state socialist
countries are also less likely to favour mixed powers in these areas. In the
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case of those showing a preference for full Europeanization, in the issues of
taxation and health care we find for the first time a significant effect of
objective economic benefits received from the EU (measured through the
OBB), which runs in the expected direction––more benefits would support
a greater desire for Europeanization. Besides, MPs in former state socialist
countries and those entering the EEC between 1973 and 1981 are less likely
to support full EU Europeanization in these areas against keeping authority
for policy making exclusively in national/regional hands than founding
members.
For economic elites, only models for preferences regarding fighting unem-
ployment and taxation could be computed. In the case of fighting unemploy-
ment, only ideology (self-positioningon the left) has a significant, positive effect
in explaining preferences on shared powers as opposed to exclusive power for
country/regional government. Trust in European institutions at the individual
level has a significant effect onpreferences on taxation issues––more trustwould
mean more support for exclusive EU-level authority in this matter. At the
country level, being a top business leader in a former state socialist country has
a negative effect on a preference for full Europeanization in taxation, while
political elites have also a significant preference against transferring decision
making to the EU level in health care and social security.
4.4.3 Long-Term Policy-Making Preferences
Table 4.7 includes the results of the multilevel logistic regression models for
long-term (ten years) preferences on the complete Europeanization of taxa-
tion, social security, and foreign policy.3 Out of these areas, only taxation can
be compared with short-term preferences––taking into account the differences
in operationalization of variables, while social security only allows an indirect
comparison with social policies included in the previous models.
In the case of taxation, ideology continues to be a key explanatory factor of
political elites’ long-term preferences. Those with self-positioning on the right
and who consider the EU’s main goal to be the promotion of economic com-
petitiveness are less likely to favour the Europeanization of this policy area in
the long term. Individual evaluation of EU institutions and the benefits they
offer to respondents’ countries also have a significant positive effect. The same
patterns concerning individual level variables are again found for the social
3 For the dependent variable, it would be more appropriate to use ordinal logistic regression.
However, our data did not adjust to the parallel regression assumption, so for reasons of simplicity
we opted to dichotomize the dependent variable. Thus, the ‘In favour’ category includes former
‘Strongly in favour’ and ‘Somewhat in favour’ categories, while the category ‘Not in favour’ refers to
the rest of the responses.
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security model, where both the traditional and the neo-liberal–regulation axes
are also at work in the same expected direction; the instrumental-evaluative
judgements also play a significant role in this model. Institutional and perfor-
mance evaluation are also significant factors accounting for preferences on the
establishment of a single foreign policy. In addition, this is the only policy area
where exclusive national identity has a significant effect––in the expected
direction: members of the political elite who identify exclusively with their
country are also less likely to support full Europeanization in this policy area.
Concerning country-level variables, it appears frommodels in Table 4.7 that
political elites in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU are most likely
to favour Europeanization in the long term for all three policy areas. Also,
a higher degree of trade integration (that is, a higher exposure to external
economic forces) has a positive significant effect on political elites’ preferences
on the Europeanization of foreign policy. Furthermore, just as in the case of
short-term policy preferences, political elites in former state socialist countries
are systematically less likely to favour Europeanization of the three policy
areas. The same applies in the case of taxation and foreign policy for countries
joining the EEC between 1973 and 1981.
With respect to economic elites’ long term policy-making preferences, eval-
uative-pragmatic factors have a positive significant effect in all policy areas.
This is most true for trust in EU institutions, while subjective evaluation of
benefits is significant only in the case of social security. However, ideology has
a significant effect on the long-term policy-making preferences of this area.
Here, we find both traditional left–right and neo-liberal–regulation dimen-
sions working in the expected directions. Finally, regarding country-level
variables, members of the economic elite in countries with positive OBB are
significantly more likely to support the Europeanization of social security and
foreign policy within the next ten years. As in other models, however, respon-
dents in former state socialist countries are less prone to support Europeaniza-
tion in taxation and social security.
4.5 Discussion
As we have shown, the factors behind national elites’ policy preferences
present a complex picture, with no uniform pattern along policy areas or
type of elite being evident. In this section, however, we will summarize our
findings and try to relate them to previous theoretical suggestions.
The first thing that appears is that both pragmatic and ideological factors are
key to understanding political (and, sometimes economic) elites’ preferences.
Ideology is present as a key factor in explaining political elites’ preferences on
shared authority between national/sub-national and European levels in the
National elites’ preferences on the Europeanization of policy making
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Table 4.7. Preferences on Europeanization of policy areas in 10 years
Taxation Social security Foreign policy
Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites Political elites Economic elites
Level 1 units 1111 537 1123 1123 1128 535
Level 2 units 17 17 17 17 17 17
Condition number 849.224 859.947 838.537 838.537 1606.738 911.582
Log likelihood 627.054 321.856 549.591 549.591 376.708 146.534
Cat: In favour Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Age 0.020* 0.006 0.023* 0.023* 0.006 0.005
Male 0.229* 0.522 0.032 0.032 0.246 0.090
Benefited EU 0.916* 0.986 0.840* 0.840* 1.844*** 0.088
Trust EU institutions 0.138*** 0.184* 0.143* 0.143* 0.162* 0.278***
Left 0.209 0.628 0.570* 0.570* 0.509 0.321
Right 0.785* 0.253 0.113 0.113 0.151 0.033
Extremism 0.110 0.004 0.097 0.097 0.079 0.249
EU more competitive 0.612*** 0.366 1.114*** 1.114*** 0.161 0.186
Exclusive national 0.171 0.230 0.099 0.099 0.488* 0.109
Exclusive regional 0.208 0.049 0.160 0.160 0.212 0.197
Trust national institutions 0.161 0.010 0.078 0.078 0.234* 0.156
OBB 2007 per 0.636* 0.543 0.912* 0.912* 0.926*** 0.401*
Trade integration 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.024** 0.015
Bargaining centralized 1.973 0.103 1.953 1.953 1.695 1.160
EU member 73–81 2.643*** 1.709 2.456 2.456 0.978** 0.346
EU member 86–95 0.844 0.892 0.336 0.336 0.536 0.159
EU member 04–07 1.196* 1.836* 1.715** 1.715*** 2.220*** 0.714




0.227 (0.115) 0.401 (0.310) 0.408 (0.292) 0.408 (0.292) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Category of reference: ‘Not in favour’. Robust standard errors.
* p  0.05; ** p  0.01; *** p  0.005.
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short term, as well as their long-term preferences for taxation and social
security. In this respect, results do not show a clear dominance of a particular
view of the ideological space. In immigration and health care, the ‘Hooghe-
Marksian’ view dominates, while in environment the traditional ‘left–right’
axis is the important dimension. However, in most of the areas both dimen-
sions are significant simultaneously. Explaining why these patterns appear
would require an in-depth investigation into the particular characteristics of
each policy area, and this is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Pragmatic-evaluative arguments seem to hold for political elites in the case
of strong pro-Europeanization preferences (transnational policy areas and
health care policy). Trust in EU institutions, and lack of trust in national
institutions, are driving forces of preferences concerning full Europeanization
of transnational policy areas. It is also interesting that, in these cases, ideology
is not significant, which allows us to conclude that strong Europeanization
preferences in the short term are less dependent on the political-ideological
debate. In the long term, however, pragmatic-evaluative and ideological argu-
ments are both confirmed in the case of political elites’ preferences over
taxation and social security.
Such a mix does not occur in the case of long-term preferences over foreign
policy. Related to the discussion of the role of ideology in defining the political
space, power over foreign policy is seen as a major state sovereignty function.
In this way, and given that it is the only policy area where ideology is not
significant at all in explaining political elites’ preferences (as opposed
to exclusive national identity, which is), it could be taken to confirm the
Hix-Lord’s intergovernmentalist hypothesis.
In contrast to political elites’ preferences, those of economic elites are much
less influenced by ideological considerations. For this group, ideology is only
significant in explaining short-term preferences for full Europeanization
concerning environmental policy, shared Europeanization in unemployment
policy, and long-term preferences concerning social security. In turn, prag-
matic-evaluative arguments are only confirmed for long-term preferences. In
general, the evident explanatory paucity of individual level variables in the
models for economic elites, particularly in the short term, clearly raises the
question of whether there are other variables, not included in our analysis,
which account for variation in preferences.
Our analysis also shows the non-significance of ideological extremism, the
low importance of exclusive territorial identity––with the exception of envi-
ronment, health care, and foreign policy. Extremism’s lack of impact may be
related to the fact that we investigated only elite groups. However, results
do not suggest that extremist elite members are unable to influence policy
preferences of the public.
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Concerning contextual (country-level) factors, the significant effect in some
models of a country’s average level of trust in national political institutions
is of particular interest. This partially confirms the Sánchez-Cuenca (2000)
hypothesis on the inverse relationship between levels of trust in national and
European institutions. Economic globalization arguments also make sense
in the case of economic elites where policy issues have a clear transnational
nature (environment and immigration), also confirming partiallyWessels and
Kielhorn’s (1999) cross-border hypothesis (see above). In contrast, these
authors’ arguments about the possible role of the internal structure of interest
intermediation are solely confirmed for economic elites and in case of immi-
gration policy. Some models reflect a significant effect of the objective benefit
countries receive from their membership in the EU. Regarding short-term
preferences, this variable is more important for economic elites, while in the
long term it also has a significant effect on political elites’ preferences. Finally,
our analyses also confirm that the contextual variables of former state socialist
states and, to a lesser extent, of those who joined the ECC between 1973 and
1981 (particularly the United Kingdom and Denmark) have negative influ-
ence over the supranational policy preferences of these countries’ elites.
4.6 Conclusion
The analysis in the previous pages has shown the complexity inherent to
national elites’ preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Never-
theless, some broad patterns emerge within such complexity. First, preferences
differ dependingonwhether they are projected in the short or long term. In the
long term, national elites tend to be more pro-European––considered as a
whole, the absolute majority support the idea of single foreign policy, while a
relativemajority also support the unification of taxation and the social security
system. In the short term, however, the picture is slightly different. Thus, those
who prefer taxation to be dealt with at the European level (even if authority on
this area is sharedwith national/regional institutions) are aminority. The same
occurs with unemployment and health care policies. In this respect, we find
the second general pattern: positions in the short term referring to what have
been called ‘transnational’ policy issues (namely environment, immigration,
and crime) are more pro-European than in the rest of the policy areas. These
short-term patterns are in accordance with previous research findings
concerning the globalization of social problems and with a functional
approach, which takes into account their cross-border character.
A third general pattern is that economic elites are more open to European-
ization than their political counterparts in most policy domains––fighting
unemployment and social security are the exceptions.
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Finally, the three previous general patterns vary along countries and coun-
try groups. Thus, in general terms, former state socialist elites––similarly to the
Eurosceptic elites of the United Kingdom and Denmark––are less likely to
approve of delegating national authority to the EU.
This chapter has also aimed to shed light on the reasons for these regula-
rities. Statistical models show no uniform explanatory pattern along time
span, type of policy issue, or type of elite. However, some interesting facts
have been detected. Results indicate that political elites’ views are affected by
ideological explanatory factors in all policy areas but foreign policy, which
seems to adjust to a more pragmatic, intergovernmental logic. However, we
have not found a predominance of a particular view of the ideological space in
the remaining policy areas. Besides, ideology is mostly important when refer-
ring to mild (shared) positions over Europeanization. We have also found
room for a significant impact of pragmatic-evaluative factors in political elites’
attitudes. Individual trust in European institutions and/or the average level of
trust in national institutions are significant explanatory factors of strong
preferences concerning Europeanization of transnational policy issues.
With respect to economic elites, it is more difficult to find significant vari-
ables explaining preferences at the individual level, which suggests that fur-
ther research is needed to identify other factors that could account for this
group’s specific preferences concerning the Europeanization of policymaking.
Finally, explanatory models have also shown the importance of contextual/
country-level factors. Along with others, they clarified––in line with the
descriptive findings––the significant negative impact of former state socialist
countries on the support for supranational policy solutions.
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5
The other side of European identity: elite
perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe
Irmina Matonyt _e and Vaidas Morkevicius
5.1 Background
As a point of departure for our work, we hold that, among other things, the
elites of the European Union (EU) express who ‘we’ are, what are ‘our’ norms
and ideals, and how ‘we’ differ from other communities. In this context,
analysis of elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe might provide
interesting new insights. Our aim, however, is not study threats in vivo (as
provoking a reaction along the structural-functionalist and neo-functionalist
lines), nor do we look for any causal link between elites’ perception of threats
and their later policy preferences and actions. Rather, in a social constructivist
manner, we look at the threats in vitro, in other words, we are interested in
how elites define, frame, understand, and place perceived threats in the
broader context of the European project, i.e. visions and interpretations of
desirable political developments and favoured values of the EU.
Social science literature makes it clear that every identity, whether individ-
ual, social, or political, presents a fundamental and troubling paradox: an
identity establishes itself in relation to a set of differences, and it operates
under powerful pressures to fix, regulate, or exclude some of these differences
(Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). The influential ‘no demos’ theory,
which suggests the absence of any true European community (Weiler 1999),
emphasizes the lack of any genuine common European-wide character,
and supports the proposition that the current European project is based on
territorial connections between countries and narrow social circles of elites
(Eriksen, Fossum, and Menéndez 2004). In other words, lacking the common
will and identity of a united people, the cohesion of the European project
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continues to depend strongly on elites. In relation to this, social psychology
theorists and political scientists (most notably, Carl Schmitt) have suggested
that a mythical figure of a foe is fundamental to serve as a unifying force to
establish a national ‘we’. Even if a European identity does not need to be
constructed through a radical other (i.e. it is a temptation rather than a neces-
sity), European studies often engage in an uneasy search for the other, thought
to be either seeing the EU from outside or destabilizing it from within (Risse
2001; Wodak 2004; Matonyt _e and Morkevicius 2009). From a post-structural-
ist perspective, and relative to European identity building, Diez developed
a fourfold typology of othering: the representation of the other as an existential
threat (securitization); the representation of the other as something inferior;
the representation of the other as violating universal principles; and represen-
tation of the other as different (2005: 628). Diez claims that the core values,
principles, and norms of the EU lie at the centre of othering, and that all
the time the European self is being constructed, the other is also being built
(2005: 617).
In the realm of international relations and national security studies, it is
widely accepted that the self-assertion of a people and the democratic quality
of a political regime depend on the social acknowledgement of otherness and
on the unifying ethos arising from pressure to contest the otherness (Connolly
1991: 8). Research, such as that by Campbell (1998) on American foreign and
security policy, demonstrates the importance of the constructions of otherness
as opposed to more ambiguous definitions of identity from within the polity
in elite and governmental discourse. Indeed, following the line of discourse
analysis, mainstream social constructivists focus their attention on the nor-
mative power of Europe and its abilities to shape conceptions of the normal
(Manners 2002: 235–58). In this vein, a common European foreign and
defence policy is assessed as a means for nation states to deal with the external
threats (Schoen 2008: 8), therefore empowering, rather than weakening,
the nation state to maintain its self-determination and sovereignty (Risse
2001). European studies also show that perceived threats not only motivate
protective behaviour (such as border controls, restrictions on immigrants’
freedoms and rights, etc.), but also promote support for EU-level policies.
Therefore, the normative power of Europe shaped and put forward by the
relevant political elites, when refined and placed within a broader context,
might be helpful in revealing the nuances of European identity under elites’
construction.
In this chapter we attempt to expand research on the normative power of
Europe beyond the areas of defence and security, and to associate it with
differences in elites’ visionsof the future of the EUand their political-ideological
orientations. In order to do this, we examine elites’ perceptions of threats
(external and internal) to a cohesive Europe, where threats are defined by the
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functionalist logic supposing the homeostatic nature of social systems. By this,
we mean that we assume the EU is aiming at maintaining equilibrium and that
it is sensitive to external and internal challenges that could disturb its alleged
inner balance.
It would seem that threats to a cohesive Europe may have different saliency
and that elites’ perception of them might depend on the environment,
the overall situation, and the issues at stake. With regard to elites’ attachment
to the EU, this can be conceptualized not only in parallel to their national
identities but also vis-à-vis their symbolic and pragmatic relations to Europe
and to the EU as a political project (Lengyel and Göncz 2009). In this
case, elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe would not say so
much about elites’ European identity as about other aspects of the elites’
European project, such as their trust in the EU institutions, their future
visions of the EU, and their ideological orientations, which are separate
from the nation state analytically. In this study we also control for the extent
to which elites’ gender, age, educational level and human capital, and

























































A big threat Quite a big threat Not that big a threat Not a threat at all
Figure 5.1. European elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe
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In the IntUne survey, from which we draw the data for this work,1 three
non-EU countries (Turkey, USA, and Russia) were named as potential (but not
proposed as actual) threats to European cohesion.2 Following functionalist
logic, the survey also identified several internal threats to a cohesive Europe,3
i.e. an increase in the nationalism of EU member states, immigration from
non-EU states, the negative effects of globalization on welfare, and economic
and social differences among the EUmember states as plausible factors setting
a centrifugal motion in place and causing the EU’s development outward.
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, following descriptive analysis, threats are
ranked according to how strongly they are perceived and evaluated by the
elites. We proceed by this ranking order, starting with the threat of growing
nationalism, which is assigned the highest weight as a threat to a cohesive
Europe, and ending with the smallest ranked threat, i.e. the close relations of
some EU countries with the USA.
First, conceptualization of nationalism in the EUmember states as a threat to
a cohesive Europe reminds us of the very first incentives to start the European
project of economic cooperation, which in post-1945 Europe was to restrain
German and Frenchnationalism. Since then, national identities in the EUhave
been relegated to the narrow field of cultural policies, while peaceful trade
and diplomacy became the main instruments of politics. The anti-nationalist
narratives that deny the legitimacy of nationalism altogether as an atavistic
notion and regard nationalism as an obstacle to human rights, international
harmony, and economic rationality (O’Sullivan 2004: 33) have been laid at the
basis of the EU as a political project. Yet, the national identities of the
EU member states have not disappeared and political elites exploit these
identities to mobilize significant Eurosceptic and nationalistically minded
parts of the population. Indeed, since the turn of the twenty-first century,
the radical right and neo-nationalism has been growing in almost all European
countries. The radical right insists on defence of national interests, criticizes
pro-European governments, and attacks immigration, with organized, violent
1 Only data from interviews in the EUmember states (seventeen countries) were analysed in this
chapter.
2 Exact wording of the questions was the following: Do you think that the interference of Russia
in European affairs is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that the close
relationship between some EU countries and the United States is a threat or not a threat for the
cohesion of the EU? Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat or not a
threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include countries
other than Turkey is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU?
3 Exact wording of the questions was the following: Do you think that immigration from non
EU countries is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that the growth of
nationalist attitudes in European member states is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the
EU? Do you think that economic and social differences among member states are a threat or not a
threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that negative effects of globalization on welfare are
a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU?
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attacks against immigrants and foreign companies being reported across the
EU. The referendum on the ratification of the European constitutional treaty
was rejected in spring 2005 in France and in theNetherlands, when opponents
successfully argued that Muslim minorities in the EU are already too large and
that the Constitution would harm national feelings of populations in the
EU member states.
Japanese scholar Haba (2007) claims that the rise of nationalism under
European integration can be divided into three types: radical nationalism
(exemplified by outbursts of Nazism and ethnic cleansing, since democracy
always carries with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize mino-
rities); liberal nationalism (exemplified by instances of a patriotic sentiment,
not chauvinistic or xenophobic, but rather friendly to foreign countries4); and
finally, xenophobic nationalism (born out in attempts to overcome the dem-
ocratic deficit in the EU, urging direct popular democracy, and contributing to
growing antagonism between titular (true) European citizens and the others).
According to Haba (2007: 4) the current growing nationalism in the EU is
mostly of the xenophobic type, which is expressed by popular participation in
the EU democracy through such instruments as referenda and elections,
where the EU citizens express their antagonism to the others, who presumably
undermine their interests. Xenophobic EU citizens do not see any clear match
between the EU and their own interest, and their claims for citizens’ interests
in the EU emerge not as solidarity with neighbouring countries, but as xeno-
phobia. The EU member states elites’ perception of growing nationalism as a
threat to a cohesive Europe might then mean that the whole EU project is in
danger. Indeed, as already noted, analysis shows that European elites see the
threat of the growth of nationalist attitudes in the European member states as
the highest among all the threats presented to them (see Figure 5.1). In fact, 75
per cent of the European elites surveyed perceive growing nationalism in
EU member states as a (very) big threat to European cohesion.
Second in the ranking of perceived threats is that of economic and social
differences among the EU member states. In 1957 the European Economic
Communities set the goal of a closer union among the peoples of Europe and
laid down four freedoms that allowed for the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, people, and capital in the member countries. Since then, the EU has
grown from six to twenty-seven countries, thirteen of which, at the time of the
survey (2007), successfully shared a single currency. Yet, in fact, from the
economic point of view, the EU remains very diverse. While by international
comparison all EU countries have large public sectors, member states still
differ significantly with regard to the scope of the tasks assigned to the state,
4 As was witnessed in immature democracies of early post-communist Central Europe of the late
1990s; later this liberal nationalism efficiently converged into a wide, popular support for the EU.
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local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and social security agencies.
National labourmarket institutions differ considerably: somemember states rely
on strict legislative regulation of labour markets, others leave more power
to trade unions and employers’ associations, and yet others value workers’
and entrepreneurs’ individual initiatives. The social and economic differences
among the EU member states have been reported as especially disturbing in
relation to post-socialist EU enlargement (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003), although
evenamong thefifteenoldmember states of the EU, social policies divergevastly
in areas such as social security, industrial relations, regional development, and
agriculture. Distinctive dynamics of socio-economic development of an individ-
ual EU member state arise from a multi-tiered system where the member states
share policy-making responsibilities with the EU central authorities. For
instance, one of the reasons for the rejection of the European Constitutional
treaty (2005) was that the French ‘no’ voters were suspicious that the EU would
imposewhat is knownderisively as Anglo-Saxon economics, effectively disman-
tling the cherished French welfare state. Therefore, social and economic differ-
ences among the EU member states are seen as a potential centrifugal force, so
that elites perceive them as a strong threat to a cohesive Europe. Indeed, the
descriptive statistical analysis shows (see Figure 5.1) that economic and social
differences among the member states are understood as the second biggest
threat to a cohesive Europe: more than a half of European elites see it as a big
or quite big threat.
The elites in our sample ranked eventual EU enlargement to include Turkey
(an official EU candidate country since 2005) as the third most significant
threat to a cohesive Europe. This may be because the elites see Turkey as a
particular challenge on many accounts concerning the European common
market, cultural traditions, and geopolitical stakes. Indeed, the possibility of
Turkish entry into the EU has already produced quarrels among the EU leaders
and representatives of the EU member states, ranging from disagreements
about human rights and women’s place in the country, to issues of secular
culture and Islam in public life in Turkey, as well as addressing problems
of Turkish immigration to the EU (McLaren 2007). Due to its hybrid position
vis-à-vis Europe, Turkey is an ideal other for the construction of European
identity. Historically, Turkey has mostly been a part of the European power
set, but it was also construed as a Muslim enemy at the gates of Europe.
Turkey’s limbo position allows the EU on the one hand to wield its influence
over Turkey, and on the other hand to construct its difference (Diez 2005:
633). In the case of Turkey, the power of the Europeanization discourse is not
unidirectional: this discourse binds the EU and Turkey, since it empowers the
other (here, Turkish elites) to remind the EU leaders of their promises (Diez
2005: 633). Both sides entertain and maintain affective, normative, and prag-
matic engagement. Assessment of the EU member states elites’ perceptions of
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the threat posed to a cohesive Europe by its eventual enlargement to include
Turkey might capture many reference points around which the European
project evolves. Indeed, the descriptive statistical analysis shown in Figure
5.1 indicates that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is understood as an
important threat to a cohesive Europe (half of the elites thinks so).
Elites assign Russian interference in European affairs, which is presented in
the IntUne survey in a clear and direct way (causing nuisance through its
interference in European affairs) as the fourth threat to a cohesive Europe. In
fact, the descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that half of the
elites consider the Russian interference in European affairs as either a very
important or an important threat to a cohesive Europe. The European elites’
understanding of Russia is important and since historical times Russia has
played a significant role in the formation of European identity. Russia has
been, and still is, often perceived as a learner (or a follower) of European
economic and political practices (the idea of Russia as a follower does, of
course, imply that Russia is becoming more like ‘us’ and thereby less different)
while at the same time being perceived as a potential threat to European
security (primarily from a military perspective, but also concerning energy
and economic matters). In 1996, Neumann found that the most important
others in the Russian political discourse were the West, Germany, the Baltic
countries, as well as Europe in general (Neumann 1996: 6). Yet, for Russians
since the late 1990s there is an obvious tension between accepting the role of a
follower of Europe and maintaining the notion that Russia is a great power.
Russia is reluctant to be a ‘good’ learner and to respect human rights, cherish
ethnic minorities (for instance, Chechens), and recognize its neighbouring
countries (Central and Eastern European states from the former Soviet bloc,
and the Baltic countries, in particular) as nations on a par with the Russian
nation itself. This situation suggests that insecurity of the Russian self may
result in a nationalistic policy vis-à-vis Europe. Russian aggressive reactions to
the enlargement of the EU (and NATO) also show the extent to which Russia
has not yet accepted that these particular institutionalizations of European
and Western selves are not and cannot be potential threats to Russia (Neu-
mann 1996: 6).
In the elites ranking, the next threat to a cohesive Europe is posed by
immigration from non-EU countries, which is in fact growing in the EU.
Cooperation in the sphere of immigration policies is seen as a prerequisite
for the European single market, its internal border-free space and its shared
external borders (Papademetriou 2006). After the September 11, 2001 attacks
in the US (and those in Madrid and London later) immigration took on the
additional connotation of a security threat to the EU. Yet, regulation of
European immigration has a decades-long legacy of failed promises. In the
EU, cooperation on the issues of immigration is hampered by a confrontation
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between Euro-enthusiasts, supporting the initiative to fully harmonize the
EU immigration policy, and the Eurosceptics, suspicious and conservative,
willing to preserve national vetoes on the numbers of admitted immigrants.
Political divergences between the European mandate to regulate immigration
and its matter-of-fact results point to a difficult dilemma and render the
issue of immigration elusive. It also makes harmonization of immigration
policies difficult, which is required by the European single market (the
project of economic integration). However, in matters of immigration, con-
cerns of identity (national and European) override economic considerations,
since people are inclined to make choices based on non-economic criteria
when contemplating outsiders and the political means to control them (Ugur
1995: 971). Immigration policy, owing to its resonance with policies of
citizenship, membership, and identity, is non-divisible and non-transparent
and cannot be produced through bargaining, like simple economic negotia-
tions. Immigration stands out as a tremendous threat to established visions
of the European identity and societal integrity (Ugur 1995: 972). Even
though the elites may have an educational advantage, which can be expected
to increase tolerance, and do not share the ordinary people’s fears of losing
their jobs, the issue of immigration is sensitive for them too since it taps into
the very essence of the EU as a political project, drawing a lot of its support
from a general hostility towards other cultures (McLaren 2002: 564). Indeed,
the descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that 40 per cent of
the elites perceive immigration from non-EU countries as an important
threat to a cohesive Europe.
The survey also addressed the elites’ perception of negative effects of
globalization on welfare as a threat to a cohesive Europe. This question was
intended to measure the elites’ approval of economic globalization and their
perception of the trade-offs between European welfare and its success in the
globalizing economy. As Giddens and Hutton (2000) claim, we must take
globalization seriously and acknowledge that the old strategies and institu-
tions, including existing structures of the welfare state, are no longer able to
deliver. Indeed, as our data (in Figure 5.1) show, the negative effects of
globalization on welfare are perceived as a threat to a cohesive Europe by
more than one-third of elites.
Another issue, tested as an external threat to a cohesive Europe, concerned
the eventual EU enlargement to include some unspecified countries (they
could have includedNorway, Ukraine, Croatia, Moldova,Macedonia, Georgia,
Tunisia, and Israel among others5). This variable measured elites’ general
5 In 2007 Iceland was not yet on the EU agenda for its eventual membership.
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support for further expansion of the EU, their readiness for multicultural
accommodation of newcomers, and their willingness to sharpen several
geopolitical and socio-economic disputes. However, the descriptive statistical
analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that the threat of EU enlargement to countries
other than Turkey was not rated very highly by the elites.
Finally, the last threat to a cohesive Europe considered by the elites was that
stemming from the US having close relations with some EU countries. The
US as an external factor, which helps articulating the European identity and
mobilizes EU collective action, is analysed in several instances. European
concerns over US competition in the defence sector led to an elaboration of
the EU Research and Technology Development policy (Mörth 2003). Some
authors argue that the very possibility of an EU common foreign and security
policy is questionable, given that the US entertains special relations with
several EU countries (for example, with Great Britain, as well as with the
post-socialist Central European states, Poland in particular; see Šešelgyt _e
2007). Other studies imply broader and deeper cultural affinities between
the US and, on the one hand, the Anglo-Saxon and Eurosceptic Great Britain,
and on the other hand, the conservative post-socialist EU member states
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Figure 5.2. European elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: elite type
differences
The Europe of Elites
102
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
not conceived as an important threat to a cohesive Europe, yet it was included
to represent another political tradition and another security community. The
descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that close relations
between some EU countries and the US are not generally perceived by elites
as a threat to a cohesive Europe, but nevertheless, 20 per cent of European
elites find it somewhat threatening.
Further analysis (see Figure 5.2) shows that there are no great differences
between European political and economic elites’ perception of threats to
a cohesive Europe.6 Political and economic elites do not diverge significantly
in their assessment of threats to a cohesive Europe, lending support to the
thesis about the intra-elites mutual cueing effect, enhancing and levelling
their attitudes towards the EU (Best, Matonyt _e, and Morkevicius 2009).
Indeed, economic elites significantly differ from political elites only regarding
their relatively low perception of the threat posed by globalization (20 per cent
of business elites find it a big or quite a big threat, with a much higher 40 per
cent of political elites finding it a big or quite a big threat). On all other
accounts, perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe run in parallel between
political and economic elites.
It is known that elite perception of threats to a cohesive Europe varies
considerably between various EUmember states and, as observed by Anderson
and Kaltenhaler (1996), that the timing or length of a country’s membership
in the EU has an impact on national elites’ attitudes towards Europe. However,
larger differences are found when perceptions of threats by elites from the
founding member states of the EU are contrasted to those of elites from new
(post-socialist) EU member states. In general, elites from founding EU
member states (in this study: Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany) perceive
a lower level of threats than their counterparts from the post-socialist EU
member states (in this study: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia). This difference might be explained by
the performance of the nation state (Kritzinger 2003): old consolidated
democracies with well-functioning market economies have an evident advan-
tage over the post-socialist states where a general feeling of insecurity is
amplified by many ongoing reforms, the latter led by the state institutions
crucially lacking public trust.
The biggest difference (of 30 per cent) is seen in European elites’ perception
of Russia: 60 per cent of elites from post-socialist countries claim that Russia
poses a big or quite a big threat to a cohesive Europe, while this opinion is held
by only 30 per cent of elites from the EU founding states (see Figure 5.3). This
difference highlights the geographical proximity and recent political past of
6 In Figure 5.1 both political and economic elites were included in the analysis.
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the post-socialist countries, whose elites define the Russian threat of interfer-
ence in European affairs not in a soft, social constructivist way, but in harsh
terms as an existential threat (securitization), adding that Russia transgresses
the universal principles of human rights, democracy, etc. (Diez 2005: 628). In
relation to the general strongly negative perception of Russia, post-socialist
elites want in particular to control negative externalities of political transfor-
mations in Russia and to be absolutely sure that the EU is a zone of peace,
respecting human rights and supporting prosperity. Elites from post-socialist
countries also are markedly more afraid of the enlargement of the EU to
include Turkey and of the threat to a cohesive Europe posed by immigration
from the non-EU countries than the elites from old Europe. Yet, past experi-
ence or the current situation explain little as to why elites from new post-
socialist EU member states are more sensitive to perceived threats associated
with immigration from third countries and the Turkish integration. It may be
that these fears have deeper cultural roots and draw on aspects concerning their
national identity and/or are related to a particular vision for the future of Europe.
We should also point out that the post-socialist elites appear to feel much less
threatened by eventual EU enlargement (not including Turkey) than their
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Figure 5.3. European elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: country
differences
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countries from the Central European Schicksalgemeinschaft––community of
fate––such as Croatia, Moldova, and the Ukraine).
The elites from the founding EU member states report significantly higher
concerns about the disintegration of welfare in the EU than do the post-
socialist elites: 40 per cent of them (compared to 30 per cent of post-socialist
elites) find globalization negatively affecting a cohesive Europe, and 30 per
cent (compared to 10 per cent of post-socialist elites) see close relations
between some EUmember states and the US as a threat to European cohesion.
The fact that a greater threat from the US is perceived by the elites from the
founding EU member states might reflect their discontent concerning the
intense transatlantic ties of Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, of Eastern
European countries (new NATO members). Elites from the old EU member
states are also more worried about the centrifugal effect of growing national-
ism in the EU countries. This finding corroborates the view that there are
diverging nationalisms in the founding EU countries versus post-socialist
EUmember states (Haba 2007). In other words, higher saliency of xenophobic
nationalism in the public and political agenda of founding EUmember states,
as opposed to the post-socialist EUmember states, generates greater sensitivity
of elites from the old Europe to the threat of growing nationalism to a cohesive
Europe. Also, elites from the founding EUmember states evaluate the threat to
a cohesive Europe posed by economic and social differences among the
EU member states more highly than the post-socialist elites. The relatively
negative assessment of economic and social differences among the EU mem-
ber states given by elites from the old Europe might stem from the fact that
these countries are net contributors to the EU budget and are getting tired of
the (growing) burden of economic solidarity.
5.2 Hypotheses
Differences in observations of country (region) and structural (depending on
elites’ sector) differences in elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe
necessitate a closer scrutiny of other aspects of the elites’ European project,
which might present complex patterns. Here, we formulate some exploratory
hypotheses, which we test later by means of regression analysis.
Empirical studies reveal that political ideology is a major factor influencing
elites’ attitudes towards different issues (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman
1981). We assume that perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe are shaped
by the elites’ left–right ideological orientations. It is extensively conceptua-
lized that people oriented towards the political left usually emphasize issues of
political and social equality, social security, solidarity, as well as international
peace and cooperation, whereas politically right-oriented people put emphasis
The other side of European identity
105
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
on issues of economic freedom and growth, competition, national and tradi-
tional moral values, as well as state authority and military power (Budge et al.
2001). Consequently we expect to find that left-leaning elites perceive bigger
threats to cohesive EU as coming from growing nationalism in the EU, from
economic and social differences among the EU member states, from globali-
zation effects on welfare, as well as from close relations of some EU countries
with the US. In parallel, we hypothesize that right-leaning elites would
perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe as being posed by enlargement
of the EU to include Turkey, by Russian interference in European affairs, by
immigration from non-EU countries, and by enlargement of the EU to
include countries other than Turkey. Following the performance model
(March 1988; North 1990; Dalton 1996), we also expect that the strength
of elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe would be negatively
related to the elites’ trust in major EU institutions.7
We also assume that differences in the interpretation of the European
project might explain the differences in European elites’ perceptions of threats
to a cohesive Europe. First, we identify the cultural dichotomy, defining elites’
attitudes towards the European cultural heritage (here: considerations that
Christian values and traditions are at the core of the European project versus
assertions of the secular nature and profile of the EU). Even though formally
the EU (since its inception by the Treaty of Rome) is a secular body and there
are no formal ties to any religion and no mention of religion in any current or
proposed treaty, researchers agree that Christianity is a powerful cultural
identity that works both to resist and to accommodate Europeanization.
Looking at political controversies surrounding Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and
Islam, Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) discuss the increasing salience of Eur-
ope’s religious definition and argue that religious factors are stumbling blocks
rather than stepping stones towards further integration of Europe. These
authors show that all three religious traditions promote European identity
and the EU in the ways not intended by the founders of the European project
and are divisive for the body of EU political leaders and social elites. Therefore,
we assume that elites who perceive being a Christian as very important for
being a true European would also perceive higher threats posed by EU enlarge-
ment to Turkey and other countries, as well as by immigration from non-EU
countries. Additionally, we expect that elites who think European identity is
secular will perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe posed by nationalism
and by close relations of some EU countries with the US.
7 The ‘Trust in the EU institutions’ index was constructed from questionnaire items asking
respondents to evaluate their trust in the EU institutions (the European Parliament, the
European Commission, and the European Council of Ministers) on an 11-point scale (from 0 –
‘No trust at all’ to 10 – ‘Complete trust’). Internal consistency of the index is quite high (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.84). The index is an average of non-standardized item scores.
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Second,we identify the socio-economic dichotomy, defining elites’ attitudes
towards the EU role of providing better social security versus making the
European economy more competitive. Vaughan-Whitehead (2003) found
that political sensibilities of the European elites are sharpened by widening
social and regional inequalities in the EU, which are caused by the presumed
EU obsession with economic growth, detrimental to social and cohesion
policies. Growing proportions of European elites claim that the European
project is not only about economy and trade, but also about social protection,
cooperation, and solidarity, and that the EU must set an example of how to
manage interdependencies and master globalization. Competing views on
how the EU economic integration and market regulation should evolve are
embraced by elites. Hooghe andMarks (1999) subsumed this discussion under
the label of neo-liberals versus social democrats. Hence, we expect that elites
who think the main aim of the EU is to make the European economy more
competitive will perceive economic and social differences among the EU
members states and negative effects of globalization on welfare as posing the
greater threat to a cohesive Europe.
Third, we identify the supranationalist versus intergovernmentalist dichot-
omy defining elites’ attitudes towards the EU governance, the first group
supporting supranational governance and the second arguing for greater
reliance on EU member-state generated legitimacy and authority.8 As Wessels
and Katz comment, ‘the acute problem of the EU legitimacy emerged, because
the European Community eroded the basic ordering principle of the modern
European state, which is autonomy within and independence without’ (1999:
5).We hypothesize that supranationalist elites will perceive greater threats to a
cohesive Europe to be posed by growing nationalism in the EU member states
and by some EU countries having close ties to the US. In addition, we expect
that intergovernmentalist elites perceive EU enlargement to Turkey and other
countries and the interference of Russia in European affairs as posing the
greater threats to a cohesive Europe.
For the regression model, we hypothesize that some distinguishable pat-
terns in elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe might appear due to
the EU being a factual community, engaging national elites (among other
actors) in intensive social interactions: we expect that elites’ engagement in
dense European networks, knowledge of foreign languages, and frequent
8 Later in the text we use the labels—supranationalists and intergovernmentalists—to
differentiate between elites supporting supranational design of the EU governance and those
arguing for keeping a member-state dominated framework of the EU. The ‘Supranationalism’
index was constructed from four questionnaire items: for details see the IntUne Codebook,
items rp08_1a, 1b, 1c, and rp08_2 in the Appendix of this book. Internal consistency of the
index is quite low (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59). The index is an average of standardized (mean – 0,
variance – 1) item scores.
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communication in and about the EU will generally lead to lower levels of
perceived threats. Finally, we control for whether perceptions of threats are
shaped by the elites’ gender, age, and level of education.
5.3 Results
The results of an ordered logistic regression analysis show that elites’ ideologi-
cal left–right orientation generates themost empirical support for our hypoth-
eses concerning elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe (Table 5.1).
Left-leaning elites perceive growing nationalism inside the EU, the close ties of
some EU countries with the US, and the effects of globalization on welfare as
significant threats to a cohesive Europe. Right-leaning elites, however, per-
ceive threats from immigration, the eventual enlargement of the EU to
include Turkey, and interference of Russia in European affairs to be signifi-
cantly higher. Perceptions of only two threats (socio-economic differences
among the EU member states and enlargement of the EU to countries other
than Turkey) do not generate any significant relation with elites’ political
ideologies. These findings are in line with classical political theory, which
conceptualizes the left as emphasizing issues of political and social equality,
social security, solidarity, as well as international peace and cooperation,
whereas the right is found to be oriented towards economic freedom and
growth, competition, national and traditional moral values, as well as state
authority and military power. These results, which show how strongly the
left–right continuum is applicable to the perceptions of the threats to a
cohesive Europe, are yet more proof of the unyielding weight of political
ideologies in framing the understanding of issues, not only at the national
but also at the European level, and across public policy domains.
As expected, trust in the EU institutions significantly decreases elites’ per-
ceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe. The higher the level of elites’ trust in
the EU institutions, the lower their perception of economic and social differ-
ences among the EUmember states, enlargement of the EU to include Turkey,
immigration from non-EU countries, effects of globalization on welfare, and
close American ties with some EU countries as threats to a cohesive Europe. As
to three other threats (growing nationalism, interference of Russia in Euro-
pean affairs, and enlargement of the EU to include countries other than
Turkey), they do not display any significant relation to elites’ trust in EU
institutions. This twofold finding is clearly in line with the institutional
performance thesis and shows that in those areas where the EU institutions
have some leverage and experience of engaged and successful dealing institu-
tional trust lowers threat perception. Yet, in the areas which are not clearly
related to any EU institution and which do not have a good track record of
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successful prior initiatives and actions of the EU (here, faulty EU dealings with
Russia, uncertainties about further EU enlargement, and lack of EU institu-
tional leverage to combat xenophobic nationalism) institutional trust has no
effect on elites’ perceptions of threats.
Concerning elites’ dichotomous views about European cultural heritage
(Christian versus secular Europe), socio-economic order (better provisions of
social security versus competitiveness of the European market), and gover-
nance (supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism) we find that all three
frames do indeed work and that they explain variations in elites’ assessment of
the threats to a cohesive Europe. The cultural dichotomy generates significant
relations with perception of all but one (economic and social differences
among the EU member states) of the threats to a cohesive Europe. The socio-
economic dichotomy yields significant results with elites’ perception of four
threats to a cohesive Europe. Those elites who hold that the main aim of the
EU is to make its economy more competitive, perceive higher threats to a
cohesive Europe posed by social and economic differences among the EU
member states, negative effects of globalization on welfare, and close relations
between some EU countries with the US. On the contrary, those elites who
favour social security in the EU are systematically more sensitive to the threat
of the EU enlargement to Turkey. Curiously, we do not find the frame of social
security versus a competitive European market relevant to elites’ perception of
immigration as a threat to a cohesive Europe. Plausibly, for those elites who
see the EU as a project of increasingly competitive European market, immi-
grants do not contradict the principle of free movement of labour and com-
petitive salaries. On the other hand, those elites who see the European project
as one of social rights and guarantees do not perceive immigrants as a threat to
a cohesive Europe, but they do recognize immigrants as providing the ulti-
mate test for the proclaimed values of European solidarity and social justice.
Finally, the dichotomy distinguishing supranationalist and intergovernmen-
talist elites also yields significant results, regarding the perception of four
threats to a cohesive Europe. Supranationalist elites systematically perceive
higher threats to a cohesive Europe posed by growing nationalism and by the
close ties of some EU countries with the US, while intergovernmentalists
perceive the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey and immigration from
non-EU countries as higher threats to a cohesive Europe.
The density9 of elites’ contact with EU institutions has a very limited
influence on the elites’ perceptions of the threats to a cohesive Europe. It is
9 The ‘European contacts density’ index was constructed from four questionnaire items where
respondents reported the density of their contacts with the actors and institutions of the EU. For
details, see the Codebook, chapter 11, items co2_1, ev09a, b, and c. Internal consistency of the
index is quite low (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65). The index is an average of standardized (mean – 0,
variance – 1) item scores.
The other side of European identity
109
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Table 5.1. Ordered logistic regression of elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe on their visions of the EU, ideologies, social background,
and human resources (seventeen EU countries, 2007)
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0.37 0.29 0.75 0.56
Supranationalism 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.29
Left–right self-
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Trust in the EU
institutions
0.13 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.13
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Log likelihood 1544 1567 1583 1603 1458 1561 1425 1393
N 1304 1315 1307 1296 1307 1286 1244 1313
a On a scale from 0 (not a threat at all) to 3 (a big threat).
b On a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 3 (very important).
c Making the European economy more competitive coded 1 and providing better social security for all coded 2.
d 1 (female), 0 (male).
e 1 (the field of education specified), 0 ( otherwise, including ‘no university degree’).
f On a scale from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
g On a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (every day).
h 1 (can speak at least two foreign languages), 0 (otherwise).
i Regression coefficient (reported only if p  0.05).
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statistically significantly correlated only with the lower perception of the close
relationships between some EU countries and the US as a threat to a cohesive
Europe. In a similar vein, elites’ knowledge of foreign languages is only weakly
related to their perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: it lowers perce-
ption of immigration and EU enlargement to countries other than Turkey.
Frequency of foreign media use does not affect elites’ perception of any of the
enumerated threats. Therefore, we conclude that the factual elites’ European
experiences and socialization in everyday life of the EU do not significantly
influence elites’ perception of the threats to a cohesive Europe.
Finally, we find that elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe are
seldom and weakly related to elites’ gender, age, and educational profile. Inter-
estingly, male European elites perceive Russian interference in European affairs
and the close relations of some EU countries with the US as significantly greater
threats to a cohesive Europe, while female elites distinguish themselves by their
higher concerns about the threat of immigration from non-EU countries.
Surprisingly, being younger slightly increases the likelihood of higher percep-
tion of the threat posed by the Russian interference in European affairs. As to




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is not important at all for being a European
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is very important for being a European
Average profile
Figure 5.4. Predicted probabilities of perceiving growth of nationalist attitudes in the
EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’
groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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greater concern among elites relating to the threat of immigration from non-EU
countries; in all other instances, educational profile does not affect or lower
elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe. The field of education also has
the most significant influence on elites’ perceptions of Russian interference in
European affairs and on effects of globalization on welfare as threats to a cohe-
sive Europe.
In order to explore the hypothesized relations between the three variables
reflecting the identified dichotomies of elites’ interpretation of European cultural
heritage, socio-economic order, and type of EU governance with elites’ percep-
tion of threats to a cohesive Europe, we constructed ideal types (reflecting the
extreme values on the identified variables) of elites and compared predicted
probabilities of their answers when confronted with the threats under consider-
ation.Due to consistent impact,we also included elites’political self-identification
in the ideal types. We excluded elites’ trust in the EU institutions, since––if
significant––it indiscriminately lowers perception of all examined threats. On
the grounds of weak impact in our regression model, we also did not include





































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme leftist elites for whom the main aim of the EU:
to make the European economy more competitive in world markets
Ideal type: extreme rightist elites for whom the main aim of the EU:
to provide better social security for all its citizens
Average profile
Figure 5.5. Predicted probabilities of perceiving economic and social differences
among the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized Euro-
pean elites’ groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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It appears (see Figure 5.4) that perception of growth of nationalist attitudes
in the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe clearly differentiates
the hypothesized elites’ groups. It is significantly higher among those who
underline the secular character of the EU, who support its supranational
governance, and who identify with the extreme left. Proponents of a secular
Europe are clearly those who also favour post-national modernity and who are
therefore sensitive to nationalism, in particular in its xenophobic forms.
Analogous logic explains the supranationalist worries about growing nation-
alism as a threat to a cohesive Europe.
In parallel, elites’ perception of economic and social differences among the
EU member states moderately differentiates the hypothesized elites’ groups:
likelihood of perceiving economic and social differences among the EU mem-
ber states as a threat is higher among elites who favour social security over the
economic competitiveness of the EU, and who identify with the extreme left
(see Figure 5.5). As predicted along functionalist lines, elites who identify with
the extreme left are concerned with social justice more than with economic
growth and global market competitiveness, and view economic and social




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is very important for being a European
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is not important at all for being a European
Average profile
Figure 5.6. Predicted probabilities of perceiving enlargement of the EU to include
Turkey as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’ groups
(derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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It also appears that seeing Turkish integration as a threat to a cohesive Europe
considerably differentiates the hypothesized elite groups: it is significantly
higher among elites who favour a Christian Europe, are against supranational
governance of the EU, and identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.6). In
the eyes of those who cherish the Christian roots of Europe, the non-Christian
traditions of Turkey make its eventual integration into the EU a threat to
European cohesion. Intergovernmentalist elites are more sensitive to the threat
associated with Turkish integration into the EU because they plausibly expect
that due to its big population, huge markets, and strong geopolitical situation,
Turkey’s integration into the EU would cause disequilibrium in the European
fraternity and hinder the interests of smaller states.
Results of the analysis show that perception of Russian interference in
European affairs as a threat to a cohesive Europe also differentiates to a
considerable extent the elites’ groups: perception of this threat is systemati-
cally higher among intergovernmentalist elites who identify with the extreme
right (see Figure 5.7).
Similarly, perception of immigration as a threat to a cohesive Europe
strongly differentiates the elite groups: it is significantly higher among
those elites who cherish the Christian roots of Europe, are intergovernmen-




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites
Average profile
Figure 5.7. Predicted probabilities of perceiving interference of Russia in European
affairs as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’ groups (derived
from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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that strong opinions about the Christian roots of the EU enhance negative
perception of immigration is related to the fact that most current immigrants
to the EU come from non-Christian backgrounds and therefore dilute the
cultural-religious specificity of the EU. The finding that intergovernmentalist
elites fear immigration more highly than those who proclaim a supranational
Europe might be related to the fact that those elites identify strongly with
the nation state and do not want to empower supranational EU institutions,
even though it becomes increasingly evident that immigration policies
require coordinated EU action at the expense of member-state sovereignty.
To somewhat lesser extent, perception of globalization effects on welfare as a
threat to a cohesive Europe also differentiates the elite groups: it is higher among
elites for whom themain aim of the EU is tomake the European economymore
competitive and who identify with the extreme left (see Figure 5.9). In a way,
the results presented so far might be reflective of the neo-liberal versus socialist
controversy among the European elites.
There is little differentiation in the elite groups concerning the probability
of considering EU enlargement to include countries other than Turkey as




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is very important for being a European
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is not important at all for being a European
Average profile
Figure 5.8. Predicted probabilities of perceiving immigration from the non-EUmember
states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’ groups (derived
from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme leftist elites for whom the main aim of the EU:
to make the European economy more competitive
Ideal type: extreme rightist elites for whom the main aim of the EU:
to provide better social security
Average profile
Figure 5.9. Predicted probabilities of perceiving effects of globalization on welfare as a
threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’ groups (derived from




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is very important for being a European
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is not important at all for being a European
Average profile
Figure 5.10. Predicted probabilities of perceiving enlargement of the EU to include
countries other than Turkey as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European
elites’ groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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an accent on the Christian roots of Europe, are against supranational gover-
nance, and who identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.10).
Finally, perception of some EU countries having close relations with the
US as a threat to European cohesion also considerably differentiates the
hypothesized elite groups: probability of perceiving this threat as a big one
is higher among elites who favour a secular Europe, support supranational
governance of the EU, and identify with the extreme left (see Figure 5.11).
Evidently, for the European supranationalists, the close relations of some EU
countries with the US mean additional barriers and difficulties to the central
management of European politics, especially concerning foreign affairs and
security. However, the observed relation between the cultural-religious dichot-
omy and elites’ perception of the threat posed by the US to a cohesive Europe
invites us to broaden the interpretation of the US as the other to Europe.
Plausibly, the European elites in favour of a secular EU view the US as a threat
to a cohesive Europe and thus display their disapproval of the high political
stakes the US put on ‘moral values’, such as those associated with pro-life and
other highly voiced conservative policies (our survey took place during the




































































Not a threat at all Not that big a threat Quite a big threat A big threat
Ideal type: extreme leftist and supranationalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is not important at all for being a European
Ideal type: extreme rightist and intergovernmentalist elites for whom
to be a Christian is very important for being a European
Average profile
Figure 5.11. Predicted probabilities of perceiving close relationships between some EU
countries and the US as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites’
groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)
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5.4 Conclusions
The EU was created more than fifty years ago with the aim of fighting against
nationalism and the socio-economic differences that had led to the devastat-
ing world wars of the twentieth century. The European project at that time
was meant to unite its member states in their efforts to live in peace and
prosperity. At the end of twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
century, the European project underwent tremendous changes and began
evolving into a superstate. This has necessitated new legitimating arguments
and discourses, since the realist/functionalist background of the EU as
a practical arrangement for free trade and international cooperation is no
longer sufficient. This has led to the EU searching for an identity, which differs
greatly (both the search process and its content) from those observed in the
construction of national identities. Perceived threats to the European project
capture elites’ imagination: along with the old threats of nationalism and
socio-economic differences among the European countries, new malicious
forces appear: the proposed entry of Turkey, of other countries, and immigra-
tion in general (i.e. the inflow of different people, cultures, and values), the
close ties of some EU countries with the US (friendship with the other and
betrayal of native Europeans), the interference of Russia in European affairs
(destructive influence of the other), and the negative results of globalization on
welfare. Our initial differentiation of threats to a cohesive Europe into internal
and external sources is therefore refuted. Our analysis of elites’ perceptions of
threats to a cohesive Europe rather shows that the old realist/functionalist
threats of nationalism and socio-economic differences among the EUmember
states continue to be perceived as the highest, yet the new constructivist/
subjective threats to a cohesive Europe are perceived as lower.
Our findings also show that there are differences in perception of the old
and new threats to a cohesive Europe expressed by elites from the old and new
EU members states (elites from the EU founding member states score higher
than elites from the new post-socialist EU member states on perception of
nationalism and socio-economic differences among the EU countries, and yet
they also score higher on perceiving the enlargement of the EU to include
other countries and the close relationship of some countries with the US as
threats vis-à-vis a cohesive Europe).
Contrary to our assumption that there might be some ‘division of labour’
between political and economic elites, whereby political elites are more inten-
sively engaged in EU matters, perception of threats to a cohesive Europe
among the political elites is not systematically stronger than among economic
elites. This observation lends itself to interpretation along the lines of the
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elites’ mutual cueing effect. However, more research on other segments of
national elites (civil society, media, cultural, academic, etc.) and their percep-
tion of threats to a cohesive Europe would be needed to better explain the
national elites’ cueing effect in the European project.
Our study strongly confirms the assumption that elites’ left–right political
identification is a powerful predictor of perceptions of threats to a cohesive
Europe. We find that European elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive
Europe are related to their visions of Europe, articulated along three lines:
cultural heritage (Christian versus secular Europe), socio-economic order
(better provisions of social security versus competitiveness of the European
market) and governance (supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism).
It is worth emphasizing here that the realist/functional dichotomy of the
socio-economic order appears to have much lower differentiating potential
regarding the elites’ perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe than the
two constructivist/subjective dichotomies related to elites’ interpretations of
European cultural heritage and suggested governance. Our finding that the
socio-economic frame (arguably, the initial one and the driving force of the
European project from its very inception) is only moderately relevant in
explaining elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe supports our
assumption that there are two layers to the European project: the old one
based on common interests (prosperity and peace) and the new one based on a
search for a comprehensive European identity. Regrettably, there was no data
in the IntUne survey on yet another possible frame applicable to the European
project, namely, on its military versus civilian power. In terms of the search for
a new common identity and normative constructions of the EU, it would
be interesting to study its impact on the perceptions of threats to a cohesive
Europe. Such a test would allow us to see if elites’ preferences tomilitary power
(reflecting the old layer of the European project) versus preferences to civilian
power frame (reflecting the new layer of the European project) are in line
with the socio-economic frame of the EU (the old one favouring economic
growth and the new one emphasizing social solidarity). This line of research
concerning the differentiation of old and new perspectives of a cohesive
Europe might be pursued with a time series study that compares eventual
changes in elites’ perceptions of threats resulting from the world economic
crisis in 2008 with other areas of change, such as developments in US political
leadership and the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2009.
Finally, our study greatly substantiates the social constructivist paradigm,
which emphasizes relations of political convictions, subjective evaluations,
and cultural attitudes with further conceptualizations of social and political
practices and orientations much more than with factual individual situations.
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Notably, elites’ trust in the EU institutions statistically significantly decreases
their perception of threats to a cohesive Europe. Yet, there is little elites’
convergence in values and perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe due
to high interaction density among its elites, to their strong European sociali-
zation or, for that matter, to their gender, age, or level of education.
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6
Elites’ views on European institutions:
national experiences sifted through
ideological orientations
Daniel Gaxie and Nicolas Hubé
6.1 Introduction: Diversity of Elites’ Positions
on European Institutions
The respective powers of member states and European institutions have long
been at stake in national and supranational debates among elites, where a
cleavage between federalists and defenders of national sovereignties has been
shown. From the very beginning of the process of European integration,
Federalists have advocated the construction of a supranational state based
upon a European defence community and a common foreign policy. Con-
versely, the ‘sovereigntists’ have relentlessly opposed European integration in
the name of national sovereignty and the independence of the nation states,
depicting European institutions as centralized, bureaucratic, undemocratic
Leviathans, endangering national freedoms, cultures, and identities. How-
ever, besides proponents of a federal integration, there is a third group of
defenders of intergovernmental methods of coordination (Bitsch, Loth,
Barthel 2007), whereby European integration is conceived as a means to
preserve and restore national autonomy and independence (Haller 2008:
80). In support of this, the European Council was established to guarantee
that the heads of member states have the last say on the main EU decisions.
Indeed, as the construction of a united Europe advances, this loose unionist
model of Europe as a family of nations has beenmore or less accepted bymany
champions of national independence. Members of elites who participate in
these debates are also divided over deeper European integration, with some
supporting and others opposing EU intervention in various policy domains.
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Some integrationists ask for the transfer of national competences to a supra-
national level and others to an intergovernmental European level. Therefore,
controversies about European institutions cannot be reduced to a binary
opposition between supporters and opponents of European integration.
Indeed, we need to distinguish many shades of federalist, intergovernmental-
ist, confederalist, unionist, and nationalist attitudes.
Elites’ attitudes towards European institutions are also dependent on their
views of the main aims of European integration. After the failure of the first
attempts to establish a European defence community, the most eager parti-
sans of European unification turned their thoughts to market integration. The
radical left has therefore regarded the EU as a capitalist project endangering
social protection and has long spoken for a ‘social Europe’. Social democrats
have also wished to protect national welfare regimes and have proposed to
coordinate fiscal policies and to extend EU competence in employment and
social regulations (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 16). Nevertheless, some political
and economic elites, especially those claiming high economic freedom, are
cautious with regard to European institutions because of their regulatory
functions. Green parties have come to consider European federal integration
as part of their vision of a multicultural society (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 17).
Cleavages over European institutions are thus intertwined with several ideo-
logical divides: deregulated market versus regulated capitalism, market liberal-
ism versus social market capitalism or social regulations, and cultural
liberalism versus conservative fondness for authority, tradition, and national
identities and cultures.
6.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses from the Literature
Numerous hypotheses have been put forward to explain the diversity of views
set out in the Introduction regarding European institutions. One stance
adhered to by many scholars is that the European construction is an elite-
driven process. Wemight therefore expect that most members of political and
economic elites would share positive rather than negative views of European
integration, but national political elites may be interested in safeguarding a
national arena of decision making. Further, integration has been focused on
the economy almost since the beginning, so that we might suppose the top
economic elites would be eager to support stronger European institutions.
However, some authors, such as Simon Hix (1999), contend that attitudes
towards European integration are linked to the ‘location of social interest’
within social structures, especially, when it comes to business elites, to
their economic sector. Following this view, we should observe variations of
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attitudes among economic elites according to the type of economic activities
of their company.
Other scholars argue that citizens do not assess the EU according to the
personal or collective benefits they expect to receive from it, but that they
rather rely on various representations, emotions, and values (Bélot 2002: 29).
In this respect, most proponents of ‘value theories’ think first of territorial
identities; certainly, a positive attachment to European integration has been
found to intensify with an increased feeling of belonging to Europe (Dell’Olio
2005: 102). According to such a hypothesis, we could expect that political
elites (MPs) and economic elites (business executives) who have studied and
lived abroad, and who speak a foreign language, share a more cosmopolitan
world view, thereby having a more positive conception of European construc-
tion than those with a more parochial experience.
Political and ideological explanations of attitudes towards European inte-
gration also refer to partisan membership. Europe is said to be the ‘touchstone
of dissent’. Pro-European established centre-left and centre-right governing
parties and governments presumably oppose more sceptical fringe or radical
parties, factions, or politicians on European issues (Taggart 1998). This kind of
explanation often mixes up two distinct hypotheses. The first is that attitudes
towards European integration depend on the position of political actors in
power relationships within the political system, political parties, or political
hierarchies. Marginal political parties that are excluded from governing coali-
tions, as well as marginal factions and second-ranked politicians within gov-
erning parties, are more likely to share sceptical views of European integration
(Sitter 2001). Within national parliaments, we may expect backbenchers to be
more critical of the EU than frontbenchers. However, when scholars distin-
guish between radical and centrist political parties, they refer to a different
hypothesis. Partisan ideologies are said to be the best explanatory factor and
‘extremist’ political parties, whether far-right or far-left, are expected to
oppose more ‘moderate’ organizations. It is also sometimes assumed that
European politics is linked to class cleavages (Deflem and Pampel 1996;
Gabel 1998: 337): political parties linked to blue-collar workers should worry
about, and hold the EU responsible for, economic woes, whereas parties close
to business interests would support European integration. Other authors have
stressed that left and centre-left political parties are eager to strengthen the
regulatory powers of European institutions in order to fight unemployment,
and to protect national welfare, the environment, and human and women’s
rights (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 16). That is one of the reasons why the EU
may be perceived by economic actors and liberal or conservative political
parties as a bureaucratic meddler, imposing excessive, pernickety, and costly
regulations on firms.
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Some scholars contend that country differences as regards popular support
for European integration are a more important factor than individual eco-
nomic or political concerns (Deflem and Pampel 1996: 136; Dell’Olio 2005:
96). Citizens––and first and foremost elites––of the various members states of
the EU are supposed to have a distinct national experience of European
integration (Diez Medrano 2003: 5; Harmsen 2007: 72). For example, it is
said that from a German (both elite and mass) point of view, European
construction means redemption from their past, an alternative to national-
ism, a safeguard against latent hegemonic and anti-foreigner tendencies, a
means to reassure the world about their peaceful intentions, and a guarantee
for democracy and a social market economy (Marcussen et al. 1999; Diez
Medrano 2003).
Some of these political culturalist explanations of attitudes towards
European integration insist on the specificity of each member state’s percep-
tions in relation to its unique national history. Others look for a general model
aimed at giving a systematic account of national attitudes towards Europe.
Because they belong to a supranational institution, Roman Catholics are said
to be more likely to support European construction (e.g. De Master and Le
Roy). Another general model relies on the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis, which
stresses the differential degrees of adaptation required of national institutions
to fit in with emerging European norms (Harmsen 2007). The greater the costs
imposed on its citizens by EU legislation, the more likely these citizens are to
share negative opinions on the European integration (Hooghe and Marks
2004: 416). A related hypothesis is that nationals who are net recipients of
EU spending will be inclined to support European integration, while those in
donor countries will tend to oppose it (Hooghe and Marks 2004).
Relying on the 2007 IntUne elite survey, this chapter tests these rather
conflicting hypotheses and aims to elucidate the main determinants of the
elites’ positions in the debates about the European institutions within political
and economic fields.
6.3 Measuring Elites’ Views on European Institutions
Our analyses are based on answers provided by participants in the IntUne
survey (see Chapter 11, this volume) to twelve questions related to the insti-
tutional organization of the EU and therefore considered as indicators of
elites’ views on issues raised by debates on European integration. Of the twelve
questions, seven are indicators of attitudes towards the institutional setting of
the EU. These are:
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1. How much do you agree (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, strongly disagree) that the member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU?
2. How much do you agree that the European Commission ought to
become the true government of the EU?
3. How much do you agree that the powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened?
4. Howmuch do you trust the European Parliament to usually take the right
decisions?
5. . . . and the European Council of Ministers?
6. . . . and the European Commission? Please indicate your views using a
10-point-scale where 0 means you do not trust the institution at all, and
10 means you have complete trust.
7. Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached, or not at
all attached to the EU?
Two questions are related to debates over the transfer of nation states’ powers
to EU institutions. These are:
1. Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell
me whether you are in favour of (strongly in favour, somewhat in favour,
somewhat against, strongly against) a single foreign policy towards
countries outside the EU, instead of national policies?
2. Some say that we should have a single European army. Others say every
country should keep its national army. What is your opinion (National
army, European army, mixed system)?
Three questions aim at measuring elites’ opinions on the missions and the
future of European institutions. These are:
1. Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell
me whether you are in favour or against a unified tax system for the
European Union?
2. Can you tell me whether you are in favour or against a common system
of social security?
3. Some say European unification has already gone too far. Others say it
should be strengthened. What is your opinion? Please indicate your
views using a 10-point-scale where ‘0’ means that European unification
‘has already gone too far’, and ‘10’means that it ‘should be strengthened’.
There are numerous significant––although rather weak––correlations between
answers to these twelve questions: the more respondents give a pro-European/
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anti-European answer to one of the twelve questions, themore likely they are to
have analogous reactions to the others. Because of these correlations, we are
tempted to focus on two opposite attitudes towards European integration. The
first is characterized by a will to increase the powers of the European Commis-
sion and Parliament and to reduce the role of the member states; a positive
attitude towards the strengthening of European unification, to a European
army, to a common European foreign policy, to a unified European tax system,
and to a common system of social security; and by a high level of trust in and
attachment to European institutions. The second features a desire to maintain
the member states as central actors of the EU and a rejection of any increase in
the powers of European institutions; a refusal to strengthen European unifica-
tion and to increase the competences of European institutions; a preference for
a national army and nationally controlled social security, tax, and foreign
policies; and a low level of trust in and attachment to European institutions.
We are therefore considering all answers as analogous indicators, regardless of
their very different frequencies. For example, 71 per cent of the respondents
agree with strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, 51 per cent
think that theCommission should become the government of the EU, and only
23 per cent disagree that themember states should remain key actors of the EU.
The focus on correlations between answers may also lead to an excessive
reduction in the complexity of elites’ attitudes towards European institutions.
Table 6.1 shows that those who agree that member states should retain
control are typically less likely to support a common European foreign policy
than those who disagree (86 and 95 per cent respectively). Whilst such a
finding is not unexpected, it is more surprising to observe that most cham-
pions of the role of member states also support a common foreign policy, and
that they form a larger share of the sample (66 per cent) than those with a
more federalist approach (22 per cent). Regressions between answers to the
selected questions shed light on minority opinions and leave more frequent
positions in the dark. The stress on the opposition between pro-European
(federalist) and anti-European (sovereigntist) positions hides the fact that a
greater number of interviewees are in favour of a mixed or intergovernmental
system, which cannot be taken into consideration if we concentrate on
opposing trends. Table 6.1 also shows that those who agree to keep the
member states as central actors are more likely to disagree that the Commiss-
ion should become the government of the EU (56 per cent) than those who
wish to diminish the power of the national states in the Union (26 per cent).
However, 34 per cent of the respondents agree that the member states should
remain key actors and that the Commission should become the government
of the Union. Further, those who wish to keep national armies are less likely to
agree with a common European foreign policy than advocates of a European
army (77 versus 96 per cent), but those who support such a foreign European
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policy are more numerous (21 per cent of the sample) than those who defend
national armies and reject the idea of a European foreign policy (6.5 per cent
of the sample). They thus express a position that cannot be assimilated either
to a federalist or to a sovereigntist attitude.
6.3.1 Why a Multiple Correspondence Analysis?
Descriptive statistics show that elites’ attitudes towards institutions cannot be
reduced to a simple binary opposition between pro- and anti-integrationists, so
that we need a statistical methodology that makes it possible to differentiate
between and take into account all configurations of opinions. We decided to
conduct a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)1 of the sample of national
MPs and economic elites interviewed in 2007, because it differentiates all
kind of associations between modalities of active variables, without de facto
ignoring those that run counter correlations between indicators. In our case it
accounts for all combinations of answers to the questions, and thus helps to
Table 6.1. Cross-tabulations of opinions on institutional issues
The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the European Union
N = 1945 Agree Disagree Total
Are you in favour of or
against a single EU
foreign policy
Against 10.9% 1.2% 12.1%
(14.3%) (5.0%)
In favour 65.6% 22.3% 87.9%
(85.7%) (95.0%)
Total 76.5% 23.5% 100%
(100%) (100%)
The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the European Union
N = 1940 Agree Disagree Total
European Commission
ought to become the
true government of
the EU
Disagree 42.6% 6.0% 48.7%
(55.7%) (25.7%)
Agree 33.9% 17.5% 51.3%
(44.3%) (74.3%)
Total 76.5% 23.5% 100%
(100%) (100%)
Army
N = 1884 National army Both European Total
Are you in favour of or
against a single EU
foreign policy
Against 6.5% 4.1% 1.2% 11.8%
(23.3%) (9.8%) (4.0%)
In favour 21.3% 37.4% 29.5% 88.2%
(76.7%) (90.2%) (96.0%)
Total 27.8% 41.5% 30.7% 100%
(100%) (100%) (100%)
1 The MCA and the Ascendant Hierarchical Classification (cluster) analyses have been carried
out with the software program R 2.8.1.
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identify the entire diverse range of elites’ convictions. It also distinguishes
between weak and strong answers, such as ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat
agree’, and may take other answers, such as ‘no answer’, ‘don’t know’, or
‘refusals’ into consideration.
As already noted, through the IntUne survey, members of political and
economic elites responded to twelve questions related to European institu-
tions. We can say that all respondents are located by a definite set of answers
in a twelve-dimensional space (more precisely, in a space defined by 54
modalities of answers to the twelve questions). A Multiple Correspondence
Analysis provides a simplified representation of such a space by identifying
the main oppositions on institutional issues. Of course, the greater the num-
ber of questions, the lower the percentage of inertia summed up by an MCA.
With twelve questions, the first axis (first opposition) summarizes 7.88 per
cent (44.59 per cent with Benzecri’s modified inertia rate––BMIR), the second,
6.98 per cent (31.5 per cent with BMIR), and the third, 4.91 per cent (10.04 per
cent with BMIR) of the variance in the answers of elites. Considering the
number of questions taken into account, these percentages are in fact highly
significant. This MCA, and other statistical analyses described later, return
nine main results.
6.3.2 First Finding: Two Main Dimensions of Elites’ European Attitudes
The position on and the contribution to the factorial axes of each type of
answer show that the first axis is structured by a cleavage between advocates
and opponents of European integration and supranational institutions (see
Table 6.2.). On the far right (positive end) of the axis, we find political and
economic leaders who strongly disapprove of (sometimes refusing to answer
questions on) a single foreign policy;2 who strongly disagree with the idea that
the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened and that the
European Commission should become the government of Europe3; who are
also strongly against a common system of social security4 and a unified tax
system; who think that European unification has gone too far (reporting 0–4
on the unification scale); who say they are not attached to the EU; who express
low levels of trust in the European Parliament, the European Commission
(some even refusing to answer the question), and the European Council of
Ministers; who state that themember states should keep their national armies;
2 Answers defining this first pole of the first axis are mentioned hereafter in decreasing order of
their positive contribution to the first factorial axis (Table 6.3.). This means that the answers
‘strongly against a single foreign policy’ display the highest level of contribution to the first axis
on the ‘euro-critic’ side. This answer is abbreviated as ‘Stg against CFP’ in Figure 6.1.
3 Abbreviated as ‘Stg disagr. ECom government’ in Figure 6.1.
4 Abbreviated as ‘Stg against com. Syst of social secu’ in Figure 6.1.
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Table 6.2. Weight and orientation of each variable’s modality on the first three factorial axes
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3
A single foreign policy: strongly against 1.8945 Trust the European Commission: no
asnwer
6.2322 A single foreign policy: strongly against 1.2713
The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: disagree
strongly
1.2625 Trust the European Parliament: no
answer
5.6647 The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: agree strongly
0.9026
A common system of social security:
strongly against
1.2135 A common system of social security: no
answer
4.8346 Scale of unification: no answer 0.8533
Scale of unification: 0–4 1.132 A single foreign policy: no answer 4.6601 A unified tax system: strongly in favour 0.8139
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: disagree strongly
1.0991 A unified tax system: no answer 4.5796 A unified tax system: somewhat against 0.7764
A unified tax system for the EU: strongly
against
1.0904 Trust the European Council of Ministers:
no answer
4.0462 The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: disagree
somewhat
0.7049
A single foreign policy: somewhat
against
0.9777 The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: no answer
2.7389 A common system of social security:
strongly in favour
0.6757
Attachment to the EU: not attached 0.9615 The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: no answer
2.5954 A single foreign policy: neither in favour
nor against
0.6517
Trust the European Commission: 0–4 0.9349 The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: no answer
2.4356 Trust the European Council of Ministers:
0–4
0.6463
Trust the European Parliament: 0–4 0.9205 Attachment to the EU: no answer 2.3234 The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: disagree
0.6383
Trust the European Council of Ministers:
0–4
0.7593 Scale of unification: no answer 1.4666 Scale of unification: 9–10 0.6154
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: agree strongly
0.7556 Single European army or keep its own
national army: no answer
1.2807 The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: disagree somewhat
0.6114
Trust the European Commission: no
answer
0.738 A common system of social security:
neither in favour nor against
0.5408 Trust the European Commission:
0–4
0.6035
Single European army or keep its own
national army: national armies
0.7137 A unified tax system: neither in favour
nor against
0.2124 A single foreign policy: somewhat in
favour
0.5773
Scale of unification: 9–10 0.6951 A common system of social security:
strongly against
0.2117 A common system of social security:
strongly against
0.55
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A single foreign policy: neither in favour
nor against
0.6451 The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: disagree strongly
0.2095 A common system of social security:
somewhat against
0.5177
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: no answer
0.6392 Scale of unification 0–4 0.2093 A common system of social security:
somewhat in favour
0.5133
A unified tax system: strongly in favour 0.6216 A single foreign policy: somewhat
against
0.2092 The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: agree
strongly
0.5081
Trust the European Commission: trust
7–10
0.6075 A single foreign policy: neither in favour
nor against
0.2048 Scale of unification: 5–6 0.5024
The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: disagree
0.576 A single foreign policy: strongly against 0.2037 The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: agree
somewhat
0.4702
Single European army or keep its own
national army: European army
0.5619 Attachment to the EU: not attached 0.1912 Trust the European Parliament: 0–4 0.4386
Trust the European Parliament: trust:
7–10
0.5472 A unified tax system: strongly against 0.1858 The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: disagree strongly
0.4385
The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: no answer
0.5452 Trust the European Council of Ministers:
0–4
0.1853 A unified tax system: somewhat in favour 0.4299
A common system of social security:
strongly in favour
0.5245 Trust the European Commission: 0–4 0.1847 Attachment to the EU: not attached 0.4025
The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: agree
strongly
0.5079 Trust the European Parliament: 0–4 0.1645 The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: disagree
strongly
0.3821
The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: no answer
0.4948 A common system of social security:
somewhat against
0.1396 Single European army or keep its own
national army: European army
0.3647
The European Commission ought to
become the true government of the
EU: agree somewhat
0.4854 The member states ought to remain the
central actors of the EU: agree
strongly
0.1118 Trust the European Commission: 5–6 0.3356
Trust the European Council of Ministers:
no answer
0.4854 The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened: disagree
somewhat
0.1048 Trust the European Commission: no
answer
0.3328
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and (although to a lesser extent) who strongly agree that the member states
should remain the central actors of the EU. This groupmay be characterized as
the staunch adversaries of European integration as it has been developed until
now, or of its further advancement, and the kernel of the Eurosceptic camp.
Those who somewhat disagree with the strengthening of the powers of the
European Parliament5, who locate themselves on intermediate levels (5–6) on
the unification scale, who are somewhat against a common system of social
security, and who somewhat disagree that the Commission ought to become
the true government of the EU, also contribute to the definition of the ‘euro-
critic’ half of the first factorial axis, but to a lesser degree, being closer to the
centre of this axis. We will also see that those who accept limited advances in
European integration through intergovernmental or unionist institutions are
also closer to the axis’ centre.
At the opposite end of the axis (far left, negative end), interviewees agree
strongly that the Commission ought to become the true government of the
EU6 (Table 6.2). They think that European unification should be strengthened
(positions 9–10 on the scale); are strongly in favour of a unified tax system and
(to a lesser extent) of a common system of social security; and express a high
level of trust (7–10) in the European Commission, the European Parliament,
and (although less significantly) in the Council of Ministers. They disagree
that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU, are
in favour of a European army, and strongly agree that the powers of the
European Parliament should be strengthened. At a less significant level, they
are strongly in favour of a single foreign policy and are very attached to the EU.
Such a set of answers clearly defines a pole of advocates of an increase in
European integration through supranational institutions. Once again, respon-
dents withmore lukewarm but still positive opinions of the EU also contribute
to the definition of this half of the first factorial axis, but to a lesser degree. In
sum, this first axis may be considered a synthetic index of elites’ continuum of
positions on European integration, from those with a general positive attitude
towards the EU to its more resolute opponents, with all the nuances in
between these two extremes.
The second axis is mostly defined by ‘non-answers’ to several questions (see
Table 6.2), which, together with refusals or answers of a ‘neither, nor’ type,
characterizes those located along the positive half of this second factorial axis.
At this elite level, respondents do not refrain from answering because they do
not know, but rather because they disagree with discussing European issues
through the closed questions of the survey. Several interviewees asked if we
were speaking of the ‘present’ European Commission when asked if they agree
5 Abbreviated as ‘Swhat disagree strength Eparl Powers’ in Figure 6.1.
6 Abbreviated as ‘Stg agree ECom government’ in Figure 6.1.
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that it ought to become the true government of the EU. Others replied that
they do not understand expressions like states as central actors of the EU or
the true government of the EU. Some economic elites said they had a private
opinion but not in their role as a head of a company. When questioned about
a unified tax system or a common system of social security, several interviewees
criticized the words ‘unified’ and ‘common’ as totally unrealistic. Some added
that it would have been better to ask opinions about a ‘harmonized’ system.
A few respondents declared that they could not think of their attitude towards
the European Commission or the European Parliament in terms of ‘trust’.
The majority of interviewees who agreed to answer the questionnaire are
scattered along the opposite negative half of this second factorial axis. We are
thus able to see that this second axis represents a second divide among
interviewees opposing those who have apparently no opinion on several
issues raised by the survey and respondents with the strongest and most
resolute positions.
The third axis is structured by an opposition between respondents with
strong coherent opinions and those with more lukewarm, conflicting posi-
tions (Table 6.2.). Interviewees who say they are strongly against a single
foreign policy, as well as those who strongly agree that the European Commis-
sion ought to become the true government of the EU are likely to be located at
the end of the positive half of this axis. Respondents who answer that they are
strongly in favour of a unified tax system, or of a common system of social
security, who strongly disagree with the opinion that themember states ought
to remain the central actors of the UE, as well as those who display a low level
(0–4) of trust in the European Council of Ministers or in the European Com-
mission, or who are strongly against a common system of social security also
contribute a great deal to the definition of this third axis.
Towards the opposite pole of this third factorial axis (negative half), we find
respondents who express more lukewarm and conflicting views (Table 6.2).
They say they are somewhat against a unified tax system; they somewhat
disagree that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened,
or that the Commission ought to become the true government of the EU; they
are neither in favour nor against or somewhat in favour of a single foreign policy;
they are somewhat in favour or somewhat against a common system of social
security; they choose intermediate positions on the unification scale (5–6),
and so on.
In so far as the second axis is less a dimension of elites’ European
attitudes than an artificial consequence of the questionnaire, being consid-
ered as simplistic and inadequate by a fraction of the sample, a first finding
of the MCA is that two main dimensions structure elites’ attitudes towards
the EU. Due to the statistical logic of a MCA, the first axis equates with a
synthetic index of elites’ orientations vis-à-vis European integration and
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institutions based on the whole set of the twelve questions/indicators in-
troduced in the MCA as active variables. Each position on this axis may be
considered as a value of this first dependent variable, from the most pro-
integration and federalist attitudes (negative values) on the left side to the
most anti-integration and sovereigntist positions (positive values) on the
right side. The third axis equates with a synthetic index of the strength and
consistency of elites’ conceptions of European institutions, from the stron-
gest and the most coherent views (negative values) on the top, to weaker
and more conflicting positions on the bottom. The first and third axes
define a factorial plan that gives a clear and simple representation of the
distribution of attitudes of political and economic elites towards EU inte-
gration and institutions (see Figure 6.1).
Members of these European elites are not unexpectedly divided between
supporters and adversaries of supranational institutions, but also between
those with strong and lukewarm opinions. Strong champions of a strengthen-
ing of integration and of the powers of EU institutions are located in the top-
Stg favour uni. tax syst.
Stg agree ECom government
Stg favour com Syst social secu
Disagree member states central actions
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Figure 6.1. Two main dimensions of elites’ European attitude
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left region of the map7, whereas weaker or more irresolute advocates (who
may also advocate intergovernmental forms of integration) are also situated in
the left-hand region but in the bottom-left quadrant, and closer to the centre
of the first axis.8 They contrast with EU critics who are found in the right-hand
parts of the map, those with strong opinions in the top-right quadrant9, and
those with more moderate views in the bottom-right quadrant, and closer to
the centre of the first axis.
6.3.3 Second Finding: Multifaceted Issues of European Integration
The second finding of the MCA is that cleavages about EU institutions are
intertwined with opposing views regarding their aims and missions. Those
who support an increase in the powers of the European Commission and
Parliament are also in favour of a single foreign policy, a unified tax system,
a common system of social security, and a strengthening of European unifica-
tion. Symmetrically, respondents who express negative views of European
institutions also strongly oppose any advance in European integration.
6.3.4 Third Finding: Similar Distribution of Political and Economic
Elites’ Attitudes
In order to identify the main determinants of elites’ views on institutions and
integration, we have charted regressions and projections of independent vari-
ables (nationality, self-location on right–left scale, partisan affiliation, eco-
nomic sector, religion, frontbencher/backbencher position, age, gender,
education) on the first and the third factorial axes. These regressions add
interesting findings. One is that, contrary to intuitive expectations, political
and economic elites do not display different European attitudes. They are
similarly scattered across the factorial plan and economic elites are not more
pro-integrationist than political elites (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4).
7 They are for instance more likely to answer that they strongly agree that the European
Commission ought to become the government of the EU (‘Stg agree ECom government’ in
Figure 6.1) and that they are strongly in favour of a unified tax system (‘Stg favour uni. Tax syst’
in Figure 6.1).
8 They are for instance more likely to say that they are somewhat in favour of a unified tax
system (‘Swhat favour uni. Tax syst.’ in Figure 6.1) or that they are somewhat in favour of a
common European foreign policy (‘Swhat favour CFP’ in Figure 6.1).
9 They are for instance more likely to answer that they are strongly against a Common European
foreign policy (‘Stg against CFP’ in Figure 6.1), and that they strongly disagree that the European
Commission should become the true government of the EU (‘Stg disagr ECom government’ in
Figure 6.1).
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6.3.5 Fourth Finding: Nationality as the Strongest Predictor of Elites’
European Attitudes
Regressions show a strong correlation––the strongest of all correlations––
between attitudes and nationality (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). On average, MPs
and economic leaders coming fromWestern European countries are located in
the left-hand quadrants, some in the top-left––resolute proponents of stronger
integration and supranational institutions––(Greece, Italy, and Belgium),
others in the bottom left (weaker advocates, such as Spain) (Figure 6.2).
However, it is interesting to note that the overall positions of French, German,
and Portuguese elites in the pro-integration half of the plan are not statisti-
cally significant, which means that they are divided. Such a result is at odds
with the usual assertion of a German consensus on European integration. The
main exceptions are members of the British political and economic elites who
are located in the top-right quadrant (strong EU critics) and who are the main
Table 6.3. Linear regressions of the elite type on the first factorial axis
Estimatea Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
Political elite 0.002536 0.014888 0.170 0.865
Economic elite 0.004907 0.020709 0.237 0.813
Note: Residual standard error: 0.544 on 2023 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 4.21e-05; Adjusted R-squared:
−0.0009465; F-statistic: 0.04259 on 2 and 2023 DF, p-value: 0.9583
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.02178 0.40362 0.08599 0.31964 1.89969
Note: a the ‘estimate’ is the average location of each modality on the axis; the Std. error, its standard deviation. Pr(>|t|)
t measures the statistical significance of each modality. It is all the more significant that it is close to zero.
Table 6.4. Linear regression of the elite type on the third factorial axis
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Political elite 0.01272 0.01174 1.084 0.279
Economic elite 0.02462 0.01633 1.508 0.132 *
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.0561 0.3302 0.0183 0.304 1.3207
Note: * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4289 on 2023 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.001702; Adjusted
R-squared: 0.0007147; F-statistic: 1.724 on 2 and 2023 DF, p-value: 0.1786.
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Table 6.5. Linear regressions of nationalities on the first factorial axis
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Austria 0.01622 0.04380 0.370 0.711212
Belgium 0.25444 0.04236 6.007 2.24e-09 ***
Bulgaria 0.04754 0.04169 1.140 0.254276
Czech Republic 0.40924 0.04271 9.583 < 2e-16 ***
Denmark 0.23900 0.04717 5.067 4.42e-07 ***
Estonia 0.16238 0.04457 3.643 0.000276 ***
France 0.05296 0.04236 1.250 0.211384
Germany 0.05602 0.04253 1.317 0.187956
Great Britain 0.93583 0.05598 16.717 < 2e-16 ***
Greece 0.30225 0.04202 7.193 8.93e-13 ***
Hungary 0.18999 0.04271 4.449 9.10e-06 ***
Italy 0.28212 0.04202 6.714 2.46e-11 ***
Lithuania 0.03164 0.04306 0.735 0.462609
Poland 0.19787 0.04271 4.633 3.83e-06 ***
Portugal 0.07228 0.04306 1.679 0.093393 .
Slovakia 0.19759 0.04306 4.589 4.74e-06 ***
Spain 0.32092 0.03864 8.305 < 2e-16 ***
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 Residual standard error: 0.4717 on 2008 degrees of freedom; Multiple
R-squared: 0.2537; Adjusted R-squared: 0.2474; F-statistic: 40.15 on 17 a 2008 DF, p-value: <2.2e-16.
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.11264 0.31717 0.05248 0.27627 2.19703
Table 6.6. Linear regressions of nationalities on the third factorial axis
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Austria 0.008950 0.037008 0.242 0.80892
Belgium 0.067250 0.035794 1.879 0.06041 .
Bulgaria 0.003015 0.035230 0.086 0.93180
Czech Republic 0.102856 0.036086 2.850 0.00441 **
Denmark 0.021343 0.039858 0.535 0.59239
Estonia 0.316863 0.037663 8.413 < 2e-16 ***
France 0.176178 0.035794 4.922 9.26e-07 ***
Germany 0.028972 0.035939 0.806 0.42026
Great Britain 0.234226 0.047303 4.952 7.98e-07 ***
Greece 0.177629 0.035509 5.002 6.15e-07 ***
Hungary 0.010114 0.036086 0.280 0.77929
Italy 0.391021 0.035509 11.012 < 2e-16 ***
Lithuania 0.214690 0.036386 5.900 4.24e-09 ***
Poland 0.022454 0.036086 0.622 0.53387
Portugal 0.099450 0.036386 2.733 0.00633 **
Slovakia 0.113266 0.036386 3.113 0.00188 **
Spain 0.089667 0.032653 2.746 0.00609 **
Note: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.3986 on 2008 degrees of freedom; Multiple
R-squared: 0.1442; Adjusted R-squared: 0.137; F-statistic: 19.91 on 17 and 2008 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.079597 0.302738 0.002931 0.257276 1.280230
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occupiers of this quadrant. Danish MPs and economic leaders also lean
towards the EU-opponent pole, but close to the centre of the third axis in
the downward (moderate) direction.
Most political representatives and economic leaders of the Eastern European
countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Estonia) lean towards the
EU-critic pole at a significant level (Figure 6.2). With regard to the third axis,
most interviewees of these countries (Estonia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic)
express lukewarm or conflicting opinions. Members of the Hungarian elites
are the main exception, because of their overall location in the EU-supporter
half of the map, even if they are divided between strong and weak supporters.
The locations of the Bulgarian and Lithuanian interviewees within the pro-EU
half are not statistically significant. One important conclusion of these ob-
servations is that, when it comes to European integration and institutions,
members of political and economic elites of a same country are closer to each
other than members of the same type of elite across the EU.
6.3.6 Fifth Finding: A Right–Left Divide on the Future of the EU
The fifth finding of theMCA indicates that there is a close association between













































Figure 6.2. National belonging, ideology, and European attitudes
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institutions. If we take elites’ self-location on the left–right scale into account
(Tables 6.7 and 6.8), we see that respondents who situate themselves on the
left (scoring 3 or 4) are significantly more likely to be located in the left part of
the map (supporters of further European integration and supranational insti-
tutions) (Figure 6.2). Interviewees who place themselves at the centre of the
political scale are also situated in the pro-EU half of the first axis, although
closer to its centre, which shows that they are more divided than their coun-
terparts on the left. Even more surprisingly, those who situate themselves at
the far-left end (0–2) of the political scale are located in the euro-supporter
Table 6.7. Linear regressions of the self-location on the left–right scale on the first factorial
axis
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Far left [0:2] 0.03433 0.03686 0.931 0.3517
Left [3:4] 0.15386 0.02511 6.128 1.08e-09 ***
Centre [5] 0.06793 0.02851 2.383 0.0173 *
Right [6:7] 0.04601 0.02235 2.059 0.0396 *
Far right [8:10] 0.18678 0.02826 6.609 5.02e-11 ***
Note: *** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.5303 on 1909 degrees of freedom (111 observations
deleted due tomissingness); Multiple R-squared: 0.04598; Adjusted R-squared: 0.04348; F-statistic: 18.4 on 5 and 1909 DF,
p-value: < 2.2e-16.
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.09562 0.37962 0.08778 0.30642 1.96271
Table 6.8. Linear regressions of the self-location on the left–right scale on the second
factorial axis
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Far left [0:2] 0.07198 0.02976 2.418 0.0157 *
Left [3:4] 0.03797 0.02028 1.872 0.0613 .
Centre [5] 0.00897 0.02302 0.390 0.6969
Right [6:7] 0.04777 0.01805 2.647 0.0082 **
Far right [8:10] 0.02884 0.02283 1.264 0.2065
Note: *** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4282 on 1909 degrees of freedom (111 observations
deleted due tomissing data);Multiple R-squared: 0.009396; Adjusted R-squared: 0.006802; F-statistic: 3.622 on 5 and 1909
DF, p-value: 0.002901.
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.07417 0.33286 0.01396 0.29743 1.20998
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camp, but at a non-significant level. By contrast, those who situate themselves
on the right (scoring 6 or 7), or even more on the far right (scoring 8 to 10) are
more likely to be in the EU-critic camp, although with mainly lukewarm and
conflicting opinions for the former group (Figure 6.2). This means that we see
a left–right political divide on European institutional issues that not only
splits the political elite, but also, less expectedly, the economic elite. Contrary
to some analysts (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), we find no evidence of a
strong far-left EU scepticism, at least not at these parliamentary and business
executive levels. Neither is there a linear relationship between self-location on
the political scale and European attitudes, nor a moderate versus radical
cleavage, but rather a left–right opposition on European integration and
institutions. Such results mark a shift in the political bases of European
integration since elites with left and centre-left leanings are more likely to
back further advances in European integration and supranational organiza-
tion than those with right and centre-right preferences.
Looking at national MPs affiliations, it is meaningful that the Christian
Democrats, who had been the main advocates of the European construction
for a long time, can no longer, on average, be considered as members of the
supranationalist and pro-integration camp. They are even located in the right-
hand euro-critic half of the space, although at a non-significant level. It is also
surprising that the ‘Right Liberals’ are firmly settled in the anti-EU camp, and
that the location of the ‘Liberals’ in the pro-integration part of the plan is not
statistically significant. Whereas European integration is often depicted as an
economic neo-liberal construction, the main advocates of economic liberal-
ism are not likely supporters of European integration. When it comes to
national MPs, the established–outsiders cleavage on European issues is inter-
twined with the radical–moderate, and the left–right divisions. Nevertheless,
centre-left elites currently seem more anxious to push European integration
forward and to strengthen EU institutions than their right and centre-right
counterparts. At that moment in the history of Europe (2007), the Greens
appear as the most resolute champions of a new advancement towards greater
EU integration.
6.3.7 Sixth Finding: No Significant Sector Cleavages within Economic Elites
Contrary to some scholars’ hypotheses (e.g. Hix 1999), and to certain conven-
tional wisdom, it seems that there are few relationships between the economic
sector of business leaders and their views on European institutions. On aver-
age, agents of almost all economic sectors seem to be situated in the same pro-
EU camp, but so close to the centre of the factorial axes that their situations
cannot be considered as significant. We may only observe a counter-intuitive
statistically significant location of heads of public utilities in the pro-
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integration half of Figure 6.2 (0.027). The main exception is the group of
leaders from trade and service companies, who stand in the EU-critic half of
the map, although, here again, at a non-significant level.
6.3.8 Seventh Finding: Few Other Determinants
Other relationships between attitudes towards European institutions and inde-
pendent variables are weak. For instance, in most cases, correlations between
the position on the first axis and religious affiliations are not significant.When
they are, we may wonder if the religious affiliation is not an indicator of
national belonging rather than an independent variable. For instance, the
‘other Christians’, who are firmly in euro-critic camp, are in many cases Angli-
cans and British citizens. Individual characteristics of themembers of the elites
are poorly associatedwith attitudes towards European integration. For example,
there are no significant relationships with gender and, contrary to our hypoth-
esis, there are no differences on average between back and frontbenchers in
parliaments. However, MPs who are affiliated to governing parties are signifi-
cantly positioned in the pro-European half of the first axis, and those who
belong to opposition parties are located clearly in the opposite half.
As expected, the more elites say they have had a broad international experi-
ence, such as studying or living abroad, and having command of a foreign
language, the more they are located in the pro-integration half of the first axis.
The same is true for the number of contacts with European actors and institu-
tions. However, in both cases the relationships are not statistically significant.
There are also no clear-cut correlations between the level of education of the
members of the elites and their attitude towards Europe.
6.3.9 Eighth Finding: National Belonging and Ideology Have
an Independent Influence
The conclusion that national belongings and general ideological orientations
are the main predictors of attitudes towards European integration raises new
questions: do these two factors have an independent impact and which is the
strongest? In fact, frequencies of ideological orientations vary according to the
geographic origins of interviewees. Elites coming from Eastern Europe are
more often self-located at the far right of the political scale than their Western
counterparts (29.4 per cent compared with 10.3 per cent respectively),
whereas proportionally more Western elites express left-wing political lean-
ings than those in the East (28.1 and 16.7 per cent respectively).
In order to determine whether these two correlated variables have an inde-
pendent effect, we created a new variable by cross-tabulating geographical
origins––countries with a pro-integration tendency (overall placement on the
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left part of the first axis, irrespective of significance),10 and those with a
nationalistic tendency (located on the right anti-integration part)11––with
the political leanings of their nationals. The regression of this new variable
(see Table 6.9) on the first axis shows the strong effect of geographical origins.
In each case, whatever their placements on the political scale, elites coming
from countries with a strong pro-EU attitude are systematically located within
the pro-integration half of the axis. Symmetrically, regardless of their ideolog-
ical orientations, those coming from countries with prevailing negative per-
ceptions of the EU are likely to stand on the anti-integration side. It is
remarkable that all these results are statistically significant, with the sole
exception of far-right elites coming from countries with an overall pro-EU
inclination. However, political orientations still have an effect on elites’ Euro-
pean attitudes. The likelihood that interviewees coming from countries with a
prevailing liking for European integration share such positive feelings in-
creases when their political orientations move from the far-right, the right,
the far-left, the centre, to the left of the political scale. The relationship is
similar for interviewees who come from countries with a predominant collec-
tive scepticism about the EU, since their average position on the first axis is
moving further towards euro-criticism if their political orientations move
from the left to the centre, the right, and the far-right of the political scale.
Table 6.9. Linear regressions of countries and political self-positions on the first factorial axis
Estimate Std. error t value Pr(>|t|) Sig. level
Pro-integration countries/Far left 0.12053 0.04023 2.996 0.00277 **
Pro-integration countries/Left 0.28222 0.02826 9.986 < 2e-16 ***
Pro-integration countries/Centre 0.20286 0.03256 6.230 5.74e-10 ***
Pro-integration countries/Right 0.12621 0.02692 4.688 2.96e-06 ***
Pro-integration countries/Far right 0.05951 0.03896 1.528 0.12680
Anti-integration countries/Far left 0.19251 0.06527 2.949 0.00322 **
Anti-integration countries/Left 0.12095 0.04135 2.925 0.00349 ***
Anti-integration countries/Centre 0.19616 0.04556 4.306 1.75e-05 ***
Anti-integration countries/Right 0.29905 0.03263 9.164 < 2e-16 ***
Anti-integration countries/Far right 0.39201 0.03556 11.023 < 2e-16 ***
Note : *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4928 on 1904 degrees of freedom (111
observations deleted due to missing data); Multiple R-squared: 0.1783; Adjusted R-squared: 0.174; F-statistic: 41.31 on
10 and 1904 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
1.30086 0.35848 0.05297 0.29021 2.01531
10 Belgium, Bulgaria (ns), France (ns), Germany (ns), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania (ns),
Portugal (ns), and Spain.
11 Austria (ns), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Poland, and Slovakia.
The Europe of Elites
142
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
6.3.10 Ninth Finding: Four Types of Attitudes towards European
Institutions and Integration
In order to complete the depiction and explanation of elites’ European atti-
tudes towards European integration and institutions, we have conducted an
ascendant hierarchical classification (or a cluster analysis).12 This results in
four main attitude groups. The first of these (N = 488, 24.10 per cent of the
sample) is located in the top-left quadrant of the factorial plan and comprises
the most integrationist and federalist segments of the European elites. These
interviewees are strongly in favour of a unified tax system and of a common
system of social security; choose the highest scores (9 or 10) on the unification
scale; agree to increase the powers of the European Parliament; want the
European Commission to become the government of the EU; and are strongly
in favour of a common European foreign policy and a European army. They
also disagree that the member states should remain central actors of the
Union. From this we can see that they are very attached to the EU, but they
are weakly characterized by their level of trust in its institutions. In accordance
with the findings of the MCA, Westerners are over-represented in this group,
especially Italians, Greeks, French, Belgians, Spaniards, members of Socialist,
Social Democrat, and Green political parties in national parliaments, respon-
dents who place themselves on the left (3–4) of the political scale, and also
those with frequent contacts with EU institutions.
A second group comprises more tepid or less enthusiastic integrationists and
federalists (N = 522, 25.78 per cent of the sample), with a small part of the
group situated in the top-left quadrant, but close to the centre of the vertical
axis, while the main part is scattered across the bottom left. Members of this
group share many of the views of the first group, but they express weaker and
sometimes different opinions on several issues. Contrary to the first group,
they declare a high level of trust in the EU institutions, agree to strengthen
their powers, and to reinforce European integration, although with minor
restrictions. For instance, they declare that they somewhat agree that the
European Commission should become the government of the EU, or that
they are somewhat in favour of common social security or tax system. Likewise,
they select upper intermediate positions (scores 7–8) on the unification scale.
12 A cluster analysis defines ‘groups’ whose ‘members’ share the same positions on European
issues. These ‘groups’ are set up through an algorithm that minimizes intra-group and maximizes
inter-group distances. A definite association of a set of parameters taken into account by the
analysis characterizes each group. Cluster analyses may thus provide information about the
configurations of opinions on European institutions. As each group may be also defined by over-
representations of modalities of the selected independent variables, the cluster analysis provides
evidence about the main determinants of elites’ attitudes towards European integration and
institutions. It also gives indications about the numerical weight of each ‘group’, and therefore
about the frequency of each type of European attitude within elites.
Elites’ views on European institutions
143
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
At the same time, they express some intergovernmental preferences: they
somewhat agree that the member states ought to remain the central actors
of the EU and they believe in amixed system of national and European armies.
This group is weakly defined by the usual determinants of attitudes towards
the EU: Lithuanians, members of liberal (but also socialist) parties in national
parliaments, as well as frontbenchers and holders of university degrees are
over-represented among its members.
Members of the third group (N = 483, 23.85 per cent) may be defined as
moderate intergovernmental integrationists. They are somewhat in favour of a
single European foreign policy and unified social security and tax systems, and
they choose intermediate positions (5–6) on the unification scale. At the same
time, they appear rather doubtful about the EU as a supranational polity. They
express moderate levels of trust in its institutions (scores 5–6), to which they
say they are only somewhat attached. They somewhat disagree that the Com-
mission should become the government of the EU, and that the powers of the
Parliament should be strengthened. By contrast, they agree that the member
states ought to remain the central actors of the Union. Eastern Europeans,
especially Estonians and Lithuanians, and members of the economic elite are
over-represented in this group.
Opponents of the EU, European integration, and supranational organiza-
tions form the fourth group (N = 494, 24.34 per cent). They are mainly
situated in the top-right quadrant of the factorial plan; they claim not to be
attached to the EU and express low levels of trust (scores 0–4) in its institu-
tions. They strongly disapprove of a common social security and a unified tax
system, but only somewhat disapprove of a single foreign policy. They strongly
disagree that the European Commission should become the government of
the EU, and that the powers of the European Parliament should be strength-
ened. They strongly agree that member states should remain the central actors
of the EU and are in favour of national armies. British, Czechs, and Danish
elites, respondents who place themselves at the far right of the political scale,
members of right liberal, far-right, and communist parties in national parlia-
ments, are all over-represented in this group. Slovaks and Poles are also
proportionally numerous in the group, but they are located closer to centre
of the first axis and scattered across the top and bottom-right quadrants.
6.4 Conclusion
Multiple correspondence and cluster analyses confirm that elites’ views on
European institutions cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between
partisans and adversaries of European unification. Indeed, there are strong
and weak advocates of and opponents to European integration. Among the
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advocates, we observe nuances of federalism and intergovernmentalism, and
only a minority of political and economic elites share a true federalist concep-
tion of European institutions. Likewise, not all Eurosceptics are staunch de-
fenders of national sovereignties, and those that can be called true
Eurosceptics only constitute a minority of national elites. Indeed, many Euro-
sceptics support a moderate strengthening of European integration, typically
through a unionist or intergovernmental model of cooperation between
member states.
European unification is undoubtedly an elite-driven process, but it does not
entail that all members of the national elites are faithful advocates of suprana-
tional institutions. Indeed, around a quarter of the elites of the seventeen EU
member states appear to be more or less critical of the process of European
integration, at least as it has been developed until now, and another quarter
express only lukewarm reluctant support. We may surmise that national MPs
fear to lose some of their powers with an extension of the Union’s powers, but,
contrary to general expectations, business elites are no more enthusiastic
about the EU than their political counterparts. At the same time, most elites
either support or are resigned to deeper integration, although for many of
them integration needs to be decided and carried out through intergovern-
mental channels. Multiple Correspondence and cluster analyses also confirm
that elites’ views of the European institutions are closely intertwined with
notions of their main missions. Strong partisans and strong opponents of
further European integration alike have the issues of a common foreign policy,
a unified tax system, a common system of social security, and a European
army in mind when they support or oppose an increase in the powers of
European institutions.
When it comes to the determinants of attitudes, several findings need to be
stressed. In particular, elites’ individual socio-demographic or religious char-
acteristics, their ranking in the political hierarchies, their level of international
experience, and their level of education have no––or only a weak––influence
on their attitudes towards European institutions. Indeed, one of the main
results of this analysis of the IntUne elite survey is that elites’ attitudes towards
the EU are linked mainly to their national belonging. Beyond that, we found
that both the political and economic elites of member states have distinct
views of the EU institutions. We may thus infer that there is, in many cases, a
collective national experience of European integration, more or less common
to all elites of a given country, which contributes to the formation of attitudes
of a more or less salient proportion of political and economic elites within
each country towards Europe. There is, however, no simple explanation for
the variation in their perceptions. It is not, for instance, a simple opposition
between Western and Eastern Europe: Western elites are more likely to share
positive attitudes towards deeper European integration, whereas Eastern elites
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are more critical, but there are several exceptions. More research is needed to
probe into national elites’ perceptions and the reasons and motives for their
appraisals.
Attitudes towards European institutions are also strongly dependent on the
ideological leanings of the elites. Oppositions on institutional issues are cor-
related with the left–right cleavage, but not in the usually expected direction.
Whereas the current construction of Europe is often depicted as market- and
business-oriented, according to our results, this seems to be mainly supported
by elites who share far-left, left, centre-left, and centre general political views.
Such a politicization of European attitudes could be expected fromMPs, but it
is once again surprising that the same pattern can also be observed within the
economic elites. It appears as if each national collective experience is sifted
through the ideological orientations of the national elites. We may thus
wonder whether EU institutions are perceived as interventionist bodies in
charge of economic and social regulations, rather than as advocates for a
liberal free market.
The Europe of Elites
146
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
7
Patterns of regional diversity in political
elites’ attitudes
Mladen Lazic, Miguel Jerez-Mir, Vladimir Vuletic, and Rafael Vázquez-García
7.1 Introduction
The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether differences in attitudes
among the political elites in member countries of the European Union (EU)
towards the process of EU integration are patterned in some way so that
common regional (i.e. supranational and sub-European), economic, political,
or cultural characteristics of certain groups of countries significantly influence
the attitudes of their political elites. Our first goal is, therefore, to identify
variations among countries, and secondly, to see whether there are patterns
in these variations. If such patterns exist, our aim is to find out how important
they are, i.e. to determine how much they influence elites’ perceptions of the
EU. In other words, we will try to trace the current forms of coherence and/or
deviancyof attitudes among thepolitical eliteswithin the EU, and toprovide an
explanation of any regional (geographical, economic, cultural, etc.) variations.
In this chapter we will not be able to analyse all the possible patterns for the
relevant groupings of countries. We will first focus on the geographical dimen-
sion and then try to ascertain whether certain economic, political, and cultural
characteristics of groups of countries provide an internal social logic that
induces a geographic coherence, andwhether this coherence helps the homog-
enization or diversification of political elites’ attitudes towards EU integration.
7.2 General Framework
Our analysis will not dwell on the significance of elite studies in general, or
the importance of the role elites have played in the process of European
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integration, since these topics make the principal content of the whole book
(see also Slater 1994; Wessels 1999a; Holmberg 1999; Jenny, Pollak, and
Slominski 2006). What is important for us to stress here is that there are
good reasons, based both on previous theoretical considerations and concrete
historical experiences, to claim that there are some important differences
concerning the attitudes towards integration between the elites in certain
European states,1 and that these states orient their behaviour in many practi-
cal issues in different directions. Two examples help to illustrate the rich
empirical evidence of these differences: the inauguration of the Lisbon
Treaty––the symbol of the new stage in EU integration––was altered by
amendments forced through by the Czech and Irish political elites (in addi-
tion to the non-acceptance of its first draft in France and the Netherlands);
and the fact that the European currency has not been introduced in all
member states. In addition to these two examples, of course, there are many
day-to-day disagreements between officials of numerous European agencies
coming from different countries and trying to advance the particular interests
of their respective states. On the other hand, there are many theoretical
considerations (including whole research fields, like political geography)
pointing to the fact that, apart from the differences between the interests of
particular countries, common structural elements in the positions of some
groups of countries produce common interests at the ‘mediate level’, i.e.
between the individual and the general. According to this view, if we want
to understand the EU integration process or obstacles thereto, it is necessary to
include this mediate level in the analysis.
What, then, may be the basis of a common interests-forming entity at the
country-group level that is able to produce some kind of internal homogene-
ity, and which can differentiate it from another entity (or entities) while
retaining the differences between individual countries on one side, and the
overall EU unity on the other? Fernand Braudel (1966) starts his monumental
history of the Mediterranean by pointing to the geographical conditions that
make some forms of human activities possible or impossible, thereby deter-
mining the whole process of social development. The relatively friendly sea
and coast, which made the distant trade of larger quantities of merchandise
possible, formed the precondition for the early development not only of
ancient civilization, but also of the seeds of capitalism in the fifteenth century.
However, those same surroundings, which together with some socio-historical
processes nurtured the first capitalist centres of Europe (and the world) in
Genoa and Venice, became an obstacle when trade moved to the Atlantic
1 Notwithstanding a common rationale (grounded on well-interpreted interests) that leads the
elites of practically all European countries to push for a continent-wide economic, political, and
cultural integration.
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ocean and transferred the centre of capitalist development to Antwerp, Am-
sterdam, and, finally, to London. The rise of capitalism in Western parts of
Europe was immediately followed by an (interdependent) socio-historical
change in Central and Eastern parts of the continent. Described as the ‘second
serfdom’, this made these areas lag behind the rest of Europe both economi-
cally and socially ever since the sixteenth century (cf.Wallerstein 1974). These
broad processes2 have, to this day, left deep historical marks. In a nutshell:
faster economic development of the Western parts of Europe, interconnected
with permanent technological advancement, favoured a faster building of
nation states, with stronger administrative, fiscal, and military capacities
(cf. Tilly 1990). Mutually supportive economic and political developments
of Europe’s Western parts soon left behind not only the older Mediterranean
centres, but also the early Atlantic powers (Spain and Portugal), not to men-
tion the increasingly backward Eastern parts of the continent. Finally, but
also significantly, this political-economic development was accompanied by a
deep cultural change. As Max Weber showed, capitalism found fertile ground
in the Protestant work ethic and asceticism (Weber 2002), which was also
prone to individualism, rationalism, and even (in some interpretations) toler-
ance––in other words, all the necessary preconditions for fast technological,
economic, and political change, which were largely absent in Catholic, and
even more so, in Orthodox Christianity.
As is well known, the early capitalist structuring of the European continent,
which included, among others, the developed West, the less developed South
and the very late to develop East of Europe, hadmany consequences, of which
we will mention just two that are particularly connected with our argument.
The communist revolution in Russia, which among other things represented
an attempt to increase the speed of modernization (cf. Galbraith 1967; Inkeles
1968) was later forced upon other East European states. This produced not
only an ideological divide in Europe––‘the Iron Curtain’––but also a physical
one––the Berlin Wall; both of these had long-term consequences, even after
being dismantled, in all these countries. On the other hand, the idea and first
institutional arrangements of a united Europe came from exactly the opposite
side of Europe, from the most developed Western parts of the continent.
Our argument has so far pointed to the fact that regional divisions in Europe
have deep historical roots and were produced by specific historical processes
that have been shaping its particular interests, such as securing long-term
peaceful conditions for economic development and decreasing political
obstacles for market relations through the establishment of the European
2 In the second case also co-determined by ‘geography’, since mass production of grain and
timber, and opportunity to ship these products by sea, represented the preconditions for that type
of social development.
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Community. It may be expected, therefore, that these same commonalities are
still at work today on the basis of some particular interests, as for example in
the case of founding members who have already overcome the phase of
exhausting negotiations3 wanting to push integration still further. We have
also seen, however, that geography played only the initial role in structuring
historical developments, andwas subsequently ‘upgraded’ by economic, polit-
ical, and cultural factors that, on the one hand, may ‘support’ geography, so
that neighbouring countries share similar historical routes. On the other
hand, these factors may ‘disturb’ the foundations laid down by geography so
that individual countries do not follow the regional route, as in the case of the
Czech lands that were forced to join the Soviet block despite being an early
modernized region according to all criteria. This is whywe have tomove a step
forward from regional divisions and try to find out if the factors that make the
‘contents’ of historical development––economic, political, and cultural char-
acteristics of different countries––play an independent role, whether mutually
connected or not, in determining the interests of these countries and the
attitudes of their elites to the EU.
As already explained, for this analysis we intend to use the most common
regional division of European countries into those of the West, South, and
East, since this reflects their geographical situation and the long-term histori-
cal development connected with European integration, which is at the centre
of our research.We therefore classify the countries in our survey as follows (see
also Malefakis 1995; Bruneau et al. 2001):
 Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom.
 Southern Europe: Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
 Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Serbia.
After the initial analysis of possible regional patterns in the distribution of
elites’ attitudes towards EU integration, we will proceed by ‘deconstructing’
geography into its economic make-up. For this, we will use the simplest
indicators of economic development––GDP and GDP per capita––assuming
that different levels of development might independently influence relations
towards integration. For example, countries with stronger economies may
prefer less political impediments to free market principles, as opposed to
national economies that need more help from the ‘visible hand’ of state
protectionism. Further, we suppose that level of development not only
3 Often over trivial things, which impede efficient decision making; or, in the case of new East
European members, diluted somewhat so as to enjoy political protection and economic benefits
while keeping the recently acquired state sovereignty.
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influences politics directly but also indirectly, via the voting behaviour of
citizens. We start with the presupposition that an increase in GDP has not
always been followed by decreasing economic inequalities among the popula-
tion, that rising inequality may again produce a tendency towards a more
interventionist national state and away from political integration into distant
EU institutions. In order to check this hypothesis, we use the Gini coefficient
as an indicator of economic inequalities.
Moving with our procedure of ‘deconstructing’ geography into its social
components, i.e. taking it from the previously described political-economic
indicator into a narrower (stricter) political field, we hypothesize that political
history and political culture may also play an important role in determining
the elites’ attitudes towards European integration. It is obvious that the recent
historical divide between the ‘free world’ and ‘Soviet’ spheres comes first to
mind as a possible explanatory factor in our analysis, so that belonging to the
post-socialist block of countries has to be included among our indicators. As
already mentioned, we hypothesize that fifty years of Eastern European
countries’ complete political dependence on the Soviet Union makes the
political elites (and population) of these countries hesitant to surrender full
state sovereignty to yet another ‘higher’ level of authority. On the other hand,
the political cultures of different countries have not been shaped by medium-
term conditions only, but also by their long-term historical development.
Looking at Western countries alone, it is clear that only some have a long,
uninterrupted democratic tradition and that in others, populist, dictatorial,
and other forms of undemocratic regimes played an important historical role.
Therefore, we will try here to take the duration of democratic regimes in
countries under observation as an indicator, assuming that the longer the
democratic experience of a country, the more its elites will be prone to accept
the transfer of some decision making from the national to supranational level
(assuming this change is the result of democratic procedures). Also, as we have
already demonstrated in previous research (see Lazic and Vuletic 2009), inter-
nal political tensions stemming from a recent history of secession, including
current threats of secession, and state formation following secession, influ-
enced elites’ attitudes towards European integration. Even if this influence is
not unequivocal, whereby the threat of secession may lead to positive atti-
tudes towards greater EU integration, while having obtained state sovereignty
by secession may work against more supranational integration, we will again
check the role of this factor in forming elites’ attitudes towards deeper EU
integration.
Finally, as previously mentioned, common or interconnected historical
developments have shaped and been shaped by certain cultural characteris-
tics. There is not enough space in this chapter to investigate the whole of this
elusive field, so we decided to use just one, long-established indicator––the
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majority’s religious denomination in any given country. We will not follow
Huntington’s extreme presuppositions about the civilization-wide conse-
quences of different religious systems for political organizations and so on
(cf. Huntington 1996) for the very simple reason that a mixture of denomina-
tions represents one of our classification units. We instead assume (following
Max Weber) that a country’s type of religious ethics is not only important for
its economic culture, but also that a relatively long coexistence of different
denominations will increase the level of tolerance, making a culture more
ready to accept political integration into wider political communities.
7.3 Findings
7.3.1 Regional Patterns
We start our analysis of elites’ attitudes towards strengthening EU integration
by looking into the data on individual countries (Table 7.1).4
When we look at our data, what first comes to mind is that elites in most
countries support the advancement of EU integration, but that they also show
a variety of attitudes towards this issue: the range of attitudes stretches from
strong support for further integration (Spain) to opposition to the already
achieved level of integration (Great Britain and Estonia; the Czech Republic
being just over the theoretical mid-point of the scale). It is also interesting to
note the existence of a pattern of regional grouping, with the countries of
Southern Europe showing strong support and the majority of Eastern Euro-
pean countries showing opposition.5 At this point, however, we find a more
complex situation. First, if data on the elites and the rest of the population are
compared, we see that in six of the countries in our sample, the general
population does not support increasing integration, and that even where
there is support (in ten countries) it is weaker than in the case of the elites,
so that variations between countries are smaller and internal variations are
bigger. Also, the order of countries is partially changed in the case of the
general population, so that only the most supportive countries (Southern
Europe) and the most oppositional (UK and Estonia) remain the same, while
4 Since what we examine here are the general (geographic, economic, etc.) factors influencing
the attitudes towards EU integration, rather than the specific factors that concern the elites’
orientations, we, at this point, provide the data on these countries populations’ attitudes towards
integration as a wider context of the elites’ orientations. It is obvious, however, that we do not have
the space to proceed with a comparative analysis of these two sub-samples in this chapter.
5 These results are corroborated by those of other sources and scholars. Thus, higher levels of
Euroscepticism have been found in CEEPC countries (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2002;
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006, 2007), while Southern Europe has been traditionally more
supportive of the EU (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007).
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the elements of regularity at the medium level disappear. This means that
continuing with EU integration represents the orientation of the elites more
than that of the general public and that the public on the whole might be
ready to follow the elites in this respect, but not without hesitation.
Since it is clear from Table 7.1 that country-by-country data indicate some
elements of regional grouping, but that there are obvious exceptions, we take
our analysis a step further and try tomeasure the possible existence of regional
associations more precisely. In order to do this, we reclassify the relationship
towards the strengthening of the EU into three categories: elites from
countries believing that integration already went too far (answers 1–4 on the
scale), those who would keep the present relations (answer 5, which is the
middle of the scale), and those who support further increase in EU integration
(answers 6–10);6 the countries concerned are also grouped by region as already
indicated. This procedure resulted in the distribution in Table 7.2.
Table 7.1. European Union should be strengtheneda
Political elite Public
Country Mean N Std.
Deviation
Country Mean N Std.
Deviation
Spain 8.13 94 1.60 Portugal 6.75 844 2.95
Italy 7.72 82 2.45 Italy 6.70 974 3.04
Greece 7.57 90 2.37 Greece 6.62 963 3.11
Germany 7.41 70 1.72 Poland 6.46 880 2.45
Belgium 7.27 79 2.61 Spain 6.46 980 2.64
Denmark 6.78 58 2.93 Slovenia 5.74 954 3.01
Portugal 6.74 77 2.42 Denmark 5.73 958 2.70
Bulgaria 6.67 79 2.42 Germany 5.70 983 2.68
France 6.48 44 2.24 Serbia 5.64 776 2.78
Hungary 6.43 79 2.32 Slovakia 5.51 981 2.22
Austria 6.38 79 2.69 Belgium 5.41 985 2.89
Lithuania 6.34 80 1.85 Bulgaria 5.36 683 2.52
Serbia 6.33 72 2.71 Hungary 5.22 764 2.32
Slovakia 6.21 78 2.16 France 5.20 989 2.95
Poland 6.03 78 2.32 Estonia 4.79 815 2.62
Czech Republic 5.53 80 2.75 Great Britain 4.51 963 2.72
Estonia 4.87 71 2.19 Austria   
Great Britain 4.65 48 2.85 Czech Republic   
Slovenia    Lithuania   
Europe 6.6 1338 2.52 Europe 5.75 14492 2.82
Source: IntUne Project.
Notes: a Question: Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it has already gone too far. What is
your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, ‘0’means unification ‘has already gone too
far’ and ‘10’ means it ‘should be strengthened’. What number on this scale best describes your position? Responses:
0–10, DK (S), Refusal (S).
6 The regrouping of data from the original scale into three categories is made in order to make
them easier to follow for the reader. In all cases, differences in the statistical significance of the
relations among variables were negligible.
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Grouped in this way, our data show that regions do matter in determining
the attitudes of political elites towards European integration; although,
despite the relationship being statistically significant, the relationship is
weak. As Table 7.2 indicates, elites from Southern Europe have been the
main proponents of further integration, while Eastern European elites have
been the most cautious. In order to explain this difference, we turn first to
some already considered historical-political factors. It was, for example, sug-
gested that in the case of Southern European countries, democratic transition
and consolidation were facilitated by the moderation shown by both their
general public and elites, which included a clearly pro-European stance
(Bruneau et al. 2001: 81). In addition, democratization processes in these
countries (with the exception of Italy, where democratic political order was
introduced before the establishment of the EU) were favoured by the support
they received from other Western European countries and international
organizations. In this respect, the advantages of joining the EU clearly out-
numbered the effects of conditionality for Greece, Portugal, and Spain. While
joining the EU secured Eastern European countries economic prosperity,
political stability, and the integrity of state sovereignty, it is likely that their
former dependence on the Soviet Union continued to restrain the elites
and the population from surrendering basic elements of their sovereignty to
any supranational entity. In this way, despite the fact that national elites in
Eastern Europe were strongly committed to the ‘return to Europe’ (Grabbe and
Hughes 1998; Higley et al. 2000), the process of accession also fuelled uncer-
tainty, lack of enthusiasm, and growing scepticism among the public (and
sometimes of the political elite) about the consequences of EU membership.
This created a mismatch between the behaviour and attitudes of the ‘pro-
European’ national elites and the rising levels of Euroscepticism among the
public in some countries (Hughes et al. 2002: 328; Taggart and Szczerbiak,
2001). In any event, both the public and the elites strongly supported the
idea of integration with the West and the EU in general, although they
were sceptical about specific instruments of integration (Rohrschneider and
Whitefield 2006: 142).
Table 7.2. Attitudes towards EU integration and regional division of countries (in %)
EU integration European regions
Southern Western Eastern
Went too far 8.6 13.3 18.5
Should stay as it is 8.1 15.1 20.5
Should be strengthened 83.3 71.6 61.0
Spearman: -0.192; Sig. 0.000
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7.3.2 Economic Factors
Although the explanations just given may seem plausible, it is obvious that
they are not sufficient to account for either the commonalities or diversities in
the regional groupings of elite attitudes towards EU integration. We therefore
need to check if there are any other factors at play ‘behind’ these groupings.
We start by looking at the economic factors and analysing the level of eco-
nomic development. For this analysis we use GDP per capita as the indicator
and divide the countries into three groups accordingly: countries with more
than 40,000 euros per capita (highly developed), countries with 20,000–
40,000 euros per capita (middle developed), and countries with less than
20,000 euros per capita (less developed); attitudes towards integration will
be classified as in Table 7.2. The results of this analysis are given in Table 7.3.7
Generally speaking, the relationship between the level of economic devel-
opment and the elites’ attitudes towards the increase in EU integration is
statistically significant but is even weaker than in the case of the regional
division of countries. Of course, the overall tendency in the present case
follows the preceding one (regional grouping) because Eastern European
countries have, on the whole, been economically less developed so that less
enthusiasm for advancing EU integration among the elites in countries with
the lowest GDP levels may be expected. What seems interesting, however, is
that the level of economic development plays almost no role in this respect
with regard to elites from countries with high and middle levels of per capita
GDP. When this is taken together with our assumption about Eastern Euro-
pean countries being grouped into the less developed category, it leaves us
with the conclusion that we need to find another factor that might influence
these attitudes more strongly; we therefore turn to politics.
Of course, it could be argued immediately that there is no clear-cut separa-
tion between political and economic considerations, particularly from the
Table 7.3. Attitudes towards EU integration and level of economic development (GDP per
capita) of countries (in %)
EU integration GDP per capita (in Euros)
40,000 and more 20–40.000 Less than 20,000
Went too far 13.3 13.5 16.3
Should stay as it is 15.1 9.7 21.2
Should be strengthened 71.6 76.8 62.4
Spearman: 0.093; Sig. 0.000
7 We also examined the total GDP of a country as an indicator but––as it will be demonstrated
later on in the chapter––the present one has a better predictive value.
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elites’ perspective. For this reason we decided to first interconnect these con-
siderations using an economic indicator that is directly related to politics: the
Gini coefficient. Our aim in using this coefficient is that, as a measure of
economic differentiation in a country, it can show the potential for increasing
political instability and uncertainty in countries where economic inequality is
pronounced (following the ‘classical’ political science argument––cf. Lipset
1960; Huntington 1984). Where such potential for instability and insecurity
exists, we expect a stronger elite orientation towards the nation state as a
means to ensure stability. On the other hand, it could be argued that, where
we see a relatively modest economic differentiation in a country, the resulting
political stability makes elites more ready to ‘soften’ their need for strong
nation-state apparatuses in order to guarantee internal stability and thereby
makes them more likely to transfer part of their national regulation to the EU
as a supranational entity. In Table 7.4 we again divide the countries into three
groups according to attitudes to EU integration and correlate them with the
level of their economic differentiation.8
The data clearly show that our hypothesis about the influence of possible
political instability––due to the high economic differentiation in the coun-
try––on the attitudes of its elite towards EU integration should be dropped. It
is interesting to note, however, that the elites in countries with amedium level
of economic differentiation display the highest inclination towards increasing
integration, whichmight alsomean that a low level of differentiation, thereby
decreasing the potential for social conflict, also reduces elites’ need for supra-
national integration. However, since grouping the countries according to the
level of economic differentiation did not follow the regional grouping, and as
the correlation between this indicator and attitudes towards EU integration
Table 7.4. Attitudes towards EU integration and level of economic differentiation (Gini
coefficient) (in %)
EU integration Countries according to level of economic differentiation (Gini coefficient)
Lower Medium Higher
Went too far 16.1 12.0 15.8
Should stay as it is 17.2 12.0 19.3
Should be strengthened 66.8 76.1 65.0
Spearman: 0.006; Sig. 0.808
8 Countries in our research are distributed according to the size of the Gini coefficient in the
following way: lower level of differentiation (Gini below 0.30): Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria; medium level of differentiation (Gini between 0.30 and
0.35): Serbia, France, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Spain; higher level of differentiation (Gini above
0.35): Estonia, UK, Italy, Lithuania, and Portugal. It is important to notice that this division does
not follow either of the previous two divisions, namely regional and developmental.
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was significantly lower than in the case of the regional grouping, we have to
move on and try to check the validity of our next hypothesis concerning the
possible influence of several political characteristics of the countries on their
elites’ attitudes to EU integration.
7.3.3 Political Factors
As already mentioned, when speaking about differences in the attitudes of
political elites towards the EU, what most often comes to mind is the position
of countries that recently joined the EU after having been a part of the Soviet
block for almost half a century. Bearing in mind that, for these countries, the
fall of the Berlin Wall not only signified a systemic change, namely the
introduction of the capitalist system and democratic polity, but also the end
of enforced state integration into the Soviet block. Entry into the EU had
politically ambivalent consequences: safety from a possible Russian threat,
but also a limitation to their long-awaited full state sovereignty.
Our previous regional groupings mostly followed the division between the
post-socialist ‘Eastern’ and the traditional capitalist ‘Western’ and ‘Southern’
countries. However, since we noticed in Table 7.1 that in many cases individ-
ual countries do not follow the group pattern, we want to check whether
putting the two groups together (and reclassifying attitudes towards integra-
tion) changes the relation between the elites’ attitudes and the recent political
past (Table 7.5).
As can be seen in Table 7.5, there is almost no change if we group countries
as being with or without a Soviet past rather than by regional belonging; the
relationship with elites’ attitudes towards EU integration remains statistically
significant, but pretty weak. In other words, elites in many post-Soviet
countries are very cautious about the strengthening of supranational integra-
tion. Going back to the list of individual countries, we see that only the
Bulgarian elites are slightly above the European average in positively evaluat-
ing the possibility of strengthening EU integration. This might be connected
with the fact that Bulgaria entered the Union just before the survey, so that
Table 7.5. Attitudes towards EU integration and previous
membership in the Soviet block (in %)
EU integration Membership in the Soviet block
Yes No
Went too far 18.5 11.0
Should stay as it is 20.5 11.7
Should be strengthened 61.0 77.3
Spearman: 0.173; Sig. 0.000
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pro-European attitudes in the country were still fairly high. In this case, the
strength of the Union may still be seen as a necessary protection against a
possible threat from the East rather than as a factor limiting the country’s
independence. Among post-Soviet countries that entered the EU earlier, how-
ever, the feeling of threat may have already disappeared. The position of the
UK, which is traditionally cautious about deeper European integration, at the
bottom of the scale obviously lowers the correlation.
Even though our hypothesis that recently acquired sovereignty following
the collapse of the Soviet empire decreases a country’s orientation towards
deeper European integration found some modest confirmation, it could still
be argued that another factor is involved in this relationship: namely, that
what the East European countries have in common is not only their post-
Soviet experience, but also a long history of undemocratic political regimes.
So, assuming that deeper (voluntary) European integration also means further
consolidation in the constitution of broader democratic polity, we need to
check whether the duration/stability of democratic regimes in these countries
is connected with the desirability of EU integration. In other words, we can
hypothesize that the presence of an undemocratic tradition may influence
some of the political elite not to support the transfer of additional decision-
making authorities to a supranational entity, since such a transfer would
reduce the potential for internal non-democratic rule; or vice versa, whereby
part of the elite would support the transfer of certain powers to a suprana-
tional entity precisely because it would reduce such potential (Table 7.6).
Even if it is immediately clear that the correlation between the attitudes
towards increased EU integration and the duration of a democratic regime in a
country is statistically insignificant, it is interesting to see that the positive
evaluation of strengthening EU integration comes mostly from countries that
have had democratic regimes for most but not all of the time. In a way, this
somewhat supports both our presuppositions: that a historically stable demo-
cratic tradition makes the elites in such countries less in need of opting for a
Table 7.6. Duration/stability of democratic regime and attitudes towards the EU (in %)
EU integration Countries according to duration of democratic regime in the twentieth
centurya
Continuously democratic Mostly democratic Mostly undemocratic
Went too far 15.8 9.7 16.0
Should stay as it is 18.3 9.5 17.6
Should be strengthened 65.9 80.8 66.3
Spearman: 0.056; Sig. 0.016
Notes: a Among the countries with continuous democratic regimes (disregarding the period of foreign occupation) we
include: Belgium, Denmark, France, and the UK; mostly democratic (over 50 years of democratic regime) are: Austria,
Germany, Greece, and Italy; mostly undemocratic (less than 50 years of democratic regime) are: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, and Spain.
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wider and possibly safer democratic polity; and that a lack of historical demo-
cratic tradition decreases the wish of the elite to integratemore fully into such a
polity. On the other hand, as the data in Table 7.6 clearly demonstrates, the
problem we investigate is highly complex. While the UK might be used as an
example of a country with a long democratic tradition not wishing to opt for a
wider and possibly safer democratic polity, France is an example of the con-
trary, just as Spain falsifies our second presupposition. In other words, the
long list of factors, whose possible role in the explanation of elites’ orienta-
tions towards EU integration is tested here, shows precisely that numerous
influences necessarily turn many countries into ‘individual cases’ departing
from one or another with regularity. Naturally, this is no reason to dismiss the
whole argument, but it is grounds for continuing to search for other explana-
tions, which is why we now turn to see whether another historical-political
experience––that of separatism––influences the attitudes of elites’ towards EU
integration.
Asmentioned earlier, in other researchwewere able to show that an influence
of separatism did exist, but it was not linear: elites in countries formed by
secession tended to place above-average stress on the priority of nation states
over the EU, while elites in countries under the threat of secession prioritized
stronger supranational ties (cf. Lazic and Vuletic 2009). Having in mind the
two-directional consequence of this factor, we now look at how it works when
the question of strengthening the EU is at stake (Table 7.7).9
As in the previous case, in which the relation between democratic stability
and elites’ attitudes towards EU integration was checked, we see that the
connection between the two variables is weak and insignificant, especially
because there is no difference between the attitudes of the elites from two
types of country––those that have not experienced (internal) demands for the








Went too far 12.5 21.7 12.5
Should stay as it is 14.6 21.7 13.8
Should be strengthened 72.9 56.6 73.7
Spearman: 0.032; Sig. 0.172
Notes: a The surveyed countries are grouped in the following way: ‘without separatist experience’––Austria, Bulgaria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal; ‘formed recently by separation’––Czech Republic,
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia; ‘with present separatist threat’––Belgium, Serbia, Spain, UK.
9 Two differences exist here in comparison with previous connections: we do not confront
directly the EU and a nation state; and we use only one indicator of the attitude towards the EU.
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separation of a part of their territories, and those facing such demands (by
political parties, movements, or even terrorist groups). However, it is quite
clear that the elites in countries having recently acquired sovereignty through
separation from another country are more cautious towards the strengthening
of the EU, which is consistent with our finding that newborn state indepen-
dence increases the pro nation-state orientation of the political elite (see
Table 7.5). This finding also leads to the conclusion that in time, when
the elite’s legitimization basis moves from obtaining state independence to
securing its successful functioning, its attitude towards strengthening the
supranational entity might become more favourable.10
7.3.4 Cultural Factors
Finally, we look at whether the relatively weak regional regularities in forming
the elites’ attitudes towards the strength of supranational ties in Europe have a
common cultural background. Due to space considerations, we have had to
limit ourselves to a few indicators, and have therefore selected one that has for
a long time been considered very important by social scientists: religion. As
already mentioned, Weber claimed that Protestantism stood behind the early
rise of capitalism in England, and that this fundamentally contributed to the
present socio-economic and political regionalization of Europe. Following this
standpoint, it has also been argued that certain characteristics of religious
denominations are directly connected with certain types of political system,
whereby some are more or less prone to support democratic regimes, some are
‘neutral’ in this respect, and others favour undemocratic regimes (see Hun-
tington 1984). In the same vein, some have suggested that denominations
differ among themselves depending on the tolerance of their ‘spiritual com-
petitors’ and that this tolerance also has important socio-economic and politi-
cal consequences (Bellah 1957). Following these ideas, wemay suppose that the
elites in countries with a long-standing mixture of religious denominations
would find it easiest to accept the enlargement of their political community,
which by itself brings increased cultural diversification. It could also be argued
that predominantly Protestant countries, wherein capitalism developed early,
wouldbemore ready toweaken state borders and thus enable greater freedomof
capital circulationandaccumulation.Conversely, however, itmaybe logical for
countries with a prevalent Orthodox tradition to be more cautious towards the
strengthening of EU integration, since its churches have usually been closely
10 We also tried using the existence and size of ethnicminorities in a country (operationalized by
the percentage of dominant ethnic community in the country) as an indicator of possible political
instability and therefore as a source of influence on the elites’ attitudes towards EU integration. We
will later on demonstrate that this variable is also significantly connected with our dependent
variable but less strongly than historical experience with separatism.
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tied to their nation states, so that a weakening of the nation state would also
reduce the influence of the national church. Let us now look at our data to see if
these considerations can be empirically verified (Table 7.8).
Interestingly enough, in the present case, the relation between the elites’
attitudes and our independent variable is statistically significant (even if
relatively weak). However, the direction of the relation does not follow
expectations: elites in predominantly Catholic countries support EU integra-
tion most energetically, while support is the weakest among elites in Protes-
tant countries, with Orthodox and religiously mixed countries being closer to
Catholic countries than to Protestant ones. The first explanation that comes to
mind is that most Catholic countries also belong to the Southern region
of Europe, where support for EU integration is strongest, while the attitude
of UK elites again determines the position of the whole Protestant camp. On
the other hand, the position of Orthodox countries may best illustrate the
problems with which our explanations of variation of support for deeper
EU integration are faced. Namely, if we want to understand why the elites in
Catholic, Orthodox, and mixed religious countries give stronger support to
increasing EU integration than the elites in Protestant countries, we have to
take into account the fact that the Orthodox countries in our sample include
Greece (a Southern and mostly democratic country), Bulgaria (a fresh EU
entrant), and Serbia (an aspiring EU entrant). These are also the countries
with an above-average presence of factors already established as those con-
tributing to the strengthening of pro-EU integration.
7.4 Conclusions: Towards a Synthetic Analysis
The repeated demonstration in our analyses of the effect of different influ-
ences on the attitudes of political elites towards EU integration forces us to
abandon the search for additional individual factors and to look at the effect of
Table 7.8. Dominant denominations in a country and elites’ attitudes towards the EU (in%)
EU integration Dominant denominationa
Catholic Orthodox Protestant Mixed
Went too far 10.2 13.4 22.9 19.1
Should stay as it is 13.0 17.1 26.4 15.5
Should be strengthened 76.8 69.5 50.7 65.4
Spearman: 0.142; Sig. 0.000
Notes: a Countries in which at least 67 per cent of the population declares to belong to one religious denomination are
grouped into (dominantly) Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, while others are put into the Mixed group. According to
this criteria, Catholic countries are: Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain; Ortho-
dox countries are: Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia; Protestant countries are: Denmark, UK, Estonia; and Mixed countries are:
Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia (source: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos>).
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these factors taken together. In order to do this, we use a regression analysis
in which elites’ attitudes towards the strength of EU integration are taken as
the dependent variable, while the factors we have analysed so far––together
with two additional factors, namely, ethnic composition of country and total
GDP––are incorporated as independent variables (Table 7.9).11










1 (Constant) 6.541 4.117 1.588 0.112
Orthodox 0.212 0.573 0.034 0.369 0.712
Protestant 1.667 0.237 0.232 7.047 0.000
Religiously mixed 0.494 0.497 0.091 0.996 0.320
Ethnic composition 0.022 0.010 0.091 2.166 0.030
GDP 5.042E-5 0.000 0.024 0.549 0.583
GDP per capita 7.647E-5 0.000 0.514 1.999 0.046
Gini coefficient 0.008 0.073 0.015 0.114 0.909
Southern 1.052 0.374 0.192 2.810 0.005
Continuously 0.851 0.560 0.135 1.521 0.128
democratic
Mostly democratic 0.341 0.490 0.059 0.695 0.487
Founded by
separation
0.655 0.224 0.117 2.919 0.004
Problem with
separatism
0.352 0.219 0.066 1.610 0.107
Membership in
Soviet block
1.408 0.791 0.297 1.781 0.075
Notes: a Dependent variable: scale from ‘Unification has already gone too far’ to ‘Unification should be strengthened’.
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 0.314a 0.098 0.092 2.25730
Notes: a Predictors: (Constant), post-socialist countries, ethnic composition, Orthodox, Protestant, Gini, separatist
problem, partly democratic, GDP, founded by separation, democratic, religiously mixed, southern, GDP per capita.
11 Independent variables in the regression model are defined in the following way: ‘Orthodox’,
‘Protestant’, and ‘religiously mixed’ are dummy variables (with ‘Catholic’ as referent category). The
scale of ‘ethnic composition’ was made on the basis of the percentage of the dominant ethnic
group. ‘Continuously democratic’ and ‘mostly democratic’ are dummy variables (with ‘mostly
undemocratic’ as referent category). ‘Founded by separation’ and ‘problem with separatism’ are
dummy variables (‘without separatist experience’ is the referent category). ‘Membership in the
Soviet block’ is a dummy variable (with ‘not members’ as referent category). ‘Southern’ is a dummy
variable (with ‘Eastern’ as referent category). ‘Western’ corresponds to ‘notmember in Soviet block’
and could not be included in the model; when ‘members in the Soviet block’ are excluded, the
dummy variable representing ‘Western’ countries compared to ‘Eastern’ countries as the referent
category is not a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable.
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The results of the regression analysis show that all variables explain less
than 10 per cent (9.8 per cent) of the total variance. This suggests that, if all
independent variables taken together have so small a predictive value, many
cannot be significantly connected with our dependent variable. In brief, elites’
attitudes towards the strength of EU integration are not influenced by the
previous existence of a socialist order in the country; by the history of demo-
cratic order; by the country’s aggregate level of economic development (GDP);
or by the level of economic differentiation in a country. Some variables that
we explored, however, are found to be significantly connected with elites’
attitudes towards EU integration:
 The more specific measure of economic development––GDP per capita––
represents the factor with the strongest influence on the elites’ attitudes:
an additional dollar per capita increases the score at the scale of support
for deeper unification for 0.514 standard deviations.
 The prevalent religious denomination represents another factor which
significantly influences the researched attitudes, to the effect that
respondents from predominantly Protestant countries are less willing to
support stronger EU integration than those coming frommostly Catholic
countries (resulting in the scale of unification dropping by 0.232 standard
deviations; however, there is no significant difference between
respondents from predominantly Catholic and those from mostly
Orthodox countries).
 Our starting hypothetical dimension concerning the effect of
geographical region comes third in level of influence on elites’ attitudes
towards the strength of EU integration, in so far as elites’ from Southern
European countries prefer stronger EU integration in comparison to
respondents from Eastern Europe (0.192 standard deviations). On the
other hand, the difference between Western and Eastern European elites
is not statistically significant in this respect.
 An historical experience of separatism is also significant, so that elite
members from countries having recently obtained state independence by
secession are less oriented towards strong EU integration than the elites
from countries without secession problems. Nevertheless, there is no
significant difference in this respect between the elites coming from
countries currently facing secession problems and those which are not.
 Finally, the weakest but still significant influence is that of a country’s
ethnic homogeneity, so that an increasing level of homogeneity reduces
elites’ orientation towards deeper EU integration (each per cent of
increased ethnic homogeneity results in a decrease in the integration scale
of 0.091 standard deviations).
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The most general conclusion of the regression analysis would probably be
that our findings are ambivalent. We did establish that some independent
variables influenced the attitudes of political elites towards the further integra-
tion of their countries into the EU, but these influences were neither strong nor
numerous. Taken individually, only four of these variables were statistically
significantly in relation to the dependent variable, but in all cases the relation
was weak. Taken together, our independent variables explained a small per-
centage of variations in the total elite sample. What is the meaning of these
findings? Was the whole problem incorrectly formulated, so that the hypothe-
sis about the existence of any kind of commonalities in elites’ attitudes to
deeper EU integration could not be confirmed? Or were the independent
variables not suitable, or was the dependent variable unreliably measured?
We will answer these questions in the inverse order. With regard to the
dependent variable, we collapsed the original scale concerning elites’ attitudes
towards the strength of EU integration into three categories, as already men-
tioned (see page 153), but we did this only after we had explored the original
11-point scale to check that the results we obtained by using this simpler
indicator did not change significantly. We did also try to build a more com-
plex dependent variable, using several indicators to construct an index of the
elites’ relation towards the strengthening of the EU. However, as the outcome
of this attempt had no significant effect on the results, we decided to use the
simpler construction to make the chapter easier to read.12 In the case of the
independent variables, it is obvious that those used in our analyses could not
be a finite list of possible influences. However, if we look at the variables that
demonstrated a statistically significant relation with the dependent variable,
we do have a very interesting finding: all fields of social relations wherein we
looked for an influence on the elites’ attitudes––economy (GDP per capita),
politics (experience of separatism, ethnic composition), culture (dominant
religion), and finally, our starting indicator (regional position)––proved to be
important.
We can, therefore, say that our search generally took the right, multi-linear,
direction. At the same time, the very complexity of potential influences
suggests that such an investigation may not proceed too far. In other words,
each country represents an individual mixture of a multitude of general
factors that, combined with individual characteristics of the countries’ elites,
makes any strong connection between an attitude and a particular factor
highly improbable. Does this mean that our attempt to find such connections
was futile from the beginning? We do not think so. First, demonstrating the
12 We used a complex index of the elites’ attitudes towards the EU as the dependent variable
relatively successfully in our previous research, but our conclusions in that case also were not linear
and unequivocal (cf. Lazic and Vuletic 2009).
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extreme complexity of the relations we studied represents a valuable result,
especially when the importance of all dimensions of social relations––eco-
nomic, political, and cultural––in this field was positively confirmed. We also
believe that some general practical consequences (to which we will turn in the
following, concluding pages of our chapter) can be deduced from our findings,
in spite of our overall conclusion about the strength of individuality (particu-
larity), where elites’ attitudes towards the further integration of the EU are
concerned.
Returning to our initial finding, we saw that political elites in a large
majority of countries support an increase in EU integration. Also, since we
found that the level of economic development was the best predictor of a
positive attitude towards greater integration, we might be able to predict some
options in future alterations of this attitude. Here, we may say that the present
period of economic crisis, marked by a drop of the GDP in the majority of
European countries, does not provide the most favourable conditions for
institutional change oriented towards increased EU integration, since the
political elites in (at least some of) these countries would not be ready to
support that change. On the other hand, economic growth might improve
the political elites’ readiness to look positively towards increased integration.
This is particularly important for the former socialist countries, although we
found that their overall socialist prehistory did not play a significant role in
determining their elites’ attitudes towards EU integration. What may explain
the cautious attitude in some of these countries towards the transfer of addi-
tional authority to a supranational entity such as the EU is their recent politi-
cal past: the creation of an independent state (in case of Estonia, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, in our sample) or the achievement of full
state sovereignty (Poland). It could be expected, therefore, that the crucial
element of political legitimization in these countries––full state sovereignty––
will gradually lose importance over time and, together with the expected
economic growth, might orient their political elites towards deeper EU (supra-
national) integration. Finally, it is certainly interesting to note that the
increasing (ethnic) heterogeneity positively influences the attitudes towards
supranational integrations. Since the increase in different forms of heteroge-
neity (cultural, ethnic, racial, etc.) is a corollary of the globalization process, it
might also facilitate the acceptance of advancement in European integration.
Of course, we have to repeat that, since the individual factors investigated in
this chapter did not demonstrate a strong influence on elites’ attitudes
towards EU integration, and that even when taken together they only ex-
plained a limited part of the variation in these attitudes, the predictive value of
our findings is not very high. It is also necessary to add that the predictive
value in our case is very limited if we look at individual countries. The
complexity of numerous individual factors is, in many countries, removed
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by such factors being forged into a single hard entity called tradition, which
may endure notwithstanding a major change in actual circumstances. This is
partly why the UK’s political elite, for example, continually ranks last in
positive attitudes towards deeper EU integration in spite of the fact that it is
a Western country, it is economically highly developed, with a long-lasting
sovereignty, and is culturally diverse. However, explaining individual varia-
tions between countries must be the subject of future research.
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8
The elites–masses gap in European
integration
Wolfgang C. Müller, Marcelo Jenny, and Alejandro Ecker
8.1 Introduction
The elite–masses gap is notorious in European integration. Throughout the
history of the European integration project, pro-European elites have been
moving ahead withmeasures leading to ever closer integration and presenting
the citizens with a series of fait accompli to which they then gradually became
accustomed. The Luxembourg PrimeMinister, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed
this quite freely in an interview concerning the working of the EU Council of
Ministers:
We decree something, then float it and wait some time to see what happens. If no
clamour occurs and no big fuss follows, because most people do not grasp what
had been decided, we continue––step by step, until the point of no return is
reached. (Der Spiegel, No. 52, 1999, our translation)
Indeed, it is widely believed that many of the major moves in the European
integration process that are largely accepted by the public today would proba-
bly have failed if there had been a referendum at the time of decision making.
Regardless whether the above is true, we need to consider why an elite–
masses gap is relevant to the issue of European integration and the extent to
which a cross-sectional study can contribute to such a debate. First, the recent
referendums on European integration in France, Ireland, and The Netherlands
that rejected important elite arguments for moves towards deeper integration
made it clear that European citizens are no longer acquiescent, even in
countries not known for having a troubled relationship with ‘Europe’. As the
effects of European integration come closer to the everyday lives of citizens and
gain salience, party competition is picking up the subject. Issue entrepreneurs
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of small parties, also more extreme on other dimensions than the established
parties, were the first ones to exploit the EU issue (Franklin and van der Eijk
2004). Yet, taking a critical attitude towards aspects of the European integra-
tion process is no longer the exclusive province of outsider parties. The more
successful these outsider parties are, and the more the integration process
affects the core concerns of established parties, the less these establishedparties
can afford to remainunqualified supporters of further integration (Hooghe and
Marks 2008). Given these circumstances, elites in established parties have to be
careful about the magnitude of the representation gap: too large a gap can
cause ‘big fuss’––to use Juncker’s terms (see earlier quote)––and thereby harm
both established parties and the European integration project.
Political elites, therefore, need to be concerned about the representation
gap, as too large a gap can backfire and jeopardize their electoral, office, and
policy goals. However, there is no natural metric with which to measure the
gap and no certainty about what kind of divergence between elites and the
masses will result in trouble. Nor are national elites free to choose their fate.
Being confronted with demands from their European partners and EU institu-
tions on the one hand and national constraints on the other may be similar to
being caught between a rock and a hard place. In addition, national political
opportunity structures may differ widely and a similarmagnitude of the elites–
masses gap may be inconsequential in some systems but constitute major
challenges in others. We cannot address or even resolve all these problems
in the present chapter. Rather, we confine ourselves to measuring representa-
tion gaps as they emerge from various dimensions of the European integration
project and different modes of preference aggregation. We proceed by looking
at key projects towards a fully integrated Europe that are either already in
place, agreed in principle, or which loom prominently on the agenda when
deepening European integration is the aim. These are the common European
foreign, defence, social security, and tax policies, and the EU cohesion policy.
In so doing we make the simplifying assumption that cross-national differ-
ences in the magnitude of the elite–masses gap are valid measures of the
tensions over the European integration project in the member states at the
given point in time. The larger the elite–masses gaps in these areas, the greater
the challenges faced by the elites.
The present chapter makes two contributions, one conceptual and one
empirical. Most research under the ‘issue congruence paradigm’, originally
proposed byMiller and Stokes (1963), focuses on substantive representation of
voter opinions by members of parliament (MPs; see Powell 2004). Given the
relevance of government in parliamentary systems we propose to extend that
perspective by considering the entire chain of delegation from voters, to MPs,
to governments (Strm,Müller, and Bergman 2003), and hence to evaluate the
gap between elites and masses in terms of political outcomes. To this end, we
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develop an outcome-oriented approach that is based on stylized models of the
political process. Our approach is novel in that it measures representation gaps
as resulting from the two-step aggregation process of preferences that is typical for
party democracies, whereby the first step takes place within political parties,
and the second step between them. By taking into account actual inter-party
coalitions and the key role of governments in making public policy in general
and EU policy in particular, our approach is alsomore realistic than others that
compare elite opinions in parliament with voter opinions. Admittedly, that
makes our results sensitive to changing patterns of party alliances and the
parties’ government or opposition status.
Finally, we want to be clear that we are not claiming to measure policy
outcomes in a narrow sense. Rather, we estimate the outcomes of the political
representation process under the assumption of specific rules of preference
aggregation. In a world without technical and political constraints,1 our
measure of policies preferred by the government and real policy outputs
should be equal. Clearly, real world situations satisfy the above conditions
to very different degrees.
Our empirical contribution is measuring the elites–masses gaps in fifteen
EU member states with regard to central issues of European integration in
2007 by drawing on the unique data collected by the IntUne project (see
Chapters 1 and 11, this volume).
We begin by surveying how representation studies have measured the
degree of ‘policy correspondence’ between citizens and political elites, and
by discussing a number of conceptual issues. Then we present our approach to
the topic. Next we compare the views of political and economic elites with
those of voters. In the concluding section we discuss some potential implica-
tions of our results for the European integration process and its democratic
legitimacy.
8.2 How to Study Policy Congruence
The rich literature on policy representation offers many ways of comparing
the opinions ofmasses and elites and ofmeasuring the gap between the two. It
has also resulted in very different substantive conclusions about the quality of
representation and what accounts for such differences (for excellent literature
reviews see Powell 2004; and Golder and Stramski 2010). As Powell (2004)
and Mattila and Raunio (2006) have noted with regard to the contributions in
Miller et al. (1999), the peaceful coexistence of research results and conclusions
1 For instance, agenda-setting rights and strategic voting or abstention of actors may impact on
the final outcome of the preference aggregation process.
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about the quality of representation could remain as long as different methods
of comparing mass and elite attitudes were applied to different data sets.
However, more recent research demonstrates that different methods applied
to the same data can lead to different conclusions concerning the size of
representation gaps and the factors that cause them.2 It is important, therefore,
to be aware of the choice of methods available and the possible consequences
of each choice.
8.2.1 Conceptual Issues
WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ELITE GROUP?
Empirical research on policy representation began in the United States, with
researchers comparing the policy preferences of the voters in single-seat con-
stituencies with the policy choices of the individual representatives they had
elected (Miller and Stokes 1963; Rehfeld 2005). Subsequent empirical analyses
and models aggregated the representative agents into groups and extended
the level of aggregation on the side of the voters to both ends of the scale,
from a single voter to the national electorate (e.g. Weisberg 1978). In the
context of European democracies, political parties are key to the structuring of
the opinions and behaviour of voters and politicians. The pair-wise compari-
son of party voters and party politicians was originally proposed by Barnes
(1977) and is now common to empirical representation research in European
party democracies. The chain of delegation has also been extended from the
voters–MP relation to the voters–government relation (Huber and Powell
1994).
Although we address both relations in this chapter, we remain ultimately
interested in the existence of representation gaps between voters and govern-
ments. This is the core of policy representation and it seems particularly
relevant with regard to European integration. Although national parliaments
appear to have increased their scrutiny of EU affairs in the most recent period
2 Take the relevance of electoral systems for the size of representation gaps. According to Huber
and Powell (1994) and Powell (2000), democracies with proportional electoral systems exhibit
better issue congruence than majoritarian electoral systems. Golder and Stramski (2010) have
challenged this result. They find that ‘the level of ideological congruence between citizens and
their government is not substantively higher in proportional democracies than in majoritarian ones’
(Golder and Stramski 2010: 91). According to their analysis, the conflicting results of scholarly
analyses result from different concepts of congruence, as either defined purely in terms of
ideological distance between citizens and their representatives (absolute congruence) or also
taking into account the dispersion in citizen preferences (relative congruence). In contrast,
Powell (2009) finds that it is different time periods rather than different measures of congruence
that account for conflicting results. While in most decades proportional representation systems
produce higher amounts of congruence between voters and legislators, this result completely
vanishes in the 1996–2004 period (Powell 2009: 18). As Powell notes, this, can be ‘random
fluctuation (of the few single-member district elections), the outcome of short-term global or
ideological context, or a trend’ (2009: 19).
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of the European integration process (e.g. Aurel and Benz 2005; Raunio 2009),
it continues to be elite driven (Haller 2008).
Unfortunately, practical problems render it impossible to measure govern-
ment preferences and voters’ opinions directly with the same methods and
metric. One possible strategy is resorting to estimate government positions
from other sources, such as party manifestos, coalition agreements, or govern-
ment declarations, but this requires the making of quite a few potentially
consequential assumptions. Another common approach has been to calculate
government preferences from party positions identified by expert surveys (e.g.
Huber and Powell 1994).We follow a different strategy.While it is not without
assumptions, we consider those we make more intuitive than those behind
approaches that extract position data from political texts or use expert ratings
instead of political actor data. Specifically, we consider the cabinet under
parliamentary government as a kind of parliamentary committee. While
access to this most exclusive club hinges on several factors, ‘party’ is the one
that most systematically discriminates between parliament and government:
some parties are represented in the cabinet and others are not. Moreover,
research on politicians’ policy positions shows that party membership
is typically their strongest determinant, clearly outperforming other factors
(e.g. Putnam 1973). Further, cabinet members are ultimately accountable to
parliament and depend on the trust and support of their parliamentary parties
(Müller 2000; Strm 2003). Our method, therefore, is to calculate government
policy positions from the answers of government parties’ MPs to our survey
questions.
POSITIONS VERSUS DIRECTION AND SALIENCE
According to the Downsian framework (Downs 1957), politicians should
mirror the preferences of their voters and hence take positions very similar,
if not identical, to those of their constituents. Any relevant differences found
in empirical studies, therefore, suggest that representation does not work, and
indeed, the bulk of the empirical representation literature seems to proceed from
that understanding. Note, however, that in the literature on voting and party
competition several other approaches have gained prominence. One such
refinement is incorporating the policy status quo; another is to allow for some
difference between the parties’ promises and their ability to deliver public policy
or even outcomes (Merrill and Grofman 1999; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman
2005). Once the status quo is taken into account and parties’ claims formaking
public policy have been discounted, a party that takes a position far from that
of the voters may be acting more in the voters’ interests than the party closest
to the voters.
Downsian proximity models have been challenged more fundamentally
by directional theory (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In this vein, Valen
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and Narud (2007) claim that it is the directional mechanism that drives
representation: it works when politicians take positions that promise to
move the status quo in the direction favoured by the voters and in so doing
take more extreme positions than the voters.
Finally, proximity models may be challenged from a salience perspective.
Appealing to that reasoning, Schmitt and Thomassen argue that the difference
in importance voters and representatives attach to an issuemight be the better
indicator than the difference in position with regard to the issue:
Issue effects on the vote are more pronounced for issue competence attributions
than for parties’ policy positions. This is consequential also for the measurement
of political representation. Following the competence logic, measures of issue
congruence should be based on issue salience rather than issue positions. A close
match between voters’ and elites’ views is then indicated by similar salience rather
than distances in their policy positions. (2000: 335 n. 2)
All these different approaches to classic issue proximity have strong micro-
foundations, and it would be fascinating to engage with these theories empir-
ically to see whether they lead to substantively different results than the issue
proximity approach. Yet, although the IntUne project has established a
unique and rich database, its strength is more in breadth than depth. While
we can study issue proximity of elites and citizens in fifteen countries, for the
first time covering both long-standing and relatively new democracies, we
cannot explore all theoretical approaches to political representation empiri-
cally. For this reason, we focus on the classic concept of issue proximity and
discuss what our results mean within the directional framework.
ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIVE CONGRUENCE
Until recently, the literature on representation has focused almost exclusively
on ‘absolute congruence’––the absolute distance between citizens and their
representatives. As Golder and Stramski (2010) show, this measure is useful
for some purposes but less so for others. For instance, it is a poor measure for
revealinghowgoodpoliticians are at their job in representing the citizenry. This
is because absolute distance is highly contingent on the dispersionof preferences
among the citizens. As a result of such differences, representatives doing a poor
job in pleasing their voters can score more highly in terms of absolute distance
than representatives who are doing their utmost but technically cannot
come closer to their voters in the aggregate. Golder and Stramski (2010) have
therefore proposed a new measure––relative citizen congruence––that takes into
account the dispersion of citizen preferences. In this chapter, however, we are
less interested in the fairness of how the performance of representatives is
evaluated than in a very real problem of European integration––the notorious
masses–elites gap. For this reason, we focus exclusively on absolute congruence.
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8.2.2 Measurement Issues
ALTERNATIVE DATA
Representation studies employ a range of different types of data: population
surveys, elite surveys, expert surveys, judgements of single experts, and data
derived from the coding of party documents. Most studies face the problem
that their data have severe limitations, forcing the researchers tomakemore or
less heroic assumptions. This is most obvious when party positions, govern-
ment positions, and the position of the median voter are derived purely from
party manifestos (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Kim and Fording
1998). Some studies combine party manifesto data (which serve to establish
elite positions) with voter surveys (Carruba 2001; Powell 2009), but they face
the problem that the data use different metrics. While voter positions can be
directly observed by asking relevant questions, establishing party positions
from manifestos requires the researchers to make assumptions that are highly
contested in the academic debate (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). In this way,
representation studies drawing on the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)
data buy themselves into the specific assumptions of this project. Many
representation studies avoid such measurement problems by drawing on
expert judgements and asking the experts to place the parties on the same
scale used for the voters.3 Nevertheless, it remains contested to what extent
expert surveys can substitute for ‘real’ data (i.e. data originating from the
parties; Mair 2001). Finally, using population surveys (such as the Compara-
tive Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data) for establishing both the voter and
party positions (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Mattila and
Raunio 2006) has the limitation of comparing the actual self-placement of
voters with mere perceptions of party positions. This may be highly relevant
for some research questions, but less so for others. Many national representa-
tion studies, therefore, rely on elite surveys,4 and although such surveys come
with their own problems, asking a sample of national-level politicians about
their policy positions might nevertheless be the most convincing strategy
with which to ascertain party positions. The sheer magnitude and complexity
of conducting such surveys, however, has tended to limit such research to
single-country or small-set comparative studies (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999;
Holmberg 2000), and few studies concerned with representation in the con-
text of European integration have employed elite survey data (Schmitt and
3 Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000, 2009; Powell and Vanberg 2000; Gabel and Scheve 2007;
Steenbergen et al. 2007; Ray 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006.
4 Miller and Stokes 1963; Converse and Pierce 1986; Dalton 1985; Esaiasson and Holmberg
1986; Holmberg 1997, 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Matthews and Valen 1999; Narud and Valen
2000.
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Thomassen 1999, 2000; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Wessels 1995; Hooghe
2003).
Compared to the extant studies of European representation, the IntUne
study has a competitive advantage in that it can draw on separate data sources
for populations and elites, that is, on individual data on both the mass and
elite levels. A further advantage is that it uses the same metric to establish
policy positions in both cases. Compared to the previous elite surveys in the
EU context, the IntUne study also distinguishes itself by focussing on a more
clearly defined elite group (compared to Hooghe 2003) and a group higher
up the hierarchy (compared to Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, 2000; and
Thomassen and Schmitt 1997 who studied candidates rather than MPs). By
relying on telephone or face-to-face interviews, the present survey also avoids
the problem of uncertainty about the identity of respondents that can plague
written surveys. Finally, we also avoid (or at least contain) the problem of
different countries having different policy spaces that is most virulent when
abstract scales (such as a 10-point left–right scale) are used. Rather than using
such scales, we employ specific policy issues, although admittedly this cannot
guarantee that survey respondents from different pools think about these
issues in the same way.
The major disadvantage of the method employed here, of course, is that
it is tremendously costly and, while mass surveys are unlikely to run out
of respondents, elite surveys probably will when too many such demands
are made upon the scarce time of politicians. Consequently, the double-
survey method used here can only be employed on rare occasions. It is
imperative, therefore, that our results help shape methods for future research
to derive elite positions from other sources, such as population and mani-
festo data.
AGGREGATE MEASURES VERSUS COMPARING DISTRIBUTIONS
In comparing voters and elites, we compare opinion distributions within two
groups. Having two samples, as is typical for empirical studies, means that the
standard problem of inference to their populations applies. The sample dis-
tributions can be compared by using the full set of available cases or, more
often in the social sciences, through a small set of summary statistics, or even
a single summary measure of a distributional characteristic. Data analysis
groups them into measures of location, spread, and shape. The representation
literature has focussed on measures of location like the arithmetic mean and
the median and we will follow this path in this chapter. However, it is worth
pointing out that directly comparing two distributions instead of their
summary statistics is a viable alternative approach (Achen 1978; Golder and
Stramski 2010).
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QUANTITATIVE ASYMMETRY
Political delegation is about relationships that are quantitatively highly asym-
metric.5 In fact, the process of delegation from voters through parliament to
government evokes the image of a funnel, with the number of actors becom-
ing dramatically smaller at each step in the chain of delegation.6 This does not
imply that the smaller group will exhibit a smaller dispersion of opinions, as
dispersion is a relative measure. However, another effect can occur. Given
the difficulties of collecting elite data, there is a danger that the size of the
elite sample may be so small that the robustness of any findings concerning
the level of policy congruence is called into question. The IntUne project
protected itself from this problem by employing short scales in its survey
questions that provide a ‘natural’ barrier against excessive outlier influence.
We thus expect our results to be quite robust.
8.3 Theoretical Framework
We use a highly stylized version of the decision-making process in a polity
with three collective actors: voters, parliament, and government, which builds
on and extends previous work (Huber and Powell 1994; Kitschelt et al. 1999;
Powell 2000). We treat each group as a collective decision-making body. At
stage one, it is the voters whomake a collective decision; at stage two, it is MPs
organized in parliamentary parties; and at stage three, it is the subset of MPs
who belong to the government parties. The three groups are connected by a
chain of delegation. For the purpose of assessing the functioning of represen-
tation, we need to look at three dyads: voters–parliament, parliament–govern-
ment, and voters–government.
With regard to single-peaked preferences on a one-dimensional issue, Black
(1948) has shown that the policy position of the median voter should be
the outcome of voting in committee; a small collective decision-making
body that is able tomove back and forth in its deliberations and to reintroduce
proposals to votes until the process converges on an equilibrium. On the other
hand, Huber and Powell argued that, in a social choice situation over a single
issue, the median voter position beats the mean position on normative and
empirical grounds:
Since the meanminimizes the sum of the squared distances, it gives greater weight
to cases more distant from the center. We see no justification in democratic theory
5 Rehfeld (2005: 5) calculated the proportion of the adult population in France in 2003 serving
as delegates to the two chambers of the French Parliament as 0.000183.
6 It is obviously not true for the next step of delegation from the cabinet to the bureaucracy,
which could be seen as a second, but inverted funnel.
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for permitting minorities to prevail over majorities or for giving greater weight to
ideologically extreme citizens. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that ideo-
logically extreme citizens hold their positions more intensely, which might be the
one possible, but hotly debatable, justification for weighting them more heavily.
(1994: 296)
We concur with these arguments and rely on the median voter position to
represent the policy positions of the electorate, and on the position of the
median MP within each party to represent individual parties. For single party
governments, the median MP of the government party also represents the
government position. Determining a government position is less trivial for
coalition governments. A coalition government’s position should be derived
from the set of positions advanced by individual government parties. To take
into account differences in party size, various authors have weighted these
positions––either the individual government parties’ vote shares, legislative
seat shares (among all parties or government parties only), or cabinet seat
shares––when calculating means or medians (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Budge
and Laver 1992; Warwick 2001).
However, the median results in implausible and empirically wrong positions
for coalition governments. Regardless of the type of weights used, the median
of the government of a two-party coalitionwill always bewhere themedianMP
of the larger government party is. A two-party coalition with unequally sized
partners and a single-party government of the larger party would then take
the same value. This runs counter to the long-established, empirically robust
‘law of proportionality’ (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006), which
states that coalition parties distribute the important spoils of government
participation (e.g. cabinet seats) according to their relative share of legislative
seats among themselves. We expect this logic to extend to the policy positions
of a coalition government. Following the ‘proportionality norm’, we therefore
calculate the positionof a coalition government as aweighted arithmeticmean.
8.3.1 Two Models of Representation: Institutions versus Parties
We now present our twomodels for the aggregate outcomes at the three stages
(Table 8.1). In the first model, the aggregate outcome is calculated by a simple
aggregation over all members of the respective groups (voters, members
of parliament, member of government parties). In the second model, we
introduce political parties (Müller and Jenny 2000). Accordingly, in each
of the parliamentary and government stages, the aggregation process is of a
two-step nature that occurs first within the individual parties and then between
them in the relevant institutional arena––the parliament or the government
(party democracy model). We argue that this more complex aggregation
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model, though still stylized, is more realistic in modern parliamentary democ-
racies than a purely institutionalist perspective with single-step aggregation in
each of the institutions (institutional model).
At the first stage, both models access voters’ choice in the same way,
namely, we consider the collective outcome at the voters’ stage as a kind of
referendum over the different options available. From our survey data, we
calculate the median position and take this to represent the voters’ choice.
At the second stage we calculate the parliament’s position. Here the models
diverge. In contrast to other studies,7 we distinguish between the median
MP and the median party. We identify the position of the median MP in a
single-step aggregation of all members of parliament (institutional model),
whereas the position of the median party is the outcome of a two-step process
of aggregation. With regard to the latter, in the first step we calculated the
median position within each party, and in a second step, we chose themedian
of the party medians, which is the measure used in our party democracy
model. A central function of parties is to channel the opinions of their voters
into one or more positions in policy space that are then represented in
parliament by the party MPs. Party decision making precedes parliamentary
decision making, and strong parties (Krehbiel 1993, 1998) are able to aggregate
the variety of opinions held by their MPs to a single type of voting beha-
viour––the party line. The party line that is adopted for a parliamentary vote
is the result of a process of internal deliberation and negotiation among
members of the same party. Thus, Black’s (1948) model of committee decision
making is a reasonable approximation of this process, which leads us to the
median MP’s position as the outcome of the intra-party vote.
At the third stage, the models differ again. In the institutional model, the
government’s position is that of the government legislator who occupies
Table 8.1. Two models of collective outcomes
Stage Institutional model Party democracy model
(Single-step aggregation at
each stage)
(Two-step aggregation at the parliamentary
and government stages)
Voters Median voter Median voter
Parliament Median MP Median party
Government Median government MP Weighted mean of government
parties’ medians
7 McDonald, Mendes, and Budge (2004: 2 n. 3), who infer party positions from electoral
manifestos, use the terms ‘median party in parliament’ and ‘parliamentary median’ as synonyms.
With MP survey data the two terms denote different entities.
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the median position within the block of government MPs, although this is
a rather unrealistic assumption in the case of coalition governments. In the
party democracy model, we replace the government position with a weighted
mean of the medians of all government parties, where the weights represent
the government parties’ shares of the legislative seats held by government
MPs. This follows the logic of Gamson’s (1961) ‘law of proportionality’ in the
distribution of cabinet seats. For single-party governments, the two models
produce the same outcome as the government’s position.
To test the three stages of our models (see Table 8.2), we used the case of
Germany and an item from a battery of questions onmass and elite support for
further Europeanized policies. This item asked interviewees to state whether
they were in favour or against a common system of social security in the
European Union and was scored against a 5-point scale, where 1 indicated
strongly against, 3 was the neutral mid-point, and 5 indicated strongly in
favour. (More details on survey construction and testing, and on data collec-
tion, can be found in Chapter 11, this volume.)
Results showed that the German median voter is somewhat supportive
of the idea of a common system of social security in the European Union,
whereas the median German Bundestag MP in the institutional model exhi-
bits a slightly negative attitude towards the idea, being situated at scale point 2
(somewhat against). Given that Germany was ruled by a grand coalition of
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats at the time of the surveys in 2007,
the distribution of opinions of the government MPs is very similar to the
complete set of opinions of all members of the Bundestag. In other words, the
median government MP holds the same somewhat unfavourable view of a
common system of social security in the EU as the median Bundestag MP.
Table 8.2. Institutional model and party democracy model outcomes: the example of
Germany
Stage Institutional model Party democracy model
(Single-step aggregation at the
parliamentary and government stages)
(Two-step aggregation at the
parliamentary and government
stages)
Voters Median voter Median voter
Somewhat in favour (4) Somewhat in favour (4)
Parliament Median MP Median party
Somewhat against (2) Somewhat in favour (4)
Government Median government MP Weighted mean of government
Somewhat against (2) parties’ medians
Neither/nor (3)
Note: Question on support for ‘a common system of social security in the EU’. Scale: Strongly against (1), somewhat
against (2), neither/nor (3), somewhat in favour (4), strongly in favour (5).
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In the two-step aggregation process in the party democracy model,
the procedure followed to locate the median voter’s position is identical to
that followed in the institutional model. In the second and third stages, the
procedures diverge, as do the outcomes. For the parliamentary stage in
the party democracy model, we first need to identify the median positions
of the five parliamentary parties. The median MPs of both the German Chris-
tian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP) are somewhat against the
proposal. The median MPs of the three parties to the left in the Bundestag,
the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens (die Grünen), and the Left (die Linke),
are all somewhat in favour of further Europeanization. As these three left-
leaning parties held more seats than the two rightist parties, the position of
the median party in parliament is also somewhat in favour of a common
system of social security. The Government’s position––based on the answers
of the MPs from the two government parties CDU/CSU and SPD––is situated
at the neutral position at scale point 3. The two government parties are almost
equal in size; therefore, the common government position is situated at
almost equal distance in between the two party positions.
Comparing the two models over the three stages, we see different outcomes
at the parliamentary and government stages. In both models, the German
voters would have chosen a different option to that calculated for their
government, which shows that aggregation procedures can make a difference
in terms of the outcomes at the parliamentary and government stages, as well
as for the resulting size of the gaps between voters and the political elite.
As we will see in the next section, the outcomes of the two models at the
parliamentary and government stages are very similar and often identical. The
preference distributions of different parties need to diverge to some extent in
order to let ‘strong parties’, who impose a party line on their MPs, or intra-
coalition negotiations, have a distinct effect on the outcome. If the distribu-
tions are very similar, the alternative procedures of the party democracy
model will have no effect.
The empirical applications that we present also include the positions of the
national economic elites (defined as top managers and economic lobbyists––
see Chapters 1 and 11 in this volume for sample details). This enables us to
describe the gap between voters and economic elites as well as the gap between
the economic elite and the government, but we do not try to incorporate the
preferences of economic elites into the framework of democratic political dele-
gation from voters to government, as this would overstretch the concept.
However, the economic elite is, without doubt, a very important reference
group for a government, and opinions on European integration voiced by
members of a national economic elite can influence MPs and even voters.
While overall we would expect national business elites to take a more
positive perspective on European integration than citizens in general, we
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need to be aware that individual business firms and sectors may not always
welcome the stiffer competition and market rules imposed by the EU. We
make no assumption about a collective decision-making process in the eco-
nomic elite by choosing the ordinary median to represent the group’s posi-
tion. Rather, we bank on its quality as a robust measure that is less prone to
outliers than the mean.
8.4 The Elites–Masses Gap in European Integration
Our empirical analysis draws on surveys conducted in fifteen West and East
Central European countries withmembers of national parliaments, with CEOs
and other persons who belong to the national economic elite, andwith voters.
In this chapter, we concentrate on items of a prospective nature that represent
five distinctive integration ‘projects’. One can be characterized as a strength-
ening of current policy (more help to the regions), one as a goal that is
accepted in principle but has not yet been attained (a single foreign policy),
and three that represent new goals (a common tax system, a common social
security system, and a European army).
We will first present figures that depict the positions of the voters, the
economic elite, the political elite, and the national governments in the fifteen
countries with regard to the five items described. The positions of MPs and
governments are based on the two-step aggregation procedure of our party
democracy model. We then turn to showing the size of the gaps between the
various groups based on an index of the five items and compare the results of
aggregation according to the institutional and party democracy models.
Altogether we draw on a total of 1145 MPs (for whom we have complete
data) and 15,115 voters, and 608 business managers. Answer refusals and
‘Don’t know’ answers to specific items were quite prevalent in the voter
surveys whereas they were almost non-existent in the surveys among MPs
and business managers. The ‘More support for EU regions in economic or
social difficulties’ item collected the smallest share of refusals and ‘Don’t
knows’ overall, while the ‘Common European tax system’ item collected the
highest share. More help for the regions indeed seemed to be the easiest of the
five policy issues for people with minimal interest in or minimal knowledge of
politics to answer. We excluded answer refusals and ‘Don’t knows’ ahead of
calculating the voter and elite positions. In some countries, the item regarding
defence policy resulted in spontaneous ‘Neither’ answers to the volunteered
choice between ‘European army’, ‘national army’, or ‘both’. For some countries,
e.g. Bulgaria, the median depends on whether and how we incorporate the
‘Neither’ answers into the ordinal scale. In this chapter we use the three original
options ‘national army’, ‘European army’, and ‘both’.
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8.4.1 More Help for Regions in Economic or Social Difficulties
The first issue we present asked whether respondents approved or disapproved
of, ‘More help for regions with economic and social difficulties’. Such support
has been one of the most durable EU programmes. The answers given by
citizens and the political and economic elites suggest that regional support
(even beyond today’s level) is a valence rather than a position issue. Indeed,
with the sole exception of the German economic elite, which takes a ‘some-
what against’ stand, no collective position in the fifteen countries expresses
disapproval. In Germany, the topic has special domestic significance due to
the national support programme of the federal government to the regions that
were part of the former German Democratic Republic.
In Figure 8.1, we have ordered the countries according to government
position, beginning with countries expressing the strongest approval. Most
countries with good prospects of being the beneficiaries of additional support
locate themselves in the upper part of the figure, while countries tending to
receive less are found in the lower part. In several countries (Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary, Portugal), all groups––voters, economic elites, MPs, and government
––are strongly supportive of the idea. In several other countries, however, there
is a gap in the amount of enthusiasm for regional aid between voters and
the positions of MPs and government: France, Great Britain, Poland, Slovakia,
Italy, minimally also in Belgium and Estonia. Denmark is the only country
where the government is less supportive of this item than MPs, business elites,
and voters.
8.4.2 A Single EU Foreign Policy
The famous goal of a single EU foreign policy enjoys wide support both at the
mass and elite levels. Nevertheless, a representation gap exists as the median
voter in all fifteen countries is only ‘somewhat in favour’, while economic and
political elites express strong support for this goal. Yet, the gap between
masses and elites is a gap in the degree of enthusiasm. Support for a single
European foreign policy is most widely spread among the economic elites. In
twelve of the fifteen countries, the median manager was ‘strongly in favour’.
The exception is the British economic elite, which is somewhat against this
goal. The Danish, Estonian, German, and Belgium government positions are
somewhat more in favour than those of their parliaments, while the idea
receives only lukewarm support from both voters and the political elites in
Poland, Austria, and Great Britain.
While more help for the regions and the foreign policy issues are rather
uncontroversial in each of our fifteen European countries, no consensus exists
with regard to the idea of common European tax and social security systems.
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As we will see, disagreement between different elite groups is greater than
between elites and the masses.
8.4.3 A Common European Tax System
Figure 8.2 indicates that, in eleven out of fifteen countries, the median voter
expressed moderate support for the proposal. The median voter in Great
Britain, Estonia, and Denmark moderately opposes this goal, and is ambiva-
lent about it in Austria. As might be expected, the intensity of approval and
disapproval increases at the elite level, and in France, Greece, and Italy, the
political and economic elites are all strongly in favour of a common tax
system. The elite groups in Great Britain, however, are clearly against the
idea. To a lesser extent, this is also true for Estonia, Denmark, and Poland. In
Denmark, the economic elite is in favour, while parliament and government
oppose such amove. In Estonia, the economic elite and themedianMP oppose
a common European tax system, while the median voter and the government
are in favour. Overall, however, the tendency amongmost groups is to favour a
common European tax system. Only fourteen (of sixty) group positions are on
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Scale: strongly against(--), somewhat against(–), neither nor(+/–), somewhat in favour(+), strongly in favour(++)
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Figure 8.1. Voter and elite positions towards more help for regions and a single foreign
policy according to the party democracy model
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the negative side of the scale: four national governments, four parliaments,
three electorates, and three economic elite groups.
There is no country with a complete discord between the voters on the one
hand and the various elites on the other. The country closest to such a repre-
sentation gap is Austria, where the elite groups are all in favour of a common
tax system, while voters are ambivalent. In Slovakia the median voter is some-
what in favour,whereas themedianparty in parliament is slightly opposed and
the government position is much closer to that of the voters. In a number of
countries, the largest gap is the one between the positions of the government
and themedianparty inparliament (Slovakia, Poland,Germany, andDenmark).
In Slovakia, the largest gap is between voters and elites. However, we record by
far the greatest gap between the Danish economic elite and the Danishmedian
party in parliament.
What accounts for the variation in national group positions and the intra-
country variation, especially among the political and economic elites? The
peculiar Danish pattern might result from different reactions to the ‘race to
the bottom’ argument implied in common European tax rates. While the
Danish economic elite may find the prospect of lower rates attractive, political

































Common social security system
Scale: strongly against(--), somewhat against(–), neither nor(+/–), somewhat in favour(+), strongly in favour(++)
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Figure 8.2. Voter and elite positions towards a common tax and a common social
security system according to the party democracy model
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elites (with an eye to the voters) seem inclined to preserving the financial base
of the welfare state. In contrast, in Great Britain and Estonia, the risk of losing
the competitive advantage enjoyed by these low-tax countries from accepting
uniform European tax rates looms large. Thus, the opposition seen in these
three countries towards a centralized European tax system might be based on
different reasons.
8.4.4 A Common European Social Security System
National elite responses towards the proposal of a common tax system are in
many ways similar to those towards the proposal of a common social security
system. At the mass level, however, the idea of a common social security system
is less controversial than the idea of a common tax system, meaning that the
elites–masses gap is more extreme with regard to social security. In all fifteen
countries, the median voter was somewhat in favour, and even strongly in
favour in Hungary, of establishing a common European social security system.
In twelve of the fifteen countries the political elites were also in favour, or at
least not opposed. As in the common tax system proposal, the aggregate
opinion among political elites showed greater divergence than among voters.
The positions of parliaments and governments cover both ends of the scale,
from very much in favour to being strongly against the proposal.
As we have seen, the government and parliament positions towards the goal
of a common tax system are negative in Great Britain, Denmark, and Austria.
These countries also exhibit the largest gap between themedian voter position
on the one hand and the parliament and government positions on the other.
Among our set of issues and sample of countries, these are the first cases to
show not just mere differences in intensity betweenmasses and elites, but also
differences in the direction a policy should take.
8.4.5 Defence Policy Options
Our last issue, concerning defence policy, had a different question format
to the other four. Here, respondents were asked whether they wanted to
keep a national army, have a European army, or have both (see Figure 8.3).
In thirteen out of fifteen countries the median voter opted for a double-track
defence policy: keeping the national army and creating a European army.
Only in Great Britain and Bulgaria did the median voter prefer a defence
policy based on a national army exclusively. In the case of Great Britain, the
political elites in parliament and government concur with the median voter.
In the case of Bulgaria, elite and masses diverge: the positions of parliament
and government are in favour of having both a national and a European army.
Another noteworthy difference between the two countries is that the British
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elites seem to have made up their minds about that issue (a marginal number
of ‘Don’t knows’), while this is not so evident in Bulgaria.
A step towards a more strongly Europeanized defence policy, based on the
creation of a European army, is supported by the political elite in Belgium,
Germany, and Spain. In these countries, parliament and government take the
same positions, but they diverge from the position of the national median
voter, who wants to maintain a national army in addition to a European army.
Denmark is the only country where the positions for both parliament and
government favour only a national army. In contrast, the Danish median
voter favours having both. The Polish median voter is more European than
the government (under Jaroslaw Kaczynski) and parliament (dominated by
the right), both of whom favour having only a national army.
With regard to economic elites, results show that they like the idea of
having a European army more than any of the other groups. The collective
positions of six (out of fifteen) economic elites, three parliaments, and three
governments is to prefer a European army as the only means of defence,
but not a single electorate of all countries shares this strong view. The most
frequent stance of economic elites, however, is a preference for having both
national and European armies, with only the Estonian economic elite prefer-
ring the national army.

















Figure 8.3. Voter and elite positions towards defence policy options
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8.4.6 The Elite–Masses Gap across Issues
After looking at the five issues separately, we now turn to the overall picture
of opinion representation on European integration in the fifteen countries.
We do this by building an index.8 First we calculated the distances between (a)
voters and parliament and (b) the parliament and government for each item
separately. Next, we combined the two differences into a single measure of the
elite–masses gap. Finally, we sum up the resulting values over all five issues.
This is our index of the elite–masses gap. We calculated the index both with
single-step aggregation (institutional model) and two-step aggregation (party
democracy model).
Table 8.3 presents the resulting indices and their sub-components, with
countries ranked according to the index of the institutional model. The
party democracy model, which we argue to be a better approximation of the
collective position of the political elite in parliament and government, pro-
duces slightly larger gaps in seven countries, smaller gaps in four countries,
and identical results in the remaining four. The mean index values calculated
over all fifteen countries indicate that themodels produce similar results when
summed across both steps––from voters to parliament and from parliament
to government. The Spearman rank correlation of the indices from the insti-
tutional model and the party democracy model is 0.92. Yet, the two stages of
the delegation chain vary according to the model of preference aggregation
chosen (see e.g. Estonia and Germany).
Bothmodels identify Portugal as the country with the smallest elites–masses
gap––note that it was under a single-party government (of the Socialist Party)
at the time of the survey––and we find the largest gaps in Germany, Great
Britain, and Denmark. This latter group comprises two coalition governments
and one single-party government (in Great Britain). Thus, there is no straight
pattern linking a specific government type to larger elites–masses gaps.
Nextwecompare themagnitudeof thegapsbetweenvoters andparliament and
between parliament and government in the two models. The voters–parliament
representation gap has more than double the magnitude of the parliament–
government gap, regardless of aggregation model. In our sample of European
integration issues, it seems that delegation from parliament to government pro-
duces higher policy congruence than delegation from voters to parliament via
elections. This is in line with theoretical expectations in the literature on political
delegation (Müller 2000; Strm2003).
8 As there are four issues with a 5-point scale and one issue with a 3-point scale, weighting is
necessary. As the maximum possible gap is four units on the 5-point scale and two units on the
3-point scale we sum the elite–mass gap over the four issues with the 5-point scale and then add
two times the gap measured on the 3-point scale.
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Table 8.3. Indices of the elites–masses gap across the five issues in 15 countries in 2007























Portugal 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Hungary 2 0 2 2 0.2 2.1 4 1.2
Slovakia 4 2 2 4 1.6 2.4 6 7.1
Greece 2 1 3 3 0 3 3 0
France 3 0 3 3 0.2 2.8 2 1.2
Poland 1 2 3 3.5 0.4 3.3 2 3.3
Estonia 0 3 3 1 1.9 1.8 3 3.8
Spain 1 2 3 3 0 3 4 1
Austria 3 0 3 3 0.5 3.5 5.5 4
Bulgaria 3 0 3 3 0.8 3.5 4 1.2
Belgium 3 0 3 2.5 1.4 3.9 3 1.7
Italy 4 0 4 4 0.8 3.9 4 0.8
Germany 4 1 5 2.5 2.3 4.8 5 6.2
Great Britain 5 2 5 5 0 5 7.5 4.5
Denmark 5 4 5 7 2.8 5.2 4 9.2
Mean 2.7 1.2 3.2 3.2 0.9 3.3 3.9 3.1
St. Dev. 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.8
Note: Rank order of countries according to index in the institutional model. We have doubled the weight of the distances on the item ‘Defence options’ in the indices to correct for the item’s
smaller scale.
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Economic elites are not constrained by the same chains of delegation and
accountability as exist between voters and MPs, or among politicians them-
selves, and results for this elite group are consistentwith that freedom.Across all
issues, the gap between the position of the economic elite and the position of
the voters, and between the economic elite and the government, are larger than
that between voters and parliament and between parliament and government.
However, the variation between countries is huge. The economic elites are in
accord with both the masses and the political elites in Portugal, Greece, and
France, but takewidely differing positions inDenmark, Slovakia, Germany, and
Great Britain, whose economic elites were more pro-integrationist than voters
and politicians. However, on some issues, economic elites from one or two
countries took the most ‘nationalist’ stance of all the groups that we have
studied (see Germany for the ‘More help for regions’ and ‘Common social
security system’ issues, Great Britain for the ‘Single foreign policy’ issue, Slova-
kia for the ‘Common social security system’ issue, andEstonia for the ‘Common
defence’ issue).
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted how voters and elites think about the important
steps that have either already been taken towards a unified Europe or which
occupy a prominent place on the agenda of ‘integrationists’. Notwithstanding
the common interpretation of European integration as an ‘elite project’
(Haller 2008), actual data on the attitudes of political decision makers on
this topic is extremely scarce (in contrast to the abundance of studies on the
attitudes of the masses). The present study, which allows us to rank fifteen
countries by the actual degree of elite support for European integration, helps
to fill that gap. In so doing, we findmany of the ‘usual suspects’ at the bottom
of the list: Great Britain, Denmark, and Austria in Western Europe, and
Estonia and Poland in Eastern Europe, but interestingly, we also find Germany
in this group.
The main purpose of our study, however, has been to shed light on the
notorious elite–masses gap in attitudes towards European integration. We
have reported this gap with regard to five issues of European integration and
presented twomodels of calculating collective opinions of voters, parliaments,
and governments. Theoretically, we argued that a two-step aggregation process
that is sensitive to the intervening effects of political parties and government
coalitions is a better empirical approximation of the outcomes of collective
decision-making processes than the simpler model of single-step aggregation
of individual preferences in the relevant institutions.
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After confronting our empirical data with the two models of preference
aggregation, and considering the combined distances of the two delegation
steps––from voters to parliament, and from parliament to government––the
two models were found to return similar results in terms of size of representa-
tion gap. Yet, such similarities between themodel outcomes arenot guaranteed.
This is clear whenwe look at the group distances for each step separately, where
we find substantial differences between the two models. It is worth pointing
out that our measurement utilizing ‘short’ (3- or 5-point) policy scales loaded
the dice in favour of finding small differences and that larger divergences in
outcomes could be expected when employing larger scales.
Two of the five items––‘more help for disadvantaged regions’ and support
for a ‘common foreign policy’––were almost uncontroversial and elicited
broad support among voters, economic elites, and politicians alike. Support
among voters for a single foreign policy was lukewarm in most countries
compared to the stronger support expressed by the political and economic
elites. This resulted in elite–masses gaps in many countries, but these were
gaps in the intensity of support rather than gaps created by conflicting views
of the direction that European integration should take. Of course, such oppos-
ing views of the direction a policy should take would indicate much more
significant representation gaps and enormous challenges for the elites. It is a
good sign of the working of European democracies that the policies already in
place in the EU do not show any significant divergence between the opinions
of the voters and those of their political representatives.
The goal of unifying national social security systems drew overwhelming
support among voters in all fifteen countries studied, whereas elites held more
diverse opinions. In particular, political elites, but often also the economic
elite from the ‘rich’ Western European member states, such as Great Britain,
Denmark, and Austria, opposed the idea. On the issue of ‘a common tax
system’ opposition even extended to the mass level. In concurrence with
their elites, voters in Great Britain, Estonia, and Denmark disapproved of
this idea.
Our final issue probed the choice between a national and a European army.
The collective outcome among most national groups––at the elite and at the
mass level––was to ‘play it safe’ by opting for both. Inmost instances where we
found a gap between the positions of the voters and the elites, it was due to
elites preferring a European army.
The last three issues, where we find a greater amount of disagreement
between the national elites and their citizens, all relate to European integra-
tion steps that have not yet been taken. According to the traditional pattern of
elites’ driving the integration process and mass attitudes adapting to the new
realities, we should expect elites to take more pro-integrationist positions. Yet,
this is not always the case. With regard to social security and tax issues, elites
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in some countries take less integrationist positions than their citizens. We can
think about such differences either in terms of conflicting values or differences
in information levels between voters and political elites. Clearly, elites know
much more about the possible implications of the choices involved (such as
levelling social services) and, once confronted with these implications, voters
may indeed adapt quickly to the line taken by their political representatives.
At the same time, however, real world developments, such as the near collapse
of the international banking system and associated crisis fighting, may force
national elites to grudgingly accept more European integration in the taxation
and social security policy domains.
In terms of the group difference, our results confirm the expectation derived
from the functionalist logic of European integration. National economic elites
turned out to be the most pro-integrationist group on all five items, with just a
few nationalist outliers among them. Generally, however, we find a consider-
able amount of agreement in the positions taken by economic and political
elites on European integration issues. Not surprisingly, economic elites are
more similar to the political elites in their attitudes than to voters, and politi-
cal elites tend to be more pro-integrationist than their voters. However, this
is not a universal pattern and the nature of the issue clearly plays a role (see
Hooghe and Marks 2008). As already indicated, the ability to keep one’s own
variant of the welfare state, or to preserve a favourable low tax-rates regime,
seemed to concern political elites, and even the voters in somemember states.
In the introduction to this chapter, we have argued that the very dynamic of
European integration suggests that there will be some level of gap between the
positions of voters and elites. Yet, too large a gap may lead to trouble, such as
government defeat in referendums, or may negatively impact on the electoral
prospects of government parties, in particular when EU issues become salient.
While some of the gaps we have measured are small, this is not the case in all
countries (see the countries at the bottom of Table 8.3). Unfortunately, there is
no natural threshold distinguishing critical from uncritical divergences
between the voters and their representatives. Nevertheless, larger gaps provide
elites with incentives to close or narrow them; something elites will typically
make greater attempts to do when elections are approaching. One way they
can do this is by bringing their policy attitudes closer to those of the voters,
referred to by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1986) as ‘representation from below’.
Alternatively, they can provide leadership und use the electoral campaigns
to educate the voters, thus providing ‘representation from above’ (see also
Holmberg 1989, 1997; Stimson et al. 1995; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000).
Given real world constraints, the former strategy is easier for opposition
parties. In addition, real world developments can render the policy positions
of government parties unfeasible when they conflict with what governments
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(must) do to cope with current events. Obviously, ‘dynamic’ questions of
representation cannot be fully answered from analyses, such as the present
one, measuring preference gaps at a single point in time. Based on the IntUne
project’s second wave of mass and elite interviews, however, this is something
we will turn to in future analyses.
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9




This volume documents at length the attitudes of domestic elites towards the
role played by the EU in three constitutive dimensions of citizenship: identity,
representation, and scope of governance. In the previous chapters of the book,
all the analyses carried out by the authors have focused on the results of a
survey of national members of parliament (MPs) and of economic actors. The
MPs, however, not only represent an important segment of domestic political
elites and decision makers; they also represent a primary component of party
organization (Katz and Mair 1994), or to be more precise, they are the part of
the party in public office. In order to make the picture more complete, in this
chapter I document the attitudes of another face of party organization that is
also composed of party elites, namely the party in central office. The different
faces of party organization have traditionally been compared in organiza-
tional terms, giving birth to the paradigm of the ascendancy of the party
public office (Katz andMair 2002). However, assessing the level of congruence
between the attitudes of the two faces is also a relevant problem, as revealed
when the influence of institutional factors is taken into consideration. For
example, the socialization of MPs by public institutions that are committed to
implementing EU policies couldmake themmore pro-EU compared to officers
in party central office, who may not be so well socialized with EU affairs.
Additionally, while Euromanifestos represent the official party line and the
party as a unified whole, data on the individual positions of MPs is certainly
more sensitive to eventual intra-party variations. It is also relevant to note that
Best documents in this volume (see Chapter 10) how anti-Europeanness is
relatively rare for the political elites of the member states, and that Cotta and
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Russo confirm the same view in their chapter (Chapter 2). At the same time,
however, Best as well as Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (Chapter 8) document how
the attitudes of the masses towards the EU are more cautious than those of the
political elites. So, what happens when wemove the focus of the analysis from
national MPs to the party central office, which is the face of party organization
responsible for the communication with the electorate, in particular through
dissemination and reiteration of the official party line by means of propa-
ganda? Indeed, we can say that the central office works as a link between the
party in public office and the party on the ground. Two other questions are
pertinent here: what is the response of the party central office to the thoughts
of the elites and the masses, and considering that masses seem to be much less
pro-European than party elites, what are the pronouncements of the party
central office on the EU?
The faces of party organization detailed above are indeed interconnected.
Considering the disparity between MPs and public opinion in support of the
EU, the central office may pool together either with the party in public office,
the party on the ground, or take a position in between. Certainly, parties
represent the opinions of the citizens but, to a large extent, they also help
to shape such opinions (Neumann 1956; Ware 1996: 5). Particularly, in the
context of the general empowering of party elites vis à vis the rank and file––a
broad phenomenon often referred to by scholars (Katz and Mair 2002)––the
role of the party elites as initiators of a normative stance on many issues,
including the EU, should be considered carefully. Parties contribute to politi-
cizing issues and, consequently, to mobilizing sentiments over such issues
(Almond and Powell 1978) and this is true, for example, with regard to anti-EU
politics (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Mudde 2007). Parties also make strategic
calculations and come close to popular preferences in order to gain support
from citizens.
What stance the party central office takes on the EU is the question ad-
dressed by the analyses carried out in this chapter. Similar to the analyses
presented in the other chapters, in order to map party positions I will address
the questions of if and how parties want the EU to develop. In particular, the
empirical analyses will attempt to answer the following questions. How is the
EU depicted in the member states by parties? Can the EU rely on wide party
consensus for its institutional performance and involvement in policy
making? Do projects of deeper integration find party support in the member
states? Is there an identity issue that parties raise when they politicize the EU?
Are these issues politically contested in the member states and, if so, what is
the pattern of contestation they reflect? In the conclusion, I will discuss the
level of congruence between the positions of the party in central office as
analysed in this chapter and those of the MPs that have emerged in the other
chapters of the book.
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9.2 The Method
The empirical investigation presented in this chapter is based on content
analysis of party Euromanifestos, a widespread technique in the study of
party positions as is shown by the presence of large-scale research projects
that use manifesto analysis for their investigations.1 These documents repre-
sent an extensive source of information with which to map the positions of
parties across a large number of issues. Like the IntUne survey presented in the
other chapters, manifestos refer to the national level since they are produced
by domestic parties to contest elections for the European Parliament (EP). The
platforms issued by the European party federations will not be considered.
In addition, Euromanifestos do not have a focus as narrow or as specialized as
other party documents (i.e. position papers on EU treaties or parliamentary
debates); on the contrary, they are broad enough to represent an appropriate
documentary source for the analysis of party preferences on the many faces of
the EU process as studied by the IntUne project. Indeed, Euromanifestos can
be considered a representation of the preferences of the party central office
which, within the party organization, is the component usually responsible
for issuing and disseminating these programmatic platforms. At the same
time, Euromanifestos represent the stance of the party as a unitary whole,
while the survey of MPs documents the subjective perceptions and prefer-
ences of national politicians. As already explained, it should not be assumed
that Euromanifestos necessarily represent the attitudes of the party in public
office, as the attitudes of this party component may be influenced by other
(institutional) factors. For example, Hix et al. (2007) show that being in
government leads parties to be more supportive of the EU and of institutions,
such as the European Commission.
From the operational point of view, a team of country experts coded 298
Euromanifestos of fifteen EU member states.2 The available documents cover
the period from 1979 to 2004 although the majority of them (243) actually
date from 1994 to 2004. Unlike other research techniques, such as the expert
survey, where party positions are mapped on the bases of the estimates of
scholarly experts (Benoit and Laver 2006), here coders were asked to classify
party positions only if explicitly expressed in the documents, i.e. only when
positions could be referred to parts of the analysed texts. On the other hand,
coders were asked not to associate parties to any position on the basis of their
previous knowledge, but only on the basis of a text excerpt that could justify
1 In particular, see the Comparative Manifestos Project (renamedManifesto Research on Political
Representation) of the Social Science ResearchCentre Berlin and the Euromanifesto Research Project
of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research that is part of the European Election Studies.
2 The countries included in this analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France,
Germany,Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, andUnitedKingdom.
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their coding. They were also asked to insert the relevant excerpts in the project
data set. The empirical evidence for party positions that I present in this
chapter have therefore been searched and examined in such a way as to
allow replicability and the highest levels of transparency for the coding
process.
From the analytical point of view, in order to integrate my analysis into the
general framework of the volume I examined party positions on issues of
identity, representation, and scope of governance. The first step was to explore
whether such issues were mentioned or not in the Euromanifestos. Then,
where they were mentioned, I classified the positions expressed in the man-
ifestos according to whether they expressed support for or opposition to the
EU. Finally, I attempted to control variation in the party attitudes for ideology,
incumbency in government, and other territorial factors. As these indepen-
dent variables have been analysed in the other chapters with respect to the
MPs, and so the results of the present chapter can be compared with those of
the other chapters––with the exception of socio-demographic factors that are
not applicable in this enquiry––the framework applied here duplicates that
used for the other analyses of MPs. At the same time, the above-mentioned
causal factors are also those most widely referred to in the literature on party
attitudes towards the EU. Hence, the analysis presented in this chapter also
aims at highlighting the high level of convergence between the theoretical
foundations that inform research on the attitudes of parties and of political
elites towards the EU. The sameness of the explanatory factors represents a
main finding of the research in this volume and it shows that the party central
office and the party in public office do not live in separate worlds; instead their
attitudes tend to be influenced by the same determinants. I will give evidence
to support this statement in the following sections.
The influence of ideology in shaping party attitudes to the EU is now a rather
established argument in the literature. In particular, many scholars consider
the pattern of opposing mainstream to radical parties as a main pattern of
contestation of the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000, 2002; Taggart 1998;
Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003), with the former parties supposedly expressing
an underlying support for the EU, as opposed to the latter who express
rejection. This theoretical argument is highly consistent with Best’s findings
(Chapter 10, this volume) onMPs. At the same time, evidence of an ideological
divide on the EU, although of lesser magnitude, has also been found along the
division between left and right (Gabel and Hix 2004; Hix 2002; Hix and Lord
1997; Hix and Noury 2006; Hooghe et al. 2002, 2004; Ladrech 2000; Marks
et al. 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002, 2004; Ray 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett
2000), with left parties described as more pro-European than right parties,
particularly since the 1990s. This theoretical argument is consistent with the
findings of several other analyses ofMPs presented in this volume. Specifically,
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Cotta and Russo (Chapter 2) show that Euro federalists are mainly left-wing
while Eurosceptics and Euro minimalists are more right-wing. Real-Dato,
Göncz, and Lengyel (Chapter 4) found that leftist positions are associated
with more positive attitudes towards the EU and with deeper integration.
Matonyte andMorkevicius (Chapter 5) found that the left–right self-placement
of the MPs is a powerful predictor of the threats they perceive towards a
cohesive Europe.Gaxie andHubé (Chapter 6) document theway that European
integration ismainly supported by political elites of left and centre-left political
views, who also express a greater trust for the EU institutions.
Although being in government or in opposition has been hypothesized to
have some influence on party attitudes towards the EU (Sitter 2001: 202),
except in the case of some limited empirical attempts (Hooghe et al. 2004), the
impact of governmental incumbency has until recently never been tested on a
large scale. Hix et al. (2007), who produced the first systematic analysis of the
impact of such factors, reached the conclusion that government incumbency
exerts a moderate influence on party attitudes to the EU, although one that is
much less significant than ideology. In this volume, Müller, Jenny, and Ecker
(Chapter 8) also document some limited influence of government incum-
bency on the attitudes of MPs towards the EU.
Finally, some recent studies have shown the impact of territorial factors on
these attitudes, such as the division between old and new member states
(Lewis 2008) or the distinction between more and less liberal national eco-
nomic systems (Marks 2004). As to the division between old and newmember
states, in their analysis of MPs, Cotta and Russo refer to the member states of
Central and Eastern Europe as the most Eurosceptic and describe European-
ness as more widespread inWestern Europe. The findings of Real-Dato, Göncz,
and Lengyel on policy delegation lead in the same direction: recent member
states are more nation-minded and less prone to support the Europeanization
of several policies. Moreover, a major argument introduced byMarks (2004) to
refine the theory of the instrumentalist approach to the EU (Marks 1998) is
that the nature of the domestic economic system also influences party atti-
tudes. It is an argument, however, that has not yet been tested empirically.
The analysis in this chapter will attempt to fill this gap and to assess whether
the nature of the domestic economic system really contributes to shape party
attitudes towards the EU.
In the analysis, I adopt a comprehensive approach aimed at testing the
validity of each of the explanatory factors outlined earlier. This is in order to
assess the relative explanatory power of each factor and the validity of the
related theoretical arguments for the explanation of party attitudes towards
the EU. Throughout the text, I also compare my findings with those of the
other chapters that resulted from an analysis of MPs.
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9.3 The Analysis
9.3.1 Identity
Following the multidimensional nature of the investigations presented in this
book, in this section I explore problems of identity, while the following sec-
tions focus, respectively, on representation and scope of governance. The first
finding for the dimension of identity certainly concerns the limited salience
found in the Euromanifestos. In particular, even themost recurrent variables of
this domain have only a limited occurrence in the Euromanifestos, especially if
compared to the other two dimensions (Table 9.1). Thus, we can argue that
themes of identity are overall not very salient in the party discourse on Europe.
The fact that most observations are about ‘no salience’ ultimately produces a
picture of little variation among cases. The low salience of themes related to
identity also reduces the ability to infer any possible cause of variation. For
instance, contrary to the other dimensions, I found no statistically significant
values for any logistic regression performed using the factors presented in the
previous section. At first glance, this evidence contradicts the argument of
Hooghe and Marks (2008) that the public discourse on Europe is increasingly
framed under the dimension of identity.
It should be noted that references to themes such as a common European
culture, values, history, or traditions in the Euromanifestos of mainstream
(54 per cent) and radical parties (43 per cent) are still considerable. However,
they are less recurrent than one may expect, especially when one considers
that the survey of MPs showed that the supranational community has gener-
ated diffuse feelings of affection. Indeed, a very large majority within national
elites declares an attachment to Europe, even when this affection is at a
disadvantage compared to other communities, in particular the national one
(see Cotta and Russo, this volume). So, when asked, political elites declare
Table 9.1. Salience of selected themes in the Euromanifestos (N = 298)
Mentioned in % of Euromanifestos
All parties Mainstream parties Radical parties
Representation
EU decision making 70.1 69.1 74.1
Scope of governance
Foreign policy 71.3 71.2 71.9
Defence policy 71.4 72.9 65.5
Justice and Home Affairs 50 50.4 48.3
Immigration policy 51.7 50 58.6
Identity
National identity 35 30.1 55.2
European culture 52 54.2 43.1
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their affection for Europe, but this feeling does not translate into a normative
stance in the party propaganda and discourse. Furthermore, the theme of
European culture is more recurrent in the Euromanifestos of the new member
states (62 per cent) than in those of the old member states (53 per cent). It is
to be seen to what extent this reference to a sort of European ‘civilization’
or ‘meta-culture’ (Mudde 2007: 169), often depicted by parties as a cultural
heritage actually preceding the EU, translates into an idea of European identity
that could justify, for example, the development of a genuine European citi-
zenship. Alternatively, it remains to be seen whether this is mostly an attempt
to differentiate the in-group of Europeans from the out-group of ‘others’.
In fact, national identity3 is also more salient in the new member states (it
occurs in 46 per cent of Euromanifestos of mainstream parties and in 83 per
cent of radical parties) than in the old member states (salient in 27 per cent of
Euromanifestos of mainstream and 52 per cent of radical parties). As argued by
Cotta and Russo (Chapter 2, this volume), attachment to Europe is highest
among those with stronger feelings of affection for their country, and the
Euromanifesto analysis confirms this argument. Indeed, references to Euro-
pean culture are also more recurrent in the new member states, where the
defence of national identity is a strong element in the discourse of parties,
whereas in the old member states the theme of national identity is mainly
confined to radical parties. Best (Chapter 10, this volume) offers a specification
of this point when he says that with reference to identity, Europeanness
sometimes appears in implausible and contradictory combinations. He argues
that it is a particularly attractive solution for the newmember states of Central
and Eastern Europe to refer to the European culture and values in order to
promote national sovereignty. In the end, the evidence may suggest that a
concurrent emphasis on European culture and national identity––particularly
in the new member states––primarily represents an attempt to mark the
distance of own country/nation from the out-group of non-Europeans, more
than being a genuine devotion to the EU and to its attempts to build a
European citizenship rooted in a set of EU-led values. In particular, as argued
by Mudde (2007), radical right parties do not make reference to the European
meta-culture in order to challenge the independence of European nations, but
rather to mark the distance from the supposed non-Europeans. The same
explanation could also be applied to the new member states, since in these
countries the perception of external threats is stronger than in the oldmember
states (Matonyt _e and Morkevicius Chapter 5, this volume).
We have seen that, although relevant for citizenship, identity is not a very
salient theme in the European discourse of domestic parties, in particular of
3 This variable consists of reference to the national identity label or, more generally, to
commonalities/similarities among the country’s citizens.
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mainstream parties. At least, it is not so relevant in the party discourse ad-
dressed to the electorate and framed in the Euromanifestos. On the other
hand, references to national identity often outweigh or overlap with refer-
ences to European culture. As a matter of fact, we could clearly identify the
advocates of national identity––radical parties in all EU countries and most
parties in the new member states––while the concept of European identity
seems to lack purpose on the side of mainstream parties, especially in the
old member states. These results concur with the argument of Hooghe and
Marks (2008) on the mounting salience of identity in public discourse on the
EU, an assertion that can be confirmed for the new member states (in that
it has increased since their accession) and for radical parties. Furthermore,
results confirm the findings of Best (Chapter 10, this volume) on the peculiar
nature of the discourse of the new member states. Ultimately, the concept of
a distinctive European identity does not seem to exist in the discourse of
the parties we surveyed, except in the form of a threat from non-Europeans
to national identity and to European civilization. Likewise, references to the
theme of European identity are often inserted in stories of moral panic and of
defence from outside enemies, sometimes in an openly xenophobic fashion.
9.3.2 Representation
So far, I have focused on the symbolic face of the EU and have found that this
face has only limited salience, in particular with the national introverted
character of radical parties and parties in the new member states. The analysis
now moves to a domain that differs deeply from the one considered above,
since it concerns representation and the institutional functioning of the EU.
The main interest with respect to this dimension was to understand exactly
what constitutes the preferred mode of EU decision making in the view of
political parties. In particular, the aim was to assess whether parties are more
supportive of the extension of majority voting, and therefore whether they
want to empower the supranational level of decision making, or whether they
favour the intergovernmental mode of decision making and the veto power of
the member states instead. This is certainly a crucial aspect in the debate on
the future of the EU and about its authoritativeness in themultilevel system of
governance. It is a theme that finds an empirical equivalent in the questions
asked in the elite survey concerning the preferred role for the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states. In Chapter
2 of this volume, Cotta and Russo show that, among national MPs, a large
majority continues to defend the role of states, and only a minority is ready to
accept a transformation of the Commission into a true government of the
Union, although they are open to accept increased powers for the European
Parliament. I now test whether the same holds true with reference to the
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positions expressed by parties in the Euromanifestos; in particular whether they
also make a strong defence of the power of the member states. Table 9.2 shows
the results of a logistic regression that documents the likelihood for Euromani-
festos to express either a supranational or a sovereigntist stance with reference
to this problem. In the regression model, I have included all the independent
variables considered for the analysis: (1) the government/opposition status of
a party at the time it issued the Euromanifesto; (2) the ideological nature of
mainstream/radical4 parties; (3) parties left–right positions; (4) the level of eco-
nomic freedom of the Euromanifesto country according to an index used by the
InternationalMonetary Fund;5 and (5) the status of old/newmember state of the
Euromanifesto country. The dependent variable in Table 9.2 is a dummy that
classifies party positions in two categories: supranational6 or sovereigntist.7
We can observe in Table 9.2 that the only independent variables with a
significant impact on party preference are the radical/mainstream nature of
a party, the left–right ideology, and the level of economic freedom of the
Table 9.2. Logistic regression for ‘EU decision making: intergovernmental or supranational?’
Independent variables EU decision making
In opposition/in government
Radical/mainstream 4.11***






Cox & Snell R2 0.12
N 298
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.001. Only beta coefficients with p  0.05 shown.
4 Mainstream parties have been considered as those belonging to the following party families:
Christian democrats, socialists, liberals, conservatives, regionalists (except the Italian Lega Nord),
greens, and some other moderate parties following the indication of the country experts involved
in the research. Communist, nationalists, extreme left, and extreme right parties have been
considered radical.
5 For the analysed countries, scores in this index vary from 1.7 (UK) to 2.8 (Greece) in a range
from 1 to 4. The mean value is 2.29 (Portugal), so I have inserted all countries with higher score in
the category of low economic freedom and those with a lower score in the category of high
economic freedom. The following are the scores assigned by the IMF: UK (1.74), Estonia (1.75),
Austria (1.95), Germany (1.96), Czech Republic (2.10), Belgium (2.11), Lithuania (2.14), Portugal
(2.29), Spain (2.33), Slovakia (2.35), Hungary (2.44), Poland (2.49), Italy (2.50), France (2.51), and
Greece (2.80).
6 When a preference for decisions made by majority vote or mixed unanimity and majority vote
is expressed in the Euromanifesto.
7 When it is declared in a Euromanifesto that decision making should be kept central to member
states and decisions in the EU made by unanimity. Also, when European institutions are severely
criticized and asked to shift powers back to member states, or when it is declared that EU
institutions should have solely advisory or implementation functions.
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Euromanifesto country. However, the last two factors have only a very limited
impact, as is shown by the low beta values (0.37 and 0.78), so that their
explanatory power is rather weak. On the other hand, being a radical or a
mainstream party is the best predictor of party attitudes, as shown by the
higher beta (4.11). Radical parties are four times more likely than mainstream
parties to express a sovereigntist attitude with respect to the decision-making
issue. The other two factors explain instead a change in likelihood that is very
limited. As to the left–right distinction, the fact that the two extremes of the
political spectrum tend to converge and to share Eurosceptical attitudes has
certainly watered down the differences between them.
However, as discussed in the introductory section of this chapter, other
studies show differences between left and right when extreme parties are
excluded from the analysis. Moreover, breaking down the stance on the EU
decision-making issue intomore specific categories contributes tomaking these
differences emerge. In Table 9.3, I have introduced these corrections to the
model. I have also broken down the dependent variable (EU decision making)
into more specific categories, and have excluded the radical parties from the
analysis. I made use of a multinomial logistic regression model to calculate the
likelihood of the different categories of the dependent variable compared to a
reference category, controlling for left–right. I found that with respect to the
reference category ‘re-nationalization of powers’, left and right show the same
likelihood (7.20 and 7.33 respectively) to express instead a preference for
majority voting. However, as the Exp(B) coefficients show, the right has an
even greater likelihood (11) ofmaking no reference to the problem––in particu-
lar, 56 per cent of the Euromanifestos of the Christian democrats do not make
reference to the issue––or to prefer unanimity voting (8) as a mode of decision
Table 9.3. Multinomial logistic regression for ‘EU decisionmaking’ by left–right (radical parties
not included)
EU decision making Exp(B)
No reference Left 5.80***
Right 11***






Reference category: re-nationalization of powers
å2 95.03
Sig. 0.000
Cox & Snell R2 0.31
N 234
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.01. Only Exp(B)s with p  0.05 shown.
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making. The likelihood of the left to make no reference to the problem is more
limited (5.80) and to prefer unanimity voting is non-significant. In this greater
cautiousness, reticence even, of the right we can find the main difference with
the left. Comparatively, the right ismore internally divided, whereby allmodes
of EU decision making, including the exclusive intergovernmental mode, are
advocated by its different national components. On the contrary, the prefer-
ence for majority voting prevails within the left.
In the end, results show that it is the divide between mainstream and
radical parties that better characterizes party contestation of one of the most
controversial issues of representation in the EU, namely the issue of majority
or unanimity voting. However, a more limited influence is also exerted by
the left–right ideology, particularly when we exclude radical parties from the
analysis. Socialists and liberals prove more open to the empowerment of the
EU, as they favour majority voting more strongly than Christian democrats,
conservatives, and nationalists. On the contrary, the other factors considered
in the model produce almost no variation, or are simply not significant for the
explanation of party positions.
9.3.3 Scope of Governance
I nowmove the focus of the analysis to another relevant aspect concerning the
role of the EU in the multilevel system of governance: policy making. Specifi-
cally, I was interested to know whether parties express a supranational8 or a
sovereigntist9 attitude in the case of somepolicies that still represent a privileged
domain of the nation state. The policy themes analysed in the Euromanifestos
find an empirical equivalent in the elite survey in similar questions about the
preference for levels of responsibility in different policy domains.
I start the analysis of this dimension with foreign policy. In this dimension,
I found confirmation of the fact that a party’s stance is strongly dependent on
its radical or mainstream nature. As it is shown by the beta values, mainstream
parties have greater likelihood (5.27) than radical parties to express a suprana-
tional, hence pro-European attitude in the Euromanifestos (Table 9.4). The
status of old or new member state is also very significant. In particular, parties
in the old member states are more likely (8.87) than parties in the new
member states to express their favour for the EU-ization of foreign policy. It
seems to be evidence of the fact that, beyond the well-known cases of themost
sovereigntist old member states (such as the UK), the new member states also
8 When the supranational level of decision making is indicated––alone or in combination with
the national or sub-national level––as the favourite level to be responsible for a given policy.
9 When levels of decisionmaking other than the supranational one are indicated as favourite for
being responsible in a given policy.
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represent a stronghold of opposition to deeper future integration, in particular
as regards the second pillar of the EU.
Dropping radical parties from the analysis, I found no relevant difference
this time between left and right. In particular, 73 per cent of Euromanifestos of
the socialists support either the EU exclusive or the mixed national/EU com-
petence in foreign policy, as well as 70.2 per cent of those of the Christian
democrats and 75.6 per cent of those of the liberals. Nomajor difference could
be found among these three party families, even after breaking down results
by EU exclusive and mixed national/EU competence. Conservative parties
prove more pro-EU than would normally be expected when we think about
the British Conservatives (52 per cent of conservative Euromanifestos support
the shared national/EU competence in foreign policy; but support for the
exclusive EU competence is much lower than for the above party families).
This shows that, thanks to the stance of parties such as the Hungarian FIDESZ
and the Italian National Alliance, conservatives in the member states are not
necessarily confined to Euroscepticism.
We find confirmation of this tendency in the other constitutive policy of
the second pillar of the EU, i.e. defence. Again, the radical/mainstream nature
of a party and the status of old/new member state are the best predictors of
party attitudes. The linearity displayed by causality reveals a clear pattern of
contestation of the EU policies. Once more, mainstream parties are much
more likely (8.87) to express more supranational attitudes in this domain
than radical parties, and for parties in the old member states the likelihood
is greater (7.47) than for parties in the newmember states (Table 9.4). As could
be expected, party attitudes in the two domains of foreign and defence policy
overlap. Hence, the tendency of socialists, liberals, and Christian democrats to
















New/old member state 7.87*** 7.47*** 5.05*** 2.78**
Constant 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.16
å2 40.81 52.80 28.74 18.97
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Cox & Snell R2 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.08
N 298 298 298 298
Note: *** statistically significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05. Only beta coefficients with p  0.05
shown.
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voice their support for the involvement of the EU is also confirmed for
defence. Between 70.9 per cent (socialists) and 75.7 per cent (Christian demo-
crats) of their Euromanifestos express such views. However, when EU compe-
tence is considered exclusively, and not in combination with national
competence, then Christian democrats are those most in favour of this option
(51.4 per cent); socialists aremore cautious (39.6 per cent) and liberals stand in
between (45.9 per cent). Conservatives express a preference for the mixed
national/EU competence (50 per cent) but are much less in favour of the
exclusive supranational option (25 per cent). Overall, after dropping radical
parties from the analysis, left and right parties tend again to balance their
views. Finally, parties from countries with higher economic freedom are more
likely to express EU positive attitudes in this domain, but here the relation-
ship, although statistically significant, produces a much weaker effect, as is
shown by the low beta (0.4).
Although foreign and security policy are not the same thing, it was logical to
predict that attitudes with regard to these two policies would overlap. Now the
analysis moves to what was the third pillar of the EU in order to see whether the
same pattern of contestation found for the second pillar can also be confirmed
here. Indeed, results show that party attitudes are not policy-specific but instead
permeate many policy areas. In particular, in the policy domain of justice, the
mainstream/radical party divide and the old/new member status of a country
are again the best predictors of party attitudes (Table 9.4). This time, though,
the strongest impact is made by a territorial factor, since parties in the old
member states are more likely (5.05) to express a preference for supranational
competence than parties in the new member states. Once more, mainstream
parties are more likely (2.53) to take a stance in favour of supranational compe-
tence in this domain than radical parties, and government parties are more
likely to do so (1.8) than opposition parties. Once again, only low intensity
differences could be found between left and right after dropping radical parties
from the analysis. In particular, breaking down preferences into more specific
categories, I found that the Christian democrats express a preference for the
exclusive EU competence more frequently (30.6 per cent) than socialists (23.4
per cent) and about as often as liberals (29.7 per cent), but definitely more often
than conservatives (19.2 per cent).
To conclude my analysis, I examined immigration, a policy moved from the
third to the first pillar of the EU after the Treaty of Amsterdam. This policy
again confirms the pattern observed in the analysis of the other dependent
variables examined in this section: party attitudes are shaped along the divi-
sions between mainstream and radical parties on the one hand, and parties of
the old and parties of the new member states on the other. As revealed by the
beta values, mainstream parties (2.10) and parties of the old member states
(2.78) are more likely than their counterparts to express positive attitudes
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towards the involvement of the EU in the immigration policy (Table 9.4).
Dropping radical parties from the analysis and breaking down party prefer-
ences into more specific categories shows that left and right tend overall to
balance their views, although within these two poles the Euromanifestos of
the liberals (37.8 per cent) and of the conservatives (34.6 per cent)10 show
greater support for exclusive EU competence in immigration than those of the
socialists (25.5 per cent) and of the Christian democrats (22.2 per cent).
Overall, and surprisingly enough, although until the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty it was a policy of the first pillar, where decisions could be taken
by majority vote, support of the national parties for the delegation of powers
to the EU in immigration was more limited than for the other policies of the
second and third pillars.
In the end, the analysis shows that in the member states there is a clear
pattern of party contestation of the issue of the EU’s role in the multilevel
systemof governance. Indeed, there are parties that support the EU for its actual
role and express preferences for its empowerment in their programmatic state-
ments. It is possible to argue that these parties play an important function of
legitimization of the EU within the member states. These are, mostly, main-
stream parties and parties in the old member states. Conversely, the main
source of opposition to the EU and to its empowerment comes from radical
parties who propose some alternative options of exclusive or predominant
national competence in policy making. Also, we found that parties in the new
member states are on average more cautious about the role and future policy
competences of the EU than parties in the old member states. Other factors
pertaining to the left–right ideology or to national economic specificities have
only a very limited impact on party attitudes to the EU, one that is actually
much less linear and that could explain only small variations in party attitudes.
If the role of radical parties in opposing Europe was rather well known (Szczer-
biak and Taggart 2008), the analysis has shown that parties in the newmember
states may also constitute a bulk of resistance to deeper integration in the EU.
9.4 Conclusions
The results of the analysis presented in this chapter show that the structure of
the European discourse of the party central office is different from the one that
emerges through a survey of MPs presented in other chapters of this book.
When interviewed, members of the national elites answer thoroughly the
questions concerning the three dimensions of identity, representation, and
10 For the conservatives, this figure is related in particular to the positions of the Czech Civic
Democratic Party, the Hungarian FIDESZ, and the Italian National Alliance.
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scope of governance. As a consequence, their conception and representation
of the EU appearsmultidimensional. However, when parties frame their stance
on the EU in the Euromanifestos, a clear hierarchy emerges. The EU is mostly
represented in its functional aspects of institutional functioning and policy
making, while the more symbolic elements of identity are clearly much less
salient. Identity tends to be more salient in the party discourse only where
external threats are perceived more strongly and defence of a European civili-
zation overlaps with nationalism, as in the case of the new member states.
As to the direction of the attitudes, the Euromanifesto data and the data
reported in the other chapters of the book based on a survey of MPs are highly
congruent. The analyses also show that the supranational level of governance
consisting of the EU institutions and policies is represented in different ways in
the member states. The discourse of parties in the Euromanifestos of the old
member states tends to be more benevolent towards the EU than in the new
member states, where clear signs of Euroscepticism have emerged. In the old
member states, the EU currently remains a matter of large consensus among
mainstream parties, both left and right, while opposition to the EU belongs
predominantly to radical parties. On the other hand, resistance to deeper inte-
gration is sowidespread in the newmember states as to also involvemainstream
parties, particularly with respect to policy delegation, as Real-Dato, Göncz, and
Lengyel also document in their chapter (this volume). These findings are highly
consistent with those of other contributions, such as Best, and Cotta and Russo,
in this volume. The fact that the same pattern is shown by findings based
on different data sources––namely a survey of MPs and Euromanifestos––is
certainly something that strengthens the reliability of these findings.
Radical parties tend to be left out of national governments, so that their
opposition to the EU is less influential when developments of the EU are
decided by intergovernmental mode, particularly through decisions taken
by the European Council. Nevertheless, in this arena the role of mainstream
parties from the new member states and their resistance to deeper integration
could constitute a serious limitation to the empowerment of the EU. This is
something that the advocates of deeper integration should take into serious
consideration in order to avoid future blockades and deadlocks in the integra-
tion process. Furthermore, the opposition of radical parties to the EU can be
very influential when decisions are taken through popular vote in referen-
dums. Consistent with the other contributions in this volume, this chapter
shows in comparative terms that if the escalation of a constraining ‘dissensus’
on the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2008) is really in place, it is driven by radical
parties and, since 2004, by parties in the new member states.
A broad problem that was raised in this chapter concerns whether the party
in central office is closer to the stance of the public office or to the party on the
ground. The evidence generated by the analysis of Euromanifestos shows a
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good fit between the positions of the central and the public offices. The broad
consensus of moderate party families on the EU, in particular in the old
member states, as opposed to the Euroscepticism of radical forces, is confirmed
by the analysis carried out in this and the other chapters for both faces of party
organization. This divide emerges even more clearly in the analysis of Euro-
manifestos where all parties are represented, whereas the survey of MPs does
not include radicals from member states where they are not represented in
parliament, possibly as a consequence of the electoral system.
The moderate influence of the left–right divide found for the MPs in several
chapters of this book is not so relevant in the Euromanifestos. With the
exclusion of radical parties, it is true that left parties are to some extent more
in favour of majority voting and supranational decision making than right
parties. In terms of policy preferences, if we consider only the main four party
families (Christian democrats, socialists, liberals, and conservatives), left and
right tend instead to balance their positions. Certainly, adding other smaller
parties, such as nationalists and greens, would change the picture and make
the left remarkably more pro-European than the right.
Finally, the influence of government incumbency on the stance expressed
in the Euromanifestos is very limited; in particular, it is more limited than that
found by Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (this volume) for MPs. This is evidence
of the fact that the discourse of the central office, being addressed to the
party rank and file, and more broadly to the citizens, tends to be more stable,
more ideological, and more linear. It is also probably more repetitive and less
influenced by the competition between government and opposition at the
domestic level. Conversely, the stance of the party in public office is more
strategic, and MPs are more sensitive to the influence of the costs and benefits
offered by the position they occupy with respect to the national government.
On the whole, the stance of the party in central and in public office is highly
congruent and often shaped by the same determinants. However, two factors
(left–right and government incumbency) show a different influence on the
stance of these two faces of party organization. Despite this difference, the
central office remains overall very close to the stance of the public office on
the EU, so the gap between parties and citizens found in the other chapters
could also be confirmed with respect to the findings of this chapter. As the
data from the Euromanifesto analysis are built on different metrics from those
of the IntUne elite survey it is not possible to produce an exact measurement
of such closeness/distance of the party central office to the public office and
the party on the ground. However, the overlap between the positions of the
party central office and those of the MPs is certainly considerable, to the point
that one could argue that parties do not seem to follow popular preferences
on the EU issues; rather, party elites seem to build their own preferences in
relative isolation from the masses.
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10
Elite foundations of European integration:
a causal analysis
Heinrich Best
The study into the ‘Europe of Elites’ that has formed the basis of this book
departed from the assumption that European integration can be conceptua-
lized as a process of elite integration leading to an accord between national
elites over their enduring cooperation and peaceful competition in the frame
of pan-European institutions. According to this theoretical approach a com-
prehensive process of elite integration provides the normative and secures the
structural basis for the establishment and operation of a European system of
multilevel governance. Indeed, results presented in this book furnish evidence
for the emergence of a ‘Eurelitism’ that is characterized by a stronger attach-
ment to Europe, a stronger support for the process of European integration,
and a stronger willingness to transfer substantial elements of national sover-
eignty to the European level than is found in the general population (see
Chapters 1 and 8). Results also show a broad and strong consensus among
national elites in their view that membership in the EU has benefited their
countries. Among economic elites this assessment is nearly unanimous, and
among their political counterparts there is an average agreement level of 94
per cent; in the general population, however, about a quarter of all respon-
dents, on average, disagree (see Chapter 2 and Figure 10.4).
Other findings though have challenged the consensus thesis and provided
a much more differentiated picture of partial consent and division over
important facets of Europeanness between and within European national
elites (see Chapter 2). Whereas Eurosceptic or Europhobic positions are rarely
expressed in all dimensions of Europeanness, discordant and inconsistent
answer patterns are the rule. We maintain that analyses of European integra-
tion as an elite process have to take this contradictory plurality in the expres-
sions of Europeanness into account because Europe-related elite behaviour
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and in particular elites’ policy preferences will reflect these patterns. It is
pivotal for our understanding of Eurelitism, therefore, to identify and explain
the causes of variation in the Europeanness of European economic and politi-
cal elites.
This chapter pursues this agenda and provides a comprehensive causal
analysis of the Europeanness of national political elites (see Chapter 1). Com-
prehensive means here that we will test causal models, which include a wide
array of factors expected to explain the variance in the degree (favourable or
unfavourable) of elites’ Europeanness. Some of these causal factors have
already been introduced and discussed in earlier chapters of this book, such
as contextual influences emanating from national polities and societies (see
Chapter 7) or the effects of elites’ embeddedness in institutional and individ-
ual networks of supranational cooperation (Chapters 4 and 7). Others, like
intra-elite cue taking or cognitive mobilization, will be introduced here.
10.1 Europeanness: the Explanandum
‘Europeanness’ will be measured according to the theoretical concepts and
indicators introduced in the introductory chapter of this book. There, we
identified a cognitive, an emotive, and a conative dimension of Europeanness
emanating from elites’ attitudes towards European integration, their attach-
ment to Europe, and their preparedness to accept a transfer of control over
sovereignty rights to a supranational level in several key policy areas. We have
further substantiated how these facets of Europeanness may be rooted in
deeper mental layers of attitude formation. In order to examine the applica-
bility of our conceptual suggestions, in particular regarding the concept of
Europeanness, a short review of the dependent variables used in this chapter is
appropriate. The concept of Europeanness is represented here by three items
that were used identically in all versions of the elites and general population
questionnaires, each capturing one of the three dimensions of Europeanness
(see Chapter 12 Appendix).
 The emotive dimension: ‘People feel different degrees of attachment to their
town or village, to their region, to their country, and to Europe. What
about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached,
or not at all attached to . . . ’ (attachment to Europe is reported here).
 The cognitive-evaluative dimension: ‘Some say European unification should
be strengthened. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your
opinion?’ Answer categories range from ‘0’ meaning unification ‘has
already gone too far’ to ‘10’ meaning ‘should be strengthened’.
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 The projective or conative dimension: ‘Thinking about the European Union
over the next ten years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or
against the following: ‘A single foreign policy towards outside countries’.
Answer categories range from ‘1’ meaning ‘strongly in favour’ to ‘4’
meaning ‘strongly against’.
The three items chosen to represent Europeanness also capture the three
different subject areas addressed in the IntUne questionnaire, i.e. identity
(here: attachment to Europe), representation (here: strengthening of unifica-
tion), and scope of governance (here: common EU foreign policy), and there-
fore form a link between the construct of Europeanness used in this book
and the general concepts used in the theoretical framework of the IntUne
project (see Chapter 1; Cotta and Isernia 2009). For the purpose of this
chapter, foreign policy was selected as a pivotal policy competence from a
set of other policy areas covered in the IntUne questionnaire because it refers
to the core competence of a sovereign state and its status as an independent
subject of international law.
The three items representing the construct of Europeanness are significantly
correlated, indicating that there is some communality between emotive,
cognitive-evaluative, and projective-conative orientations towards Europe.
Generally, connections are stronger within the elites than within the popula-
tion. Within the elites, stronger connections prevail between the conative
and cognitive dimensions than between these and the emotive dimension
of Europeanness. Within the population, correlations between emotive and
cognitive dimensions are stronger. Nevertheless, the correlations are far from
being deterministic in all samples (the Pearson coefficients vary between
0.139 and 0.356; see Table 10.1), meaning that the three dimensions capture
different and distinguishable facets of the construct. Earlier chapters of this
book, in particular the contribution by Cotta and Russo, have further ascer-
tained and defined themultidimensionality of elites’ attitudes towards Europe.
Contrary to expectationsof an integrated ‘Eurelite’, we seemassive differences
between countries in all three dimensions of Europeanness and between all sub-
samples targeted by the IntUne surveys (see Figures 10.1–10.3). Among political
elites, attachment toEuropevaries between66per cent ‘very attached’ inPoland
and 10 per cent ‘very attached’ in the United Kingdom. In the management of
large companies, banks, and employers’ organizations, extreme values of strong
attachment to Europe vary between 79per cent (France) and 10per cent (United
Kingdom), and between 46 per cent (Hungary) and 10 per cent (United King-
dom) in the general population.
Strong support (answer categories 8–10) for a strengthening of European
unification are expressed by 67 per cent of Spanish and 59 per cent of Greek
political elites, but only by 13 per cent of their Estonian colleagues, who are
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preceded by only 15 per cent strongly pro-European British politicians.
Among economic elites we find Estonia and United Kingdom again at the
bottom of the ranking (0 [!] and 5 per cent, respectively) which is now topped
by Austria (69 per cent) and Belgium (61 per cent). In the general population
the range between top and bottom is smaller, but again we find the United
Kingdom and Estonia (13 and 15 per cent respectively) at the bottom of the
ranking, and Italy and Portugal (46 and 45 per cent respectively) at the top.
The project of a single foreign policy of the EU is strongly supported by 90
per cent of the Italian and 84 per cent of the Greek political elite, but only by
28 per cent of their Czech and 12 per cent of their British colleagues. Among
the economic elites, the respective positions are occupied by Italy (90 per cent)
and France (72 per cent) at the top of the ranking and the United Kingdom
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Figure 10.1. Dimensions of Europeanness––attachment to Europe (% very attached)
Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item id01d.
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Figure 10.2. DimensionsofEuropeanness––unificationshouldbe strengthened (%strongly
in favour)
Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item rp08.
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Figure 10.3. Dimensions of Europeanness––single foreign policy (% strongly in favour)
Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item sg03_3.
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(0 per cent) and the Czech Republic (38 per cent) at the bottom. In the general
population, the distance between extremes is again smaller with Bulgaria
(42 per cent) and Greece (39 per cent) occupying the top ranks and Denmark
(18 per cent) and the United Kingdom (14 per cent) being at the bottom.
Results of these country rankings challenge the consensus thesis of European
unification and integration. In terms of their emotive, cognitive-evaluative,
and conative-projective orientations towards Europe, European political and
economic elites display huge variations at national level. In the general popu-
lation the spread between countries is smaller but still sizeable. Only among
Italian political and economic elites can the project of European integration
count on amajority of strong supporters in all dimensions of Europeanness. In
other countries, like the United Kingdom and Estonia (here with the exception
of support for a common foreign policy) we found only small minorities of
respondents with strong pro-European orientations. Although there is a
tendency of Southern European political elites to be more pro-European and
for elites from CEE-countries to showmore Euroscepticism, the positioning of
most countries varies strongly between the different rankings.
In some countries, elites seem to build elements of Europeanness into their
very specific concepts of national identity––e.g. Poland as the defender of ‘true’
European values––or into elite strategies to promote national sovereignty––e.g.
Europe as a shield against Russian attempts on Estonian independence. The
national use and reinterpretation of European topoi may explain why ele-
ments of Europeanness sometimes appear in seemingly implausible and even
contradictory combinations. Europe as the shell and support for a national
revival and redefinition seems to be a particularly attractive solution for elites
of thenewmember states ofCentral and Eastern Europe that had been force fed
with internationalist ideologies under Soviet hegemony (Best 2009). Elites
in these countries are naturally reluctant to embark on a new experience of
internationalism and submission to a distant centre under European auspices.
It was a challenging task of this book to give answers to the question of what
factors underlay these between-countries differences and whether there are
regional patterns recognizable in this European diversity (see, in particular,
Chapter 7).
An important limiting factor of European elites’ Europeanness is the differ-
ences found between the elites and the general population in our survey. This
elites–masses gap is seen in all the European countries included in both the
elites and the general population surveys, and in all facets of Europeanness.
With regard to both economic and political elites, we see an elite–masses
differential giving economic and political elites an advantage in Europeanness
over the general population (Hooghe 2003). Only in a very small minority of
elites–masses comparisons does the general population have a lead over the
elite in terms of Europeanness. In view of these results we can justifiably speak
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of a ‘Europe of Elites’. The elite–masses differential is particularly large when
it comes to the evaluation of the present state of European integration. The
actual population is by far more sceptical towards a strengthening of European
unification and the cession of rights of sovereignty to European institutions
(here: the transfer of foreign policy competences from the member states to
the EU) than elites. In view of these results, the failure to introduce a European
constitution or a new constitution-like Treaty of the Union does not come as a
surprise. The elite–masses gap limits the Europeanness of Europe’s political
elites in that it restricts their options to broaden the European Union if
this requires a referendum. As well as creating a strong temptation to enter
into anti-integrationist populism, it also decreases the attractiveness of the
European Union for economic elites, because a ‘Europe of citizens’ would
probably be protectionist and restricted by the preservation of rights of national
sovereignty, thus being somewhat of an impediment to economic freedom.
The limiting effect of the general population’s Euroscepticism on elites’
Europeanness must be, however, fairly inconsistent, because the elite–
population gap varies considerably between countries. It comes close to zero
in the United Kingdom and attains particularly high values for both economic
and political elites in Belgium and France. CEE-countries show on average a
somewhat smaller elite–population margin than their Western and Southern
neighbours. The question of whether the elite–masses gap is indeed a causal
factor influencing the Europeanness of individual members of the elite is a
question that cannot, however, be decidedon the basis of comparisons between
aggregate data. To investigate the causes of elites’ Europeanness we need
to embark on confirmatory data analyses of individual elite data. This is inves-
tigated in more depth in the following paragraphs of this chapter.
10.2 Exploring the Causes of Elites’ Europeanness
The observations reported in the previous paragraph require us to test causal
models for each indicator separately and, because we assume that the forma-
tion of political and economic elites’ attitudes towards Europe and European
integration follows a different logic, to differentiate between these two elite
groups (see also Chapter 1). This latter decision is based mainly on the consid-
eration that, for political elites, divergences over Europe are a subject of public
controversy consequential in their competition for power. Economic elites,
on the other hand, are expected to relate to Europemainly as amarket offering
a set of opportunities to be utilized in their competition for financial gain.
For causal analyses of European political and economic elites’ Europeanness,
the national sub-samples of each elite sector are merged separately to form
comprehensive samples of ‘European’ economic and political elites.Weighting
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procedures are not applied, so that all political and economic elites are included
in the data analysis with the same weighting. A Multiple Regression Analysis
is used to test causal models of European elites’ Europeanness. The three
dimensions or facets of Europeanness (emotive; cognitive-evaluative; projective-
conative) are tested separately for each elite group resulting in six Multiple
Regression Models.
We derive the theoretical propositions regarding the determinants of elites’
Europeanness from general theoretical explanations of public support for
European integration. This ‘universalistic’ approach is used as the starting
point for empirical scrutiny, because we assume that elites are rooted in and
closely related to their domestic societies and polities. The question as to what
extent this is true in the given case, and in particular whether it has an impact
on elites’ Europeanness, is central to this chapter, with the answer expected to
provide important insights into the nature of Eurelitism. The specific status of
elites is also considered in our explanatory models, in particular by including
elite–masses differentials and elite–elite cues in the models.
In designing the causal or explanatory models for the investigation
of Europeanness, we start by drawing on the theoretical propositions of
structural-functionalism which have dominated—mostly implicitly––academic
discourse about the foundations of European unification. Although func-
tional integration theory has obvious shortcomings––as outlined in the intro-
ductory chapter––because of its teleological and harmonistic biases, the
general framework of structural-functionalism may be considered as a source
and guideline for the formulation of hypotheses and the choice of indicators.
In its general form, this theoretical approach imputes ‘as rigorously as possi-
ble, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a
supposedly stable, cohesive system’ (Bourricaud 1981: 94). Our short outline
of an explanans for European elites’ Europeanness, which focused on the self-
interests, belief systems, and network capital of European elites as a basis for
their Europeanness, departed from a structural-functionalist position (see
Chapters 1 and 4). In more general terms, it explained elites’ Europeanness
by the advantages elites derive from the political and economic consequences
of integration and the allegiances they show to supranational foci of identity.
It also maintained that the integration and unification of Europe is an elite
process emanating from the social structure of elite systems, i.e. from their
interests, norms, traditions, interactions, and institutions.
In reformulating this general proposition into empirically testable state-
ments, we start with the general hypothesis that European elites’ European-
ness will be determined by their level of embeddedness in transnational
networks (i.e. their European ‘contact capital’), the scope of their biographical
experiences (temporal and territorial), their cultural capital, and their religious
and political belief systems (Fligstein 2008). However, this general hypothesis,
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which holds that individual status, situs, and socialization experiences
define their relation to the European context and thereby their level of Euro-
peanness, has to be broken down further into partial hypotheses for empirical
examination. First, we assume that where general political belief systems
are linked to statist and nationalistic ideologies they will impact on elites’
Europeanness, because both are difficult to reconcile with European integra-
tion and the opening of national markets (Hooghe 2007; Schlesinger 2007). In
this study, political ideology is measured by respondents’ positioning on an
11-point left–right self-rating scale.
We also assume that religious belief systems and denominational affiliations
will have an impact on elites’ Europeanness, because Christianity formed
a defining element of Europe (‘Christian occident’) against the Islamic world
(Nelson, Guth, and Fraser 2001). On the other hand, there are some Protestant
churches strongly attached to established national states (like in Great Britain
and Denmark), whereas orthodoxy has its roots in the Eastern Mediterranean
and a long history of hostile relations with the ‘Latin’ church of Western and
Southern Europe (Best 2009). Both religious affiliations should therefore fur-
ther Eurosceptic positions. In the models, religious belief systems are repre-
sented by the religious and denominational affiliations of elite members.
Another set of hypotheses claims that ‘macro-contexts’ (De Winter 2003),
such as gender, territory, and age, will have an impact on elites’ Europeanness.
We expect that the younger elites are, and the wider their territorial scope
of biographical experience, the stronger their Europeanness will be, because
younger elites are more likely to have been socialized in a nation-transcending
area of communication. In particular, extended stays abroad should further
cosmopolitan orientations and the readiness to attach effective allegiances to
supranational institutions (Inglehart and Robier 1978; Fuss, Garcia-Albacete,
and Rodriguez-Monter 2004). With regard to the effect of gender, female elites
are expected to show higher levels of Europeanness, because the European
Union champions policies of gender equality. In the case of female economic
elites, however, European economic integration may reduce their level of
Europeanness due to negative effects on their career chances stemming from
the male domination of internationally operating concerns (Nelson and Guth
2000). The territorial scope of biographical experience will be represented by
the elites’ record of extended stays in other European countries.
We also assume that elites’ social and cultural capital is associated with their
level of Europeanness. This hypothesis is based on Inglehart’s theory of
cognitive mobilization, which claims that increases in education and access
to information encourage citizens to develop a more cosmopolitan outlook
that benefits support for European integration (Inglehart 1971). Higher levels
of education are also expected to have a ‘functional’ link to Europeanness,
because well-educated individuals are assumed to have the cognitive ability
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and social competences with which to interact in the complex institutional
and cultural settings of an integrated Europe. In themodels, therefore, cultural
capital is introduced by level of education. The social capital hypothesis
assumes that the deeper the involvement of elites in institutional networks
at European level, the stronger will be their Europeanness. The link is con-
stituted by the increased subjective and objective value of transnational con-
tact capital in the case of deepening of European integration. Involvement in
institutional networks is represented by elites’ self-reported contacts with
organizations and authorities at the European level.
Structuralist and functionalist theories, which see Europeanness as a
result of the perceived benefits and welfare derived from the political and
economical consequences of integration, have been recently challenged by
‘post-functionalist theories’ that focus instead on the range and nature of
identity-forming collective historical experiences (Hooghe and Marks 2008).
The core of this approach is the affective andperceptive bases for the allegiances
of individuals to supranational institutions and collectivities. It is expectedhere
that these allegiances are, to some extent, independent of the locus of an
individual in the social structure. A ‘post-functionalist’ perspective, therefore,
requires us to consider in the explanans attitudinal data referring to identities,
subjective evaluations, and trust. The extension of our research agenda into the
realm of cognitive, normative, and affective frames will be achieved by includ-
ing three attitudinal variables in the multiple regression models:
 Attachment to one’s own country. Here we expect a trade-off between
emotive ties to one’s own country and attachment to Europe, because
identification with different in-groups is considered to be a zero-sum
phenomenon (Carey 2002). There will also be a negative impact of a
strong attachment to one’s own country on the approval of further
European integration and a cession of national sovereignty to the
European level, because ‘the stronger the bond that an individual feels
towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of
measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics.
The growth in scope of the European Union in the realm of economics,
politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole control of
the nation state impinges on this view of the nation’ (Carey 2002: 391).
Strong attachment to one’s own nation should therefore be negatively
connected to attachment to Europe. Strong attachment to one’s own
nation should also reduce the acceptance of multilevel governance
(deeper integration) and the transfer of authority for foreign policy to the
European level.
 No such trade-off is expected with regard to trust in the institutions of the
European Union (here: the EU Commission). Research into political
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support has identified belief in the integrity and performance of its core
institutions as an important factor in forming an allegiance to
representative democracy (Newton 2007). We expect the same
mechanism to be working in relation to EU institutions, whereby trust
in the EU Commission will be positively linked to elites’ Europeanness,
i.e. to a high attachment to Europe, to an acceptance of multilevel
governance, and to support for a transfer of authority to the
European level.
 A similar pro-integrationist effect will result from the assessment that
one’s country has benefited from membership in the European Union.
Perception of the utility of EU membership for own country will, therefore,
increase elites’ Europeanness in all three dimensions of the concept. We
have, however, to be aware that, due to the very high overall level of
agreement among elites that their countries have benefited from EU
membership, the power of this variable to explain variation of
Europeanness will be limited.
A third set of factors influencing the Europeanness of political and economic
elites is considered to be specific to power holders anddecisionmakers. Herewe
are referring in particular to the cues regarding European issues that national
elites receive from their domestic environments. First, however, we need to
look at the relationship between elites and non-elites, which is––particularly
for political elites––a factor constraining and directing their involvement in
supranational institution building and European policy making. In abstract
terms, the complex intertwining between the various levels of the European
system of governance has been described recently as a ‘compliance-legitimacy
relationship between the union and its member-states’ which is ‘constrained
by the basic compliance–legitimacy relationship between member-govern-
ments and their constituents’ (Scharpf 2009b: 173). In more simplistic terms,
it means that voters hold politicians accountable for their decisions regarding
the European Union, which is translated by the politicians into a considerable
electoral hazard. The theory of ‘constraining dissensus’ has recently put these
elites–masses interactions at the centre of the argument (Hooghe and Marks
2008). We expect, therefore, to see some responsiveness on behalf of political
elites in accordance with the preferences of their domestic populations regard-
ing integration policies and allegiances towards the European Union. As these
relationships concern constituents and their representatives in particular, we
do not expect to see the same pattern in the relationship between economic
elites and the domestic populations in their home countries (see Chapter 8).
We do expect, however, to find indications for mutual cue-taking between
economic and political elites. One reason is the expectation that EU-related
interests and perceptions of economic and political elites are linked, which is
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grounded in the fact that the EU is a political union that has evolved from an
economic community and still has at its core a commonmarket. The historical
background and the actual operational requirements of running the EU imply,
and to some extent require, an understanding between political and economic
elites about their status in the integration process and their allegiances towards
Europe. For this reason, we include the national averages of elites’ and their
respective general populations’ agreement concerning the three indicators of
Europeanness as contextual variables in the models.
With the inclusion of contextual variables, which provide averages of mass
and elite attitudes and orientations for the countries covered in this study, we
are taking themultilevel character of our data into consideration (Steenbergen
and Jones 2002). Nevertheless, we have to be aware that this specification of
our model is no proper multilevel analysis and that Beta estimates and the
calculation of significances in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions can be
seriously biased by the ‘nested’ structure of the data and the resulting distor-
tion of standard errors. The ‘methodological concern of heteroskedasticity
when pooling data from cross-sections as varied as the member countries of
the EU’ (Carey 2002: 397) is complemented by our interest in the overall
impact of national diversity on the variation of elites’ Europeanness. The
question to be addressed here is whether and to what extent Eurelitism is
basically a national phenomenon, reflecting national agendas and conditions
of action.
In sum, we examine seven hypotheses that are assumed to impact on the
emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and projective-conative dimensions of Europe-
anness. These are: elites’ position in the transnational social structure and
institutional networks of Europe; the range of their historical experiences;
their cultural capital; cues from peers and masses in the elites’ national
environments; attitudes towards their own nation; the level of trust they
confer on the EU Commission; and the perceived benefits of EU membership
for their country. These are examined with ‘Attachment to Europe’, ‘Strength-
ening of European integration’, and ‘Support for a single European foreign
policy’ as dependent variables. Regression models will be tested in two steps,
with attitudinal variables being included in the second step. This procedure
will allow us to ascertain the overall effects (direct and indirect) of the struc-
tural, contextual, and attitudinal variables on the dependent variables.
Results of OLS-regression analyses are presented in six separate tables (see
Tables 10.2–10.7) for both elite groups (political and economic) and three
indicators of Europeanness (attachment to Europe, attitude towards unifica-
tion, and attitude towards a single foreign policy). Each table contains five
differently specified models: two single-level models, one including and the
other excluding attitudinal variables. It also presents three variants of the
multilevel model: one ‘empty’ model, which considers only the constant
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and shows how much of the variance in the dependent variables can be at
most explained by the aggregate level (here: country); one model that only
contains individual-level independent variables; and a comprehensive multi-
level model, which also includes context variables that measure country
differences at the aggregate level. The discussion of results will go through
clusters of independent variables sequentially, starting with ideological self-
placement and religious affiliations.
Table 10.2. Multiple regression model for attachment to Europe––political elites
Attachment to Europe (1 = none at all; 4 = high) political elites
















0.093** 0.010 0.012 0.011
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.028 0.038 0.031 0.012
Catholic 0.002 0.028 0.029 0.036
Protestant 0.022 0.037 0.067 0.045
Other 0.048 0.040 0.041 0.036
Gender (Ref. cat.: male) 0.074* 0.066* 0.054* 0.060*
Age (mean centred) 0.063* 0.001 0.018 0.010
Education 0.059* 0.002 0.024 0.014
Contact frequency to EU
actors and institutions
(1 = no contacts last year;
5 = at least once a week)
0.148*** 0.112*** 0.095*** 0.105***
Context variables
Duration of EU Membership 0.030 0.037 0.042
Elite consensus 0.279*** 0.258*** 0.275***
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.037 0.053 0.050
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.237*** 0.241*** 0.238***
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.227*** 0.215*** 0.222***
Has your country benefited
from EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203***
Constant/intercept 0.219 2.087*** 3.208*** 0.767*** 2.290***
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.116*** 0.286*** 0.082*** 0.285*** 0.300***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 14.4% 11.9% 2%
2Log-likelihood 2166.210 1917.474 1896.963
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 85.589*** 248.736*** 20.511***
N 1034 995 995 995 995
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 2251,799
The Europe of Elites
220
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
10.3 Empirical Findings
The expected effect of political ideology is overwhelmingly supported by
empirical scrutiny. With the exception of economic elites’ approval of a
strengthening of European unification, political ideology has a significant
effect in five out of the six regression models (Tables 10.2–10.7). This effect,
Table 10.3. Multiple regression model for attachment to Europe––economic elites
Attachment to Europe (1 = none at all; 4 = high) economic elites
















0.141** 0.160*** 0.155*** 0.153***
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.007 0.004 0.066 0.011
Catholic 0.054 0.061 0.050 0.036
Protestant 0.011 0.017 0.061 0.053
Other 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.006
Gender (Ref. cat.: male) 0.049 0.052 0.050 0.054
Age (mean centred) 0.113* 0.079 0.077* 0.072
Education 0.009 0.012 0.022 0.018
Contact frequency to EU actors
and institutions (1 = no
contacts last year; 5 = at
least once a week)
0,045 0.037 0.038 0.041
Context variables
Duration of EU membership 0.010 0.040 0.060
Elite consensus 0.186** 0.120* 0.122a
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.017 0.004 0.009
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.293*** 0.317*** 0.310***
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.167*** 0.194*** 0.191***
Has your country benefited
from EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.003 0.010 0.008
Constant/intercept 1.552* 0.516 3.217*** 1.669*** 0.322
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.074*** 0.171*** 0.037 0.200*** 0.206***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 9.1% 6.5% 5.0%
2Log-likelihood 1068.917 975.993 971.932
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 18.617*** 92.924*** 4.061*
N 524 499 499 499 499
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 1087,534
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however, only appears after ‘folding’ the left–right scale and its transforma-
tion into an extremist–moderate scale. By a folding procedure, scale-positions
left and right of the mid-point of the scale are collapsed and (ignoring signs)
added, so that moderate positions receive low and extremist positions receive
high values. The resulting Beta values show that political extremism, notwith-
standing its position on the right or on the left, reduces elites’ attachment to
Table 10.4. Multiple regression model for attitude towards unification––political elites
Attitude towards Unification (0 = against; 10 = in favour) political
elites
















0.070* 0.016 0.011 0.016
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.005 0.016 0.059 0.016
Catholic 0.106** 0.089** 0.072* 0.089*
Protestant 0.022 0.026 0.056 0.026
Other 0.035 0.030 0.018 0.031
Gender (Ref. cat.: male) 0.040 0.030 0.023 0.030
Age (mean centred) 0.039 0.011 0.016 0.011
Education 0.032 0.059 0.051 0.059
Contact frequency to EU actors
and institutions
(1 = no contacts last year;
5 = at least once a week)
0.098** 0.081** 0.079** 0.081*
Context variables
Duration of EU membership 0.048 0.059 0.059
Elite consensus 0.254*** 0.240*** 0.240***
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.108** 0.110** 0.110**
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.031 0.031 0.031
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.218*** 0.217*** 0.218***
Has your country benefited from
EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.234*** 0.234*** 0.234***
Constant/intercept 1.278 2.960** 6.731*** 3.862*** 2.956**
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.129*** 0.268*** 0.100*** 0.252*** 0.280***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 14.6% 14.4% <0.01%
2Log-likelihood 4278.003 4101.532 4065.482
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 99.753*** 176.47*** 36.05***
N 990 951 951 951 951
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 4377,756
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Europe, their acceptance of European integration, and their willingness
to support a single European foreign policy in the future. The relationship
between political extremism and Europeanness is, however, as the Beta values
also show, rather weak and unstable. Only in the case of economic elites’
attachment to Europe does the effect of political ideology ‘survive’ the signifi-
cance threshold after the inclusion of attitudinal variables in the models. We
Table 10.5. Multiple regression model for attitude towards unification––economic elites
Attitude towards unification (0 = against; 10 = in favour) economic
elites
















0.064 0.051 0.054 0.050
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.019 0.005 0.056 0.001
Catholic 0.051 0.059 0.027 0.044
Protestant 0.066 0.074 0.085 0.079
Other 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.018
Gender (Ref. cat.: male) 0.100* 0.086* 0.093* 0.087*
Age (mean centred) 0.012 0.025 0.014 0.017
Education 0.037 0.033 0.037 0.034
Contact frequency to EU
actors and institutions
(1 = no contacts last year;
5 = at least once a week)
0.021 0.009 0.028 0.015
Context variables
Duration of EU membership 0.011 0.010 0.023
Elite consensus 0.352*** 0.353*** 0.349***
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.046 0.070 0.067
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.062 0.061 0.065
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.104* 0.132** 0.112**
Has your country benefited
from EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.001 0.017 0.007
Constant/intercept 2.983* 2.003 6.751*** 5.796*** 1.837
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.094*** 0.138*** 0.170***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 15.2% 13.8% 1.7%
2Log-likelihood 2033.860 2009.286 1990.801
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 48.83*** 24.574*** 18.485***
N 519 493 493 493 493
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 2082,690
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attribute this instability (which is particularly reflected in the volatility of Beta
values after inclusion of attitudinal variables) to the problematic validity
of the left–right scale and to the heterogeneity of extremist political camps
regarding their Europeanness. The initial hypothesis holds, however, for eco-
nomic elites’ attachment to Europe, where we see a strong and stable effect
of political extremism, in that extremism diminishes their attachment to
Table 10.6. Multiple regression model for attitude towards a single foreign policy––political
elites
Attitude towards a single foreign policy (1 = against; 5 = in favour)
political elites
















0.074* 0.019 0.019 0.019
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.006 0.012 0.022 0.009
Catholic 0.044 0.022 0.007 0.018
Protestant 0.015 0.020 0.042 0.021
Other 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.009
Gender (ref. cat.: male) 0.020 0.030 0.013 0.025
Age (mean centred) 0.052 0.048 0.036 0.043
Education 0.080** 0.009 0.002 0.006
Contact frequency to EU
actors and institutions
(1 = no contacts last year;
5 = at least once a week)
0.010 0.018 0.016 0.017
Context variables
Duration of EU membership 0.051 0.048 0.048
Elite consensus 0.287*** 0.263*** 0.264***
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.024 0.024 0.023
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.072* 0.075* 0.077*
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.131*** 0.142*** 0.133***
Has your country benefited
from EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.274*** 0.272*** 0.273***
Constant/intercept 0.562 0.257 4.244*** 3.177*** 0.257
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.101*** 0.216*** 0.074*** 0.206*** 0.229***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 13.4% 11.5% 0.6%
2Log-likelihood 2915.464 2762.176 2732.959
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 76.212*** 153.288*** 29.217***
N 1031 993 993 993 993
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 2991,676
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Europe. We assume that this stability and consistency can be ascribed to the
fact that political extremism for economic elites means predominantly right-
wing extremism.
On the other hand we found none of the expected effects of religious belief
systems. Nevertheless, a weak but stable negative effect of Catholic affiliation
among political elites on their attitudes towards a deepening of European
Table 10.7. Multiple regression model for attitude towards a single foreign policy––
economic elites
Attitude towards a single foreign policy (1 = against; 5 = in favour)
economic elites
















0.110** 0.079 0.063 0.079
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)
Orthodox 0.081 0.082 0.108 0.081
Catholic 0.017 0.002 0.027 0.002
Protestant 0.031 0.004 0.043 0.004
Other 0.067 0.078 0.069 0.078
Gender (Ref. cat.: male) 0.037 0.008 0.007 0.007
Age (mean centred) 0.027 0.037 0.033 0.038
Education 0.062 0.058 0.059 0.058
Contact frequency to EU
actors and institutions
(1 = no contacts last year;
5 = at least once a week)
0.053 0.073 0.073 0.072
Context variables
Duration of EU membership 0.019 0.003 0.003
Elite consensus 0.304*** 0.263*** 0.262***
Elite–mass responsiveness 0.019 0.003 0.003
Attachment to own country
(1 = low; 4 = high)
0.070 0.074 0.070
Trust in European institutions
(0 = none; 10 = high)
0.123** 0.142*** 0.123**
Has your country benefited
from EU membership?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
0.031 0.030 0.031
Constant/Intercept 1.445 1.102 4.360*** 4.147*** 1.115
Adjusted R²/Maddala R² 0.093*** 0.102** 0.033 0.079*** 0.129***
Intra-class correlation (ICC) 13.5% 7.6% <0.01%
2Log-likelihood 1342.130 1318.113 1290.469
Log-likelihood-ratio testa 16.826*** 24.017*** 27.644***
N 525 496 496 496 496
Significance levels: *** sig. < 0.001; ** sig. < 0.01; * sig. < 0.05
a -2LL single level empty model = 1358,956
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integration suggests that Catholic politicians consider an integrated Europe as
a threat to their religious values rather than as an institutional frame for the
Christian occident. Conflicts with the Catholic Church over the enforcement
of equality laws, and the rejection of claims to include religious references in
the draft of the European constitution, may have reduced the enthusiasm of
devout Catholic politicians concerning European unification.
Hypotheses assuming that the Europeanness of elites is influenced by their
positioning in the social structure are either refuted, weakly supported, or work
in an unexpected direction. Surprisingly, the territorial scope of previous Euro-
pean experiences throughmigration for the purpose of studyhadno significant
impact at all and was therefore omitted from the models. Age has a significant
and positive impact on both economic and political elites’ attachment to
Europe, meaning that older elites show a stronger attachment to Europe. This
finding runs contrary to thedirectionof the age effect expected according to the
theory of cognitive mobilization. It seems that a wider range of historical
experience of older elites has a positive effect on their attachment to Europe.
The stereotype of young, cosmopolitan, and pro-European elites is, it seems,
exactly that. Significant effects for age, however, are only found in the attach-
ment to Europemodels and disappearwhenwe control for attitudinal variables.
The effect of gender is more stable but inconsistent in its direction: while,
as expected, female political elites show a stronger attachment to Europe
than their male colleagues, female economic elites tend to show a distinct



















Masses Economic Elites Political Elites
Figure 10.4. Country has benefited from EU membership (% benefited)
Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item ev2.
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aversion to a further deepening of European unification. We attribute this to
the potential threat posed by expanding Western companies to female-held
management positions in Central and East European (CEE) countries. This
interpretation conforms to other findings that the gender gap in EU support
can be predominantly attributed to the positioning of women in the labour
market (Nelson and Guth 2000). It is also compatible with our finding that
female politicians show stronger attachment to Europe than their male col-
leagues, because there is no international competition in legislative recruit-
ment markets (Best 2007).
The hypothesis that higher levels of education enhance elites’ Europeanness
is partly confirmed. Education has significant and (although fairly weak)
positive effects, however, only for political elites and only in relation to their
attachment to Europe and their support for a single European foreign policy.
The question remains openwhether thisfinding supports Inglehart’s cognitive
mobilization theory, because attachment was introduced here as an emotive
concept, whereas we see no effect of level of education on the cognitive facet of
Europeanness.
Stronger and more consistent support is given for the impact of network
capital. We find significant and positive effects of contacts to institutions and
authorities at EU level on political elites’ attachment to Europe and on their
support for integrationist positions. Although no significant impact of Euro-
pean contact capital on any of the indicators of Europeanness is found for
economic elites, results show that the involvement of national politicians in
institutional networks and arenas at the European level increases their support
for European integration and unification. The overall effect of European
contact capital is stable after controlling for attitudes and the impact of
national context; it is, however, rather weak.
The hypothesis that responsiveness to cues from reference groups and the
general population influences elites’ levels of Europeanness is strongly and
consistently confirmed with regard to cues coming from other elite groups. In
all three dimensions of Europeanness, and in all variants of the models, we
find orientation of members of the political elite influenced by the average
national level of Europeanness among economic elites and vice versa. The
consistency, strength, and symmetry of elite–elite responsiveness at the
national level is a strong indication of the existence of integrated elite systems
at that level, which are probably connected by intensive inner flows of com-
munication and by peer pressure, thereby rectifying orientation and beha-
viour. This interpretation is the most plausible explanation for the somewhat
bewildering finding that individual levels of Europeanness in one elite group
are heavily influenced by the aggregate levels of Europeanness in the other.
This suggests that systemic interconnection results in a mutual adaptation of
elements of Europeanness between elite groups.
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Cues from the masses are only significant for political elites and only in the
case of their attitude towards integration. This result conforms to our expecta-
tions and fits plausibly into a comprehensive model of interconnectedness. At
the national level, we find a ‘half-circle of responsiveness’ that connects
political elites and masses, and both elite groups reciprocally. This half-circle
of responsiveness absorbs other contextual or regional factors of elites’ and
masses’ Europeanness, such as the length of their country’s EU membership,
which has no significant effect in any of the six models due to suppressor
effects of elite–elite reciprocity and elite–masses responsiveness. If the average
levels of masses’ and elites’ Europeanness are removed from the models,
however, we see the expected positive effects of length of EU membership
on elites’ Europeanness. The most important realization emanating from
these findings is that we find here a structure of elite–elite and elite–masses’
relations that actually caves in and perpetuates national differences.
At this point of the analysis, and with corrected R2 varying between 0.14
and 0.07, the overall explanatory contribution of the independent variables is
rather low. The Europeanness of European elites is only weakly anchored in
their religious affiliations, political belief systems, and their locus in the social
structure. The strongest impact on Europeanness comes from significant
others, particularly from cues taken from fellow elites in other sectors and ––
to a lesser degree and only for political elites––from the population at large.
Structural-functionalist approaches are obviously only of limited value when
it comes to explaining European economic and political elites’ Europeanness.
This holds true, even if we include aggregate data about national contexts in
our analyses. However, a marked improvement of the explanatory power of
multiple regression models, more than doubling R2 values in the case of
political elites, is achieved when attitudinal variables are included. The
model with attachment to Europe now attains corr R2 = 0.29 for political elites
(after corr R2 = 0.12) and corr R2 = 0.17 (after corr R2 = 0.07) for economic
elites. However, the same effect cannot be seen for economic elites regarding
the other two dependent variables.
If we look at the impact of specific attitudes we can see that an attachment
to one’s own country has a significant effect in three out of the six models.
However, the original hypothesis is only confirmed for political elites’ accep-
tance of transferring authority for foreign policy to the EU level. Here we find a
weak but stable effect that results in a reduced agreement to such a transfer if
attachment to one’s own country is high. The next result came as a surprise:
attachment to one’s own country has a strong and consistent, but reverse
effect (to what was expected) on attachment to Europe. Both are positively
linked in both economic and political elites. In this case, in-group identifica-
tion is not a zero-sum phenomenon, but it is mutually reinforcing in multi-
level European settings. From these findings, we can refute the concept of a
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‘terminal community’, which claims there is a highest––typically national––
political unit to which people feel they owe allegiance (Deutsch 1966). On the
other hand, we do find support for the thesis that ‘European allegiance origi-
nates in national allegiance and that European integration depends on a
primary allegiance to the nation-state and a secondary or derived allegiance
to the EU’ (Van Kersbergen 2000: 19). There is, however, a caveat in that this
conclusion only holds true for the affective facet of Europeanness, whereas we
found no effect for the cognitive-evaluative side of the concept and a reverse
effect on its conative-projective dimension. Politicians, who are closely
attached to their own country, are reluctant to agree to a transfer of control
over foreign policy from national to European authority. This inconsistency
should warn us not to have too harmonistic ideas about the impact of multi-
level allegiances on the process of European integration.
The original hypothesis concerning the effect of elites’ trust in the European
commission is convincingly confirmed. This has the expected reinforcing
effect in all six models and is the most consistent of all three attitudinal
background variables. The belief in good (i.e. trustworthy) governance of
European institutions obviously reinforces European economic and political
elites’ Europeanness. This implies, however, that elites’ Europeanness is con-
ditional on their perception of the trustworthiness of European institutions,
which might become shaky ground with the fading of permissive consensus,
as discussed in Chapter 1. Similar problems may arise with the perceived
benefits to one’s own country of EU membership. This has the expected
reinforcing effect on political elites’ Europeanness in all three models, but in
none of the models for economic elites. It would be premature, however, to
conclude from this result that the Europeanness of economic elites is not
driven by perceptions regarding the benefits of their own country’s EU mem-
bership, because the non-relation can be easily explained by the extreme
skewness of the independent variable in the case of this group: only 2.5 per
cent of the economic elite respondents did not consider EUmembership to be
beneficial for their country, so that there is simply not enough variance in this
variable to add any explanatory power to the model. Perceived benefits of EU
membership are not only one of the strongest instances of pan-European elite
integration; they are also an important explanatory factor for elites’ Europe-
anness (see Figure 10.4).
10.4 The Impact of National Elites
One of the central issues addressed in this chapter and the focus of our
theoretical consideration is the thesis that European integration can be con-
ceptualized and interpreted as a process of elite integration, which involves
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national or domestic elites as the main actors in the building and operation of
European institutions. We have also suggested that this process should be
beyond normative and structural integration––i.e. the convergence of elites in
terms of their make-up and outlooks––and entail ‘systemic integration’, i.e. an
assimilation of the social and mental mechanisms that shape these elites.
Only when this precondition is fulfilled can we rightfully speak of ‘Eurelitism’
(see Chapter 1); when it is not, we should continue to treat national elites as
separate social groupings and avoid merging national samples into one Euro-
pean meta-sample. This problem can be approached technically in different
ways, such as, for example, by the introduction of national units as dummy
variables. A more appropriate approach, however, is to apply a multilevel
analysis that considers explicitly the ‘nested’ or multilevel structure of data
in specifying OLS-regression models. This raises the question of whether the
consideration of the multilevel structure of our data in the causal models
actually changes the fundamental patterns of variable relationships and
thereby the interpretation of the models. If this is the case, multilevel analysis
would mean treating national elites as unconnected collectivities and
dropping the concept of Eurelitism.
Results of log-likelihood ratio tests and intra-class correlations do indeed
show thatmultilevel modelling considering country as level specification does
significantly improve the fit of the six models. We have, therefore, to be aware
that we are dealing with aggregates of national elites. The other side of the
coin, however, is that the adaptation of a multilevel design does not dramati-
cally change the general pattern of OLS-regression analysis results. None of
the Beta values changes signs or significance levels. In addition, the improve-
ment of model fit achieved by multilevel modelling is modest, because
we have to take into consideration that a multilevel element had already
been introduced into our data when we included context variables like elite–
consensus and elite–masses responsiveness. The most dramatic change in the
models, and one that had a major impact on the signs and significances of
the Beta values, was the introduction of attitudinal variables, which also raised
R2 values to levels only slightly below those attained in the comprehensive
multilevel models. The conclusion is that our elite samples have a hybrid
character, in that they are displaying features indicating the effectiveness of
‘systemic integration’ at the European level, as well as the persistent signifi-
cance of national arenas. Overall, however, ‘systemic integration’ seems to
dominate. This is particularly the case among economic elites, where the need
to respond to national constituencies is missing.
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10.5 Conclusion
Our analyses of European political and economic elites’ attitudes towards
Europe have re- or rather deconstructed their Europeanness as a loosely cou-
pled configuration of emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and conative-projective
dimensions that are combined in nation-specific patterns (see Table 10.1; also
Chapters 2, 4, and 6). The generative logic behind these national patterns
shows that European integration and unification cannot be based on a
uniform pan-European consensus, or even on a general majority of strong
supporters with regard to any of the three dimensions of Europeanness. So far,
the Europe of elites is a rather ephemerons construct, being based on a wide
and sometimes contradictory diversity of value concerns, interests and assess-
ments. On the other hand, this variety ensures that Europhobia in all of the
three dimensions is a relatively rare configuration. The only case in our sample
of countries where there is a consistent pattern of Europhobic elite orienta-
tions is the UK, which acquires an outlier status in this respect. Overall, results
converge after all in the highly contradictory realization that the pan-Euro-
pean communality in European elites’ Europeanness results from its national
diversity.
A second fundamental result of our study is the ubiquity of an elites–masses
gap in terms of Europeanness. With very few exceptions, elites in general are
more Europhile than the general public in all territorial and substantial aspects
of our aggregate-level analyses, and economic elites in particular tend to
display higher levels of Europeanness than their political counterparts. The
elite–masses differential is particularly distinct with regard to the cognitive-
evaluative and the projective dimension of Europeanness, i.e. when it comes
to the question of whether it was right to have ceded national sovereignty to
European institutions and authorities andwhether this should be expanded in
the future. European citizens are less prepared than European elites to accept
such a cession now or in the future. We interpret the elite–masses gap as an
indication of conflict over citizens’ rights, in that European citizens are reluc-
tant to accept a Europe of elites where distant authorities cannot be sanc-
tioned at the ballot box, or at least to a lesser degree than national
governments, and only indirectly. It can be also shown that the general
population is more sceptical about the benefits of EU membership for their
countries than both elite groups.
Causal analyses of factors determining European political and economic
elites’ Europeanness have shown a highly diverse picture that converges,
however, in two main results: evidence for an impact of elites’ situs, status,
previous biographical experience, or religious affiliation is fragmented, con-
tradictory, weak, or non-existent. This means that earlier benefits received by
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some elite groups from policies of the European Union, generational change,
migration, and education, have no or only limited impact on European
elites’ Europeanness. Political ideology, however, generates a more consistent
impact: both radicals of the right and the left tend to be anti-European,
although probably for different reasons. Nevertheless, although relatively
consistent and statistically significant, the effect of political ideology is not
very strong and disappears almost completely after the inclusion of attitudinal
variables. Another, more consistent finding pointing in the direction of an
integrative effect of an involvement in multilevel governance is that partici-
pation in pan-European networks increases political elites’ Europeanness.
An influential explanans of European elites’ Europeanness is the average
national level of other elite groups’ Europeanness. We have interpreted this
result as an effect of mutual cue-taking and peer pressure between elite groups
at the national level. Together with the impact of the average national level of
Europeanness in the general population on political elites’ Europeanness, we
have here an indication of the existence of a half-circle of responsiveness which
links elites and masses at the national level. It is obvious that these links,
which operate at a national level, countervail the process of transforming
national elites into a fully integrated Eurelite.
The inclusion of the three attitudinal variables in the multiple regression
models confirmed the expected influence of ‘Trust in the European Commis-
sion’ and the perception of ‘Benefits of EU membership for one’s own
country’ in all three models, and for both elite groups. Trust in, and perceived
performance of, EUmultilevel governance strengthens attachment to Europe,
as well as increasing respondents’ acceptance of a stronger European integra-
tion and a transfer of foreign policy competences from the national to
the European level. In sum: the perception of good European governance
strengthens Europeanness and vice versa. The result for ‘Attachment to
one’s own country’ came as a surprise, contradicting our expectations: there
is no trade-off, but rather a strong convergence between emotive ties to the
national and European focus of identity, indicating a mutual reinforcement of
these ties. We also find that a strong attachment to one’s own country has no
negative impact on consent to further European integration and to a transfer
of authority from the national to the European level. Only in the case of the
acceptance of a single EU foreign policy, and even then only for political elites,
do we see the expected ‘trade-off’.
The task of integrating these findings into a comprehensive theory of
regional integration might be not as challenging as it first appears. If respon-
dents view European integration as being beneficial for their own country,
then there is no contradiction between an attachment to one’s own country
and an attachment to Europe, or the approval of deeper European unification.
If attitudes towards a deeper unification of Europe and a transfer of authority
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from the national to the European level depend mainly on the evaluation of
multilevel governance, wemay also turn to attitudinal data in order to explain
the elite–masses differential: elites have a much more positive opinion about
the success of European governance for their countries than the general
population. Whereas only 2 per cent of the respondents in the economic
elite samples and 6 per cent in the political elite samples say that their country
has on balance not benefited frommembership in the European Union, 27 per
cent of the general population samples agree with this statement. This leads to
the final conclusion that the process of European integration is not so much
driven by deeply rooted cognitive or normative concepts of national or
regional identities, or by the emergence of ever denser and wider networks
of transnational cooperation, as by the daily demonstration of goodmultilevel
governance. If this diagnosis is true and elites, like the general public, base
their Europeanness on the utility and trustworthiness of European institu-
tions, the foundations of European integration are much weaker than those of
consolidated national states, which can count on the solidarity and attach-
ment of their citizens, whatever the performance of their governments. The
European Union will have quite a long way to go before a majority of its
inhabitants, including its elites, proclaim: ‘My Europe, right or wrong!’, and
we can conclude that it is still based on the maxim which initiated the process
of integration: ‘S’unir ou périr!’
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11
Elites of Europe and the Europe of elites:
a conclusion
Heinrich Best
This volume enquires into the foundations of European integration by deter-
mining the Europeanness of its national political and economic elites. We
departed from the expectation that the process of European integration is
fostered by a normative and structural integration of its national elites, i.e.
by their common commitment to a unified Europe, and an increasing density
of their transnational social ties and communication links. We based this
assumption on the theoretical propositions of Higley’s and Burton’s work on
elite foundations of liberal democracy by transferring them to the process of
European integration. The basic idea here is that ‘elites usually have consider-
able leeway to activate or muffle non-elite interests or sentiments, at least for a
time, and non-elite populations are unable to achieve anything of importance
in politics without elite leadership and organization’ (Higley and Burton 2006:
4–5). According to this argument, the prerequisite for efficient leadership is
some level of coordination within leadership groups. In the case of European
integration, this is to be reached by a consensual process of elite accommoda-
tion, which in turn requires a strong cognitive and emotive basis, as well as
transnational networks and platforms of communication, in order to commit
national elites to European institution building and policy making.
In our initial concept of ‘Eurelitism’, elites have to prove their ‘true’ creden-
tials as Europeans to qualify for ‘joining the club’, i.e. for taking part in the
process of European integration and policy making. However, on the preced-
ing pages of this book, a more complex picture has emerged that strongly
supports the view of an elitist character of the process of European integration
on the one hand, while challenging the idea that European national elites
havemerged or are even in the process of merging into a coherent ‘Eurelite’ on
the other. The process of European integration is much more colourful and
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even contradictory than concepts of a straightforward normative and struc-
tural integration suggest. In particular, this process is deeply rooted in and
conditional on the social and political settings in national contexts.
The theme of multidimensionality and variety is set by Cotta and Russo
(Chapter 2), who start with the diagnosis that at the aggregate European level
there is ‘a rather solid backing to the process of European integration’ which
is particularly well founded in a ‘positive instrumental evaluation of the
EU’––meaning that economic and political elites agree almost unanimously
with the assessment that European integration is overall beneficial for the
national interest of their countries. There are also majorities of both economic
and political elites expressing feelings of attachment to Europe, trusting
European institutions, and favouring the process of European integration.
Pro-Europeanness is generally stronger among elites than among the general
population, and there is a sizeable minority of citizens who reject the idea that
European integration is beneficial for their countries (see Chapters 8 and 10).
While these findings support the concept of a ‘Europe of elites’, i.e. of a
European integration process based on and fostered by an elite consensus,
a closer look reveals that the different dimensions of Europeanness are only
moderately linked. As Cotta and Russo show, elites ‘display rather variable
combinations of positions depending on whether they are asked to express
their views on aspects that concern the nature of the European polity, its
institutional configuration, or different sets of policy goals’. The cognitive,
emotive, and conative dimensions of their Europeanness vary and are to
a large degree independent of each other. A factor analysis of political elites’
attitudes towards the European Union shows a multifactorial pattern which
indicates the conditional nature and––in some cases––even contradictory
character of elites’ Europeanness. This becomes evident in elites’ views about
European governance, where minoritarian federalist and majoritarian inter-
governmentalist positions coexist with views trying to accommodate the wish
for strong European institutions with a desire to maintain EU member states
as main political actors. The latter position, which is shared by approximately
a third of political and economic elites, internalizes the contradictory config-
uration of support for deeper European integration and the wish to preserve
the national turf.
The complexity inherent in national elites’ preferences on the Europeaniza-
tion of policy making and institution building is disentangled in the chapters
by Real-Dato et al. and Gaxie and Hubé (Chapters 4 and 6). The former show
that, with regard to the Europeanization of policy making, elites’ European-
ness has to be seen from a temporal perspective. In policy areas associated with
a long-term perspective, elites tend to be pro-European. The same applies to
what had been called ‘transnational’ policy issues, such as the environment,
immigration, and crime. These findings are compatible with a ‘functionalist’
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perspective, whereby political elites tend to allocate the competences for
certain policy areas at those levels of multilevel systems where the balance
between possible gains (e.g. in terms of mobilizing electoral support), and the
risks of failure (e.g. in terms of failing to satisfy electoral demands), is most
favourable for them. This explains why, in general, political elites prefer to
keep responsibility for redistributive policy areas, such as taxation, unemploy-
ment, and health care, at the national level. It also explains why economic
elites, who have fewer reasons to consider the power of states as resources
for empowerment, are in general more open to Europeanization than their
political counterparts. They tend to make exceptions, however, in the case of
policy areas that may threaten entrepreneurial freedom if fully coordinated at
European level, such as unemployment and social security. Gaxie and Hubé
confirm that, at the level of individual elites, Europeanness tends to be a
mixture of pro-European and Eurosceptic views. In fact, staunch federalists
and radical Eurosceptics are relatively rare specimens, and the vast majority
of elites can be found among the weak advocates and weak opponents of
European integration. In general, about a quarter of the elites in our samples
appear to be predominantly critical of the process of European integration,
while another quarter expresses only ‘lukewarm’ support, with small differ-
ences between economic and political elites. This leaves about half of the elites
in the role of more or less committed builders of a ‘Europe of Elites’. The main
dividing issues regarding the scope of European integration concern central
powers and jurisdictions of statehood like foreign policy, taxation, social
security, and defence. Very few elite members are prepared to transfer respon-
sibility for all these policy areas to the European level and to furnish the
European Union with the full set of the paraphernalia of statehood.
This observation connects with the findings of Hubé and Verzichelli
(Chapter 3) that nation states are (still) the primary foci of political elites’
career planning: only about one in five of the respondents among the politi-
cians envisage a political career at European level, although the vast majority
have at least one of the assets for an international career, such as foreign
language skills, the experience of living abroad, or a border-transcending
network of relatives and friends, at their disposal. The share of economic elites
envisaging a border-transcending career at the European level is significantly
higher than that found within political elites, but even among CEOs and top
managers of the greatest national companies, less than two in five consider
such a move. In the sense of a Europeanization of careers, European political
and economic elites have not merged into a ‘Eurelite’ and are still oriented
towards national polities and labour markets.
The expectation of an integrated ‘Eurelite’ is also challenged by the massive
differences among countries, and between both sectors of national elites, in all
dimensions of Europeanness (see Chapters 7 and 10). This is particularly true
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when we consider only answer categories indicating strong support or strong
rejection of related items, which show that elites are worlds apart when
it comes to assessing their Europeanness at country level. In the general
population the spread between countries is smaller, indicating that national
peculiarities find a stronger expression at elite level than at mass level (see
Chapter 10).
The patterns and determinants of regional diversity concerning attitudes
towards EU integration are explored in Chapter 7. These show that regional
variation of this key indicator of Europeanness needs to be explained by
a multitude of cultural, economic, institutional, and geographic variables,
whereby low per capita income, the prevalence of Protestants in the popula-
tion, the historical experience of separatism, and ethnic heterogeneity
significantly decrease political elites’ leaning towards further EU integration.
Remarkably, at the individual level the effect of Protestantism disappears. Here
we see instead the negative effect of Catholic membership on the attitude of
political elites towards further EU integration (see Chapter 10). These findings
suggest that in those countries where the integrity of the state was and is
endangered, where ‘national’ Protestant churches (as compared to suprana-
tional Catholic and Orthodox churches) prevail, and where the state has an
important role in acquiring and redistributing EU subventions, political elites
are reluctant to endorse further EU integration. These contextual factors
work at country level, whereas purely geographical factors, like being part
of Southern, Western, or Eastern Europe play a minor role. After controlling
for the other contextual variables, only Southern European political elites
show a significant pro-integrationist leaning. The endemic Euroscepticism in
post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries, which can be clearly
seen in the bivariate analyses, is reduced to statistical insignificance in the
multivariate model.
In view of strong national peculiarities at the elite level, European elites
consider the ideological expression of national distinctiveness, i.e. national-
ism, and economic and social differences between EU member states as the
greatest threats to a cohesive Europe. These two perceived threats are closely
followed by the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, i.e. another step
towards an increase of national heterogeneity within the institutional frame
of European integration (Chapter 5). We have here the paradoxical situation
that, as the main producers of European heterogeneity (given that differences
in Europeanness are generally smaller at non-elite level), European elites are
also particularly concerned about the consequences of that heterogeneity.
One of the strongest contextual factors of European political and economic
elites’ Europeanness is the level of Europeanness of the other elite group.
In other words, the individual members of one group adjust their support
for further European integration and attachment to Europe in response to the
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perceived average national level of support for integration and attachment of
the other elite group (Chapter 10). In this way, economic and political elites
become reference points for each other. Our finding of a strong responsiveness
between different sectors of national elites is a clear indication that national
elites form elite systems that are closely attuned concerning European matters
at the national level, which in turn consolidate overall differences in Europe-
anness between countries. Thus we can see a Europe of elites as a polyphonic
orchestra, trying to generate a harmonious sound out of a cacophony of
multitudinous national melodies.
The ways in which economic and political elites adjust their attitudes
concerning Europe at the national level could not be examined by our study.
Whether elites’ attitude-adjustment about Europeanness at the national level
is the result of direct interaction via peer pressure and cue-taking, or the result
of an exposure to similar experiences and influences in the institutional set-
tings of national states, or a combination of both mechanisms, cannot yet
be determined. We can be sure, however, that the same adjustment does not
exist with regard to elites’ responsiveness to non-elites’ attitudes concerning
Europe. Only in the case of political elites’ attitudes towards integration do we
see an effect of the national averages of non-elite positions on individual elites’
attitudes. This general finding highlights the fact that national political and
economic elites aremore in tunewith each other regarding Europeanness than
with the respective populations.
This observation does not, however, imply that elite and non-elite levels of
European politics operate independently of each other. As Müller, Jenny, and
Ecker (Chapter 8) show, the ‘notorious elites–masses gap’ varies in systematic
ways between policy areas that are potential candidates for Europeanization
as well as between countries. All these policy areas belong to the ‘conative’
dimension of Europeanness and refer to the actual and future attribution of
agency and sovereignty to national polities or to the level of European institu-
tions respectively. With regard to ‘more help for disadvantaged regions’ and
a ‘common foreign policy’, broad support was expressed by voters and politi-
cal and economic elites for transfer to the European level. Any differences
among these groups were generated more by the intensity of their support
than by conflicting views of the direction that European integration should
take. Müller et al. take it as a ‘good sign of the working of European democ-
racies that the policies already in place in the EU do not show any significant
divergence between the opinion of the voters and those of their political
representatives’.
Also according to Müller and colleagues, things look different regarding
steps towards ‘European integration that have not yet been taken’, such as
unifying social security systems, a common tax system, and the establishment
of a European army. Whereas elites are more pro-integrationist with regard to
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a European army, the general population is more pro-integrationist with
regard to unified tax and social security systems. These differences can be
best explained by elites’ empowerment strategies and popular aspirations to
favourable redistribution terms (Best 2011). Whereas pooling the power and
influence of European states by pursuing a common European defence system
may result in a collective increase in world influence and the pacification of an
area of traditional conflict and strain between European states, it is welfare
state and tax policies, and the associated redistribution of national wealth,
that form the most important battle fields for electoral competition and serve
as instruments for rallying mass support through material incentives. At
the level of non-elites, there seems to be hope in many European polities
that a common system of social security would mean an adjustment of state-
sponsored benefits to the highest European level and the creation of a pan-
European redistribution system that would involve transfers to the national
needy from the rich of the neighbouring states. It is obvious that elites,
particularly economic elites, are less enthusiastic about a version of a unified
Europe devoted to social protectionism and top-down redistribution.Whereas
such a process would mean elite disempowerment, the transfer of control over
the military means disempowerment of the general population. Wars, even
those that are justified, are unpopular among European populations. Giving
up national control over the military would mean giving up electoral control
over national defence policy and the politicians who are responsible for it.
Political parties play a pivotal role in the interaction between elites and non-
elites. This also applies, although to a lesser degree, to economic elites, who
can influence the make-up of party systems and the discourses initiated by
parties through financial sponsorship and media support. Hooghe and Marks’
(2008) concept of ‘constraining dissensus’, which diagnoses a conflictual
politicization of European issues, stresses the important role of party competi-
tion and agenda-setting by parties. Chapter 9 by Conti confirms that parties
are intermediaries in the process of European integration, at once shaping and
being shaped by public opinion. Conti’s analyses of party platforms show that
the EU is mainly represented in aspects of institutional functioning and policy
making, while symbolic elements of identities are less salient. Only in the new
member states is the topos of ‘European civilization’ and the need to defend
it against external threats more important. This discourse coexists somewhat
uneasily with a tendency to resist deeper integration, which in the new
member states also involves mainstream parties, particularly with respect to
policy delegation. In these countries, Europe is presented as a back-up and
safety provision for a national revival, while internationalism, even when
it takes the form of European integration, is somewhat discredited by the
previous enforced submission to the supranational order of the Soviet system.
In general, the positions of parties are guided by their ideological stance,
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whereby radical parties tend to be Eurosceptic or outright Europhobic and
parties of the centre-left and centre-right are more pro-European and pro-
integrationist. The other, highly important factor is government incumbency,
which infuses an element of European ‘realpolitik’ into party discourses.
Conti concludes, in accordance with other findings in this book, that the
‘overlap between the positions of party central office and those of the MPs
is . . . considerable to the point that one could argue that parties do not seem to
follow popular preferences on the EU issues; rather party elites seem to build
their own preferences in relative isolation from the masses’.
Conti’s results link up with many others in this book, which establish the
‘Europe of elites’ as a subject of analysis in its own right and only loosely
coupled with the ‘Europe of the masses’. Elites and general populations expect
different advantages and see different drawbacks associated with the process
of European integration. The decisive factor distinguishing between the posi-
tions of elites and non-elites towards a unified Europe is the empowerment or
loss of control that collective actors attribute to a transfer of national respon-
sibilities and authority to the European level. Here we see a wide elite–masses
differential. The main differential identified in our study exists, however,
within elites and distinguishes between national contexts and configurations
of elites’ Europeanness. The assumption that European integration is founded
on a broad nation-transcending elite consensus and focusing emotions,
cognitions, and conations of elites to the common goal of European unity
could not be confirmed. What we see is a patchwork of attitudes linking and
distancing national elites in very specific ways to and from the process of
European integration. We also see that the direction and salience of elites’
Europeanness is widely unconnected to their transnational social ties and
communication links. Only embeddedness in the institutional networks of
the European Union had some minor effect on political elites’ Europeanness
(Chapter 10). The one item that stands out as common ground for elite
consensus is approval of the statement that one’s country has benefited
from European integration. Here, instead of full normative integration, we
see varying configurations of a ‘Europe à la carte’ (Chapter 2) where different
aspects of Europeanness are combined in country-specific patterns. This leads
to a situation where very few elitemembers agree or disagree with all aspects of
Europeanness, and outright Europhobic or Europhilic positions are excep-
tional. Differences between political and economic elites also exist, although
both elite groups are closely linked by mutual responsiveness in all three
dimensions of Europeanness (emotive, cognitive, and conative). In sum, the
‘Europe of Elites’ is a multifarious and polycephalic entity, formed by mani-
fold national influences and shaped by differentials within and between
elite sectors, elites and non-elites, and––foremost––between national settings.
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This is no solid ground for a federal European Union, but European heteroge-
neity has generated the flexibility and versatility necessary for compromising
and balancing interests underlying its meandering course through the many
crises and challenges of recent European history towards deeper integration.
So far, it seems that European diversity was not a weakness but a strength.
However, to face a massive and actual threat to the very bases of European
wealth or security themultifarious and polycephalic structure of the Europe of
elites may prove to be too cumbersome and impotent. It might, therefore, be
replaced by a more hierarchical structure or even dissolve.
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Appendix.
Surveying elites: information on the
study design and field report of the
IntUne elite survey
György Lengyel and Stefan Jahr
In this chapter, we provide basic information about the sampling principles
and procedures, the structure of the questionnaire, and some experiences of
the fieldwork. This is followed by a breakdown of the key variables and ends
with a condensed version of the codebook.
12.1 Sample Design and Rules of Selection
The data underlying this book were obtained by a standardized survey ques-
tionnaire, conducted by the eighteen national research teams of the IntUne
project. For operational purposes, elites were defined as ‘groups of people who
are able personally to have a significant influence on nation-wide reproduc-
tion processes’. In this, the first of two waves1 of data collection, the target
population consisted of two groups of national elites: members of national
parliaments (MPs) and top business leaders (see Table 12.1).
To equalize variations in the size and composition of the survey population
withinandbetween the eighteen IntUneeliteprojectmember countries, a thresh-
old of eighty political and forty economic elite interviewswas specified, although
actualfinalnumbersdiddiffer slightly (seeFigure12.1). In total, 1411political and
730 economic elite members were interviewed. For political elites, the sample
design was proportional according to seniority, gender, age, party, and tenure
1 Only data from wave 1 is used in the chapters of this book.
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in parliament. It was also specified that the sample should include at least
fifteen experienced (frontbencher) politicians, such as former or present
ministers, state secretaries, and the president/vice president of the house,
of parliamentary groups, and of standing committees. The actual number of
politicians (mean = 78) varied between forty-six (United Kingdom) and
ninety-four (Spain).The average number of frontbencher politicians across
the eighteen countries was twenty-seven, with a range of twelve (Estonia) to
seventy-three (Lithuania) (see Table 12.2).
The economic elite samples were based on the ‘Top 500 firms’ lists of the
respective countries. From these lists, the largest enterprises, banks, and em-
ployers’ associations were selected according to a roll-down sample, sorted
in descending order by size of annual revenue or number of employees.Where
both data sources were available, preference was given to size of revenue.
Sampling started with the largest company and the selection of a top leader,
i.e. the president or chief executive officer (CEO), or their deputy. As a general
rule, only one top leader per company was interviewed. If the president or
the CEO was not available, the next person in the company’s hierarchy (vice
president, or deputy CEO, or equivalent) was selected for interview. Leaders in
lower positions were not eligible for interview. Besides top managers and
bankers, it was planned that between six and twelve leaders of the largest
business associations (i.e. leaders of industrialists’, employers’, bankers’, and
entrepreneurs’ organizations) should be included in the economic elite of
each country (see Table 12.3). Trade union leaders were not included.
Table 12.1. Elite sample design
Sectors Organizations Population and target sample
size
14-day reporting duties
Politics Parliament 80 members of the national
parliament, including 15–25
experienced MPs, e.g. (former)
ministers or junior ministers,
(vice)presidents of the house,




of target population, and
respondents should have









40 business leaders, e.g. (deputy)
presidents or CEOs representing
between 28 to 34 of the largesta
companies and major banks,
6-12 leaders of the main
business associations: one
leader per organization
Sampling procedure, the list of
contacted corporations,
banks, associations, the
number of target population,
and respondents had to
be given according to
sub-samples
Note: a According to annual revenue or number of employees.
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Figure 12.1. Sample size of political and economic elite by country (absolute numbers)
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Table 12.2. Political elites by country















1st term 2nd and
more
frontbencher backbencher
Austria 70 30 47 53 70 30 32 68 22 78 81 183
Belgium 68 32 54 46 67 33 48 52 21 79 80 150
Bulgaria 75 25 41 59 73 27 63 37 49 51 83 240
Czech Republic 77 23 51 49 51 49 36 64 36 64 80 200













Estonia 81 19 55 45 50 50 62 38 17 83 72 101
France 86 14 15 85 65 35 36 64 24 76 81 577
Germany 66 34 32 68 72 28 10 90 20 80 80 613
Greece 87 13 28 72 47 53 40 60 36 64 90 300
Hungary 90 10 40 60 59 41 28 72 48 52 80 386
Italy 79 21 35 65 56 44 48 52 21 79 84 630
Lithuania 81 19 41 59 43 57 41 59 91 9 80 141
Poland 82 18 64 36 50 50 65 35 40 60 80 460
Portugal 72 28 51 49 53 47 45 55 46 54 80 230
Serbia 75 25 67 33 60 40 54 46 44 56 80 250
Slovakia 79 21 42 58 44 56 53 47 56 44 80 150
Spain 60 40 37 63 49 51 51 49 26 74 94 350
United Kingdom 80 20 38 62 50 50 31 69 33 67 46 646
Total 76 24 43 57 57 43 44 56 37 63 1411 –
Notes: a Some of the data from Denmark are not available because the original research partner dropped out of the project and the survey was conducted by TNS Infratest, without such reporting
duties.
b At the time of the survey.
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The size of the economic elite sample overall varied between twenty-one
(United Kingdom) and fifty-five (Spain), and the sub-sample of business asso-
ciation leaders between zero (Greece) and twelve (Italy and Portugal). More
than a quarter of all interviewed economic elites held a leading position in the
manufacturing industry sector, with the secondmost represented group being
from the trade and services. Overall, according to economic sector, however,
the relative majority of the economic elite sample comprises respondents
from the tertiary sector (see Table 12.4).
12.2 Questionnaire
The original English questionnaire was translated into the various official
national languages by the national research teams. To identify translation
problems and to prevent translation losses, each national research team was
required to use a ‘four-eye’ translation process, i.e. an independent translation
by two people, and then, to ensure accuracy, a subsequent translation from
the national language questionnaire back into English. The translated ques-
tionnaires were pre-tested in each country, with the number of respondents
ranging from four (Italy) to thirteen (Estonia), mostly from the sample of
political elites.













Austria 0 22 0 2 9 2 0 35
Belgium 24 5 2 0 5 6 2 44
Bulgaria 8 22 1 5 5 4 0 45
Czech Republic 12 6 0 3 19 2 0 42
Denmark 1 17 5 8 3 3 3 40
Estonia 7 4 0 19 6 1 3 40
France 18 1 6 3 14 1 0 43
Germany 10 3 3 0 24 3 0 43
Greece 6 4 2 2 5 0 17 36
Hungary 11 4 3 12 12 0 0 42
Italy 8 10 2 2 20 0 0 42
Lithuania 13 18 1 2 6 0 0 40
Poland 21 0 6 2 4 9 0 42
Portugal 18 15 2 1 4 0 0 40
Serbia 17 12 2 6 3 0 0 40
Slovakia – – – – – – 40 40
Spain 18 6 9 3 17 1 1 55
United Kingdom – – – – – – 21 21
Total 192 149 44 70 156 32 87 730
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Table 12.4. Sector of companies’ activity by country (absolute numbers)










Austria 18 0 11 0 2 0 3 1 0 0 35
Belgium 22 1 4 0 3 2 0 5 7 0 44
Bulgaria 11 12 13 0 1 4 1 3 0 0 45
Czech Republic 13 4 9 0 5 1 3 4 3 0 42
Denmark 9 4 12 0 2 1 0 6 6 0 40
Estonia 13 1 12 0 1 0 0 6 4 3 40
France 8 10 7 0 0 3 3 10 2 0 43
Germany 16 2 6 0 3 3 1 9 3 0 43
Greece 2 6 10 1 0 0 0 0 2 15 36
Hungary 13 4 11 0 4 1 0 9 0 0 42
Italy 11 4 8 0 6 1 0 12 0 0 42
Lithuania 8 3 12 0 5 0 2 7 3 0 40
Poland 9 2 13 2 2 2 0 8 4 0 42
Portugal 3 4 15 0 3 1 0 12 2 0 40
Serbia 11 9 7 0 6 1 2 4 0 0 40
Slovakia – – – – – – – – – 40 40
Spain 17 5 6 0 10 0 0 11 3 3 55
United Kingdom – – – – – – – – – 21 21
Total 184 71 156 3 53 20 15 107 39 82 730
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Table 12.5. Interview method and fieldwork
Political elite Economic elite
Country Interview method Fieldwork period Number of
contacted
persons
Interview method Fieldwork period Number of
contacted
persons
Austria F2F March–September 108 CATI (89%) F2F (11%) May–June 197
Belgium Not available February–June Not available Not available February–June Not available
Bulgaria F2F February–May 92 F2F February–May 230
Czech Republic F2F (99%) CATI (1%) February–April 111 F2F (94%) CATI (6%) March–May 66
Denmark CATI February–May Not available CATI February–May Not available
Estonia F2F June–November Not available F2F (8%) CATI (92%) April–June 69
France F2F Oct. 2006–July 2007 577 F2F February–October 121
Germany CATI February–July 613 CATI February–July 287
Greece F2F February–May 120 F2F February–May 73
Hungary F2F February–May 107 F2F February–May 94
Italy F2F (6%) CATI (94%) February–June 456 F2F (5%) CATI (95%) February–June 187
Lithuania F2F March–May 188 F2F (89%) CATI (11%) February–June 324
Poland F2F March–May 93 F2F March–May 80
Portugal F2F (99%) CATI (1%) February–March 110 F2F (68%) CATI (32%) March–May 57
Serbia F2F (91%) CATI (8%) February–May 90 F2F (88%) CATI (12%) February–April 82
Slovakia F2F March–July 150 F2F March–May 82
Spain F2F (74%) CATI (26%) February–April 172 F2F (28%) CATI (72%) February–May 176
United Kingdom F2F (2%) CATI (98%) February–July 240 CATI March–July 90
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The final questionnaire consisted of ninety-four items to be responded to by
the political elites and ninety-nine items by economic elites. Both versions were
divided into four thematic sections. The first section contained items about the
respondent’s national and European identity; the second covered the intervie-
wee’s focus of representation; the third dealt with issues concerning the scope
of governance; and the fourth was devoted to the respondent’s socio-economic
background, education, and career, together with a battery of optional ques-
tions about influence. To allow for more detailed within- and between-country
analyses for the political elites, a set of supplementary technical and contextual
variables was added to the final statistical dataset.
Table 12.6. Age (absolute numbers)







Austria Political Elite 38 42 1 81
Economic Elite 16 16 3 35
Belgium Political Elite 36 31 13 80
Economic Elite 16 26 2 44
Bulgaria Political Elite 32 46 5 83
Economic Elite 31 12 2 45
Czech Republic Political Elite 41 39 0 80
Economic Elite 25 16 1 42
Denmark Political Elite 27 32 1 60
Economic Elite 20 20 0 40
Estonia Political Elite 39 32 1 72
Economic Elite 27 12 1 40
France Political Elite 12 69 0 81
Economic Elite 6 24 13 43
Germany Political Elite 26 54 0 80
Economic Elite 17 26 0 43
Greece Political Elite 25 65 0 90
Economic Elite 17 17 2 36
Hungary Political Elite 32 48 0 80
Economic Elite 14 27 1 42
Italy Political Elite 29 55 0 84
Economic Elite 20 21 1 42
Lithuania Political Elite 33 47 0 80
Economic Elite 26 14 0 40
Poland Political Elite 51 29 0 80
Economic Elite 21 21 0 42
Portugal Political Elite 41 39 0 80
Economic Elite 13 27 0 40
Serbia Political Elite 53 26 1 80
Economic Elite 25 15 0 40
Slovakia Political Elite 34 46 0 80
Economic Elite 22 17 1 40
Spain Political Elite 35 59 0 94
Economic Elite 13 41 1 55
United Kingdom Political Elite 17 28 1 46
Economic Elite 8 10 3 21
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12.3 Fieldwork
Sample design and data collection was coordinated by Heinrich Best (Jena),
Luca Verzichelli (Siena), and György Lengyel (Budapest). Technical assistance
and coordination of data collection was provided in Jena, Germany, first by
Andreas Hallermann (until 2008) and then by Stefan Jahr. For the sake of
standardization, interviewers were provided with a manual of guidelines for
implementing the survey, and were expected to report to the leaders of the
national teams every fortnight on the progress of the fieldwork. National
teams were expected to report the results, along with any problems, to Jena
with the same frequency.
Table 12.7. Gender (absolute numbers)
Country Elite type Male Female Missing
information
Total
Austria Political Elite 57 24 0 81
Economic Elite 33 2 0 35
Belgium Political Elite 54 26 0 80
Economic Elite 43 1 0 44
Bulgaria Political Elite 62 21 0 83
Economic Elite 30 15 0 45
Czech Republic Political Elite 61 18 1 80
Economic Elite 37 5 0 42
Denmark Political Elite 41 18 1 60
Economic Elite 39 1 0 40
Estonia Political Elite 58 14 0 72
Economic Elite 29 11 0 40
France Political Elite 70 11 0 81
Economic Elite 38 5 0 43
Germany Political Elite 53 27 0 80
Economic Elite 39 4 0 43
Greece Political Elite 78 12 0 90
Economic Elite 33 3 0 36
Hungary Political Elite 72 8 0 80
Economic Elite 38 4 0 42
Italy Political Elite 66 18 0 84
Economic Elite 39 3 0 42
Lithuania Political Elite 65 15 0 80
Economic Elite 34 6 0 40
Poland Political Elite 66 14 0 80
Economic Elite 36 6 0 42
Portugal Political Elite 58 22 0 80
Economic Elite 39 1 0 40
Serbia Political Elite 60 20 0 80
Economic Elite 38 2 0 40
Slovakia Political Elite 63 17 0 80
Economic Elite 36 4 0 40
Spain Political Elite 56 38 0 94
Economic Elite 53 2 0 55
United Kingdom Political Elite 37 9 0 46
Economic Elite 19 2 0 21
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Questionnaires were administered using Face to Face (F2F) or Computer
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) techniques (see Table 12.5) between
January and July of 2007, except in the case of France and Estonia. Due to the
presidential and parliamentary elections in France, whichwere held fromApril
to June of that year, the French political elite survey started in October 2006.
In Estonia, the survey was hampered by the parliamentary elections and
subsequent political turmoil between March and April of 2007. As a result,
public access to parliament was severely restricted for security reasons until the
10th ofMay. This meant that first contacts could not bemade before mid-May
2007 and that first interviews were not conducted until June.
Table 12.8. Birthplace in country or abroad (absolute numbers)
Country Elite type Country Abroad Missing
information
Total
Austria Political Elite 78 2 1 81
Economic Elite 26 7 2 35
Belgium Political Elite 73 6 1 80
Economic Elite 40 3 1 44
Bulgaria Political Elite 83 0 0 83
Economic Elite 43 2 0 45
Czech Republic Political Elite 79 1 0 80
Economic Elite 42 0 0 42
Denmark Political Elite 58 2 0 60
Economic Elite 39 1 0 40
Estonia Political Elite 70 2 0 72
Economic Elite 40 0 0 40
France Political Elite 75 5 1 81
Economic Elite 40 2 1 43
Germany Political Elite 80 0 0 80
Economic Elite 38 5 0 43
Greece Political Elite 90 0 0 90
Economic Elite 28 7 1 36
Hungary Political Elite 78 2 0 80
Economic Elite 39 3 0 42
Italy Political Elite 82 2 0 84
Economic Elite 39 3 0 42
Lithuania Political Elite 74 6 0 80
Economic Elite 37 3 0 40
Poland Political Elite 80 0 0 80
Economic Elite 40 2 0 42
Portugal Political Elite 74 6 0 80
Economic Elite 34 6 0 40
Serbia Political Elite 71 9 0 80
Economic Elite 25 15 0 40
Slovakia Political Elite 78 1 1 80
Economic Elite 33 7 0 40
Spain Political Elite 93 1 0 94
Economic Elite 52 3 0 55
United Kingdom Political Elite 43 3 0 46
Economic Elite 19 2 0 21
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The majority of the national interview teams established the first contacts
with the (political and economic elites) interviewees through a personal letter
from the research team leader. The letters were sent by regular mail between
one and two weeks in advance of the first telephone contact. Some national
research teams supported these letters with emails and faxes.
Due to the mixed use of face to face and telephone interviewing techniques,
the number of phone calls required was not documented systematically.
However, based on the data available for some countries, we can see that a
significant number of preparatory calls (estimated at between six and twelve
calls for each political interview, and between seven and seventeen for
economic elites), emails, and faxes were necessary to conclude an interview.
Table 12.9. Birthplace according to type of settlement (absolute numbers)











Austria Political Elite 18 34 9 18 2 81
Economic Elite 12 5 2 13 3 35
Belgium Political Elite 12 34 19 13 2 80
Economic Elite 5 17 14 6 2 44
Bulgaria Political Elite 16 24 27 16 0 83
Economic Elite 3 5 17 20 0 45
Czech Republic Political Elite 14 37 18 10 1 80
Economic Elite 8 13 8 13 0 42
Denmark Political Elite 24 14 10 9 3 60
Economic Elite 13 14 8 4 1 40
Estonia Political Elite 18 24 14 16 0 72
Economic Elite 5 10 7 17 1 40
France Political Elite 15 35 22 9 0 81
Economic Elite 3 12 11 9 8 43
Germany Political Elite 17 33 27 0 3 80
Economic Elite 8 9 19 1 6 43
Greece Political Elite 36 14 25 14 1 90
Economic Elite 4 3 6 17 6 36
Hungary Political Elite 10 32 12 24 2 80
Economic Elite 7 13 2 17 3 42
Italy Political Elite 32 32 14 4 2 84
Economic Elite 7 17 8 7 3 42
Lithuania Political Elite 32 16 15 11 6 80
Economic Elite 10 12 11 4 3 40
Poland Political Elite 9 41 25 5 0 80
Economic Elite 3 13 13 13 0 42
Portugal Political Elite 15 36 5 18 6 80
Economic Elite 3 6 5 20 6 40
Serbia Political Elite 11 35 16 18 0 80
Economic Elite 2 15 9 12 2 40
Slovakia Political Elite 18 37 13 9 3 80
Economic Elite 6 18 2 10 4 40
Spain Political Elite 22 32 27 12 1 94
Economic Elite 10 9 16 17 3 55
United Kingdom Political Elite 4 25 12 3 2 46
Economic Elite 2 8 6 4 1 21
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Table 12.10. Education (absolute numbers)
Highest education level


















Austria Political Elite 0 21 1 17 4 21 1 16 0 81
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 2 15 7 8 3 35
Belgium Political Elite 0 0 0 6 5 47 8 6 8 80
Economic Elite 0 0 0 1 1 21 13 6 2 44
Bulgaria Political Elite 0 0 0 0 1 1 67 14 0 83
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 0 2 37 6 0 45
Czech Republic Political Elite 0 0 1 8 4 2 52 13 0 80
Economic Elite 2 0 0 2 1 1 30 6 0 42
Denmark Political Elite 1 5 1 14 2 29 7 1 0 60
Economic Elite 0 1 0 3 1 23 8 4 0 40
Estonia Political Elite 0 0 0 1 3 48 14 6 0 72
Economic Elite 0 0 0 1 0 28 9 2 0 40
France Political Elite 0 3 0 5 0 28 19 24 2 81
Economic Elite 2 0 0 2 0 6 32 1 0 43
Germany Political Elite 0 7 0 6 1 0 54 11 1 80
Economic Elite 0 1 0 1 1 0 24 16 0 43
Greece Political Elite 0 0 1 0 2 58 14 15 0 90
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 0 8 21 7 0 36
Hungary Political Elite 0 0 0 5 2 13 53 7 0 80
Economic Elite 0 0 0 1 0 3 29 9 0 42
Italy Political Elite 0 0 1 14 0 3 58 7 1 84
Economic Elite 0 0 0 3 1 25 11 2 0 42
Lithuania Political Elite 0 0 0 1 0 53 8 18 0 80
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 0 33 3 4 0 40
Poland Political Elite 0 0 1 9 5 4 54 7 0 80
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 1 1 33 7 0 42
Portugal Political Elite 0 0 1 1 4 64 5 5 0 80
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Table 12.10. Continued
Highest education level


















Economic Elite 0 0 1 1 2 24 9 3 0 40
Serbia Political Elite 0 0 0 5 6 48 6 15 0 80
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 1 21 9 9 0 40
Slovakia Political Elite 0 0 0 4 0 18 33 25 0 80
Economic Elite 1 0 0 1 0 11 15 12 0 40
Spain Political Elite 0 0 0 3 6 55 15 14 1 94
Economic Elite 0 0 0 1 0 27 19 8 0 55
United Kingdom Political Elite 1 0 0 1 1 29 12 2 0 46
Economic Elite 0 0 0 0 0 12 8 0 1 21
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 

































































































































































































































































































Contacts with EU Identification Representation Scope of Governance Occupational and
Political Career
Social Background
Political Elites Economic Elites
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12.4 Distribution of Social Background Variables
Tables 12.6–12.10 contain basic information on the sample concerning age,
gender, birthplace, and education according to countries and type of elite.
12.5 Distribution of Non-Valid Answers
‘Missing information’, ‘do not know’, and ‘refused to answer’ were counted as
invalid answers. Questions about occupational and political career have the
highest overall share of non-valid answers in terms of sections. Figure 12.2
indicates a relatively low tendency of the interviewees to deny answers. The
most important topics in this respect were tax allocation, left–right self-allo-
cation, career ambitions, religious confession, education, and (in the case of
the political elite) the use of foreign media.
12.6 Codebook
12.6.1 Variables of Identity
Attachment : People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to
their region, to their country, and to Europe. What about you?
Variable Question/Statement Values
id01a Attachment to your town/village 1 Very attached
id01b Attachment to your region 2 Somewhat attached
id01c Attachment to your country 3 Not very attached
id01d Attachment to the European Union 4 Not at all attached
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
National identity : People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONAL). In your
view, how important is each of the following to be (NATIONAL)?
Variable Question/Statement Values
id09a To be a Christian 1 Very important
id09b To share (COUNTRY) cultural traditions 2 Somewhat important
id09c To be born in (COUNTRY) 3 Not very important
id09d To have (NATIONAL) parents 4 Not important at all
id09e To respect the (NATIONAL) laws and institutions 98 Don’'t know
id09f To feel (NATIONAL) 99 Refused
id09g To master the language(s) of the country
id09h To be a (COUNTRY) citizen
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12.6.2 Focus of Representation
European Identity : People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your
view, how important is each of the following to be a European?
Variable Question/Statement Values
id10a To be a Christian 1 Very important
id10b To share European cultural traditions 2 Somewhat important
id10c To be born in Europe 3 Not very important
id10d To have European parents 4 Not important at all
id10e To respect the European Union’s laws and institutions 98 Don’t know
id10f To feel European 99 Refused
id10g To master a European language
Threats for EU cohesion : Do you think that [Item] is/are a threat for the cohesion of
the EU?
Variable Question/Statement Values
id13a Immigration from non-EU countries 1 A big threat
id13b1 Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey 2 Quite a big threat
id13b2 Enlargement of the EU to include countries
other than Turkey
3 Not that big a threat
4 No threat at all




id13d The close relationships between some European
countries and the United States
id13e The effects of globalization on welfare countries
id13f Economic and social differences among member states
id13g The interference of Russia in European affairs
Variable Question/Statement Values
rp07_1 On a left–right scale where 0 means 0 Left
the left and 10 means the right, 10 Right
where would you place yourself? 98 Don’t know
99 Refused
rp07_2 Do you think of yourself primarily 1 Representative of your constituency
as . . . (Political Elites only) 2 Representative of your party
3 Representative of a particular social group
4 Representative of the citizens of your
country as a whole
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‘Subjective’ Representation––Trust in Institutions: Please tell me on a score of 0–10 how
much you personally trust each of the following EU/national institutions to usually take
the right decisions.
Variable Question/Statement Values










The European Council of Ministers
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
rp09_6 The Regional or local government (Economic Elites only)
Responsiveness : I am going to read a few statements on politics in (NATION) and in
Europe. Could you please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree with
each of them?
Variable Question/Statement Values
rp10_1 Those whomake decisions at the EU level do not





rp10_2 The interests of some member states carry to
much weight at the EU level?
4 Disagree strongly






rp08 Some say European unification should
be strengthened. Others say it already
has gone too far. What is your
opinion?
0 Unification has already gone too far
10 Unification should be strengthened
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
rp08_1a The member states ought to remain the




rp08_1b The European Commission ought to





rp08_1c The powers of the European Parliament
ought to be strengthened
1 National armies
2 European army
rp08_2 Some say that we should have a single
European Union army. Others say
every country should keep its own
national army. What is your opinion?
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12.6.3 Scope of Governance
Efficacy : There are different ways for national MPs to influence EU policy decisions.
How would you evaluate each of the following?
Variable Question/Statement Values
rp10_3a Via your national government 1 Agree strongly




rp10_3c Via a European party (Political Elites only) 4 Disagree strongly
rp10_3d Via European business organizations (Economic
Elites only)
5 Neither agree nor disagree
97 Filter: ECO/POL_Elites
rp10_3e Via the representations in Economic and Social
Committee (Economic Elites only)
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
rp10_3f Lobbying European institutions (Economic Elites
only)/Activating contacts with European
institutions (Political Elites only)
Variable Question/Statement Values
sg04 Which of the following two statements comes closer
to your view:
1 More competitive
2 Better social security
1. The main aim of the EU should be to make the





2. The main aim of the EU should be to provide
better social security for all its citizens
99 Refused
sg01_0a Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen




sg01_0b Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen
pays, how much should be allocated on the
national level?
sg01_0c Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen
pays, how much should be allocated on the
European level?
ev2 Taking everything into consideration, would you
say that (YOUR COUNTRY) has on balance
benefited or not from being a member of the
1 Has benefited
2 Has not benefited
98 Don’t know
European Union? 99 Refused
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Policy Competence Present : I am going to read out a list of policy areas. For each of them,
as of today, could you please tell me, on the basis of your judgement, whether they are
mainly dealt today at regional level, national level, or European Union level?
Variable Question/Statement Values













4 None of them
5 Regional and National
6 National and European




Policy Competence Preferred : How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal
with each of the following policy areas?
Variable Question/Statement Values
sg02_1 Fighting unemployment 1 Regional level
2 National level
sg02_2 Immigration policy 3 European Union level
4 None of them
5 Regional and National
sg02_3 Environment policy 6 National and European
7 Regional and European
sg02_4 Fight against crime 8 All three
sg02_5 Health care policy 98 Don’t know
sg02_6 Taxation 99 Refused
Character of EU in 10 years : Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years,





. . . a unified tax system for the European Union
. . . a common system of social security
. . . a single EU foreign policy towards outside countries
1 Strongly in favour
2 Somewhat in favour






sg03_4 . . .more help for EU regions in economic or social
difficulties
The Europe of Elites
260
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
12.6.4 Contacts to Foreign Countries
Variable Question/Statement Values
c01_1 Have you ever lived in another EU country? 1 Yes
2 No
3 Don’t know/Can’t say
c02_1pol/
c02_1eco
How frequently in your political/professional
activity were you in contact with actors and
institutions of the EU in the last year?
1 At least once a week
2 At least once a month
3 At least once every three months
c02_2pol/
c02_2eco
How frequently in your political/professional
activity were you in contact with actors and
institutions of other non-EU countries or
international organizations in the last year?
4 At least once a year




ev07 When you look at your private life, do you
have close relatives or friends living in or





ev08 How often do you use media from other than
your nation to inform yourself?
1 Every day
2 Once a the week








ev09b Have you had contacts in the last year with




ev09c Have you had contacts in the last year with
Parties of other EU countries?
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12.6.5 Occupational and Political Career
Variable Question/Statement Values
tenure MPs tenure––first-term MPs or experienced MPs 0 First term (beginner)
1 Reelected at least once
97 Filter: ECO_Elites
99 Refused
ev02a1 What kind of job did you have POLITICAL ELITE:
when you were elected to the parliament for
the first time/ECONOMIC ELITE: before you
got into the present position?
1 Top civil servant
2 Lower civil servant
3 Politician
4 Top leader of firms/banks
5 Leader, medium position

















ev02b How long (how many years) did you have that/









ev02dEco Did you work abroad? If yes, for how long?
(Years) (Economic Elites only)
96 Didn’t work abroad
97 Filter: POL_Elites
99 Refused
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Political Positions: Now we would like to ask you if you already had any political
positions (only POLITICAL ELITES: before your first parliamentary election)?
Variable Question/Statement Values
ev03a City or town councillor 1 Yes
ev03b Mayor or city executive 2 No
ev03c Provincial/regional member of assembly 98 Don’t know
ev03d Provincial/regional executive 99 Refused
ev03e Top governmental position
ev04aPol Party positions before first parliamentary








ev04bPol Have you or have you had a position in EU















ev04cEco Have you or have you had a position in a
multinational firm or association?
(Economic Elites only)
ev06 Are you considering pursuing a POLITICAL
ELITE: political/ECONOMIC ELITE:
professional career on a European level?
1 Yes
2 No
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Occupational Career of Economic Elites
Variable Question/Statement Values
b1Eco Position at company 1 President/Chair
2 General manager
3 Vice-President, Deputy






b2Eco Which year did you get your current position (4 digits)? 97 Filter: POL_Elites
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
b3Eco Your previous position was . . . (Company) 1 At this company




b4Eco Your previous position was . . . (Sector) 1 Same industry sector









b6Eco Companies’ revenue in 2006 (in euros) 97 Filter: POL_Elites
98 Don’t know
b7Eco Companies’ number of employees in 2006 97 Filter: POL_Elites
98 Don’t know
b8Eco Sector of activity of the company 1 Industry
2 Banking
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12.6.6 Optional Battery
12.6.7 Social Background
Influence on important issues of the country : People may differ according to their
influence on important issues of the country. Please mark on a scale from 0 to 100
how much influence the following persons have on important issues of [COUNTRY].
Variable Question/Statement Values
W1 Average citizen 0 No influence at all
W2 Experienced member of parliament 100 Absolutely great influence
W3 Unexperienced member of parliament
W4 Top manager of a great company
W5 Top manager of a great bank
W6 Leader of employer’s organization




Which language do you speak? Spoken European languages including
national and regional dialects
c01_3 Which language do you speak at home? 1 Yes
2 No
96 Native language



















97 No university degree
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
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Variable Question/Statement Values







ev01b_3 Have you had any study experience abroad?
Duration in years
96 No study experience abroad
Sex Gender 1 Male
2 Female










BYear Year of birth (4 digits, e.g. 1955) 9998 Don’t know
age Age 9999 Refused
Age_gr Age grouped: below 50 years and
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12.6.8 Technical and Contextual Variables
Variable Content Values























Elittype Political or economic elite? 1 Political Elite
2 Economic Elite
VADD101 Total number of seats in parliament 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD102 Number of seats each party
VADD103 Name of first tier
VADD106 Name of second tier
VADD109 Name of third tier
VADD104 Number of first tier electoral districts 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD107 Number of second tier electoral districts 9999 Not applicable
VADD110 Number of third tier electoral districts
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Variable Content Values
VADD105 Seat allocation method first tier 1 Single member plurality
2 Single member majority
VADD108 Seat allocation method second tier 3 Closed party list
4 Party list subject to changes
VADD111 Seat allocation method third tier 5 Party list with preference votes
6 Other
97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD112 Year when parliament was elected 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD113 Year of next regular election
VADD114 Year of EU membership 9999 Non-EU state
VADD01 MP belonging to government party 0 Yes
1 No
VADD02 MP frontbencher 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD03 MP tenure 0 Beginner, first term
1 Re-elected once
2 Re-elected twice




VADD04 Original party name––Acronym











12 Ethnic Minority, Regionalist, others
97 Filter: ECO_Elites








VADD07 Number of seats in MPs electoral district 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
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